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The following books by Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek are 
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PD: The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of 
Christianity 
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of Ideology 
V: Violence: Six Sideways Reflections  
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September 11 and Related Dates 
 
References to all other texts by Badiou and Žižek will be located 
in the footnotes. The same goes for any references to websites, 
which obviously will not include page numbers. 
 
 
  
 
  
Prelude: ‘Grace to Breathe That Void’ 
 
 
First last moment. Grant only 
enough remain to devour all. 
Moment by glutton moment. 
Sky earth the whole kit and 
boodle. Not another crumb of 
carrion left. Lick chops and 
basta. No. One moment more. 
One last. Grace to breathe that 
void. Know happiness. 
 Samuel Beckett 
 
 
All their many differences aside, one of the most intriguing 
messages of both Alain Badiou’s and Slavoj Žižek’s philosophy 
is that, although we live in a world in which our course is 
fundamentally determined by our biological constitution and 
social arrangements, it can nevertheless occasionally happen that 
we are given the chance to perform an act of genuine freedom; 
an act, to paraphrase Badiou, in which what we do might exceed 
what we are. Moreover, what Badiou and Žižek agree on, to put 
it simply, is that the extra-ordinary chance of such an act can 
emerge, not because it is given to us as a gift by someone or 
something, but precisely and only because there is literally 
nothing in which it can be grounded. Although their concord 
ends when it comes to the question of what exactly this nothing 
is, because, as philosophers have known at least since Hegel, 
nothing is not necessary non-existent, Badiou and Žižek 
nevertheless agree that since this chance of freedom arises out of 
nothing, as a consequence, it also has no guarantees, it is always 
unpredictable, incalculable, unmanageable. This is why we are 
never ‘home free’ in the realm of freedom. Rather, when it 
comes to freedom, doubt forever remains. Or, to paraphrase 
Samuel Beckett’s famous last lines in The Unnameable: Against 
the backdrop of the ‘silence’ of this nothing that grounds 
freedom ‘you don’t know’; so, you will have to decide: will I not 
go on or will I go on? 
This contingency, which follows from the fact that in the end 
nothing, nothing but a void, grounds our world, making it a 
world in which we do not merely exist, but are once in a while 
blessed with the chance of freedom, this is the grace that 
according to Badiou and Žižek characterizes a properly
Prelude 12 
 
materialist philosophy. Yet this grace is not some sort of 
miraculous redemption. The grace of materialism offers no 
instantaneous salvation; its ‘miracle’ consists ‘merely’ in the 
opening of a possibility, while leaving the full responsibility and 
the hard work of realizing, always anew, this possibility entirely 
up to ourselves. Thus, the wager of Badiou and Žižek is to argue 
that a genuine materialism must paradoxically contain an 
element of grace, it must allow for the chance that something can 
happen by virtue of which we might break with the established 
course of the world: an amorous encounter, a political 
revolution, a scientific invention or an artistic creation, to borrow 
Badiou’s vocabulary. At the same time, they maintain that such 
an instance of grace can only be conceptualized properly in 
materialist terms, that is, as an instance of pure inherent 
contingency detached from any idea of a determining 
transcendent Beyond. Accordingly, this is how the title of the 
present dissertation, The Grace of Materialism, should be read: 
in its double sense as referring both to the materialist element of 
chance implied in the theological notion of grace, and to the 
theological moment of grace offered to us in the contingent 
world of materialism. This wager on a gracious materialism in 
which ‘miracles happen’ might seem rather surprising 
considering Badiou’s and Žižek’s renowned ‘militant’ atheism. 
However, what is undoubtedly even more surprising is that both 
of them suggest that such a wager can find a significant source of 
inspiration at the very heart of Christian theology, or in Badiou’s 
more reserved case, in the margins of Paul’s epistles. How 
should we understand this suggestion? 
This is the issue we will be addressing. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
– Hermeneutical and Methodological Considerations 
 
 
There is no obligatory 
beginning in philosophy, 
philosophy does not 
begin with a beginning 
that would also be an 
origin. Philosophy jumps 
onto a moving train… 
 Louis Althusser 
 
How to Begin? 
As Gilles Deleuze notes on the opening pages of chapter three in 
Difference and Repetition, the delicate question of how or where 
to begin has been a recurrent problem in modern philosophy. 
One has only to think of Descartes’ Meditations or the preface to 
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. To be absolutely clear, it is by 
no means my intension here to take on this complex problem per 
se, or even to go into its detailed history. Nevertheless, it might 
be useful to sojourn on the subject just for a moment, if for no 
other reason than the banal fact that not only the philosopher, but 
anybody who attempts to set pen to paper is confronted with this 
at once trivial and crucial problem of beginning.  
In my particular case the question is quite obviously the 
following: How, or where, should one begin a Ph.D. 
dissertation? I would risk the assertion that a rather widespread 
answer to this question would be something like this: By 
introducing what your dissertation is about. That is to say, by 
introducing the ‘fundamental’ question or problem of the 
dissertation, or perhaps even its ‘core hypothesis’. So, in short, 
by posing the question: What is the specific problem of the 
dissertation? However, this question is itself loaded with another 
no less complicated question. That is, posing the question of 
what a specific problem is raises, as Deleuze illustrates perfectly 
well in Difference and Repetition, the question of what a 
problem as such is. In other words, it raises the problem of the 
definition of a problem, since this question of the definition of a 
problem as such implicitly conditions the question of what a 
specific problem is. So, what is a problem? 
The immediate and dominant understanding is undoubtedly 
that a problem is a ‘hindrance’, ‘obstacle’, ‘dilemma’ or maybe
Introduction 14 
 
 
even a ‘puzzle’, which are also some of the main lexical 
denotations of the Greek word ‘problema’ (πρόβλημα) from 
which the English word ‘problem’ originates. Yet, this 
‘immediate’ understanding is not merely a common sense 
understanding; it is in fact concordant with the general 
perception of what a problem is in large parts of philosophy. As 
is the case with any notion of anything, our notion of a problem 
is of course determinative in terms of how we relate to whatever 
it is that we consider a problem. Indeed, it has some quite 
specific consequences to pose a problem in terms of a 
‘hindrance’, ‘obstacle’ or ‘puzzle’. Deleuze (2004, 197) points to 
two such very important consequences. Namely that posing a 
problem in this manner will tend to make us believe, firstly, that 
problems are ready-mades, and secondly, that problems will 
disappear in the responses or solutions they are given. This line 
of thought furthermore implies that a problem always calls for or 
corresponds with a specific – ‘right’ or ‘true’ – solution. What is 
wrong with this?  
Well, according to Henri Bergson (2007, 36), who’s influence 
on Deleuze is well-known, if we perceive of problems in this 
way, in terms of ‘obstacles’ or ‘puzzles’ that need to be solved:  
 
One might as well assign to the philosopher the role and the attitude 
of a schoolboy, who seeks the solution persuaded that if he had the 
boldness to risk a glance at the master’s book, he would find it there, 
set down opposite the question.  
 
But, Bergson (2007, 36-37) also suggests an alternative 
understanding of what a problem could be: “[…] the truth is that 
in philosophy and even elsewhere it is a question of finding the 
problem and consequently of positing it, more than of solving 
it.” In this perspective a problem is not something we can begin 
with, but something we end up with. Or, as Deleuze (2004, 203) 
emphasizes: “A problem does not exist, apart from its solution.” 
We can only ever answer the question of what our problem is 
retroactively. Therefore, to begin on these terms is equal to 
beginning to answer a question whose content we cannot know 
until after we have answered it. In other words, we must begin, 
at least in practice, in another way than by posing questions like: 
What is the problem of the dissertation? Indeed, against the 
backdrop of this Bergsonian-Deleuzian conception of a problem, 
the fundamental concern of the dissertation would not be how to 
solve a specific problem, but rather the question of how can I 
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pose or create something that in the end hopefully will be the 
problem of the dissertation.  
 
The Basic Decision of the Dissertation 
However, the question remains: How to begin? In a sense, Alain 
Badiou’s major philosophical work Being and Event can be read 
as one long practical lesson in how to answer this question. And 
to cut a long story short, Badiou’s answer is: We begin with a 
decision. We always begin with a decision and proceed on the 
basis of a fidelity to this decision, patiently unfolding its 
consequences and possibilities. First we decide, and then we 
explore what this decision allows us to do. Although such an 
initiating decision evidently offers a kind of freedom, it also 
immediately introduces a constraint insofar that it determines our 
further course. Moreover, the course that a specific decision 
marks out for us is of course itself shaped by the particular 
context in which the decision is set. As all this implies, there is 
an element of risk involved in making a decision: Was it the 
right decision? Where will it take us? And not least, do we have 
the strength to stick to it? Thus, to begin by making a decision is, 
to borrow Althusser’s image, in a certain sense like ‘jumping 
onto a moving train’. So, with which decision will I begin? And 
what problems will it allow me to pose? 
During the last ten years or so there has been a rapidly 
growing interest in the work of Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek. 
This interest in Badiou’s and Žižek’s work is currently starting to 
make its way into the domain of theology.1 There is of course 
nothing new or surprising about this, given that theology has 
always throughout its history looked to philosophy for 
inspiration and assistance, and vice versa.2 One might even 
argue that systematic theology, understood as an explanatory and 
 
1 On Badiou see for example Bell (2007), Boer (2009), Caputo and Alcoff 
(2009), Depoortere (2009), Milbank (2005; 2007), Miller (2008), Reynhout 
(2008); on Žižek see for example Blanton (2004), Boer (2007), Caputo and 
Alcoff (2009), Crockett (2007), Depoortere (2007b), Kotsko (2006; 2008a; 
2008b; 2010), Milbank (2005; 2009; 2010), Pound (2008).  
2 Since its beginning, philosophy has had a close relationship to theology, 
and although this relationship has naturally undergone changes through 
time - even radical changes as in the encounter with Christianity, the 
transition from ‘philosophical theology’ to ‘philosophy of religion’, or with 
the birth of modern critique of religion - philosophy is still (some would 
perhaps say ‘again’) today deeply engaged in theological matters (see e.g. 
Greisch, 1998; Grondin, 2002). 
Introduction 16 
 
 
conceptual enterprise contrary to the narrative theologies of 
mythology, has its very origin in ancient Greek philosophy 
(Dalferth 2001, 19). But, if there nevertheless is something 
exceptional about the theological interest in precisely these two 
philosophers, who share a theoretical background in Althusser, 
Lacan and Hegel, and a political stance on the far left, who detest 
established academia, and who are engaged in an ongoing debate 
with each other, it is probably because of an unmistakable 
tension in both of their works. Thus, while continuously 
proclaiming their radical atheism and unreserved materialism, 
both Badiou and Žižek have also openly evinced a firm concern 
for theology or at least for certain theological matters.  
Now, this raises the obviously banal, but nevertheless urgent, 
question of how best to elucidate the precise ways in which these 
two philosophers could be of theological relevance. Which is of 
course also the question of what theological matters, more 
precisely, we are talking about. This question is, in short, my 
starting point. And the basic decision of the dissertation is to 
examine this question.  
 
The Main Themes of the Dissertation 
Against this backdrop the next step is to determine some 
guidelines for this examination. First of all: What are the main 
themes and notions around which the examination will revolve? 
I have already – in the prelude – indicated some of these themes, 
namely grace, materialism and freedom. Besides materialism and 
freedom, two other crucial philosophical notions or themes will 
be key focuses of the dissertation: truth and subjectivity. Truth, 
subjectivity and freedom, these themes, defining for the very 
configuration of modern philosophy, are at the heart of both 
Badiou’s and Žižek’s philosophical projects, composing a 
fulcrum in their common ambition to revitalize this configuration 
against contemporary prophecies of its end.  
The address of these overwhelming and complex themes are 
delimited by the specific context in which they appear in the 
dissertation; that is, they will not be the subject of a general 
exposition, which would be far beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. However, they nevertheless play a crucial part in the 
examination of the dissertation’s fundamental question, because 
in both Badiou’s and Žižek’s philosophy, truth, subjectivity, 
freedom, and materialism are in different ways related to major 
theological themes or notions such as grace, immortality and 
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incarnation. As hinted in the prelude, in their specific conception 
of freedom, both Badiou and Žižek, although in slightly different 
manners, resort to the notion of grace. Following in the footsteps 
of a long theological tradition, they do not conceive of freedom, 
which both associate with some sort of rupture with the ordinary 
state of things, as something which must be thought in 
opposition to grace, quite the contrary. The theological notion of 
grace is, as I have also already implied, furthermore employed 
by both Badiou and Žižek in their conception of materialism. 
The endeavour to reform our conception of materialism is an 
important issue for each of these philosophers, and particularly 
in Žižek’s case, this attempt to form a genuine materialism has 
also lately involved a recourse to other theological resources, 
primarily the theme of the death of God and the doctrine of 
incarnation. Besides, in the case of materialism, Badiou and 
Žižek also both engage with the theological tradition when it 
comes to their conception of truth. For both, truth is a matter, not 
of illumination or contemplation, but of intervention and fidelity, 
to use Badiou’s language, something both recognise in the 
thought of major theological figures such as Paul, Pascal and 
Kierkegaard.  Thus, for both of them, and particularly in 
Badiou’s case, subjectivity is inextricably bound to such a notion 
of truth. While Badiou moreover implies that his notion of the 
subject has a forerunner, the subject portrayed in Paul’s letters, 
Žižek draws explicit parallels between the notion of subjectivity 
that he develops against the backdrop of German Idealism, read 
through the lens of psychoanalysis and the notion of subjectivity, 
that can be identified in part of the theological tradition. Let me 
end this section with perhaps the most controversial theological 
theme employed by Badiou and Žižek. In another of their shared 
struggles, Badiou and Žižek have enlisted the at best apparently 
antiquated and at worst clearly dubious theological theme of 
immortality, claiming that we must insist, against what Badiou 
describes as the contemporary worship of finitude, on the 
immortality of the human subject.  
 
Questions of Method 
Concerning the questions of the method of the dissertation I will 
try to illustrate the essential feature of my basic approach to 
Badiou and Žižek via a detour through another – yet not entirely 
unrelated – methodological issue, namely the question of Žižek’s 
Introduction 18 
 
 
                                                
approach to theology.3 This detour is moreover meant to serve 
indirectly as an elementary clarification of the implied 
conception of the relationship between philosophy and theology 
of the dissertation.    
Žižek does not himself in any straightforward manner explain 
his ‘use’ of theology, and neither does he elaborate on this issue 
in more general terms by offering an explicit account of how he 
conceives of the relationship between philosophy and theology 
in his work. So, how should we approach this issue? I propose 
we begin with the question of Žižek’s conception of theology. 
On more than one occasion Žižek has suggested that we ought to 
understand theology in terms of what Freud called 
‘metapsychology’4 – perhaps most bluntly in an interview 
conducted in 2007 in which he delivers the following remark:  
 
Theology is another name for metapsychology, for something that is 
in Man more than Man, the inhuman core of Man etc. These are 
very precise terms. […] That is to say that God is not an old man 
sitting up there pulling the strings etc. God is just a name for this 
void, openness, this inhuman, more than human.5 
 
As Žižek (LA 37; FTKN 206-207; TTS 107-108; OB 95-97, 
104; PV 5, 118-119) stresses repeatedly, the Freudo-Lacanian 
name for this inhuman, more than human, excessive dimension 
in man, which he in the above quote associates with God, is the 
‘death drive’.6 This implicit connection between the 
 
3 In regard to the question of the relationship between theology and 
philosophy in Badiou’s work I will elaborate extensively on this issue in the 
two first chapters of the dissertation.  
4 In short, ‘metapsychology’ is the psychoanalytical equivalent to 
metaphysics. That is, as Jonhston (2005, 11) explains, in contrast to the 
studies in which Freud proceeds on the basis of empirical evidence obtained 
through the therapeutic practice of psychoanalysis, metapsychology deals 
with aspects of the psyche that cannot be evaluated on the basis of empirical 
evidence, but which make up the conditional possibility of the psychic 
experience postulated by analytic interpretation and its underlying models. 
5 Žižek, “Humanism is not enough.” 
6 Just a brief preliminary clarification: ‘death drive’, which is not a separate 
drive but an aspect of every drive (Evans 2010, 33), is, as Žižek (PF 112-
13; TTS 163-167; PV 62-67) stresses on several occasions, not to be 
understood as some sort of craving for self-annihilation nor as a parallel to 
the Heideggerian notion of ‘being-towards-death’; rather, the death drive is 
the reason why human being cannot be reduced to either (biological) life or 
death (finitude). I will discuss the notion of death drive thoroughly in 
chapter four. 
Introduction 19 
 
 
                                                
metapsychological notion of death drive and theology is made 
explicit by Žižek (PV 123) at the end of the second chapter in 
The Parallax View: “[…] is not the ‘theological’ dimension 
without which, for Benjamin, revolution cannot win, the very 
dimension of the excess of drive, of its ‘too-muchness’?” It is 
worth noting that the expression ‘too-muchness’, which Žižek 
uses here as synonym for (death) drive, was first coined by Eric 
L. Santner (2001, 8) in his book On the Psychotheology of 
Everyday Life: Reflection on Freud and Rosenzweig from 2001.7  
In this book, Santner (2001, 9) proposes a thesis which is quite 
close to what Žižek seems to have in mind, namely that: “[…] 
God is above all the name for the pressure to be alive to the 
world, to open [up] to the too much of pressure generated in 
large measure by the uncanny presence of my neighbour.” 
Another, further, indication pointing in the direction that Žižek 
(IR 9; PV 88) regards theology in terms of metapsychology is 
that he employs this name to designate the work of two major 
theological thinkers, Schelling and Kierkegaard.  
However, what is important in the present context, that is, in 
relation to the question of Žižek’s approach to theology, is that 
the fact that Žižek thinks of theology as ‘another name for 
metapsychology’ offers us a useful indication of how he might 
conceive the relationship between theology and philosophy in his 
work. Because, while Žižek does not say anything explicitly 
about this relationship, he does offer a very precise account of 
how he understands the relationship between psychoanalysis 
(including metapsychology) and philosophy.  
In his introduction to the anthology Cogito and the 
Unconscious, Žižek sketches two customary or standard 
approaches to the relationship between psychoanalysis and 
philosophy.8 On the one hand, an approach that focuses on the 
‘philosophical foundations of psychoanalysis’, emphasizing that 
psychoanalysis always relies on a series of conceptual 
presuppositions which illustrate that it is only possible within a 
certain philosophical horizon. And on the other hand, an 
approach in which psychoanalysis attempts to ‘psychoanalyze 
 
7 Let me just mention in passing that Santner’s (1997, 2001) work which 
contains several references to Žižek has left a distinctive mark on 
particularly Žižek’s discussion in On Belief and The Puppet and the Dwarf 
of the relationship between Judaism and Christianity. Žižek and Santner 
have moreover collaborated in the publication The Neighbour: The 
Inquiries in Political Theology (together with Kenneth Reinhard). 
8 Žižek, “Introduction: Cogito as a Shibboleth”, 1. 
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philosophy’ by discerning the pathological psychic motivations 
beneath fundamental philosophical attitudes. Whereas the second 
approach is ‘deservingly’ no longer taken seriously, we should, 
Žižek insists, equally reject the first approach. Because, as he 
notes: “What if psychoanalysis renders visible something that the 
modern philosophy of subjectivity accomplishes without 
knowing it, its own grounding gesture, which philosophy has to 
disavow if it is to assume its place within academic 
knowledge?”9  Subsequently Žižek elaborates this suggestion by 
explaining an alternative approach or method through which it 
might be possible to accomplish such a ‘rendering visible 
something that the modern philosophy of subjectivity 
accomplishes without knowing it’. More precisely, he proposes 
the following line of procedure: 
 
We are thus playing a double strategic game: this ex-timate kernel 
of philosophy is not directly accessible to the psychoanalysis 
conceived of as a branch of psychology or psychiatry––what we 
encounter at this level are, of course, the ‘naïve’ pre-philosophical 
theses. What one has to do, is to bring to light the philosophical 
implications of psychoanalysis, that is, to retranslate, to transpose 
psychoanalytic propositions back into philosophy, to ‘elevate them 
to the dignity of philosophical propositions’: in this way, one is able 
to discern the ex-timate philosophical kernel of psychoanalysis, 
since this transposition back into philosophy explodes the standard 
philosophical frame.10 
   
Now, what if we displace this approach into the context of the 
present dissertation, conceiving the relationship between 
philosophy and theology in a parallel manner; that is to say: 
What if the modern philosophy of subjectivity in the guise of 
Badiou and Žižek (in a similar way to psychoanalysis) ‘renders 
visible something that theology accomplishes without knowing 
it’? Could not the key-concern of this dissertation, that is, the 
 
9 Ibid., 1-2. 
10 Žižek, “Introction: Cogito as a Shibboleth”, 2. The term ‘ex-timate’ is 
Žižek’s anglicization of Lacan’s neologism ‘extimité’. As Evans (2010, 58-
59) explains, this term “[…] neatly expresses the way in which 
psychoanalysis problematises the opposition between inside and outside, 
between container and contained. For example, the real is just as much 
inside as outside, and the unconscious is not a purely interior psychic 
system, but an intersubjective structure (‘the unconscious is outside’). […] 
The structure of extimacy is perfectly expressed in the topology of the 
Torus and of the Möbius strip.”  
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attempt to elucidate the precise ways in which Badiou and Žižek 
are of theological relevance, be approached in a manner 
analogous to the one sketched by Žižek in the above quote? That 
is, bringing to light an unacknowledged accomplishment or 
potential of theology which is not immediately accessible to 
theology via a detour through the philosophies of Badiou and 
Žižek.  To paraphrase Žižek, the method or line of procedure 
through which such an insight might be realized would thus 
imply the following: ‘What one has to do, is to bring to light the 
theological implications of Badiou‘s and Žižek’s philosophy, 
that is, to transpose their philosophical propositions back into a 
theological framework; in this way, one is able to discern the ex-
timate theological potential of contemporary philosophy, since 
this transposition back into theology explodes the standard 
theological framework.’ In short, this is a line of procedure in 
which the relationship between philosophy and theology is 
conceived neither as absolutely separated nor as absolutely 
conflated, but rather in terms of the Lacanian notion of 
‘extimacy’, as a Möbius strip which at every point has two 
clearly distinguishable sides, but when the whole strip is 
traversed it becomes clear that they are in fact continuous.  
However, this moreover suggests, to elaborate on the image 
of the Möbius strip, that the point at which we have a true 
encounter between philosophy and theology is in a certain sense 
always a point of ‘missed encounter’. What I have in mind here 
is something along the lines of Alenka Zupančič (2008a, 14), 
who in a discussion of the relationship between philosophy and 
psychoanalysis in her book Why Psychoanalysis? – Three 
interventions argues that while the psychoanalytical notion of 
‘sexuality’ constitutes a singular point that philosophy cannot 
accept, it is nevertheless this very point that generates that which 
makes psychoanalysis truly interesting for philosophy. Thus, in a 
parallel way we could say that while the theological notions of 
for example ‘grace’ or ‘immortality’ constitute points that 
modern philosophy of subjectivity cannot accept, it is 
nevertheless these very points that generates that which makes 
theology truly interesting for modern philosophy of subjectivity. 
Let me conclude these methodological considerations with a 
brief remark on a few more practical issues concerning my 
approach to Badiou and Žižek. The method, in the narrow sense 
of the word, applied in the following consists in examining a 
number of issues related to the above-sketched themes on the 
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basis of a thorough reading of central texts from Badiou’s and 
Žižek’s oeuvres. Throughout these readings I will draw support 
from the extensive literature on Badiou and Žižek, occasionally 
also bringing ‘secondary’ philosophical and theological authors 
into the discussion. In the course of these examinations and 
discussions it is obviously necessary to introduce and clarify 
different central elements from Badiou’s and Žižek’s 
philosophical systems in greater detail. However, since the aim 
of this dissertation is not to provide a regular introduction to the 
philosophies of Badiou and Žižek, my presentation of such 
elements will be somewhat fragmented and always subordinated 
to the specific argument in which these elements appear. Thus, I 
will for instance at no point offer a full, systematic and 
consecutive introduction of Badiou’s ontology. Rather, I will 
provide – spread throughout all the chapters of the dissertation – 
detailed clarifications of a number of elements from this 
ontology whenever it is necessary for understanding the 
argument that I am developing at that particular point. 
 
The Architecture of the Dissertation  
The dissertation has five chapters. The first and second chapters 
have Badiou’s work as their primary focus, the third and the 
fourth chapters deal with both Badiou and Žižek, and the fifth 
chapter is dedicated exclusively to Žižek. These five chapters all 
aim at explicating the same question, yet they do not progress as 
one consistent argument in a ‘straight line’ from A to Z. Rather, 
the general idea is that every single chapter is supposed to 
constitute an individual part or study in itself, focusing on a 
particular matter and presenting a delimited argument, while 
nonetheless contributing to the elucidation of the main thesis of 
the dissertation, namely the question of the theological relevance 
of Badiou’s and Žižek’s philosophy. Although there is thus no 
strict argumentative progression between the separate chapters, 
all five chapters are nevertheless intertwined on several levels; 
first of all in terms of the overlapping nature of the singular 
themes that they examine, but also due to the implicit discussion 
between Badiou and Žižek of these themes.  
The first chapter examines Badiou’s reading of Paul as he 
presents it in his book Saint Paul – The Foundation of 
Universalism, placing it in the wider background of Badiou’s 
work as a whole. In short, the chapter presents a two-fold 
argument. Firstly, taking Badiou’s (SP 1) claim that he has 
‘never really connected Paul with religion’ as a starting point, it 
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is argued that Badiou’s book on Paul should not be read as part 
of the so-called ‘turn to religion’ in contemporary philosophy as 
it is occasionally suggested, but rather as a part of Badiou’s 
systematic attempt – against the contemporary prophesies of its 
end – to re-establish the autonomy of philosophy. Secondly, it is 
argued that viewed against the background of this context, 
Badiou’s interest in Paul is primarily of a philosophical nature; 
more precisely, this interest concerns the philosophical relevance 
of Paul’s theory of truth.  
In contrast to the first chapter, the second chapter of the 
dissertation focuses on the question of the role of religion in 
Badiou’s work. It is argued that Badiou’s engagement with 
religion is primarily of a polemical and critical character. More 
specifically, three different, but nevertheless closely interrelated, 
cases in which Badiou engages polemically with religion are 
identified and elucidated. Firstly, it is argued that Badiou’s 
persistent polemics against what he repeatedly refers to the 
‘motif of finitude’ in contemporary culture can be read in terms 
of a critique of religion, insofar as Badiou (NN 86) explicitly 
claims that “The obsession with ‘finitude’ is a remnant of the 
tyranny of the sacred.” Secondly, it is argued that this ‘critique 
of religion’, at least to a certain extent, should be linked to 
Badiou’s attempt re-establish the autonomy of philosophy. 
Thirdly, with Heidegger as the main example, it is argued that 
Badiou persistently applies terms such as ‘religious’, 
‘theological’, ‘pious’ and ‘sacral’, as a way to distance himself 
from or marginalize his philosophical rivals. Moreover, the 
discussion of Badiou’s notion of truth, commenced in the first 
chapter, is continued in this chapter in terms of a careful 
exposition of the specific definition of religion that Badiou 
founds on an absolute opposition between truth and meaning. 
After a kind of preliminary ‘clearing of the air’ in the two 
first chapters, the third chapter moves right into the centre of the 
theological debate, examining the chances of a fruitful dialogue 
between (dialectical) materialism and theology. Focusing 
particularly on Badiou’s and Žižek’s reading of the doctrines of 
incarnation and trinity, and with Hegel as the key theoretical 
reference, it argued that these readings are fully compatible with 
the conception of materialism that we find in their philosophies. 
However, as illustrated in a short return to Saint Paul , Badiou 
himself is reluctant to embrace such a reading, while Žižek 
explicitly indicates the compatibility of his conception of 
Introduction 
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materialism and his reading of Christianity. Against this 
backdrop it is moreover argued, along with Žižek, that due to his 
resistance to what he considers to be a too Hegelian, or indeed an 
all too theological, conception of dialectics, Badiou 
paradoxically risks nurturing a certain ‘idealist’ or even 
‘religious’ tendency in his own philosophy. 
The fourth chapter investigates how we should understand 
the numerous references to immortality made by both Badiou 
and Žižek, against the backdrop of their theories of the subject 
and with special focus on the issue of freedom. It is argued that 
both Badiou and Žižek associate immortality with something 
inhuman in man, something in which he exceeds his own nature, 
and that this inhuman, excessive dimension, which paradoxically 
is precisely what makes man human, is for both of them closely 
connected to the issue of freedom. Furthermore it is argued that 
both Badiou and Žižek see freedom as also involving, indeed 
even relying on, an element of contingency, or in theological 
terms, a moment of grace. It is furthermore discussed how both 
Badiou and Žižek relate the capability of immortality to the 
notion of the subject. The latter moreover associates immortality 
closely to the Freudian notion of ‘death drive’. It is illustrated 
how this notion is at the centre of an important discord between 
Badiou and Žižek, and indicates a theologically relevant 
difference between Badiou and Žižek on the issue of 
immortality. To put it simply: both Badiou and Žižek associate 
the death drive with religion, but Žižek does so in an 
appreciatory way, while Badiou associates the death drive with 
religion pejoratively by relating it to the theme of finitude. 
The fifth chapter elaborates on the issue of materialism, 
arguing that Žižek perceives the relationship between 
materialism and theology as a dialectical relationship, so that 
genuine materialism and Christian theology mutually presuppose 
each other. This argument is unfolded through a close reading of 
Žižek’s extensive engagement with the theological writing of G. 
K. Chesterton who constitutes one of Žižek’s most important 
theological inspirations. It is argued that Žižek’s reading of 
Chesterton constitutes a particularly good illustration of the 
dialectical relationship that he claims exists between theology 
and materialism because this reading follows a trajectory in 
Chesterton’s theological thought from an idealist to a proper 
materialist dialectic. 
  
                                                
Chapter 1 
 
The Truth of Paul According to Alain Badiou 
 
 
Lacan used to say that if no 
religion were true, Christianity, 
nevertheless, was the religion 
which came closest to the 
question of truth.  
                          Alain Badiou 
 
Introduction 
In 1997 Alain Badiou published a small book entitled Saint Paul 
- La fondation de l’universalisme.  This book – one of the first by 
Badiou to be translated into English – is among his best selling 
works, and has played a major role in the rapidly accelerating 
popularity he is currently experiencing, far beyond the borders of 
his native France. At the same time, Badiou’s book appeared to 
be the starting signal for an increasing interest in Paul, and in 
Christian theology more generally, among several other 
significant contemporary philosophers and critics.11 This 
interest, which in itself may well be remarkable, is certainly no 
less extraordinary given that the majority of these philosophers 
consider themselves Marxists or Atheists or, like Badiou himself, 
both. This mounting philosophical interest in Paul has also left 
its clear mark on the landscape of theology, as evidenced by a 
number of conferences and anthologies.12 
Perhaps due to this particular context, there exists a certain 
tendency in both philosophical and theological circles to read 
Badiou’s book on Paul as part of a larger ‘turn’ towards or
 
11 Giorgio Agamben (2000); Slavoj Žižek (2000); Michel Serres (2004); 
Jean-Luc Nancy (2005); Terry Eagleton (2009); Antonio Negri (2009a). 
12 E.g. the following conferences: “Saint Paul and Modernity” (UCLA 
2002), “St. Paul among the Philosophers” (Syracus University 2005), 
“Paul’s Journey into Philosophy” (Vancouver School of Theology 2008) 
and “Political Fidelity and the Philosophy of Alain Badiou” (University of 
Glasgow 2009). An anthology edited by D. Odell-Scott entitled Reading 
Romans with contemporary Philosophers and Theologians was published in 
2007 and a collection of texts edited by J. D. Caputo and L. M. Alcoff from 
the St. Paul among the Philosophers conference was released under the 
same title in 2009. 
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‘return’ of religion and theology in the field of philosophy.13 It is 
evident from the literature that deals with it that this turn or 
return is a complex phenomenon, encompassing aspects of very 
different philosophical traditions.14 However, it also expresses 
itself in a number of more general trends, which can be roughly 
categorised into three distinct but partially overlapping positions. 
Firstly, those who advocate a ‘post-metaphysical’ approximation 
of philosophy and theology (e.g. Jacques Derrida, John D. 
Caputo) based on the deconstruction of any absolute opposition 
between faith and knowledge, religion and reason. Secondly, 
those who speak in favour of a ‘post-secular’ society that 
recognizes and seeks to draw advantage from religion’s moral 
resources and potential for social mobilization (e.g. Jürgen 
Habermas, Charles Taylor), as a responds to the difficulties that 
a purely scientific and rationalistic approach seems to have in 
addressing many of the contemporary human problems. Thirdly, 
, those who explore new prospects in parts of the Christian 
theological tradition for revitalizing Marxist or anti-capitalist 
politics of emancipation (e.g. Slavoj Žižek, Giorgio Agamben), 
in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the celebration 
of the so-called ‘post-ideological’ age. Among the more general 
issues or themes that characterize this ‘turn’ are the three 
following: (i) A discussion of the relationship between 
philosophy and theology; (ii) a problematization of the 
dichotomy between the secular and the religious, and by 
extension, (iii) a renewed interest in the relationship between 
religion and politics.  
In this chapter I will not be presenting a detailed, systematic 
discussion of these different positions or an examination of the 
above issues that these positions seem to share. Rather, I simply 
want to argue that we risk arriving at a grave misunderstanding, 
not only of Badiou’s book on Paul, but also more generally of 
his position in relation to the above issues, if we read it in the 
 
13 See for example: Caputo (2009); Barker (2009); Benson (2009); 
Villamea (2008); Roberts (2008a; 2008b); Sigurdson (2007); Kaufman 
(2007). 
14 The theological and religious turn in philosophy has been discussed 
among other places in the following works: Niels Grønkjær (ed.) (1998) 
Return of God: Theological Perspectives in Contemporary Philosophy; 
Hent de Vries (1999) Philosophy and the Turn to Religion, Baltimore; 
Dominique Janicaud (2000) Phenomenology and the ‘Theological Turn’; 
Jayne Svenungsson (2007) Guds återkomst: en studie av gudsbegreppet 
inom postmodern filosofi. 
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context of and as part of this ‘turn’ towards religion. 
Furthermore, Badiou, who has written only very little explicitly 
on religious or theological matters, has himself voiced a few 
critical remarks on the reception of his work with regard to the 
issue of religion.15 I therefore propose that we commence our 
reading of Saint Paul by taking seriously Badiou’s (SP 1) 
statement on the very first page of the book, that: ”Basically, I 
have never really connected Paul with religion.” The central 
question I will examine in this chapter is therefore: If it is not 
religion that Badiou relates Paul to, then what is it? Or, in other 
words: What is it about the apostle Paul that interests the atheist 
philosopher Badiou?  
The exposition of this question will, as we shall see, also 
offer the opportunity to further clarify Badiou’s position in 
regard to the above issues concerning the relationship between 
philosophy and religion, and religion and politics. This does, 
however, necessitate a broader inclusion of the rest of Badiou’s 
oeuvre, so despite Saint Paul being the focal point of this 
chapter, what follows is not exactly a ‘study’ of that book as 
such. Nor is it my ambition to extract any ‘implicit’ theology 
hidden in Badiou’s book, or to evaluate Badiou’s contribution to 
the field of New Testament exegesis.16 Although Badiou 
certainly claims his philosophy (including his reception of Paul) 
to be of an irreligious and non-theological nature, this does not 
preclude it from theological interpretations, as he himself has 
stressed.17 But neither does it, in my opinion, entail that it cannot 
 
15 Badiou, “An Interview with Alain Badiou: Universal Truths and the 
Question of Religion”. 
16 For a reading that considers the relevance of Badiou’s book for New 
Testament Studies see Gignac, “Taubes, Badiou, Agamben: Contemporary 
Reception of Paul by Non-Christian Philosophers”, Barclay, “Paul and the 
Philosophers: Alain Badiou and the Event” and the volume St. Paul among 
the Philosophers edited by J.D. Caputo and L. M. Alcoff. More specifically, 
‘systematic theological’ receptions of Badiou can be found in Adam 
Miller’s Badiou, Marion and St Paul: Immanent Grace, Frederiek 
Depoortere’s Badiou and Theology and Kenneth Reynhout’s article “Alain 
Badiou: Hidden Theologian of the Void?”  
17 Badiou gives the following reason for this stance: “[…] the religious co-
opting of my work exists. It exists however, for profound reasons. It is not 
only the result of my reference to Paul. It exists because when your work 
concerns the relation between truth and the event you are necessarily 
exposed to a religious interpretation. You cannot avoid it. You are exposed 
because you are no longer confined to the strictly empirical or ontological 
field” (Badiou, “Universal truth and the Question of religion – an interview 
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be of any theological interest unless it is subjected to an 
explicitly theological interpretation. The aim in this chapter is 
rather to read Saint Paul with sound background in Badiou’s 
work as a whole, in order to clarify his broader philosophical 
errand with Paul; an errand which is certainly not without 
theological relevance. Philosophy, as we know, has always had a 
number of important problems in common with theology.18 The 
central problem in the following is, as we shall see, the question 
of how we should conceptualize truth.  
Thus this first chapter serves as a starting point for the 
succeeding parts of the dissertation in two ways: It tries to clarify 
Badiou’s precise interest in Paul through a contextualization of 
Saint Paul in relation to Badiou’s work as a whole, and in doing 
this, it also attempts to weed out the most obvious 
misunderstandings concerning Badiou’s stance toward theology 
and religion.  
 
Method and Truth 
Badiou has written extensively about key literary figures such as 
Arthur Rimbaud, Stéphane Mallarmé and Samuel Beckett, but 
unlike many of his contemporary equally literature-interested 
colleagues – such as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida – he 
has never been particularly preoccupied with the issues of 
philosophy of language. While Badiou, in his reading of 
canonical works of philosophy and literary classics, makes a 
great deal of deliberations about the method and stylistic features 
of the authors he examines, there are hardly any general 
hermeneutical or literary-theoretical reflections on his own 
method in his work.19 The book on Paul is no exception in this 
respect. If it is nevertheless worthwhile to make a few reflections 
on Badiou’s unspoken approach in this book, it is because the 
question of method anticipates in an instructive manner one of 
 
with Alain Badiou,” 40). This also suggests, contrary to what might seem 
most obvious, that the theological essence, if there is any, in Badiou’s work, 
should not be sought primarily in the book on Paul, but rather, and thus 
with more far-reaching consequences, at the very core of Badiou’s 
philosophical system.  
18 Indeed, Badiou (SP 5) understands his book as part of well-established 
trend in modern philosophy counting among others Hegel, Comte, 
Nietzsche, Freud and Heidegger, all of whom have written on Paul.   
19 On this issue of lack of methodological reflections in Badiou’s work, see 
Brassier and Toscano, “Postface: Aleatory Rationalism,” 260-264.  
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the issues that are at the core in the following, namely the 
question of the relationship between religion and philosophy.  
 
Formalization versus Hermeneutics 
In terms of considerations of his own approach in Saint Paul, 
Badiou (SP 1) restricts himself to state briefly in the prologue of 
the book that he does not read Paul’s letters as sacred texts, but 
instead reads them “[…] the way one returns to those old classic 
texts with which one is particularly familiar; their paths well 
worn, their details abolished, their power preserved.” With this 
description of Paul’s letter as ‘classical’ one might well think 
that what Badiou is advocating is a hermeneutic approach similar 
to, for instance Hans-Georg Gadamer (1993, 289-290), whose 
notion of the ‘classical’ refers precisely to the ‘lasting power’ of 
an artwork in the form of an, in principle, inexhaustible potential 
for further interpretation. That is certainly not the case. Badiou 
explicitly denies that his reading of Paul’s letters should be taken 
as hermeneutic. As he states very clearly, his business is not the 
revelation of a (hidden) meaning within the writings of Paul.20 In 
fact, the unspoken approach of Badiou, is best described as an 
antipode to hermeneutics.21 Badiou thus places himself within a 
broad philosophical and cultural trend in the 20th century, namely 
the persistent contrast between interpretation and formalization, 
content and form, history and structure (Hyldgaard 1998, 7).22 
One of the absolute summits of this confrontation between 
hermeneutics and formalism in 20th century philosophy took 
place in the sixties with the heyday of French structuralism. And 
Badiou is indeed deeply rooted in this tradition, not only due to 
the stimulation of Louis Althusser, who was his teacher at the 
Ecole Normale Supérieure, but also in terms of the lasting 
influence of Jacques Lacan’s continuation of Freudian 
psychoanalysis on his work. That being said, the most decisive 
influence on Badiou in this respect is no doubt his engagement 
with modern mathematics, which right from the beginning has 
 
20 Badiou, “Universal truth and the Question of religion – an interview with 
Alain Badiou,” 38. 
21 In Badiou’s often polemical account hermeneutics is not treated very 
justly, on the contrary, it obviously implies a degree of caricature. For a 
more nuanced account of the hermeneutical tradition and its relationship to 
(French) structuralism, to which Badiou in some respects belongs, see Paul 
Ricoeur (1998). 
22 Badiou (2005) has described aspects of this tendency, for example,  in the 
essay “The Adventure of French Philosophy.”  
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left – and continues to leave – significant marks on his 
philosophy.23 Although he does not use the term ‘formalization’ 
in Saint Paul, it seems none the less to be an obvious designation 
of Badious approach, not least in light of the fact that it is a 
recurring concept throughout his writings and a concept which 
he explicitly sets in contrast to hermeneutics.24 
Formalization, is in broad terms basically the process through 
which a relatively informal practice or way of thinking is given 
formal expression. In this respect the formalization of 
mathematics in axiomatic form, such as in Euclid's Elements, is 
of course paradigmatic. Badiou, however, also uses the word in a 
somewhat wider sense. For example, in his book The Century, in 
which he, in addition to the formalization of modern 
mathematics, also describes the new artistic (Avant-gardism) and 
political (Leninism) practices of the 20th century as the 
formalization of these areas. The important thing in this context 
is that, in contrast to a hermeneutic approach, formalization in 
Badiou’s terms is not a matter of interpretation or understanding, 
rather the exact opposite; it is a matter of the deterrence of 
interpretation. As Badiou (TC 162) underlines in The Century: 
”If the work must be interpreted, if it can be interpreted, it is 
because too mush particularity still survives within it, because it 
has failed to reach the pure transparency of the act, because it 
has bared its real.”25 It must be stressed that the ‘real’ here 
 
23 There is however a certain overlap between the two latter sources of 
inspiration, since Lacan (1998, 119), as it is well-know, announced that 
“Mathematical formalization is our goal, our ideal.” A phrase, that Badiou 
(C 207, 243; IF 89; TW 15) likes to quote. 
24 Initially it was specifically the formalization of mathematics that 
interested Badiou, a subject which he deals with in his first book Le 
Concept de modèle from 1969. However, the question of formalization, not 
only in mathematics, but also in art and politics, is a recurring theme in his 
authorship, and one that continues to be of importance, for instance in his 
considerations on the 20th century in the book The Century. Here he 
opposes formalization to hermeneutics in the following manner: ”The 
century has come to an end, we have to make its wager ours, the wager on 
the univocity of the real against the equivocity of semblance. To declare 
anew, and perhaps this time (who knows?) win, the war within thought 
which belonged to the century, but which already opposed Plato and 
Aristotle: the war of formalization against interpretation” (TC 164). For an 
extensive discussion of the term formalization and Badiou´s diverse use of 
it, please see: Badiou, ”The Concept of Model, Forty years later: An 
Interview with Alain Badiou.”  
25 This, of course, raises the question whether Badiou’s formalist approach 
is just a relapse into a kind of (naive) unmediated ‘intuition’. Against such 
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should not be taken in the sense of ‘reality’. On the contrary, 
Badiou (TC 64) opposes these two terms in such a way that 
’reality’, counter to the popular use of the word, assumes the 
nature of ideology, in the sense that: “It is reality [la réalité] that 
constitutes an obstacle to the uncovering of the real [le réel] as 
pure surface.”26 Reality implies, contrary to the pure surface of 
the real, a depth in so far that it is assumed to contain something, 
a content that begs to be represented and interpreted; in short 
begs for a hermeneutic. In contrast, Badiou (TC 109) propose 
that “[...] access to the real is secured through form [...].” 
Whereas hermeneutics always seeks to interpret content, the 
formalist approach will evacuate or ’subtract’ – and thus exclude 
the interpretation of – any content. Formalization thus invokes, 
through this indifference to content, a distance to reality, making 
it possible to break with its ideological representations and 
thereby encounter the real. However, it must be stressed that this 
is not a question of isolating form from content; formalization is 
not a representation of the real in terms of pure form. The real 
“[…] is not captured in form; it transits through form” (TC 154). 
 
an intuition the hermeneutic tradition interjects that interpretation is 
unavoidable; any reading is always already also an interpretation. I shall not 
delve into this question as it requires a more extensive discussion of 
Badiou’s ontology, where as the purpose here merely is to present Badiou’s 
approach in Saint Paul. 
26 Badiou’s use of the concept ‘the real’ is strongly inspired by Lacan. 
Badiou clarifies this inspiration in following way: ”What especially 
interested me about Lacan was his conception of the real. First, the 
distinction he makes between the real and reality, which is not the same as 
the classical metaphysical distinction between appearance and reality, or 
between phenomenon and noumenon. And in particular, this conception of 
the real as being, in a situation, in any given symbolic field, the point of 
impasse, or the point or impossibility, which precisely allows us to think the 
situation as a whole according to the real.” (Badiou, ”Politics and 
Philosophy – An interview with Alain Badiou,” 124). Thus the real is not 
reality, but rather that which simultaneously urges and escapes the 
representations of reality. While both Lacan and Badiou thus understand the 
real as an ‘impasse’, Badiou (TS 23) however argues, in contrast to Lacan, 
that the real, is not only a vanishing point, but that it can be given some 
form of consistence or passage through formalization: “If, as Lacan says, 
the real is the impasse of formalization [...], we must venture from this point 
that formalization is the impasse of the real.” On differences between Lacan 
and Badiou in regard to ‘the real’ see Žižek, “From Purification to 
Subtraction: Badiou and the Real,” 171-178; (cf. TTS 166-167). 
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Formalization is thus rather a way to participate in the real. An 
act through which the real passes and is encountered.27 
The reading, which Badiou presents in Saint Paul, can 
initially be described as formalization in the sense that what 
interests Badiou in the Pauline epistles is certainly not the 
content of these letters - in short the message of the death and 
resurrection of Christ. To Badiou this message is but an 
irrelevant fable. What interests Badiou is solely the formal 
structure of that which is stated. Or more precisely, the formal 
structure of the particular concept or theory of truth which he 
thinks is laid out in Paul’s letters. That the form, not content, is 
the focal point of Badiou’s reading of Paul, is highlighted in 
several places in the book, including on the very first pages 
where Badiou (SP 6) states that: 
  
It will be objected that, in the present case, for us ‘truth’ designates 
a mere fable. Granted, but what is important is the subjective gesture 
grasped in its founding power with respect to the generic conditions 
of universality. That the content of the fable must be abandoned 
leaves as its remainder the form of these conditions and, in 
particular, the ruin of every attempt to assign the discourse of truth 
to preconstituted historical aggregates.  
 
In his reading of Paul’s letters, first and foremost Romans and 
Galatians, Badiou includes a number of key concepts from his 
major work Being and Event to elucidate Paul’s conception of 
truth. Concepts such as ’event’, ‘evental site’, ‘situation’, ‘state 
of the situation’, ‘naming’, ‘intervention’, ‘forcing’ and 
‘fidelity’. Badiou develops this terminology throughout Being 
and Event to unfold a new and deeply original theory of truth 
and subject, which has modern mathematical set theory as its 
 
27 In Theory of the Subject published in 1982 Badiou (TS 23) emphasizes 
that: “We need a theory of the pass of the real, in the breach opened up by 
formalization. Here, the real is no longer only what can be lacking from his 
place, but what passes through by force” (Badiou’s italics). Badiou’s (BE 
391-430) theory of the subject, further elaborated in the 1988 volume of 
Being and Event, is just such a theory, in so far that he conceptualizes the 
subject precisely as the point of forcing through which that which in a given 
situation is impossible becomes possible in the form of a truth. Or in the 
words of Badiou (BE 429) himself: “The impasse of being […] is in truth 
the pass of the Subject.” In The Century Badiou also mentions two other 
approaches to the real besides ‘formalization’, namely ‘purification’ and 
‘subtraction’. For a discussion of these different approaches see Žižek, 
“From Purification to Subtraction: Badiou and the Real,” 178.   
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main source of inspiration and which, furthermore, can be 
expressed in the strictly formalist discourse of this discipline. 
Although it is not explicitly expressed in the book, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that the concept of truth which Badiou 
outlines in Paul’s letters, by describing its formal conditions 
through his own terminology, should be understood as a kind of 
formalization of Paul’s conception of truth. A conception of truth 
which does not revolve around interpretation and understanding, 
but which by way of Badiou’s conceptual apparatus is 
formalized as a process and an act or gesture. Which, as Badiou 
(BE 212) puts it in Being and Event, implies that: “[...] truth is 
not a matter of contemplation - or immobile knowledge - but of 
intervention.” Thus, it seems natural to ask whether Badiou also 
can be said to understand Paul’s own venture as a kind of 
formalization. I will return briefly to this issue at the end of this 
chapter. 
 
Intervention versus Interpretation 
When Badiou (MP 97-101; C 3-22; IT 39-57) rejects a 
hermeneutic reading of Paul, it should also be seen in the light of 
a more profound confrontation in Badiou’s work with the so-
called ’linguistic turn’, which he sees as a reflection of the 
historicist and relativist character of contemporary philosophy. 
He therefore tends to describe the latter as ‘sophistry’ rather than 
actual philosophy.28 Badiou (IT 43-47) sees contemporary 
philosophy as dominated by three orientations, a German 
hermeneutic orientation, an Anglo-American analytical 
orientation and a French post-modern orientation, which, despite 
their apparent differences, share the trait that they have 
abandoned one of the most basic concepts of philosophy, namely 
the concept of truth.29 This classical philosophical concept, 
Badiou argues, is firmly rejected today across the traditional 
 
28 This opposition to the ‘linguistic turn’ has been given more prominence 
in Badiou’s (TS 188) later work, but it can be detected as early as in Theory 
of the Subject. 
29 Badiou is not the only one to have registered this omission in 
contemporary philosophy of the theme of truth. In his 1982 lectures on The 
Hermeneutics of the Subject at Collège de France Michel Foucault (2005, 
189) makes the following interesting comment: “Let’s say that there have 
not been that many people who in the last years – I will say in the twentieth 
century – have posed the question of truth.[…] As far as I’m concerned, I 
see only two. I see only Heidegger and Lacan.” We might add not only 
Foucault himself, but also Badiou to this list.  
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philosophical divides in favour of an overriding focus on 
language.30 Or, as he puts it in his rather polemic diagnosis of 
the present in the first chapter of Saint Paul: “The progressive 
reduction of the question of truth (and hence, of thought) to a 
linguistic form […] [is] a point on which Anglophone analytical 
ideology and the hermeneutical tradition both concur […]” (SP 
6). Most contemporary philosophers will thus guard themselves 
against any notion of Truth, with its essentialist and totalitarian 
connotations, focusing instead more modestly on the diversity of 
historically specific ‘narratives’, ‘discourse rules’ and ‘language 
games’. This dismissal or dilution of the concept of truth in 
contemporary philosophy is in Badiou’s view expressed in 
several ways, however, in our context the main issue is the 
transformation that this concept undergoes with the 
hermeneutical tradition. 
In the 20th century, hermeneutics launched a devastating 
critique of the so-called ‘correspondence theoretical’ definition 
of truth, which has not only been predominant in the history of 
philosophy, but also widely presumed outside the philosophical 
sphere. The ‘correspondence theoretical’ conception of truth 
rests on the common presupposition that truth first of all is a 
matter of ‘correctness’. Truth is here construed as the accordance 
between an assertion and the matter that the assertion refers to, in 
other words, as ‘correspondence’ between language and reality. 
Hermeneutics replaces this ‘correspondence theoretical’ 
definition of truth with an understanding of truth as an event.31 
For instance, in the (early) works of Martin Heidegger, truth is 
understood as the event (Wahrheitsgeschehen) in which being is 
simultaneously revealed and veiled. Heidegger accentuates this 
ambiguous trait through his use of the ancient Greek word for 
truth, ἀλήθεια, which he translates as Unverborgenheit, i.e. ‘un-
concealment’. Since there will always be something veiled or 
 
30 According to Badiou the consequence of this is that philosophy is 
abandoned in its ’locus classicus’, in which the concept of truth is the 
fulcrum. This abandonment of classical or proper philosophy is clearly 
expressed in the announcement of ‘the end of metaphysics’, which in varied 
versions is put forth by all of these three philosophical orientations. In 
contrast the basic ambition of Being and Event and its sequel Logics of 
Worlds is on precisely show that (and how) philosophy is still - or rather - 
once again, possible. 
31 This is the case of two of the 20th century’s most important works of 
philosophical hermeneutics, namely Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time 
Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Truth and Method. 
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hidden in that which is revealed or manifest, truth always 
requires an explication or interpretation. As a result of this the 
question of truth is thus transformed to a question of meaning, 
and in Heidegger’s case more specifically, ‘die frage nach dem 
sinn von sein’. A meaning, which, by virtue of this structure of 
simultaneous disclosure and concealment, never can be 
determined once and for all, but is rather open to continual re-
interpretation. And so in this perspective any philosophy which 
continues to take as its task the question of truth must inevitably 
be some sort of hermeneutics.32  
While Badiou (IT 61, 85) wholeheartedly endorses the 
refutation presented by Heidegger, and in the hermeneutical 
tradition, of the correspondence theory of truth, and the 
epistemological paradigm upon which this theory rests, he just as 
determinately rejects hermeneutics’ linkage of truth and meaning 
as a decline of the concept of truth.33 He thus implicitly rejects 
hermeneutics as genuine philosophy. According to Badiou (C 
 
32 However, according to Heidegger, or at least in Badiou’s (MP 47-59) 
sketch in Manifesto for Philosophy of ’Heidegger viewed as commonplace’, 
it is not at all philosophy, suffering as it is from ‘a metaphysical 
forgetfulness of being’, but poetry, which is able to think being as a truth-
event. In Badiou’s view Heidegger thereby practically gives up on 
philosophy and reduces it to poetry.  
33 The relationship between Heidegger’s and Badiou’s concept of truth is 
not as straightforward as it might seem; it cannot be reduced to a question 
of either opposition or accordance. As it has been pointed out by several 
commentators there is obviously a number of immediate parallels between 
Heidegger and Badiou on the issue of truth: Both of them rejects the 
correspondence theory of truth, both of them contrasts truth and knowledge, 
both of them link truth to an event and they both relate the event and truth 
with concepts like ‘nothing’ and ‘the void’ (Hallward 2003, 19; Hyldgaard 
2003, 123-124). However, even though Badiou does not himself comment 
very extensively on Heidegger’s concept of truth (for one of his more 
thorough comments see IT 58-61), it is indisputable that he locates 
Heidegger in the hermeneutical tradition and explicitly links him to the 
notion of ‘meaning’. This matter thus calls for a more in depth inquire than 
possible in this context. However, we can perhaps in brief say that the main 
differences between Heidegger’s and Badiou’s concept of truth is, first, that 
while the latter understands truth as a ‘subtraction’ from being, to the 
former truth is always the truth of being. For Heidegger truth is, as Badiou 
(C 130) puts it, “[…] the very veiling of being in its withdrawal (retrait).” 
And second, whereas Heidegger identifies truth and event (as evident from 
his use of the word ‘Wahrheitsgeschehen’), in Badiou’s terms an event and 
the truth that occurs in its wake are two separate things, since the latter 
comes into existence only through the post-evental work of subtractive 
intervention and fidelity.     
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24) this linkage of truth and meaning is indeed rather the very 
definition of religion: “I propose to call ‘religion’ everything that 
presupposes that there is a continuity between truth and the 
circulation of meaning.”34 With its ‘revealed-hidden’ structure, 
the concept of meaning – in parallel with the Christian concept 
of revelation – is something which is simultaneously constitutive 
and evasive; sustaining an underlying inaccessibility, which, in 
Badiou’s mind, is incompatible with modernity’s declaration of 
the death of God, and in direct opposition to the 
demythologizing agenda of contemporary philosophy. 
Although religion is rarely subject to immediate consideration 
in Badiou’s work, it nevertheless – like ’sophism’ and 
’antiphilosophy’ – plays a certain part, namely that of a negative 
contrast, in his endeavour to (re)define philosophy. And so there 
is a rather unambiguous relationship of opposition between 
religion and hermeneutics on one side, and philosophy on the 
other. Or in Badiou’s (C 14) words: “Philosophy is distinct from 
religion because it breaks with hermeneutics.”35 Badiou’s issue 
with hermeneutics can therefore not be reduced to a matter of 
mere methodology. It is rather, with the concept of truth as its 
pivot, a matter of fundamentally colliding definitions of what 
philosophy (and religion) are. This is quite evident in the 
following passage from a text on Althusser’s conception of 
philosophy, which therefore deserves to be quoted in full length:  
 
Within philosophy itself, it [Althusser’s conception of philosophy] 
distances it from all hermeneutical conception of philosophy. This is 
an extremely precious heritage. The idea of philosophy as 
questioning and openness always paves the way, as we know, for 
the return of the religious. I use ‘religion’ here to describe the axiom 
according to which a truth is always a prisoner of the arcana of 
meaning and a matter for interpretation and exegesis. There is an 
Althusserian brutality to the concept of philosophy that recalls, in 
that respect, Nietzsche. Philosophy is affirmative and combative, 
and it is not a captive of the somewhat viscous delights of deferred 
interpretation. In terms of philosophy, Althusser maintains the 
presupposition of atheism, just as others, such as Lacan, maintain it 
in anti-philosophy. That presupposition can be expressed in just one 
 
34 This (rather wide) definition of religion is fairly consistent throughout 
Badiou’s (C 13-14, 24; D 38; B 57; TC 78-79; PP 67) (later) writings. 
35 The identification of religion and hermeneutics is furthermore affirmed, 
though in positive manner, inside the hermeneutical tradition itself by 
Gadamer (1993, 428). 
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sentence: truths have no meaning. It follows that philosophy is an 
act and not an interpretation (PP 67). 
 
Against this background, one can say that Badiou’s method can 
best be understood as a philosophical act in the sense that it takes 
the form of an intervention rather than an interpretation, but also 
in the sense that his formalist reading of Paul is part of a broader 
foray into the discussion (which as we have seen, indirectly 
touches on the question of religion) about what philosophy is. 
That is, into the discussion about whether philosophy is in fact at 
all possible any more. The book on Paul is thus very much a part 
of Badiou’s (SP 2) own particular agenda, and he concludes the 
prologue of Saint Paul by emphasizing that: “My intention, 
clearly, is neither historicizing nor exegetical. It is subjective 
through and through.” A clarification of what this subjective 
intention more precisely entails, and how it will be unfolded by 
Badiou, is the main objective of the rest of this chapter. Let us 
begin, however, by taking a brief detour via one of designations 
or titles that Badiou gives to Paul. 
 
Antiphilosophy 
In the very first pages of Saint Paul Badiou stresses, as I have 
already mentioned, that he does not relate Paul to religion. He 
does, however, use another remarkable term in his description of 
Paul’s letters, namely ‘antiphilosophy’. Though, Paul is far from 
the only one to whom Badiou attributes this term, which he 
apparently borrows from Jacques Lacan.36 Indeed, since the 
early 1990s, antiphilosophy has been a recurring theme in 
Badiou’s attempt to elucidate his conception of philosophy, and 
 
36 In an interview Badiou states that: ”Lacan declared himself to be an 
’antiphilosopher’. It is partly thanks to him that I began to ask myself, in a 
fairly systematic way, what might be declared antiphilosophical, what was 
it that characterized antiphilosophical thought, why certain kinds of thought 
constitute themselves as hostile to philosophy” (Badiou, ”Politics and 
Philosophy – An interview with Alain Badiou,” 124). Badiou also 
underlines that Lacan opened a new career for this word, which originally 
in the 18th century was used as a term for the enemies of the philosophers of 
the enlightenment (Badiou, ”The Caesura of Nihilism,” 1). Lacan used the 
word to define his own relation or non-relation to philosophy, and so it 
acquires a positive connotation in his use. As Bruno Bosteels (2008) shows 
in an outstanding article, the word attains a new meaning in Badiou’s work, 
which cannot be reduced to the meaning that Lacan gave to it.  
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is thus a relatively well-defined category in the late writings.37 It 
will therefore be worthwhile to look more closely at what Badiou 
means by antiphilosophy, how he uses the term in his attempt to 
separate philosophy from religion and what role the reading of 
Paul plays in this. 
If one reads the texts in which Badiou addresses the theme of 
antiphilosophy, it is possible to extrapolate a number of rather 
constant characteristics, which still – due to their manifold 
combinations – allow the group of thinkers that Badiou places 
under this heading, to appear as a fairly heterogeneous entity. In 
a rather long article on Wittgenstein’s antiphilosophy, Badiou 
outlines the following three characteristics or operations, which 
in his opinion have defined antiphilosophy ever since it began 
with Heraclitus. Firstly, antiphilosophy is characterized by a 
linguistic and genealogical critique of philosophy that dismantles 
its pretensions to truth and systematism. This aspect is also 
reflected in the interventionist character and fragmentary style of 
antiphilosophy. Second, antiphilosophy tries to lay bare what is 
left of philosophy, when deprived of its drapery and ornaments 
(e.g. Nietzsche’s detection of the figure of the reactive priest 
behind the lies about ‘truth’). Herein lays, as there does in the 
antiphilosophical critique of philosophy’s truth-pretensions, a 
desire to judge philosophy. Thirdly, in opposition to what 
antiphilosophy deems to be the abstract figment and theorization 
of philosophy, it invokes a non-philosophical or super-
philosophical, more honest and radically groundbreaking act 
(e.g. Nietzsche’s revaluation of values), through which the 
unutterable is attested. More precisely: “The antiphilosophical 
act consists in letting that which there is be manifested, insofar 
as ‘that which there is’ is precisely that which no true 
proposition can say.”38 A paradigmatic example is of course the 
 
37 During a four year period (1992-1996) Badiou dedicated his seminars to 
the systematic clarification of the antiphilosophy of four figures of this 
tradition: Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Lacan and Paul. This furthermore led to 
the publication of a number of texts which, to lesser or greater extent, deals 
with the antiphilosophy of these writers. Additionally there are a number of 
scattered remarks in Badiou’s work on antiphilosophy, also in relation to 
other thinkers such as Pascal, Rousseau and Kierkegaard. And in Saint Paul 
it is indeed first of all other antiphilosophers, predominantly Nietzsche and 
Pascal, but also Lacan, that Badiou brings Paul into discussion with. 
38 Badiou, “Silence, Solipsism, Sainthood: Wittgenstein’s Antiphilosophy,” 
7. I am quoting from Bruno Bosteel’s unpublished translation of Badiou’s 
article “silence, solipsisme, sainteté: l’antiphilosophie de Wittgenstein”, 
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revelation, or as in Pascal the miracle, as a testimony of God’s 
action. To these three characteristics one could add a fourth, 
namely antiphilosophy’s conception of the relationship between 
life and work as a guarantor of authenticity; contrary to 
philosophy’s claim that it, by referencing to a universal reason, 
speaks in the name of all: ”For an antiphilosopher, the 
enunciative position is obviously part of the statement’s 
protocol. No discourse can lay claim to truth if it does not 
contain an explicit answer to the question: Who speaks?” (SP 
17). This is expressed in the way the antiphilosopher includes his 
biography in his work, which thus often acquires confession-like 
character, as is the case with, for example, Rousseau’s 
Confessions, Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo, Kierkegaard’s Either/Or 
or Paul’s epistles (SP 17; LW 557).   
The identification of the traits of antiphilosophy are to be 
seen in relation to Badiou’s insistence, in opposition to the 
announcement of ‘the end of metaphysics’ in the 20th century, on 
the need to re-actualize philosophy as an independent discipline, 
with a subject matter that will not be reduced to Positivist 
epistemology, Marxist ideology critique, or Poststructuralist 
deconstruction. One of the most important and original moves in 
this attempt to retain the uniqueness of philosophy has been 
Badiou’s persistent assertion of the need to rethink three of 
philosophy’s most central, but also the most problematical, 
concepts. As he (MP 32) declares in his Manifesto for 
philosophy: 
 
I postulate not only that philosophy is possible today, but that this 
possibility does not take the form of a final stage. On the contrary, 
the crux of the matter is to know what the following means: taking 
one more step. A single step. A step within the modern 
configuration, the one that since Descartes has bound the three nodal 
concepts of being, truth and the subject to the conditions of 
philosophy. 
 
However, for Badiou, this endeavour to re-establish the 
independence of philosophy also involves an attempt to redefine 
the rivals of philosophy. Among these one finds, as hinted 
above, what Badiou considers to be the contemporary version of 
the sophists of the antique world. Taking his lead from Plato, 
 
which is forthcoming in Alain Badiou: What Is Antiphilosophy? Writings 
on Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, and Lacan (Edited, translated, and with an 
Introduction by Bruno Bosteels) at Duke University Press.  
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Badiou (C 3-25; MP 97-101) underlines the need, at the same 
time, to listen to these contemporary sophists, since their 
relativism holds a warning for philosophy – not to regress to any 
absolutism of truth, and to delineate oneself from their linguistic 
devaluation of the concept of truth, in order to attain a more 
lucid profile of philosophy itself. In addition to the sophists, but 
also partly overlapping with them, the main opponents of 
philosophy are the line of thinkers that Badiou groups under the 
term ‘antiphilosophy’. Despite the fact that ‘antiphilosophy’, as 
the word implies, is in opposition to philosophy, like ‘sophism’, 
the term does not have a purely negative meaning to Badiou (M 
49): “‘Antiphilosophy’ certainly does not offend me, since it 
represents the major determination, in my view, of works of the 
calibre of Pascal, Rousseau, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, 
Wittgenstein and Lacan.”39 As with the sophists, it may also be 
worthwhile for philosophy to listen to its anti-philosophical 
rivals, but as a means to restoring its own independence.40 The 
question is, however, in what does this independence consist? 
According to Badiou (BE 4; MP 37), philosophy is always 
conditioned by something outside itself. More explicitly, the 
conditions of philosophy are the events, which occur in the fields 
of science, art, politics and love, and it is its task to grasp and 
name the truths that are created within these four areas in the 
wake of such events.41 But Badiou also stresses the absolute 
necessity that philosophy keeps a certain distance from its 
conditions in order to avoid forming what he calls ‘sutures’ to 
these. Sutures are formed when philosophy either identifies itself 
completely with or surrenders its function to one or more of its 
conditions. In both those cases, philosophy is reduced to 
something else, be it science, aesthetics, political science or 
psychoanalysis. Philosophy is thus only philosophy if it manages 
to sustain a certain distance to its own conditions (MP 61-67). A 
similar ambiguity exists in philosophy’s relationship towards its 
rivals. In order to retain its independence, philosophy needs to 
maintain a balance in its relationships to sophism and 
 
39 Elsewhere Badiou states that: ”In the end, my theory is that philosophy 
should always think as closely as possible to antiphilosophy” (Badiou, 
”Politics and Philosophy – An interview with Alain Badiou,” 124). 
40 As Badiou (C 129) declares in Conditions: ”A contemporary philosopher, 
for me, is indeed someone who has the unfaltering courage to work through 
Lacan’s antiphilosophy.”  
41 See also chapter two in Conditions for a short and concise sketch of 
Badiou’s (C 23-25) conception of philosophy.    
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antiphilosophy, which, as mentioned, are not to be understood as 
being in absolute opposition to philosophy, but rather as 
something like internal tensions within the philosophical 
tradition. The relationship between philosophy and its rivals is 
moreover related to the question of the relationship between 
philosophy and its conditions in the sense that sophism and 
antiphilosophy have a tendency to privilege one of these 
conditions, thereby forming sutures. For instance, in the case of 
Wittgenstein, philosophy is turned into what Badiou describes as 
‘archi-aesthetics’, whereas Nietzsche’s antiphilosophy is 
characterized as ‘archi-politics’.42   
Another significant reason philosophy needs to retain a close 
relation to antiphilosophy is that, despite the fact that 
antiphilosophy includes certain religious traits (primarily the 
idea of a manifestation of the unutterable through a 
groundbreaking revelatory act), antiphilosophy constitutes a 
reminder to philosophy of its own religious tendencies, namely 
it’s tendency to reduce truth to a matter of opinion. This 
relationship between antiphilosophy and philosophy, which 
could be described as a relationship of ‘critique of religion’, is 
further complicated in Paul’s case. As Badiou makes clear 
throughout his discussion in Saint Paul of the two 
antiphilosophers, Paul and Pascal, Paul distinguishes himself by 
displaying a critical distance from the sort of religious 
inclinations of antiphilosophy which are reflected in in Pascal’s 
conception of the miracle as proof of truth. Badiou (SP 52) 
accentuates this element of critique of religion within Paul’s 
letters in the following manner: “[…] it cannot be denied that 
there is in him [Paul], and his is alone in this among the 
recognized apostles, an ethical dimension of antiobscrurantism. 
For Paul will not permit the Christian declaration to justify itself 
through the ineffable.” According to Badiou, Paul refuses to 
justify the Christian message (i.e. the event of resurrection) 
through anything, but his own subjective statement, that is, 
solely through the declaration of and fidelity to this event. He 
refrains from covering the weakness this entails with the tacit 
authority of the miracle, which in Badiou’s (SP 52; 98-99) 
perspective ultimately makes Paul more rational than Pascal. 
What is important in our context is that Badiou paradoxically 
consults Paul to produce a critical distance between the religious 
 
42 Badiou, “Silence, Solipsism, Sainthood: Wittgenstein’s Antiphilosophy,” 
7; Badiou, ”Who is Nietzsche?,” 4. 
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concept of the miracle, that Pascal advocates, and a concept of 
the event, which occupies a key position in Badiou’s own 
philosophical edifice. This manoeuvre by Badiou seems even 
more remarkable given that Badiou (BE 216) proposed the 
following about ten years earlier in the twenty-first meditation of 
Being and Event, entitled ‘Pascal’: “Let us say, without 
preceding any further, that the miracle––like Mallarmé’s 
chance––is the emblem of the pure event, as resource of truth.”43 
As proposed by one of Badiou’s commentators, this ambiguity 
testifies to a continuing attempt on Badiou’s behalf to balance 
his concept of the event between two extremes (Bosteels 2005a, 
247). On the one hand, a miraculous conception, in which the 
event assumes the character of absolute novelty, of creatio ex 
nihilo, that is, without any link to the situation in which it occurs. 
On the other hand, a conception in which the event is in fact not 
an event at all, because it is reduced to an inherent point in the 
situation, ultimately making it impossible to exceed the situation 
and therefore excluding the creation of something genuinely 
new.44 Thus, one is tempted to ask if not Badiou’s reading of the 
antiphilosopher Paul should be understood as part of this 
balancing act. An attempt, in a time which – with the 
 
43 In revised version of the text “L'événement comme trans-être” which 
originally appeared in Court Traité d'ontologie transitoire published just 
one year after Saint Paul, Badiou (TW 100-101) elaborates his dissociation 
from any parallel between the figure of the miracle and his own concept of 
the event in the following way: ”It is necessary to point out that as far as its 
material is concerned, the event is not a miracle. What I mean is that what 
composes an event is always extracted form the situation, always related 
back to a singular multiplicity, to its state, to the language connected to it, 
etc. In fact if we want to avoid lapsing into an obscurantist theory of 
creation ex nihilo, we must accept that an event is nothing but a part of a 
given situation, nothing but a fragment of being.” I will return to this 
problem of the status of the event and its exact relation to the situation 
(being) in which it takes place in chapter three. 
44 The following remark by Lacan (one of Badiou’s primary antagonists on 
this issue) addressed to one of the participants at a summit in the wake of 
the events of May 68 illustrates the logic of such a perception of the event: 
“If you had a little bit of patience, and if you wanted my impromptus to 
continue, I would tell you that the only chance of the revolutionary 
aspiration is always to lead to the discourse of the master” (quoted from 
Bosteels 2002, 174). About the same events, Badiou writes, moreover, in 
the introduction to Théorie de la contradiction 1975: “I admit without 
reticence that May ’68 has been for me, in the order of philosophy as well 
as in all the rest, an authentic road to Damascus” (quoted from Bosteels 
2002, 173). 
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revolutionary disasters of the 20th century fresh in mind – 
categorically rejects the possibility of any real novelty, to 
maintain precisely this possibility, as well as an attempt to 
harness the latent antiphilosophical or religious inclinations 
toward absolute inceptions in his own philosophy. It is ironic 
that while Badiou’s reading of Paul strives to detach Paul from 
his antiphilosophical basis by separating the form of his concept 
of truth from its mythological content, it appears that this reading 
of the antiphilosopher Paul also provides an opportunity for 
Badiou to distance himself from his own antiphilosophical 
tendencies.45 In summary, we can say that one of the ways 
Badiou believes philosophy can maintain both a balance in 
relation to sophism and antiphilosophy and a distance from its 
own religious tendencies is by exploiting its opponent’s virtues.  
It is, in my opinion, largely against the background of 
Badiou’s own agenda to re-establish philosophy that we should 
understand the above 'subjective' interest in Paul. In the next 
section I shall attempt to elaborate this in relation to the 
following three points. Firstly, Paul holds philosophy to a 
specific concept of truth, which Badiou believes to be defining 
for philosophy. Secondly, Paul hereby paradoxically shields 
philosophy from its own religious tendencies, namely the 
constant propensity to displace the question of truth to an issue 
of language or opinion. And thirdly, Paul represents at one and 
the same time a source of inspiration and a warning for 
philosophy in its relationship to politics. 
 
Badiou’s use of Paul 
One can of course approach the question of Badiou’s subjective 
interest in Paul in a more direct manner than through the above 
 
45 Now, to complicate matters even more, it should be mentioned that the 
very attempt by Badiou to relieve Paul of his antiphilosophical affinities, 
i.e. the religious content of his letters, can also be interpreted as an 
expression of Badiou’s own antiphilosophical tendencies grounded in his 
formalistic approach. This is, in any case, what is suggested by Bruno 
Bosteels: “I would argue that there is also something about the form itself – 
the form of the pure event – that is radically antiphilosophical, as Badiou 
himself shows more clearly in the case of Nietzsche and Wittgenstein” 
(Bosteels 2008, 179-180). Roland Boer (2009: 179) has raised a similar 
concern: Badiou’s ‘purification’ of the form from its content may well 
come under the suspicion of what Adorno has critically termed ‘secularised 
theology’ (on Adorno’s critique of ‘secularised theology’ see Boer 2007: 
422-430). 
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detour of antiphilosophy, namely by asking: How or in what 
ways does Badiou more precisely utilize Paul for his own 
purposes in his book? I think it is possible to identify (at least) 
three different concerns or operations: Literary exemplification, 
Philosophical intervention and Political inspiration. Let’s deal 
with them one by one.  
 
Literary Exemplification 
In Saint Paul, Badiou proceeds by introducing a number of key 
terms from Being and Event into his reading of Paul’s letters, 
thus making them appear in a very distinct way.46 This is 
obviously a mutual process. And so it is no surprise that Saint 
Paul is widely used as an explication of central parts of Badiou’s 
philosophy, originally developed in the far more demanding 
pages of Being and Event.47 However, this raises the question of 
whether Badiou’s reading of Paul should basically also be read 
as an illustration, and in that case, as an illustration of what. The 
most obvious suggestion would be to read the book on Paul as 
Badiou’s exemplification of what he calls a ‘truth-procedure’. 
Indeed, this is a suggestion that has been implied by a number of 
Badiou’s interpreters (e.g. Žižek TTS 141-143; Lecercle 1999, 
11; Critchley 2000, 21). Now, the question is of course whether 
this is a justifiable exemplification or not. In my opinion, the 
answer is both yes and no. But before I explain this ambiguity, 
let me briefly  recapitulate what Badiou understands by a ‘truth-
procedure’ by briefly paraphrasing Badiou’s detailed 
presentation of this matter in Being and Event (parts IV-VIII).48  
According to Badiou, a truth always occurs in the wake of an 
event, an unexpected incident, which is the precondition if 
 
46 From a traditional exegetical point of view this is of course a completely 
anachronistic and thus deeply problematic approach. But as I have already 
implied Badiou is not particularly concerned by such hermeneutical or (as 
he would more likely term them) ‘historicist’ considerations. 
47 In their introduction to the translation of a collection of Badiou’s texts on 
Samuel Beckett, Alberto Toscano and Nina Power (2003, xii) argues that 
“[…] Badiou’s writings on Beckett function to some extent as occasions for 
the rehearsal or mise-en-scène of principal components of his philosophy 
[…].” I suggest that Badiou’s reading of Paul can be understood in 
somewhat similar terms, that is, as a ‘staging’ of certain elements of 
Badiou’s philosophy.   
48 Badiou (E 40-44; IT 58-68) himself presents a short usefully paraphrase 
of this matter among other places in Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding 
of Evil and in the collection of lectures and essays entitled Infinite Thought: 
Truth and the Return of Philosophy.  
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anything truly new is to arise in a given situation. The new that 
comes into existence in the wake of an event is a truth. The truth 
is not something that is attained through contemplation or in 
terms of knowledge; on the contrary, a truth arises through a 
break with the established knowledge of the situation, enabled by 
the event’s interruption of the situation, and it persists only by 
commitment to this evental break. Thus a truth, from Badiou’s 
perspective, is to be perceived along the lines of the logic of 
‘holding something true’ or ‘being true to something’, such as a 
cause or a person. In this sense, the truth is a process which is 
constituted and sustained only in the course of the individuals 
who through their intervention in a given situation, declare, 
name and maintain a continued fidelity to an event, and whom 
Badiou therefore describes as the ‘subject’ for this event. In 
other words, a ‘truth-procedure’ is the operation and the process 
through which the continuation of an event, in either the field of 
science, art, politics or love, produces a truth and a subject of 
this truth.49 In short, it is the organization of the consequences of 
an event.  
At first glance it seems quite reasonable to view Badiou’s 
account of Paul as a concrete exemplification of such a ‘truth-
procedure’: Following the resurrection of Christ, Paul declares 
and names this as an event, which he – through his letters and 
travels – maintains fidelity towards and unfolds the 
consequences of, resulting in the inauguration of a subject in the 
form of Christian congregations. However, if this is the case, 
then it seems reasonable to ask in which of the four mentioned 
domains this apparent Christian truth-procedure belongs. Is Paul 
a scientist, an artist, a politician or a lover? Or, is it, as suggested 
by Slavoj Žižek, rather the case that the truth-procedure which 
Saint Paul seems to exemplify belongs to a fifth and in Badiou 
tacit truth domain, namely, religion?50 Yet, such an 
interpretation is explicitly and categorically rejected by B
h
Paul is not at all in the same field as my examples of truths in 
politics, art, science and love. Religion is simply not in the same 
field. There is something in my friend Slavoj’s consideration that is 
not completely precise because the comparison is not between 
 
49 Obviously, Saint Paul can thus also be read as an illustration of Badiou’s 
theory of the subject or his notion of the event, but that is merely a matter of 
words. 
50 Žižek, “On Divine Self-Limitation and Revolutionary Love,” 32. 
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political revolutions, artistic creations, new theories of science, new 
experiences of love and Paul. The comparison is between 
philosophy and Paul; that is, between my conception of truth and the 
Pauline conception of truth. So religion
51
 
However, Badiou’s rejection does not preclude his reading of 
Paul being seen as an exemplification; it is just not an example 
of a concrete, historical truth-procedure, but rather an 
exemplification of a theoretical conception of truth.52 This 
account is confirmed by Badiou in another interview where he 
emphasizes that: “What I show is that Paul’s line of argument is 
entirely based on a conception of truth which, it seems to me, in 
its most general aspects, is perfectly acceptable to me as a 
philosopher who, in this case, and in 
ething from the antiphilosopher.”53  
However, to complicate matters somewhat, the specific 
conception of truth that Badiou extrapolates from Paul’s writings 
overlaps with his own conception of truth; that is, truth 
conceived as the process of a ‘truth-procedure’. This is quite 
clear from the summary presented by Badiou of Paul’s 
conception of truth in four points on pages 14-15 in Saint Paul. 
This summary matches Badiou’s conception of truth in terms of 
a truth-procedure almost perfectly. Most importantly, Badiou 
states under the third point of his summary that Paul conceives 
of truth as a process (I will elaborate on the specific parts of this 
 
51 Badiou, “Universal truth and the Question of religion – an interview with 
Alain Badiou,” 40; see also Badiou, “Paul the Saint – interview by Jacques 
Henric,” 55. However, Badiou is not completely blameless of this reading 
of Saint Paul as an exemplification of a (fifth) truth procedure. Among 
other things because he himself has chosen to use the arch-Pauline word 
‘grace’ in more than one occasion as a fitting description of the situation in 
which we, in the wake of an unexpected event, are given the opportunity to 
become subject to truth (D 96-97; IT 129; C 270-271; LW 512-514; 
Badiou, ”Politics and Philosophy – An interview with Alain Badiou,” 124-
125). 
52 However, there is, as demonstrated by Roland Boer (2009, 163-165), 
some quite ‘incriminating evidence’ elsewhere in Badiou’s work which 
suggests that he, at least in an earlier stage of his authorship, did consider 
religion to be a domain of truth on a par with art, politics, science and love. 
This is, for instants, clearly indicated in the following sentence from Being 
and Event: “Saint Paul for the Church, Lenin for the Party, Cantor for 
ontology, Schoenberg for music, but also Simon, Bernard or Clair, if they 
declare themselves to be in love” (BE 393; cf. 392). 
53 Badiou, “Paul the Saint – interview by Jacques Henric,” 55.  
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process in a moment). However, and this is the first point of the 
summary, for Paul the starting point of this process is, according 
to Badiou, always an event in so far that the subject that declares 
this event only comes into existence as a result of this event. The 
second point concerns the subjective character of truth. In Paul’s 
conception, truth is, in Badiou’s reading, always subjective in the 
sense that it involves a declaration, and thus a decision, in 
relation to the event that inaugurates the truth-process. The 
fourth point concerns how Paul conceives the relationship 
between the process of truth and the situation in which this 
process takes place. In Paul’s account, again as presented by 
Badiou, the process of truth is always a process of subtraction 
from the way that the situation in which it unfolds normally 
organizes itself. It thus creates a distance or a break with what 
Badiou terms the ‘state’ of and the common opinions within this 
situation. This distance is the first step in the reorganization of 
the elements of the situation, enforced by the process of truth 
creating what Badiou (SP 98) calls a ‘generic multiplicity’. 
Under the third point of his summary, Badiou identifies in Paul 
the three concepts, which according to him are required in order 
to think of truth in terms of a process beginning with an event, 
entailing a subject and producing a generic multiplicity, such as 
‘faith’, ‘love’ and ‘hope’. Or in Badiou’s terms, ‘nomination’, 
‘fidelity’ and ‘forcing’ (Badiou elaborates on these three 
concepts particularly in chapters 8-9 of the book). Against this 
backdrop it seems quite reasonable to describe Badiou’s reading 
of Paul’s letters as a sort of ‘literary’ exemplificat
ception or theory of truth and subjectivation.54 
In the conclusion of Saint Paul, Badiou introduces another 
and somewhat more complicated argument against the depiction 
of Paul’s letters as an example of a concrete truth-procedure, 
implying that religion should be considered a fifth domain of 
truth. The argument goes to show that since the event that Paul 
declares and to which he is faithful (i.e. the resurrection of 
Christ) is ‘of the order of a fable’, Paul can be regarded as 
neither an artist, a scientist, a lover nor a political activist (SP 
108). In other words, what also precludes the claim advanced by 
Žižek and others, that Christianity seems to constitute a concrete 
truth-procedure within the framework of Badiou’s own 
philosophy, is that the event in which Christianity is founded 
 
54 In this respect Saint Paul is evidently a prolongation of the meditation 
(twenty one) on Pascal in Being and Event. 
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does not qualify as a genuine event in Badiou’s view. This raises 
two questions. Firstly, how can we distinguish an event, not only 
from an ordinary occurrence, but also from what presents itself 
as being, but isn’t really a genuine event (i.e. a false event)? And 
secondly, what does Badiou more precisely mean by his 
statement that the Pauline event (i.e. the resurrec
er of a fable’, and why does this disqualify it? 
Unlike an ordinary occurrence, according to Badiou, an event 
always arises without cause or purpose; it is unforeseeable and 
incalculable. That is, an event cannot be deduced from or 
reduced to the situation in which it happens, rather it 
supplements this situation – not as something added, but on the 
contrary as something vanishing. Or, in Badiou’s (TW 124; cf. E 
72) words: “I call ‘event’ this originary disappearance 
supplementing the situation for the duration of a lighting flash; 
situated within it only in so far as nothing of it subsists […].” An 
event can, therefore, never be objectively determined, nor can it 
be predicted. Since the event “[…] has no place other than the 
disappearance of the having-taken-place, it would be futile to 
ask, using the realist categories proper to the situation, whether it 
is accurate or merely represents a fiction.” From within the 
situation an event is, as Badiou (TW 124, 114-115; BE 182; IT 
62) puts it, ‘undecidable’. Consequently, an event is always only 
manifested as an event retroactively in the form of a subjective 
declaration of and fidelity to a specific event (TW 124; BE 178-
183; E 40-44).55 On this basis alone it is hard see why the 
resurrection of Christ should not pass as an event. However, 
Badiou’s criterion of a genuine event does not concern the 
inherent qualities of the event, rather, it concerns its effects. 
More precisely, it concerns the way the event relates to its 
 
55 As a consequence of the strong emphasis that Badiou gives to the 
subjective declaration and naming of the event along with the exceptional 
nature of the event, a number of critics, among others Jean-François 
Lyotard, have accused Badiou of harbouring a sort of decisionism à la Carl 
Schmitt. A comparison originating in Schmitt’s (2005, 5) famous dictum 
that: “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.” This comparison is of 
course not less interesting considering Schmitt’s (2005, 36) likewise 
famous claim that: “The exception in jurisprudence is analogous the miracle 
in theology.” However, the question of how deep the similarities between 
Badiou’s concept of the truth-event and Schmitt’s logic of exception really 
run requires a more thorough discussion than the present context allows for. 
See instead Hallward (2003: 285-291) for a detailed discussion of this 
matter.  
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conditions, to the situation in which it took place. To put it in 
more technical terms: for an event to be a genuine event, 
according to Badiou (E 72-73), this event must make manifest 
and name what he call the ‘void’ of the situation, which is 
normally unrepresented and foreclosed.56 What makes an event a 
genuine event is that it is related to the concrete situation for 
which it is an event only through the unplaceable void that 
grounds the situation. By being related only to the void of the 
situation the event is addressed universally, rather than to a 
particular group, community or people, which would divide the 
situation in favour of that particular element, instead of affirming 
its generic equality. So, in plain words, the criterion proposed by 
Badiou is that if an event is not universally addressed, if it is not 
an affirmation of the generic equality of the s
ply not a genuine, but rather a false event.  
Badiou offers an illustration of this point in his short book 
Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil with reference to 
Nazism as an example of a false event. Here he explains why he 
considers the rise of Nazism to be a pseudo-event in the 
following way: “[…] the striking break provoked by the Nazi 
seizure of power in 1933, although formally distinguishable from 
an event [...] since it conceives itself as a ‘German’ revolution, 
and is faithful only to the alleged national substance of a people, 
is actually addressed only to those that it itself deems ‘German’” 
 
56 ‘The void of the situation’, which is one of the most important - and 
elusive - terms in Badiou’s philosophy, is an integral part of and should be 
understood against the background of the ontology that Badiou presents in 
Being and Event (I give a short survey of the most central elements of this 
ontology in the beginning of chapter 2). The main contours of the notion of 
the void (developed in detail by Badiou in meditation 4 and 5 in Being and 
Event) can be sketches in the following way. Badiou’s (BE 23) fundamental 
ontological thesis is that the One is not. This, on the other hand, does not 
mean that there is no oneness; rather, according to Badiou (BE 24) the One, 
the Whole, Unity, is the result of a unifying, or as Badiou terms it, count-as-
one operation. However, the fact that the One is a result of a counting 
operation implies that there is something upon which this counting 
operation operates, something, which is not itself one (BE 24-25). Thus, 
although everything is counted as one, the counting operation nevertheless 
leaves a ‘remainder’ as ‘phantom’ of something which is not counted (BE 
53). This remainder, which is simultaneously excluded and included in the 
count, counts as nothing. More precisely as the nothing that names the gap 
between the one as an operation and the one as a result. This nothing is, as 
Badiou (BE 55) emphasis, at once unplaceable and all-over, nowhere and 
everywhere. This nothing cannot be counted, it must be named. It is this 
nothing that Badiou (BE 55) names the ‘void’ of a situation. 
The Truth of Paul According to Alain Badiou 50 
 
self, on the other hand, 
doe
                                                
(E 73; cf. P 167-181). Nazism is thus not a genuine event 
because it grounds its rupture with the situation in which is 
arises, not in universality (the void), but precisely in the 
particularity of the German people. The fact that the event is a 
false event naturally implies that the truth and the subject 
emerging in its wake must be rejected as well. Although the truth 
and the subject of Nazism appropriate essential parts of its 
vocabulary from genuine modern political events, they are in 
Badiou’s vocabulary merely a ‘simulacrum’.57 So, is the 
resurrection of Christ a pseudo-event and Christianity a 
simulacrum of truth according to Badiou? This is indeed the 
conclusion drawn by Žižek (TTS 143) in his reading of Saint 
Paul: “[…] Christianity, based on a fabulous event of 
Resurrection, cannot be counted as an effective Truth-Event, but 
merely as its semblance.” Badiou him
s not, at least not explicitly, say so.  
This brings us back to the question of what more precisely 
Badiou (SP 108, 4-6, 58, 76, 81) means when he depicts the 
Pauline event as ‘of the order of a fable’.58 As Badiou (SP 4, cf. 
58) makes perfectly clear on the very first page in the first 
chapter of Saint Paul, he considers the event in which Paul 
compresses Christianity (i.e. the resurrection of Christ) to be a 
fable. Succeeding this statement of his position, Badiou (SP 4) 
offers the following (very) short specification of the term fable: 
 
57 From the time of the publication of Ethics and Saint Paul Badiou has 
developed his theory of the subject beyond this binary logic of a genuine 
subject versus a simulacrum of the subject towards a more complex and 
nuanced understanding of the process subjectivation. Thus, in Logics of 
Worlds Badiou operates with a ‘typology of the subject’ that enables him to 
explain the different subjective reactions to the event, also reactions which 
he previously simply refused to identify in term of the category of the 
subject (reserved solely to fidelity) including what he in Logics of Worlds 
describes as an ‘obscure’ subject, exemplified by religious orthodoxy or 
fundamentalism. In short, this ’obscure’ subject is characterized by its 
substantialization of truth, for example by enfolding it in the structure of 
state-power. It should be noted, however, that, if the Christian subject is to 
be comprehended within the scope of this ‘typology of the subject’ 
(something Badiou has not attempted to do, his example is Islam), then it 
seems to presuppose that he would have to concede to regard the event, to 
which the Christian subject is a reaction, as a mere fable. Because a subject, 
even if it is an ‘obscure’ subject, presupposes that a (genuine) has taken 
place.   
58 For a thorough discussion of Badiou’s depiction of the resurrection-event 
as a fable, see Roland Boer’s (2006) article “On Fables and Truths”. 
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“A ‘fable’ is that part of a narrative that, so far as we are 
concerned, fails to touch upon any Real, unless it be by virtue of 
that invisible and indirectly accessible residue sticking to every 
obvious imaginary.” In other words, Badiou’s claim basically 
seems to be that resurrection is not a genuine event (but a fable), 
because it ‘fails to touch upon any Real’. But what does Badiou 
mean by the phrase ‘to touch upon any Real’? Is it just another 
way of saying that what disqualifies the resurrection as a genuine 
event is that, apart from the implicit remainder left in every
ginary, it has no anchorage in reality, that it is just a fiction?  
As I have already mentioned, according to Badiou, an event 
is only an event if it is ‘undecidable’ from within the situation in 
which it takes place. This means, as Badiou (TW 124) 
underlines, that “[…] it would be futile to ask, using the realist 
categories proper to the situation, whether it [the event] is 
accurate or merely represents a fiction.” Thus, if what Badiou 
intends to say when he characterizes the resurrection-event as a 
fable is that it is a fiction, then it indicates that he thinks that this 
event in not ‘undecidable’, that it can actually be decided ‘using 
the realist categories proper to the situation’ whether the 
resurrection of Christ is ‘accurate or merely represents a fiction’. 
If this in fact is the implicit argument underlying Badiou’s 
characterization of the resurrections as a fable, it would become 
him well to account more precisely for how it can be decided 
from within the situation that the resurrection is a fiction. 
However, if all Badiou wants to say by characterizing the 
resurrection as a ‘fable’, is that it is a fiction, why doesn’t he just 
say that the resurrection is a fiction instead? Perhaps w
e another look at Badiou’s specification of a fable.  
As mentioned a moment ago, Badiou (SP 4) in brief describes 
a fable as “[…] that part of a narrative that […] fails to touch 
upon any Real […].” The fact that Badiou here uses the word 
‘Real’ in a capitalized form clearly indicates that he refers to the 
term in its Lacanian sense. Although Badiou’s understanding of 
this notion differs from the way Lacan understands it, he does 
nevertheless concur with Lacan on the point that the Real is not 
just another term for reality. On the contrary, the Real needs to 
be distinguished from the latter, although not in terms of the 
classical metaphysical representational opposition between 
appearance and reality. Rather, the Real is the point of impasse 
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in any given situation (reality).59 As such the Real is a term that, 
at least in certain aspects, overlaps with another of Badiou’s 
most important terms, namely the ‘void’. Now, if we return to 
Badiou’s specification of a fable (as ‘that which fails to touch 
upon any Real’) with this overlap between the Real and the void 
in mind, then what Badiou seems to be saying is that the 
resurrection-fable is not a genuine event because it fails to touch 
upon, that is, relate to, the void of the situation, which, as we saw 
in the above, is precisely Badiou’s criterion for a pseudo-event. 
Although he does not put it in so many words, that Badiou 
apparently considers the resurrection to be a pseudo-event in this 
precise sense is also indicated by the fact that he depicts the truth 
succeeding the Pauline (pseudo-)event in the same vocabulary as 
when he in Ethics describes what he calls ‘truth as simulacrum’. 
This is indicated, for example, in the following statement from 
an interview on the book on Paul: “[…] the history of 
Christianity has amply proved that it was not a matter o
 sense I give that word), but of state power […].”60 
Let me just end this discussion by pointing out that these 
indications of the resurrection as a pseudo-event are not very 
consistent with the fact that Badiou, not only in Saint Paul, but 
also on a number of other occasions, emphasizes Paul’s message 
of universality as a model to follow. For example, in the 
aforementioned interview he underlines that: “As Paul declares, 
if Christ really did rise again, then there are no more Jews or 
Greeks, no more males or females, no more slaves or 
freemen.”61 The obvious question is if the concrete Pauline idea 
of universality is based on a pseudo-event, and thus merely a 
simulacrum, why refer to it as normative? Nevertheless, 
Badiou’s main message is still that since Paul’s event does not 
count as a genuine event, then
in
 
Philosophical Intervention 
This, however, does not imply that Paul’s letters do not represent 
anything new. Quite the contrary, as the subtitle of Badiou’s 
book suggests, he actually regards Paul as representing an 
                                         
59 Badiou, ”Politics and Philosophy – An interview with Alain Badiou,” 
124. 
60 Badiou, “Paul the Saint – interview by Jacques Henric,” 55. 
61 Ibid. See also P 108, 162-63, 236 and Badiou, “Universal truth and the 
Question of religion – an interview with Alain Badiou,” 39. 
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puts it in an interview: “I read Paul as a text about a new and 
provocative conception of truth and, more profoundly, about the 
        
innovation, to be exact, as nothing less than ‘the founder of 
universalism’. Indeed a rather pretentious claim, which Badiou 
moderates and clarifies in the conclusion of Saint Paul. At this 
point he enjoins that the title should not be taken to imply there 
did not exist a concept of universalism, or rather universal truths, 
before Paul. Badiou’s point is rather that Paul represents a 
rupture and new stage in the history of the concept. Paul is the 
first to establish universalism in a singular event: the resurrection 
of Christ addressed to all mankind. That this event, the 
resurrection, in fact isn’t an event at all, according to Badiou, 
does not have the slightest effect on the substance of what Paul 
has to say to us: “That the event he points to is a fable [...] does 
not invalidate in any way the body of utterances in which Paul 
places his conception of what a truth is.”62 Paul is path breaking, 
not because he initiates a new scientific, artistic, political or 
amorous truth, nor because he is the founder universalism as 
such, but because his letters contain the elements of a new theory 
of truth in terms of what Badiou describes as ‘universal 
singularity’. In other words: A theory that illustrates the formal 
conditions of a universal truth and the singular subject that arises 
(at a singular point in time) in the wake of an event. As Badiou 
general conditions for a new truth.”63 But this does not, as I have 
                                         
62 Ibid. Hereby Badiou also rejects, contrary to what Žižek maintains, that 
there is a problem concerning the fact that what seems to be the best 
example of his theory of truth (and subject) does not itself constitute a truth. 
As an interesting twist, it should be mentioned that Žižek (PD 173-174) 
argues that regarding this problem there is a relationship between Badiou 
and Heidegger, and that this relationship has to do with a shared formalist 
approach: ”An unexpected additional link between Heidegger and Badiou is 
discernible here: they both refer to Paul in the same ambiguous way. For 
Heidegger, Paul’s turn from abstract philosophical contemplation to the 
committed existence of a believer indicates care and being-in-the-world, 
albeit only as an ontic model of what Being and Time deploys as the basic 
transcendental-ontological structure; in the same way Badiou reads Paul as 
the first to deploy the formal structure of the Event and truth-procedure, 
although for him, religion is not a proper domain of truth. In both cases, the 
Pauline experience thus plays the same ex-timate role: it is the best 
exemplification (”formal indication”) of the ontological structure of the 
Event – albeit, in terms of its positive content, a “false” example, foreign to 
it.” 
63 Badiou, “Universal truth and the Question of religion – an interview with 
Alain Badiou,” 38. This point is also confirmed by Badiou in a more recent 
interview: ”What I say is that we can find in Paul a very complete theory of 
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emphasized, make Paul himself a subject of truth. Paul is not a 
scientist, an artist, a politicians, or lover; he is a theorist of truth. 
Nevertheless there is something blatantly paradoxically about 
Badiou’s claim: While Paul’s letters does not contain a particular 
truth, they do seem to say something true about truth in 
general.64 It is the same ambiguity that can be detected in 
Badiou’s endorsement in Being and Event of Lacan’s suggestion 
that ‘if no religion is truth, Christianity comes closest to the 
question of truth’, which, as Badiou (BE 212) elaborates, he 
takes to mean the following: “[…] in Christianity and in it alone 
it is said that the essence of truth supposes the evental ultra-one, 
and that relating to truth is not a matter of contemplation – or 
immobile knowledge – but of intervention.” If Christianity, as 
presented by antiphilosophers such as Paul, Pascal and 
Kierkegaard does not constitute a truth in Badiou’s terms, 
Badiou (SP 108; BE 222; LW 426) does nevertheless 
acknowledge that it presents an ‘entirely militant theory of truth’.  
However, Badiou (BE 222) does not concern himself with 
such ambiguities; quite obviously he has no intention or interest 
in elaborating on this (nevertheless admittedly admirable) feature 
of Christianity, as he assures us: “[…] I am rarely suspected of 
harbouring a Christian zeal […].” Badiou’s (SP 70) concern is to 
extract, through his own philosophical concepts, this (true) 
Pauline theory of truth as universal singularity from the 
mythological context in which it is embedded, so that it comes to 
appear in a completely ‘secular’ form.65 While he is thus very 
 
he truth is not the structure of 
 a Truth-event that is a mere semblance, not an 
th [...].” Badiou (LW 401) understands his 
the construction of a new truth. Allors! Why so, the theory of the 
construction of a new truth. The beginning of t
a fact but it’s an event.” Badiou, “A Discussion of and around Incident at 
Antioch: An Interview with Alain Badiou,” 7. 
64 A point also emphasized by Žižek (TTS 143) on several occasions, 
maybe most clearly in the following passage from The Ticklish Subject: 
[…] the problem remains of how it was possible for the first and still most 
pertinent description of the mode of operation of the fidelity to a Truth-
event to occur apropos of
actual Truth.” See also PD (174) and Žižek, “On Divine Self-Limitation and 
Revolutionary Love,” 32. 
65 A matter, which Badiou (BE 222) can be said to anticipate, albeit deploy 
in a much lesser extent, in the meditation on Pascal in Being and Event, in 
the end of which he (in contrast to the secularist tradition running from 
Voltaire to Valéry who regret that Pascal wasted his genius on the religious 
nonsense of Christianity) justifies his interest in Pascal following way: “It is 
too clear to me that, beyond Christianity, what is at stake here [in Pascal] is 
the militant apparatus of tru
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careful to make clear that he does not recognize the (theoretical) 
break that occurs with Paul as grounded in an event, it seem as if 
Badiou, perhaps because of this, ends up diminishing the 
consequences of this Pauline break. Or to put it in other words, 
Badiou does not exactly overstate the interesting fact that the 
origin, and hence the historical condition, of what he claims to 
be the philosophically adequate conception of truth, i.e. truth as 
universal singularity, is indeed antiphilosophical. However this 
does not necessarily, as suggested by John Milbank (2005, 401), 
entail the failure of philosophy to grasp this concept of truth 
altogether, rather it says something important about the close and 
constructive relationship between philosophy and 
antiphilosophy.66  
Since Paul’s message is based on a fable it does not constitute 
a truth that we can be faithful to in the same manner as Badiou 
insists that we still can (and should) be faithful today to the 
truths that came to exist in the wake of genuine events, such as 
the French Revolution and the revolts of May 1968. What Paul 
can offer instead, according to Badiou, is theoretical inspiration 
for contemporary philosophy to rethink the concept of truth. In 
Badiou’s view, it is crucial to the continued existence of 
philosophy to maintain and to reform its key concepts, including 
the concept of truth. With this as impetus, and in light of the 
tension between philosophy and its rivals, I think that Badiou’s 
reading of Paul can be regarded as a kind of philosophical 
intervention. The question is, precisely what it is that philosophy 
can learn from Paul when it comes to the concept truth. In a way, 
the whole book on Paul can be read as an answer to this 
question, to which Badiou relates more explicitly in the 
conclusion of Saint Paul. Here he emphasizes Paul as a warning 
to the philosopher not to try to reduce the conditions of truth to a 
purely conceptual matter; a warning that applies both to the 
origin and the destination of truth (SP 108-109). Philosophy 
should realize that it must take an event as its starting point, if it 
is to think the truth adequately in its singularity as well as in its 
universality, as something which applies to everyone at the same 
time, but without the constraint of transcendence. Regarding the 
                                                                                                                               
Christianity, as ‘secularized’. 
reading of Kierkegaard in Logics of Worlds in a similar way as beyond 
66 It is noteworthy that most of the philosophical thinkers referred to in the 
sections on the concepts of truth, subject end event in Being and Event, is 
actually antiphilosophers (Pascal, Rousseau and Lacan).    
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uestion.” Philosophy must at once both maintain the 
uni
also has a political dimension. I will elaborate more on 
                                                
designation of truth, Paul can, according to Badiou (SP 109), 
offer philosophy the following lesson: “There is no authority 
before which the result of a truth procedure could be brought to 
trial. A truth never appertains to Critique. It is supported only by 
itself and is correlate of a new type of subject, neither 
transcendental nor substantial, entirely defined as militant of the 
truth in q
versality of truth and recognize the radical commitment that it 
involves. 
To try and think truth in this manner is, in Badiou’s opinion, 
a very urgent task today. Why? The short answer is because our 
present situation is characterized by a pacifying relativization of 
truth. We are in a situation that, in Badiou’s view, is dominated 
by a false universalism in terms of the abstract homogenization 
of capitalism on the one hand, and an escalating process of 
fragmentation of identity in terms of ‘identity politics’ and 
‘multiculturalism’ on the other hand. This is a situation in which 
not only politics, but all four domains of truth and their truth 
procedures are at risk of being relativized or even perverted. 
That is, a situation in which art is reduced to ‘culture’, science to 
‘technology’, politics to ‘management’ and love to ‘sex’, the 
result being that any creation of universal truths is excluded.67 
Precisely in such a situation, devoid of any real commitment and 
universal pretensions, philosophy could learn a lesson from the 
conception of truth sketched in Paul’s writings. In a rather 
programmatic formulation in Saint Paul, Badiou (SP 6) puts it 
like this: “To sharply separate each truth procedure from the 
cultural ‘historicity’ wherein opinion presumes to dissolve it: 
such is the operation in which Paul is our guide.” Or as he 
writes, after having outlined in four maxims the requirements 
related to the conception of truth as ‘universal singularity’ and 
therefore dictating Paul’s fundamental problem: “There is not 
one of these maxims which, setting aside the content of the 
event, cannot be appropriated to our situation and our 
philosophical task” (SP 15). It is in this sense that Badiou’s book 
can be said to constitute a philosophical intervention; a 
philosophical intervention, which, as I have already suggested, 
therefore 
 
67 See also Badiou’s (E 23-27) Ethics for a further elaboration of the 
contemporary situation in which, according to Badiou, any genuine idea of 
universalism has been abandoned in favour of the a hypocritical ‘respect for 
differences.’ 
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 issue below, but first a very brief intermezzo on critique of 
religion. 
As noted above, Badiou points out an aspect of critique of 
religion in his reading of Paul, namely the latter’s distance to a 
certain religious idea in antiphilosophy of revelation of the 
ineffable through a groundbreaking action, for instance, as in 
Pascal’s case, in the form of a miracle. This interest, on the part 
of Badiou, in Paul as a ’critique of religion’ should be perceived 
in relation to the ambivalent relationship between philosophy 
and antiphilosophy outlined earlier. Antiphilosophy may assist 
philosophy by shielding it from its own religious tendencies. Or, 
as Badiou puts it in relation to Nietzsche: “Anti-philosophy puts 
philosophy on guard. It shows it the ruses of sense and the 
dogmatic danger in truth. It teaches it that the rupture with 
religion is never definitive. That one must take up the task again. 
That truth must, once again and always, be secularised.”68 The 
anti-hermeneutic concept of truth that Badiou produces through 
his reading of Paul’s letters may, in light of this remark on the 
warning-function of antiphilosophy, paradoxically, be seen as a 
secular corrective to philosophy’s own religious-hermeneutic 
tendencies to reduce truth to a matter of meaning. We can thus 
say that there are two types of ’secularization’ that can be 
identified in Badiou’s reading of Paul, because  Badiou also
u
perhaps rather de-my
 
Political Inspiration 
That brings us to the third and last dimension of Badiou’s 
subjective interest in Paul, namely what we might term ‘political 
inspiration’. If one is to believe one of Badiou’s most competent 
commentators, Justin Clemens (2006, 116), there is 
c
er sense, and the political potential of Paul’s writings: 
One must not underestimate this aspect of Badiou’s work, which, 
having pure reason as a paradigm, induces him to repudiate all 
forms of religious and theological thought. This does not mean that 
he does not engage with examples of such thought. On the contrary, 
he makes committed intervention into such thought, by essaying to 
detach what he de facto treats as the pure thought of such thinkers 
from the ‘religious’ impurities in which they have become enmired. 
In this approach, somebody like Saint Paul becomes an exe
 
68 Badiou, ”Who is Nietzsche?,”10. 
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political militant and thinker, who ought to be extracted from his 
                                                
religious envelope, including from the history of the church. 
 
While a number of commentators argue that the political 
dimension of Badiou’s reading of Paul is best understood by 
enrolling it in a comprehensive trend within the Marxist tradition 
– from Friedrich Engels and Karl Kautsky through Ernst Bloch 
and Walter Benjamin to Frederic Jameson and Terry Eagleton – 
that emphasizes a certain similarity in the ‘revolutionary’ aspects 
of Marxism and Christianity (usually in terms of a shared 
utopian, eschatological or messianic dimension),69 what makes 
Paul political in Clemens’ presentation of Badiou’s reading, is 
certainly not the religious or theological aspect. On the contrary, 
the point of the citation seems to be that Paul will only be 
political the moment that his letters are purified through 
Badiou’s formalistic reading of their theological and religious 
influence. Thus, Clemens’ comment raises the following very 
interesting question: If Saint Paul can be read as an indication 
that Badiou considers Paul as a resource for political renewal in 
the current situation, in which Marxism seems to be in profound 
crisis, how then should this indication be understood more 
precisely? Does it imply that Badiou endorses the idea that there 
exists a connection between Christianity and Marxism in terms 
of a shared utopian or messianic dimension? Or does Badiou’s 
reading of Paul rather involve a critical encounter, not only, as 
has already been hinted with religion, but also with the Marxist 
tradition? Moreover, does the underlying question concerning 
the issue of whether Marxism is seen as a break with, or rather a 
sort of secular continuation of, Christianity, involve an unspoken 
judgment on the validity of the theorem of secularization?70 
These questions are obviously important for our understanding 
 
69 For an exhaustive survey of the role of Christianity and the Bible in 20th 
century Marxism, see Roland Boer (2007; 2009): Criticism of Heaven: On 
Marxism and Theology and Criticism of Religion: On Marxism and 
Theology II. Similar comparisons have also been made by theologians such 
as Jurgen Moltmann, Johann Baptist Metz (Adams 2007; Ashley 2007), and 
numerous figures of Latin American ‘liberation theology’ (Löwy 2008). 
See also John Robert’s (2008a; 2008b) instructive article “The ‘Return of 
religion’: Messianism, Christianity and the Revolutionary Tradition”.  
70 Another way of posing this last question could by asking on what side 
Badiou would be on in the famous controversy between Carl Schmitt and 
Hans Blumenberg on the matter of ‘the legitimacy of the modern age’. See 
Beck Lassen (2005). 
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not only of Badiou’s (political) interest in Paul, but also his 
apprehension of the relationship between religion and politics. 
There is little doubt that there is a widespread conviction 
according to which Badiou along with several other thinkers 
(more or less) attached to Marxism, primarily Giorgio Agamben, 
Slavoj Žižek and Antonio Negri, are taken to be the latest branch 
of a trend within Marxism towards a more sympathetic approach 
to religion and Christianity in particular. Such a reading has 
moreover been reinforced by particular circumstances in the 
reception of Saint Paul and perhaps especially through Žižek’s 
part in this reception. Although Žižek himself candidly, and 
indirectly through his many references, confirms the pervasive 
influence of Saint Paul on the books in which he deals with 
theological themes, it is nevertheless the case that there is a 
certain tendency to read Badiou in continuation of Žižek (who 
has a considerable part in the growing interest in Badiou’s work) 
rather than vice versa.71 Besides, there is little doubt about 
Žižek’s opinion as to where Badiou stands on the issue of the 
relationship between Marxism and Christianity. This is quite 
clearly indicated, for example, in the introduction to The Fragile 
Absolute. Here Žižek (FA 2; cf. TTS 142) suggests the following 
strategy in response to the well-known polemical portrayal of 
Marxism as a mere secularized version of Christianity 
reproducing the same messianic or eschatological conception of 
history: “Following Alain Badiou’s path-breaking book on Saint 
Paul our premise here is exactly the opposite one: instead of 
adopting such a defensive stance, allowing the enemy to define 
the terrain of the struggle, what one should do is to
tegy by fully endorsing what one is accused of; yes, there is a 
direct lineage from Christianity and Marxism [...].”  
If we turn to Badiou himself, it does appear at first glance as 
if there is quite substantial support for the kind reading that 
Žižek proposes. Not only does Badiou refer to Marx, Lenin and 
Mao in Saint Paul, but on several occasions throughout the book 
he also mobilizes the standard Marxist rhetoric; especially in his 
characterization of Paul’s biography and his doings, as when he 
speaks of the church as ‘party’, or the brothers as ‘comrades’ in 
the second chapter of the book. Thus, Paul is described as a 
 
71 This is probably due to the fact that Saint Paul was only translated into 
English in 2003, that is, after the publication of all of the three books, in 
which Žižek explicitly engages with theology, but also that Žižek (including 
his reception of Badiou) is at present still read more widely that Badiou.  
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Marxist politics and Pauline Christianity is perhaps his remark in 
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 the one installed by Lenin and the Bolsheviks at the 
beginning of the century, which can be said to have been that of the 
f Badiou’s view on the underlying issue linking 
Ch
                                                
staunch leader who through his personal commitment and his 
written interventions organizes a political faction (SP 20-21); a 
description, which fits quite well with the parallels between Paul 
and Lenin proposed by Badiou (SP 2, 31) more than once 
throughout the book. The reflections in Saint Paul on Pier Paolo 
Pasolini’s never realized script for a film about Paul, in which 
Pasolini, according to Badiou (SP 39), ‘reflects on communism 
through Paul’, also seem to support the idea that Badiou agrees 
with the presumption of a sort of revolutionary kinship between 
Christianity and Marxism.72 However, the most substantial basis 
for asserting that Badiou (SP 2) 
 introduction of Saint Paul that: 
 
If today I wish to retrace in a few pages the singularity of this 
connection [between an event and a subject] in Paul, it is probably 
because there is currently a widespread search for a new militant 
figure – even if it takes the form of denying its possibility – called 
upon to succeed
party militant. 
 
Is not what Badiou says here exactly that Saint Paul should be 
read as an attempt to outline, using the example of Paul, a post-
Leninist version of political militancy? Is the point not precisely 
that, if Marxism is to reinvent or reform itself after the violent 
failures of the 20th century, there is an important lesson to be 
learn from Paul and the Christian tradition? The obvious answer 
is of course: Yes! But, if we take a closer look at the issues 
supporting such a reading – in particular Badiou’s use of the 
term ‘militant’ – the picture might become a little less clear. 
Before we turn to these matters, let us begin with a brief 
clarification o
ristianity and Marxism, that is, the issue of eschatology and 
messianism.  
Whether the aim has been to discredit Marxism as a pseudo-
religion or legitimatize Christianity as a progressive social 
movement, the numerous parallels drawn throughout the 20th 
century between Marxism and Christianity have almost always 
had the issue of eschatology and messianism as their fulcrum. 
While this issue is also at the very centre of recent engagements 
 
72 Pier Paolo Pasolini San Paolo. See also Mariniello (1999). 
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scipline and fidelity. 
According to Badiou, this is, as we shall see now, exactly the 
problem shared by Paul and Marxism.74 
        
with the Judeo-Christian tradition by Marxist or leftwing 
philosophers like Jacob Taubes (2004), Jacques Derrida (2006), 
Giorgio Agamben (2005) and Antonio Negri (2009b; 2010), it is 
not at all a concern in Badiou’s book on Paul. When Badiou (SP 
93), in chapter nine of Saint Paul, enters into the discussion of 
how he understands the theme of hope (ἐλπίς) in Paul’s letters, 
and mentions eschatology, it is only to dismiss the notion. 
According to Badiou (SP 93-95), there is no such thing as a 
Pauline eschatology in terms of hope in a future event in which 
ultimately justice will be done, separating the saved from the 
condemned. As Badiou (SP 97) sees it, the Pauline conception of 
hope is the concrete and patient work for the universality of a 
truth, not the projection of an abstract ideal of justice to come. 
For Paul “[…] hope has nothing to do with the future. It is a 
figure of the present subject […].” This distinction between 
present and future is also what is at stake in a short passage from 
Polemics in which Badiou – in contrast to Saint Paul where he 
does not even use the term – comments upon the issue of 
messianism in Paul. Here Badiou (P 207) argues that: “With 
Paul, for example, we have a notion that is not contained in the 
idea of messianism, since at issue is the process of coming of 
God himself, such as it has taken place.” This distinction 
between present and future is, as Žižek (OB 126) emphasizes, 
also the decisive difference between a Christian and a Jewish 
messianism, between the Messiah as someone who has already 
arrived and the Messiah as the one who is always to come. 
Moreover, these two different conceptions of the messianic event 
also imply two different forms of politics: a (Jewish) ‘politics of 
perpetual postponement’, in which it is never really the time to 
act,73 versus a (Christian) politics, in which the key problem is 
the organization of post-evental di
                                         
73 In Did Someone Say Totalitarianism Žižek (DSST 153-154) argues that 
 Polemics fits precisely Agamben’s definition of 
such a perpetual postponement is exactly the political consequences of 
Jacques Derrida’s messianic reading of Marx in Spectres of Marx. 
74 Let me just note in passing that in their article “Plasticity and the Future 
of Philosophy and Theology” Clayton Crockett and Catherine Malabou 
(2010, 23) places Badiou (along with Benjamin, Agamben and Derrida) 
within a ‘messianic paradigm’ arguing that despite Badiou’s claims that his 
understanding of Paul is not messianic, the reading of Paul he presents in 
the above quote from
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Taking a closer look at the way Badiou employs Marxist 
vocabulary in Saint Paul it shows that he primarily uses it in the 
context of his description of Paul as an organizer of the 
congregation or what is to become the church.75 Indeed his 
juxtaposition of Paul and Marxism is precisely (as suggested in 
the above quotation on Lenin) aimed at a shared organizational 
feature; or rather, a common organizational problem. Namely the 
problem of how a subject of truth can be organized so that its 
militant fidelity towards an event can be sustained, while 
avoiding the same organization turning into a rigid dogmatic 
form, and thus a substantialization of the truth that pacifies the 
militant engagement of the subject, the way that it has happened 
to the communist parties of the 20th century (and several times 
throughout the history of the church). The juxtaposition made by 
Badiou is therefore not intended to highlight a common 
revolutionary potential (in terms of a shared utopian-
eschatological or messianic dimension), but rather to suggest an 
alternative (political) organizational form. This issue of 
(political) organization is also, according to Badiou, a main 
concern of Pasolini in the latter’s reading of Paul.  
Nevertheless, this organizational issue is not the primary 
concern of Badiou himself. Rather, as we have already seen, in 
his reading of the Pauline epistles, Badiou (SP 38) is primarily 
interested in Paul as a ‘theoretician of truth’. And it is also in the 
context of this interest in the Pauline conception of truth that we 
should understand the word ‘militant’, which Badiou uses 
frequently in Saint Paul. Apparently, and especially in light of 
the above quotation, it seems obvious to take the term ‘militant’ 
to be synonymous with ‘political activist’, that is, as a 
designation of a ‘political subject’. However, such an 
interpretation clearly supports the idea that Badiou’s main 
concern in reading Paul is to be understood in terms of political 
inspiration, upholding the thesis that Paul is an important 
political resource for Badiou. And from there on it is a short step 
to fully enrolling him into the circle of other contemporary 
Marxist philosophers and intellectuals who praise Christianity 
for its revolutionary potential. It can of course not be denied that 
Badiou uses the word ‘militant’ as a term to explain what he 
                                                                                                                               
brought to an end).    
Christian messianism (the event has taken place, but has not yet been 
75 In Being and Event Badiou (BE 392) describes the church precisely as the 
post-evental ‘operator of faithful connection to the Christ-Event’. 
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means by a political subject. But, as it is clearly stated in the 
following passage from the preface to the English translation of 
L'être et l'événement, Badiou (BE xiii) uses the word ‘militant’ 
as a more general term for the ‘subject of truth’ in everyone of 
the four domains truth: “The militant of truth is not only the 
political militant working for the emancipation of humanity in its 
entirety. He or she is also the artist-creator, the scientist who 
opens up a new theoretical field or the lover whose world is 
enchanted.”76 Thus in short, being a ‘militant
essarily have anything to do with being politically engaged 
but, rather, it has to do with being a subject to truth. 
As to the aforementioned parallels drawn by Badiou in Saint 
Paul between the militant figures of Lenin and Paul, this is not a 
new idea, but has its precedent in Theory of the subject from 
1982. Here Badiou explicitly compares Christianity and 
Marxism. However, the comparison he makes does not refer to a 
presumed common revolutionary or utopian aspect; it rather 
refers to a specific characteristic concerning the origin of these 
two movements. Both movements, Christianity and Marxism, 
are, according to Badiou, characterized by having a twofold 
beginning. Marxism began of course with Marx (and Engels), 
but it was only with Lenin’s organization of the party that an 
actual Marxist subject was instituted. In the same way, 
Christianity began with Christ, but only with Paul was it 
organized as a church.77 In a comment on Lenin’s writings, 
Žižek resumes this parallel – though without any explicit 
reference to Badiou – in an intriguin
d of formalization. Žižek writes:  
 
 
76 As the passage suggests Badiou (TS 28) has previously reserved the word 
‘militant’ for political subject for the simple reason that he (as late as in 
Theory of the Subject) were of the opinion that: “Every subject is political. 
That is why there are few subjects and rarely any policy.” Following the 
conceptual framework developed in Being and Event and Manifesto for 
Philosophy, Badiou (C 305; cf. BE 329) extends his uses of the word 
‘subject’, and hence also the term ‘militant’, to all four areas of truth.  
77 Badiou’s analogy between Paul and Lenin is probably (once again) 
inspired by Lacan (1998, 96-97), who in his Seminar XX suggests that he 
himself is for Freud what Lenin was to Marx. Or, as Badiou (TS 126) writes 
in Theory of the Subject referring precisely to this particular seminar of 
Lacan’s: “Lacan is the Lenin of psychoanalysis.” 
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theory into practice – rather he ‘formalized’ Marx by way of 
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to uproot itself from the particularity 
of the religious. It is for this reason, I think, that Marx still seems so 
current. Communism, according to Marx, is essentially 
        
We should introduce the key dialectical distinction between the 
founding figure of a movement and the later figure who formalized 
this movement: Lenin did not just adequately translate Marxist 
defining the Party as the political form of its historical intervention – 
just as St. Paul ‘formalized’ Christ and Lacan ‘formalized’ Freud.78  
 
In other words, Paul’s letters constitute a sort of formalization, in 
the sense that the church represents the form of the intervention 
Paul pursues following Christ. Whether Badiou in a similar 
matter conceived of Paul’s letters as a kind of formalization, the 
way that Žižek obviously does, is not quite so clear. Badiou does 
not use the word ‘formalizing’ a single time in Saint Paul, but he 
comes close. For instance when he describes Paul’s letters as a 
reduction in which “everything is brought back to a single point: 
Jesus, Son of God, died on the cross and was resurrected”; and as 
a “forceful extraction of an essential core of thought” (SP 33). In 
the same paragraph he concludes that: “The result of all this is 
that Paul’s epistles are the only truly doctrinal texts in the New 
Testament” (SP 33). This is a phrase that naturally raises 
connotations to Badiou’s description of his own formalized 
theory of truth as a ‘doctrine of truth’.79 In any case, Badiou’s 
juxtaposition of Lenin and Paul, Marxism and Christianity, 
obviously does not refer to a shared emancipatory or 
revolutionary aspect, but is once again rather a question of an 
organizational parallel.  
But despite these common organizational concerns, it appears 
that Badiou is of the opinion that there is actually much more 
that separates Marxism and Christianity than unites them. For 
stance, in an interview from 2007 he comments on the in
re tionship between religion and Marxism (or rath
mmunism) in the following manner: 
In this case, religion presents itself as the surrogate for something 
else that has not been found, something that should be 
universalizable, should be able 
internationalist in character.80  
                                         
78 Žižek, ”Afterword: Lenin’s choice,” 191. 
79 Badiou, “On a finally objectless subject,” 94. 
80 Badiou, “’We Need a Popular Discipline’: Contemporary Politics and the 
Crisis of the Negative - Alain Badiou Interview by Filippo Del Lucchese 
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Religion, including Christianity (at least as it has evolved after 
Paul) and Marxism/Communism is, in Badiou’s view, obviously 
not positively related through a common revolutionary aspect. 
On the contrary, they seem to be in stark opposition to each 
other, since religion is merely an imitation of or substitute for the 
real thing, namely communism. The crucial difference here is 
that while religion, at least in practice, is always bound to some 
kind of particularism, then communism has in Badiou’s view a 
truly universalistic character. 81 If indeed Badiou can be said to 
agree with Žižek in that Paul represents a universalistic legacy 
which is still worth fighting for, then it seems that Badiou, in 
contrast to Žižek, who clearly connects this legacy to 
Christianity, assumes a somewhat more ambiguous position in 
regard to this connection. Badiou is happy to refer to Galatians 
3:28 as an example of a universalist way of thinking, yet it is not 
Christianity, but rather the trans-historical configuration, 
stretching from Spartacus through Thomas Müntzer to Saint-
Just, which Badiou terms ‘invariant communism’, with which he 
associates the idea of universalism, and that for Badiou therefore 
constitutes the legacy worth the fight (Badiou & Balmès 1976, 
60-75; MS 100; IT 131-132).82 The obvious contradiction that 
consists in referring to Paul as a representative of universalism, 
while rejecting religion, including Christianity, with reference to 
its particularism, can only be dissolved if we take Badiou at his 
word when he refuses to associate Paul with religion. Pushed to 
the limit, we can say that what is truly provocative about 
Badiou’s reading of Paul is not that he suggests that the founder 
                                                                                                                        
“Marxism Expatriated: Alain Badiou’s turn”. Unfortunately Toscano does 
and Jason Smith,” 655. For an enlightening clarification of Badiou’s rather 
complex relationship to Marxism, see Alberto Toscano’s (2007) article 
not relate his discussion of Badiou’s Marxism to the question’s the 
relationship between Marxism and religion.  
81 It is of course tempting here to turn Badiou’s objection to Christianity 
against himself: Has communism not precisely proved in practice not to be 
universalistic? 
82 In the pamphlet De l’ideology from 1976 Badiou and his co-author 
François Balmès mentions Thomas Müntzer and the German peasant revolt 
as an example of what they call an ‘invariant communism’. However, from 
the rest of the names on the list of ’invariant communists’ you get the 
feeling that Müntzer is included in this category not so much because of his 
Christian affiliation, but rather in spite of it. 
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 also the above 
iscussion of Badiou’s standpoint on the relationship between 
 Christianity, there is little evidence to suggest that 
                                                
of Christianity is a militant communist, but that he asserts that 
the militant Paul is not at all religious. 
By this Badiou has, if not in any other way, clearly signalled 
where he stands in regard to the normative question about the 
relationship between religion and politics. Let us in conclusion 
quote – from a recent interview in Libération – his response 
precisely to the question of whether he believes that there is a 
close relationship between religion and politics: “My position on 
this matter, reinforced by a recent trip to Palestine, is that today 
it is absolutely imperative to separate politics from religion, just 
like it should be separated, for example, from racial or identity 
questions. Religions can and must coexist in the same country, 
but only if politics and the State are separate.”83 In view, not 
only of this rather unequivocal statement, but
d
Marxism and
Badiou sees any positive political potential either in the Christian 
tradition or religion as such. Quite the contrary. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have attempted to clarify three interrelated 
issues in Badiou’s book on Paul. First, I have examined the 
inexplicit approach that characterizes Badiou’s specific reading 
of the Pauline epistles. I have here argued that his reading of 
Paul can be characterized as a formalist, in contrast to a 
hermeneutic approach, and that this confrontation is to be 
understood against the background of a more general 
confrontation in his work with the so-called ‘linguistic turn’ in 
contemporary philosophy, including in particular his critique of 
the key concept – in the hermeneutic tradition – of ‘meaning’. 
This discussion of Badiou’s approach leads to a wide-ranging 
discussion of competing notions of what philosophy, and closely 
related to this, religion, is or should be. Secondly, I have tried to 
illustrate how we must further understand Badiou’s statement in 
Saint Paul that his concern or intention in the book ‘is neither 
historicizing nor exegetical, but subjective through and through’. 
I have argued that this ‘subjective’ intention can be identified 
through three coherent aspects or dimensions, which can be 
summarized under the following headings: literary 
exemplification, philosophical intervention and political 
inspiration. At the heart of all three of these dimensions lays the 
 
83 Badiou, “On Communism – Alain Badiou in Libération” 
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ilosophy is 
nei
 a theological reading, extracting the implicit 
theology, of Badiou’s reading of Paul could not be an interesting 
endeavour, but only that the reading that I have presented here is 
not first of all a theological reading, at least not in this (narrow) 
sense of the term. 
same issue, namely Badiou’s interest in the specific theory or 
conception of truth, which he believes can be found in Saint 
Paul. This is a conception of truth which may be considered as 
an intervening illustration of Badiou’s own theory of truth, and 
which also provides a potential in terms of critique of religion. 
Finally, I have given some indication of Badiou’s position in 
regard to the three themes mentioned in the introduction as 
characterizing the thesis of a return to religion or turn to 
theology in current philosophy. On this issue, I believe I have 
shown that there is rather solid support to conclude that Badiou’s 
book on Paul, and his work more generally, should not be read as 
a part of such an alleged turn or return. Badiou’s ph
ther post-metaphysical nor post-secular, just as there does not 
appear to be any substantial indication that Badiou actually 
believes that ‘there is an intimate relationship between 
Christianity and Marxism’ as Žižek seems to argue.  
Whether Badiou’s philosophy can be placed within the 
framework of the proclamation of the return of religion in 
philosophy, despite his own explicit opposition to this, or 
whether he, in a sort of Heideggerian sense, is part of this turn 
exactly by trying to break free from it, is another discussion. 
Moreover, let me emphasize that I am of course not claiming that 
Badiou in some extraordinary way is able to completely avoid 
‘doing theology’ (he is after all reading a text soaked in 
theology), nor that
  
 
 
  
                                                
Chapter 2 
 
Against the Metaphysics of Finitude, or, Badiou’s 
‘Critique of Religion’ 
 
 
The obsession with 
‘finitude’ is a remnant of 
the tyranny of the sacred.   
Alain Badiou  
 
Introduction 
In contrast to many contemporary continental philosophers, who 
tend to follow Nietzsche (1998, 8) in his ‘mistrust of all 
systematists’, Badiou has no quarrel with the systematic vocation 
of philosophy. On the contrary, he has on several occasions 
emphasized not only the systematic character of his own 
philosophy, but that this vocation is an essential part of any 
philosophy worthy of the name: “To my mind, it’s one and the 
same question to ask whether philosophy can be systematic and 
whether philosophy can exist at all.”84 However, Badiou (D 2) 
is, as he has emphasized himself, also an extremely polemical 
philosopher – a point on which he certainly does take after 
Nietzsche. The most suitable way to approach his philosophy is 
perhaps therefore not merely to focus on his philosophical 
system, but as Peter Hallward (2004, 1), one of Badiou’s most 
esteemed readers, has suggested, through the controversies in 
which he engages.85 And when it comes to Badiou’s engagement 
with religion and theology86 it seems indeed to be the case that 
polemics take precedence over any systematic exposition. 
However, this should not be reduced to a merely personal
 
84 Badiou, “Being by numbers – Lauren Sedofsky talks with Alain Badiou,” 
85. See also Badiou, “An Interview with Alain Badiou: Universal Truths 
and the Question of Religion,” 41 and Manifesto for Philosophy (MP 65). 
85 On the polemical character of Badiou’s philosophy see also Toscano 
(2000), Bosteels (2001, 229), Clemens (2003, 194) and Hallward (2003, 
xxii). 
86 Unfortunately Badiou does not really – explicitly or implicitly – 
distinguish clearly between religion and theology. It is simply not an issue 
that concerns him. He mostly uses the term ‘religion’ and in contrast to 
‘theology’ he does actually have an explicit, fairly clear and consistent, 
definition of ‘religion’. Consequently, and for the sake of convenience, I 
will as a general rule from now on keep to this term.    
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idiosyncrasy or stylistic matter, something with no relation to the 
coherent, systematic part of Badiou’s philosophy. Badiou’s 
polemical stance toward religion is somehow a necessary 
consequence of his philosophical system. Let me try in a few 
words to explain why. 
An essential implicit condition of Badiou’s philosophical 
practice is Kurt Gödel’s famous incompleteness theorem, which, 
put very simply, states that any consistent (mathematical) system 
will generate an undecidable proposition.87 To Badiou this 
implies that a decision must be taken. As for instance in the case 
of ontology, as Badiou (BE 23) makes clear in his reading of 
Plato’s Parmenides in the first meditation of Being and Event, 
we are confronted with the following undecidable proposition: Is 
Being one or multiple? We cannot know empirically, so we will 
have to make a decision. Given that there are no grounds for this 
decision, it must take place as a kind of ‘wager’ as Badiou 
sometimes depicts it with reference to Pascal. And as Justin 
Clemens (2003, 208) explains:  
 
[…] such an ungrounded decision will be necessarily polemical – 
and such a polemical decision is integral to the practice of 
philosophy itself. Badiou’s own system cannot be both consistent 
and complete; neither can it prove its own consistency. Which 
doesn’t mean that it cannot assemble arguments in support of its 
own position; on the contrary. But these arguments will not be of 
the order of proof. They will necessarily be narrative and polemical.  
 
As we will see in a moment, Badiou’s decision in respect to 
ontology is that ‘the One is not’.88 It is in relation to this decision 
 
87 Badiou’s most exhaustive discussion of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem 
is in one of his earliest texts entitled “Marque et manque: à propos du zéro” 
(particularly the appendix) publishes in 1969 in Cahiers pour l’analyse.   
88 This is, as Hallward (2004, 15) emphasizes, one of Badiou’s most 
insistent ontological principles, another is that ‘every situation is infinite’. 
These two principles obviously collide with the traditional Judeo-Christian 
conception of God as one and of the infinite as a characteristic reserved 
solely for the divine. Badiou sometimes leaves the impression that these 
principles, the ‘death of God’ and the ‘secularization of the infinite’, is not a 
matter of decision, but that they can be justified by set theory and that an 
ontology based on set theory therefore enables a scientifically grounded 
atheism. To determine whether set theory really warrants these principles 
would of course involve a thorough examination of set theory in relation to 
Badiou’s ontology. However, this is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
Moreover, such an examination already exists; it is the main concern of 
Frederiek Depoortere’s (2009) substantial study Badiou and Theology. 
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we should understand his polemical relation to religion and 
theology. This suggests that a way to elucidate the significance 
of terms like these in Badiou’s philosophy could be to question 
the polemical role religion plays in his work. Or, to put it simply: 
What are the polemical functions of religion, and what are the 
controversies to which this term is linked, in Badiou’s 
philosophy?89  
I think it is possible to identify at least three different, but 
also closely intertwined points concerning this issue. Firstly, in 
his critique of what could be termed the contemporary 
‘metaphysics of finitude’ in its various guises – in philosophy, in 
art, in ethics, in politics – Badiou (NN 36; B 29, 124; TW 27; 
LW 228) refers repeatedly to religion. So, if there is something 
like a ‘critique of religion’ in Badiou’s work, which I will argue 
there is, it is not a kind of straight forward and explicit critique, 
but rather something resembling, in certain ways at least, the 
more general ‘critique of metaphysics’ proposed, for instance, by 
Nietzsche and Heidegger, though in a more indirect sense, since 
 
Depoortere’s (2009, 95-127) conclusion can basically be summarized in the 
following critical comment on the issue by Hallward (2004, 15): “Ontology 
[set theory] alone does not establish either principle: the axiom of infinity 
certainly does not imply that all sets or situations are infinite, and, as 
Cantor’s own piety suggests, the fact that there can be no all-inclusive set of 
all sets does not by itself disprove the existence of a properly transcendent 
limit to the very concept of set (a limit to the distinction of ‘one’ and ‘not 
one’).” 
89 Of course, another essential issue concerns the possible theological 
interpretation of Badiou’s own philosophy. Basically there are two different 
aspects – a constructive and a critical – of this issue. The first concerns 
theological attempts to embrace Badiou’s work by for instance tracing a 
‘hidden God’ in his declared atheist philosophy; only a few such attempts 
have been done. In terms of ontology I agree with Kenneth Reynhout 
(2008, 16) who has convincingly argued that there is really only one place 
in Badiou’s ontology where it might be possible to locate, or rather fit in, a 
notion of God, namely in what Badiou terms the ‘void’. However, I also 
agree with Frederiek Depoortere (2009, 124) that this identification of God 
with the void only comes at the prize of […] dropping everything which 
traditionally made God, God.” Thus, in short, I do not find this road very 
passable. But, there is of course also another dimension of Badiou’s 
philosophy which is open for theological interpretation, namely his theory 
of the event. And this leads us to the second aspect, which concerns the 
numerous criticisms raised against what is claimed to be Badiou’s 
‘religious’ or ‘theological’ conception of the event in the more specialized 
parts of the Badiou-reception (e.g. Bensaïd 2004, 98, 101; Smith 2004, 93; 
Osborne 2007, 25-26; Johnston 2008a, 35, 38). I will investigate this second 
aspect in the next chapter. 
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neither critique of religion nor of metaphysics is the definitive 
issue to Badiou.90 Secondly, Badiou openly stages his 
determined attempt to re-establish philosophy as such through its 
de-suturing from poetry (or more generally from ‘Romanticism’) 
and its re-entanglement with mathematics, as a confrontation 
with religion. And thirdly, Badiou persistently applies terms such 
as ‘religious’, ‘theological’, ‘pious’ and ‘sacral’, as a way to 
distance himself from or marginalize his philosophical rivals; 
perhaps most persistently in the case of Heidegger, but also 
when it comes to his critical engagement with Deleuze.     
By examining these three ways in which Badiou critically 
tries to dissociate himself from religion, or from a series of 
‘religious’ issues, I hope to be able to encircle the more exact 
character of this term, and subsequently clarify the role it plays 
in his philosophical system. However, since Badiou’s 
engagement with religion from the very outset is subordinated to 
his polemical interventions, to the philosophical and political 
controversies in which he engages, it is obvious that the notion 
of religion, that hopefully will begin to appear throughout my 
reading, in no way is completely coherent or without 
contradictions. Again, it never has been the intention of Badiou 
to provide any orderly composed outline of this notion; rather it 
seems to be a kind of negative ‘by-product’ of his polemics and 
to some extent it therefore needs to be ‘extracted’ from his 
 
90 If we can talk about a critique of metaphysics in Badiou, which I 
obviously think we can, it is nevertheless in another sense than in both 
Nietzsche and Heidegger. Badiou does without doubt continue the 
Nietzschean-Heideggerian critique of metaphysics in the sense that he 
wants to surmount metaphysics as onto-theology (defined as ‘the 
commandeering of being by the One’). But he breaks with the Nietzschean-
Heideggerian critique of metaphysics in the sense that he does not identify 
metaphysics wholly with onto-theology; or in other words, to Badiou (B 30; 
H 42) a none onto-theological metaphysics is possible, which he 
occasionally refers to as ‘metaphysics without metaphysics’. So, in a certain 
sense Badiou has no ambition of an ‘overcoming’ or even a ‘Verwindung’ 
of the metaphysical tradition or Platonism. On the contrary, his philosophy 
is nothing if not an attempt to ‘take another step’ in this tradition continuing 
the ‘platonic gesture’ (MP 32). Thus, there is both a critical and 
constructive engagement with metaphysics in Badiou’s work. Though the 
two aspects are intertwined, in this chapter, I will be focusing on the former 
aspect. For a further elaboration on these issues, see: Badiou, “Metaphysics 
and Critique of Metaphysics.” 
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writings.91 Although there are a few direct encounters with the 
Christian theological tradition in Badiou’s earlier writings, e.g. 
in the form of extensive references to Thomas Müntzer in De 
l’idéologie (1976), a short discussion of the theological model of 
Hegel’s dialectics and a lengthy excursion into the heresies of 
Arianism and Gnosticism in of Theory of the Subject (1982), his 
engagement with religion is closely tied to an attempt to restore 
philosophy’s autonomy by critically separating it from, not only 
religion, but also sophism and antiphilosophy. This task of 
systematically outlining the characteristics of philosophy – in 
general, but also of his own philosophical system – is something 
that Badiou commences with the publication of Being and Event 
(1988).  In the following I will therefore concentrate mainly on 
texts written after (or around the same time as) Being and Event.  
 
The Metaphysics of Finitude 
On more than one occasion Badiou (N 65; B 23; TC 166) has 
emphasized his firm fidelity to the Nietzschean announcement of 
the ‘death of God’ as the distinctive mark of, and program for, 
modernity.92 To Badiou, this announcement is first of all an 
ontological statement.93 It represents the conviction that being 
qua being should no longer be thought in terms of totality, 
whether with reference to the God of monotheism or the Man of 
20th century humanism or any other term taking the place of 
God. “We can”, as Badiou explains in a conversation with Simon 
Critchley, “understand the death of God as the ontological death 
of the One, of the transcendence of the One.”94 Or as he puts it in 
his book on number-theory Number and Numbers from 1990: 
“Modernity is defined by the fact that the One is not […]. So, for 
we moderns (or ‘free spirits’), the Multiple-without-One is the 
 
91 There is nothing extraordinary about this approach. Similar or related 
approaches can be found in the work of countless scholars exploring 
thinkers or philosopher, who has written on religion and theology, but in 
implicit, fragmented or disorderly ways. However, my main source of 
inspiration is Jeremy R. Carrette’s study Foucault and Religion (Carrette 
2000).       
92 See also Badiou, “Being by Numbers,” 86; Badiou, “A Conversation with 
Alain Badiou,” 100. Badiou (B 21-32) offers a detailed and original account 
of his conception of the formula ‘God is dead’ in the prologue to Briefings 
on Existence. I will return to this issue. 
93 Following the long tradition from Aristotle to Heidegger, Badiou (BE 13; 
B 43) defines ontology as ‘the discourse on, or what can be said of, being 
qua being.’  
94 Badiou, “Ours is not a terrible situation.” 
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last word on being qua being” (N 65).  In the first dense 
meditation of Being and Event, Badiou (BE 23) qualifies this 
declaration of the non-existence of the One further by clarifying 
that this claim is “[…] not a question […] of abandoning the 
principle Lacan assigned to the symbolic; that there is Oneness.” 
Rather, Badiou’s (BE 24) claim is, as he explains, that the one, 
that every unity, is merely the result of an operation, more 
precisely a ‘counting as one’ operation, and thus not an intrinsic 
characteristic of being. In Badiou’s wording: “[…] there is no 
one, only the count-as-one.”95  
However, as Badiou (BE 24) points out, since every one, 
every unity, is a result of a counting operation, it entails that the 
material upon which this operation operates must itself be not 
one. Thinking the one as a result of a  counting operation thus 
implies that what is counted or presented as one, what is unified, 
is itself without one, without limit or boundary, or in other 
words, infinitely multiple. If the One is not, if it is merely the 
result of an operation, as Badiou (TW 39) says, then this implies 
that being qua being is nothing but multiples of multiples, and so 
on. To the question of whether there is not some kind of an end 
point to this sequence of multiplicities, Badiou’s answer is: Yes 
there is an end point, but not in terms of some-thing other than a 
multiplicity, since that would precisely be to reintroduce the 
One. Instead he argues that: “The end point is of necessity also a 
multiplicity. The multiplicity which is the multiplicity of no 
multiplicity at all, the thing is also no-thing: the void, the empty 
multiplicity, the empty set.”96 In other words, thinking being in 
this way, as multiplicities of multiplicities, requires, as Badiou 
(BE 29) emphasizes, that there can be no substantial definition of 
the concept of multiplicity. According to Badiou (BE 29-30, 43; 
cf. NN 65) this is exactly what modern axiomatic set theory 
accomplishes; and it does so by asserting as its only existential 
quantifier precisely the axiom of the empty set or the void.97  
 
95 This operation of count-as-one is as Badiou (B 134) has suggested to a 
certain extent comparable with Kant’s notion of ‘original apperception’: “If 
the subjective connotation of original apperception is left aside, conceived 
as it was by Kant as the ‘transcendental unity of self-consciousness’, and if 
we set out sight on the operation per se, what I call counting-as-one would 
be recognized effortlessly.” 
96 Badiou, “Towards a New Concept of Existence,” 65-66 (cf. TW 39). 
97 Badiou unfolds this argument in detail in meditation 2-5 in Being and 
Event. 
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To think being in the way just described, means to effectuate 
‘the ontological death of the One’, to ‘liberate the infinite from 
its theological conception’ (IT 183). Or as Badiou (C 110) states 
in his 1992 essay-collection, Conditions: “By inaugurating a 
thinking in which the infinite is irreversibly separated from every 
instance of the One, mathematics has in its own field 
successfully accomplished the program of the death of God.” 
And so, in Badiou’s (B 23) opinion, both God and religion are 
(or rather ought to be) definitively finished.  
But, as he admits, although mathematics has shown the way 
for this program of modernity, this effectuation of the death of 
God, a task that he also refers to as ‘the secularization of the 
infinite’ (NN 45; C 111; B 124) has nevertheless not yet been 
fully realized.98 We are not yet ‘absolutely modern’, something 
still remains of God and religion today, and so the One is 
preserved. This is the case primarily through the contemporary 
celebration of what Badiou (B29; NN 36, 86; C 99) refers to as 
‘the theme of finitude.’ This might seem counterintuitive at first 
sight, since the advocation of finitude is usually associated with 
materialism or even atheism. Is not the very result of the 
proclamation of the death of God the invalidation of any claim to 
immortality and the acknowledgment of the sole finite character 
of our existence? Yes, but according to Badiou (B 29; TW 28) 
this assertion is, as we shall see, exactly the reproduction of 
religion. Badiou (LW 535) localizes the origin of the theme 
finitude, which undoubtedly has had a huge influence on 19th and 
20th century continental philosophy (not least on Heidegger), in 
Kant’s critical philosophy:  
 
Kant is the inventor of the disastrous theme of our ‘finitude’. The 
solemn and sanctimonious declaration that we can have no 
knowledge of this or that always foreshadows some obscure 
devotion to the Master of the unknowable, the God of the religions 
or the placeholders: Being, Meaning, Life…99 
 
98 The ’secularization of the infinite’ or ’liberation of the infinite from its 
theological conception’ is Badiou’s way of describing Georg Cantor’s 
realization and pluralisation of the actual infinite. 
99 Let me, for the sake of nuance, just mention Emmanuel Lévinas’ (2000, 
59) critical comment on Heidegger (1962, 31; 47), who in Kant and the 
Problem of Metaphysics also emphasizes the importance of finitude in 
Kant’s philosophy: “Kantian philosophy was reduced by Heidegger […] to 
the first radical exhibition of the finitude of being.” In contrast to Heidegger 
(and Badiou) Lévinas (2000, 59) emphasizes that Kant, in his moral 
philosophy, “[…] go father, and anyway elsewhere, than toward finitude.” 
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This ‘religious’ theme of finitude is a recurring concern in 
Badiou’s writings from the beginning of the 1990s onwards, in 
which he not only attacks the epistemological dimension, but 
also the moral(ist) dimension of the claim of our finitude. He 
thus criticizes it in many different domains – not just in 
philosophy, but also in art, ethics, politics and in his latest ‘big 
book’, Logics of Worlds, as the essence of today’s predominant 
ideology – and he does so under a range of different headings 
such as ‘Romanticism’ (C 93-112; H 1-15; TC 152-60), ‘ethical 
nihilism’ (E 18-39), ‘animal humanism’ (TC 165-178), and 
‘democratic materialism’ (LW 1-9). Due to the wide scale of this 
critique I think it is not only justifiable, but more adequate to 
talk, not just about the theme of finitude, but also of the 
metaphysics of finitude. Moreover, the function of the theme of 
finitude, as Badiou (TW 42) understands it, fits exactly his 
critical definition of metaphysics as “[…] the commandeering of 
being by the one.”100 So, what do I mean by ‘the metaphysics of 
finitude’? And why, more precisely, is this metaphysics, in 
Badiou’s view, religious?  
The best way to start answering the first question is perhaps 
by quoting a quite long passage from The Odd One In, a book by 
the Slovenian philosopher, Alenka Zupančič (2008b, 48), from 
whom I have borrowed the expression ‘the metaphysics of 
 
Even more relevantly, Žižek has raised an explicit reservation against 
Badiou’s understanding of this issue. Although Žižek (PV 110) do agree 
with Badiou on the need for a critique of ‘finitude’ in the sense that Badiou 
takes this term, it is also obvious from Žižek’s reading of Kant that he does 
not think that Badiou’s understanding applies to the Kantian conception of 
finitude. Moreover, Žižek even claims that Badiou’s himself needs a 
Kantian conception of finitude to make his philosophy coherent (Žižek, “On 
Divine Self-Limitation and Revolutionary Love,” 33). In Žižek’s reading, 
the Kantian conception of finitude cannot be reduced to the claim that ‘we 
are finite beings with finite knowledge’. Quite on the contrary, according to 
Žižek (PV 21-22; cf. TTS 163-164), the Kantian conception of finitude does 
not, to put it simply, privilege the finite or mortal dimension of life over the 
infinite dimension; rather it introduced a third domain, which Žižek likes to 
describe through a term he borrows from horror-fiction, namely the 
‘undead’ (a term that Žižek tends to use synonymously with the Freudian 
notion of ‘death drive’). 
100 Badiou (TW 43) explicitly aligns this critical definition of metaphysics 
with onto-theology, which he, as he makes clear in the abovementioned 
conversation with Critchley, understands in the Heideggerian sense that ‘the 
question of being is always also the question of the One’; or in Heidegger’s 
(2002, 54) words: “[…] the question of being as such and as a whole.” 
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finitude’, and in which she offers the following immediate and 
general characterization of this expression: 
 
For quite some time, a lot of critical philosophical work has been 
dedicated to various ways of undermining the metaphysics of 
infinity, and of transcendence. Yet we should not overlook the fact 
that there is also a considerable (modern) corpus of what I would 
call a metaphysics of finitude in which, often with a distinctively 
pathetic ring to it, finitude appears as our (contemporary) great 
narrative. The range of this metaphysics of finitude is considerable; 
it stretches from very complex and highly elaborate philosophical 
enterprises to an utterly commonsense ‘psycho-theology of 
everyday life’ (to borrow, with different signifying implications, 
Eric Santner’s expression), in which finitude appears as consolation 
for, and explanation of, our little (or not so little) disappointments 
and misfortunes, as a new Master-Signifier summoned to make 
sense of our (‘acknowledged’) senseless existence, as a new Gospel 
or ‘good news’: You’re only human! Give yourself a break! 
Nobody’s perfect!101 
    
This quotation in no way captures the full complexity that the 
theme of finitude assumes in Badiou’s exposition. However, it 
hints at two of the issues, that I will elaborate on in the 
following, namely the kind of morality that the metaphysics of 
finitude implies, and the intimate link between finitude, sense (or 
meaning) and religion. Moreover Zupančič’s description 
illustrates and emphasizes the ‘considerable range’ this 
metaphysics of finitude has. It has, as Zupančič says, referring to 
Lyotard’s celebrated expression, the scale of a ‘great narrative’, 
which suggests that its critique (in this case Badiou’s critique) is 
not only a critique of a philosophical, or to be more precise a 
religious, metaphysics; it can also be conceived as a sort of 
cultural critique.  
 
Finitude and Limit 
Now, let’s take a closer look of some of the characteristics of the 
metaphysics of finitude as they appear throughout Badiou’s 
 
101 Zupančič (2008b, 52) does not explicitly state, that her account of the 
finitude of metaphysic is inspired by Badiou, but he is mentioned a couple 
of times throughout the book, among other places, precisely during the 
analysis of finitude of metaphysic. Furthermore, Badiou has been a strong 
inspiration and interlocutor in Zupančič’s two previous book The Ethics of 
the Real (2000) and The Shortest Shadow (2003). And maybe the 
inspiration also goes the other way; thus The Ethics of the Real is 
mentioned by Badiou (LW 537) in the appendix of Logics of Worlds.  
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critique. As I have just suggested, Badiou criticizes (at least) two 
dimensions of the metaphysics of finitude: an epistemological 
and a moral dimension.  
In terms of epistemology, the argument implied by the 
metaphysics of finitude goes something like this: Against any 
metaphysical megalomania, we should humbly acknowledge our 
finitude as our ultimate horizon and accept that there is no 
Absolute Truth, that there is no way out of the prison-house of 
language and interpretation, that all we can do is to accept the 
contingency and historicity of our knowledge, our lack of any 
absolute point of reference. This point is perfectly summarized in 
the following passage by Nietzsche (2002, 13): “Everything has 
become: there are no eternal facts, just as there are no absolute 
truths. Consequently what is needed from now on is historical 
philosophizing, and with it the virtue of modesty.” However, the 
consequence of this apparently atheist point of view, is quite 
surprising. Whereas the objective of classic, pre-critical 
(theological) metaphysics was to obtain knowledge of the 
Absolute, today, as Žižek (MC 242) explains, “[…] the religious 
dimension is explicitly linked to the limitation of our 
comprehension, i.e., this dimension is not the intimation of a 
‘higher’ knowledge, but the inverted assertion of its limitation.” 
This is why, these days, atheists are no longer despised in the 
field of theology, on the contrary, it is frequently emphasized 
how the ‘post-metaphysical’, ‘deconstructive’ atheism from 
Nietzsche to Derrida, in its ‘leave-taking’ with the ‘God of the 
philosophers’, is actually much closer to the ‘true’ God of the 
Judea-Christian tradition than the absolutist theism of classical 
metaphysics. Or in the words of one of the most important 
theological inspirations of the 20th century: “The god-less 
thinking, which must abandon the god of philosophy, god as 
causa sui, is thus perhaps closer to the divine God” (Heidegger 
2002, 72). The consequence of this is, as Žižek (MC 255) points 
out, that: “[…] even Nietzsche, the fiercest critic of Christianity, 
can be enlisted to support the postmodern ‘theological turn.’”102  
 
102 Žižek is here referring to the book After the Death of God by John D. 
Caputo and Gianni Vattimo. The ill-concealed critique in the above remark 
is summarized elsewhere by Žižek (CWZ 162) in the following way: “[…] I 
am very much opposed to the recent post-secular theological turn of 
deconstruction; the idea being that while there is no ontotheological God 
there is nonetheless some kind of unconditional ethical injunction up to 
which one cannot live.” Though it is not said in the same explicit terms in 
Badiou’s case, he definitely shares Žižek’s critique. In a certain sense on 
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Ironically, this new religious dimension or space that 
characterizes modernity was created by the very delimitation of 
religion from the realm of knowledge (reason) enforced by 
Enlightenment philosophy through its radical critique of religion, 
i.e. the dismissal of ‘the ontological argument’ and thus of 
rational knowledge of the Absolute. By rigidly dividing religion 
from the realm of reason, expelling it to the domain of morality 
and feelings, enlightenment philosophy did not finally purify 
knowledge of faith; it merely transposed the gap between faith 
and knowledge into the field of knowledge (reason) itself. This 
paradoxical development is brilliantly analysed by the young 
Hegel (1977, 55-56) in Faith and knowledge:  
 
After its battle with religion the best that Reason could manage was 
to take a look at itself and come to self-awareness. Reason, having 
in this way become mere intellect, acknowledges its own 
nothingness by placing that which is better than it in a faith outside 
and above itself, as a beyond to be believed in.103  
 
And as Žižek (MC 58) emphasizes in a comment on Hegel’s 
analysis: “The epitome of this development is Kant’s 
philosophy: Kant started as the great destroyer, with his ruthless 
critique of theology, and ended up with – as he himself put it – 
constraining the scope of Reason to create a space for faith.” In 
the end, philosophy has thus in Hegel’s (1977, 56) words “[…] 
made itself the handmaid of a faith once more.” In stark 
opposition to this Badiou stresses that: “Against Kant, we have 
to maintain that we know being qua being […].”104  
 
can say that Badiou’s critique of finitude is exactly a critique of this sort of 
post-secular religiosity, since the latter is based on idea that it is through the 
‘fundamental finitude of our existence’ that we are confronted with the 
‘radical otherness’ or ‘infinite demand’. Hallward (2001a, xxi-xxx) 
indicates something along these lines in his critical discussion of Lévinas 
and Derrida in his introduction to the English translation of Badiou’s 
Ethics.    
103 More recently a criticism similar to Hegel’s has been proposed by 
Badiou’s student, Quentin Meillassoux (2008, 46), who in his book, After 
finitude, argues that: “The destruction of the metaphysical rationalization of 
Christian theology has resulted in a generalized becoming-religious of 
thought , viz. in fideism of any belief of whatsoever.” 
104 Badiou, “Towards a New Concept of Existence,” 67. Or as Badiou (LW 
8) puts it, describing his ‘materialist dialectic’ position, in Logics of Worlds: 
“To have done, if possible, with the watered-down Kant of limits, rights and 
unknowables. To affirm, with Mao Tse-tung (why not?): ‘We will come to 
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When it comes to the moral attitude implied by the theme of 
finitude, the chief imperative is once again: Be modest! That is, 
in short, that we should accept the fact that we are only human, 
acknowledge our frail, soiled body, with all its weakness’ and 
defects, our failures and limitations, admit the fragility of our 
existence and accept what we can neither master nor be the 
Masters of everything in our own lives or in nature. To argue in 
this way, that man’s most defining characteristic is his finitude, 
his ‘being-towards-death’, is in Badiou’s view the same as 
claiming that essentially man is nothing but a (potential) victim 
(E 10-11), that in the end ‘man is just a pitiable animal’ (TC 
175), or as he puts it in his short book on ethics  “[…] the 
underlying conviction is that the only thing that can really 
happen to someone is death” (E 35). It is on basis of such a 
conception of man that what Badiou (E 13) terms the 
‘contemporary ideology of ethics’ is able to undermine in 
advance every idea of betterment, every ‘positive’ project to 
unite people, on grounds that it will probably just result in an 
even greater evil.105 Against this conviction Badiou insists that 
something else can indeed happen to us other than death, namely 
that we at one point or even at several points in our lifetime are 
granted the chance to become subjects to a truth.106  
What unites the epistemological and the moral dimension of 
the metaphysics of finitude, however, is the reference to limits 
 
know everything that we did not know before’.” See also the chapter on 
Kant in Briefings on Existence (B 163).  
105 This stance is in Badiou’s (E 8) view grounded in Kant’s moral 
philosophy. For quite another reading of Kant’s ethics, which is in fact very 
much in line with Badiou’s own conception of ethics, see Zupančič’s 
(2000) The Ethics of the Real and appendix III in Žižek’s (PF 273-310) The 
Plague of Fantasies. See also Hallward’s (2001a, xix-xxi) comments on 
similarities between Badiou’s and Kant’s ethics in his introduction to 
Badiou’s Ethics.  
106 Surprisingly to some and to the great irritation of others, Badiou, as it is 
well known, tends to use the arch-Pauline word ‘grace’ as a metaphor for 
this. Recently he has even been so bold as to quote (or rather paraphrase) 
Paul on this issue: “[…] we must ask with Paul: ‘Death, where is thy 
victory’?” (Badiou, “Towards a New Concept of Existence,” 72). Of course 
Badiou still maintains that he uses the metaphor of grace in completely 
‘laicised’ way purely to describe “[…] the fact that, to the degree that we 
are given a chance of truth, a chance of being a little bit more than living 
individuals, pursuing our ordinary interest, this chance is always given to us 
through an event.” (Badiou, ”Politics and Philosophy – An interview with 
Alain Badiou,” 124). 
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and limitations. The theme of finitude introduces – to put it 
simply – a limit, not only on our existence, but also on what we 
can know, what we can do and what we can hope for. Badiou 
finds this extremely problematic, because by limiting our 
existence in this way being is retied to the One. Or in other 
words, the very transcendence that is refused by insisting on the 
merely finite character of our existence, by emphasizing our 
finitude, is reintroduced as an ‘immanent transcendence’ in 
terms of the bodily, existential and epistemological limitations of 
this finitude. At the heart of this matter is thus the question of 
how we should define the finite, the infinite and the relationship 
between them.  
According to Badiou (LW 535), the base of the theme of 
finitude is, as already mentioned, Kantian. In so far as the 
infinite in the critical-transcendental apparatus of Kant’s 
philosophy is inseparable from the forms of intuition of space 
and time, it is also always only a ‘potential’ infinite that we can 
grasp, i.e. infinity as a never fully realized possibility, and never 
an ‘actual’ infinite. From within the horizon of Kantian 
transcendental-epistemological finitude the infinite can only be 
understood as a perpetually postponed possibility in the 
future.107 Or, as Adrian Johnston (2007b, 148) puts it: “Kant 
indeed conceives of the infinite as a separate transcendence from 
which the finite is permanently barred. Kantian infinity ‘exists’ 
only in fictions of a future forever just beyond the visible 
horizon.” In this way, the infinite is only present as always 
absent or precisely as a limit or limitation constituted by our 
finitude, whereas the essence of Badiou’s ontology is exactly 
that infinity is always-already here, nothing (literally) limits it.108 
 
107 Summarizing Adrian W. Moore’s (2002, 84-93) exposition in his book 
The Infinite of Kant’s perception of the infinite, we can say, that while Kant 
considers the a priori forms of time and space to be infinite, the idea of 
infinity cannot be applied to the physical universe. However, it still has a 
legitimate ‘regulative use’ in relation to the latter. That is, it is possible to 
proceed as if the physical universe were infinite, or as if we could progress 
endless from a lower toward a higher stage of moral perfection. In short, 
Kant’s position, and the relevant consequence of it in relation to the present 
discussion, is thus, in Hallward’s (2003, 165) words, that: “Kant […] 
subordinates ontology to epistemology (and in doing so, confirms the 
foreclosure of an actually infinite reality as such).”   
108 As far as I know there is no explicit discussion of Kant’s conception of 
the infinite in Badiou’s work, only the following remark in Logics of 
Worlds: “In particular, his [Kant’s] conception of the infinite and 
consequently of quantitative evaluations is outmoded” (LW 235). Though 
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The limit displaces the infinite to a transcendent Beyond, but as 
Badiou (E 25) states in his book on ethics: “The infinite […] is 
the banal reality of every situation, not the predicate of a 
transcendence.” And thus, in Badiou’s (C 97) view, the 
relationship between the finite and the infinite should not be 
thought of in terms of a limit, at least not in terms of a horizontal 
conceptualization of the limit.109 When it comes to the emphasis 
between the finite and the infinite, one could say that Badiou 
(NN 85-86) on a certain level reverses the Kantian scheme, 
reverses the prio
 
Modern thought says that the first situation, the banal situation, is 
the infinite. The finite is a secondary situation, very special, very 
singular, extremely rare. The obsession with ‘finitude’ is a remnant 
of the tyranny of the sacred. The ‘death of God’ does not deliver us 
to finitude, but to the omnipresent infinitude of situations, and, 
correlatively, to the infinity of the thinkable.  
 
To be able to rid itself of the theme of finitude and to ultimately 
effectuate the death of God, it is thus crucial, in Badiou’s mind, 
that philosophy detaches itself from the Kantian heritage, from 
the perpetual examination of limits (IT 122; LW 8).  
As we have seen in the above, Badiou (LW 71) not only 
violently rejects anything with the slightest connection to the 
theme of finitude, accusing any thought based on this theme of 
reducing man to a ‘pitiable’ mortal animal, he opposes this claim 
of our solely finite existence with the claim that we can become 
‘subjects to an infinite truth’ and in doing so the “[…] we of 
human species have the power to be immortal.” However, this 
leaves us with the following very reasonable critical question: Is 
this rejection by Badiou of what seems to be a materialist 
insistence on our merely finite, biological and mortal existence 
in favour of lofty assertions of ‘the grace of an event’, of 
‘infinite truths’ and of ‘immortal subjects’ not exactly a return to 
some kind of idealism, an ill-concealed humanistic or even 
religious idealism? However, when explicitly confronted in an 
interview with the charge of idealism Badiou immediately 
 
Badiou is predominately critical towards Kant (and Kantianism) there are 
definitely also a certain affinity towards some aspects of Kant’s ontology 
and also some similarities in terms of ethics (see Hallward 2003, 163-168, 
266-67).  
109 Badiou (C 97) opposes the (post-Kantian) conception of the limit as a 
horizon with a mathematical conception of the limit as a ‘present-point’.    
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retorted: “Actually, I would submit that my system is the most 
rigorously materialist in ambition that we’ve seen since 
Lucretius.”110 And he indeed stages his rejection of the 
materialism of finitude, not as a confrontation between 
materialism and idealism, but rather as the confrontation 
between two brands of materialism. These are portrayed in the 
preface of Logics of Worlds respectively as the predominate 
‘democratic materialism’, summarized by the assertion that 
‘there are only bodies and languages’, and Badiou’s (LW 1-9) 
alternative ‘materialist dialectic’, summarized in the counter-
assertion that ‘there are only bodies and languages, except that 
there are also truths’.111 But, Badiou’s manoeuvre could also be 
described, as Žižek (MC 92) has explained, in the following 
way:  
 
Here Badiou performs the paradoxical philosophical gesture of 
defending, as a materialist, the autonomy of the ‘immaterial’ order 
of the event. As a materialist, and in order to be thoroughly 
materialist, Badiou focuses on the idealist topos par excellence: 
How can a human animal forsake its animality and put its life at the 
service of a transcendent Truth? How can the ‘transubstantiation’ 
from the pleasure-oriented life of an individual to the life of a 
subject dedicated to a Cause occur? In other words, how is a free act 
possible? How can one break (out of) the network of the causal 
connections of positive reality and conceive an act that begins by 
and in itself? In short, Badiou repeats within the materialist frame 
the elementary gesture of idealist anti-reductionism. Human Reason 
cannot be reduced to the result of evolutionary adaptation; art is not 
just a heightened procedure of providing sensual pleasures, but a 
medium of Truth; and so on. 
 
I will leave the critical questions of how, more precisely, Badiou 
does this (i.e. repeats in a materialist manner the gesture of 
idealist anti-reductionism) and to which degree he can be said to 
succeed in his enterprise, open for the time being. However, I 
 
110 Badiou, “Being by numbers,” 123. Very strong charges of idealism have 
also been level against Badiou by Adrian Johnston (2008a) in his article 
“What Matter(s) in Ontology: Alain Badiou, the Hebb-event and 
Materialism split from within.” 
111 Badiou presents his position of ‘materialist dialectics’ with a explicit 
reference to Louis Althusser and it can be argued that not only Logics of 
Worlds, but the whole of Badiou’s philosophy as such, is an attempt to 
renew the tradition of dialectical materialism, who’s latest great advocate 
was precisely Althusser (Bosteels, 2001; 2002).    
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will return to these questions at length in the following two 
chapters. 
 
Religion = Meaning 
Now let me return to our second question: Why is the 
metaphysics of finitude religious? The short answer is (as 
implied in the above): Because the insistence on our finitude, our 
limited finite existence, reties being to the One and thus cancels 
the death of God. However, I think it is about time that we take a 
closer look at Badiou’s definition of religion and how this 
definition more precisely relates to the tethering of being to the 
One, which, as should be clear by now, is the ‘religious’ 
operation par excellence in Badiou’s book. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, Badiou (C 24, 13-14; D 38; OB 57; TC 78-79; 
PP 67) does, at least in his later work, have a fairly consistent 
definition of religion, namely the following: “I propose to call 
‘religion’ everything that presupposes that there is a continuity 
between truths and the circulation of meaning.” Let us try to 
unfold this definition a little further. When Badiou describes the 
relation between truth and meaning in religion as a ‘continuity’, 
what he means is that religion equates these two terms, or in 
other words, reduces the one to the other. As he declares 
elsewhere: “[…] the imperative of religion [is] to affirm that, on 
one point at least, sense112 and truth are indistinguishable.”113 As 
we know from the previous chapter, if there is to be a truth, in 
Badiou’s terms, something must happen; a truth is always 
brought about by an event, it is something that we do when 
something happens to us. In this perspective religion is, as 
Badiou (OB 57) points out in his book on Beckett, “[…] the 
desire to give meaning to everything that happens.” Contrary to 
 
112 The French noun used by Badiou when he relates religion to meaning is 
’sens’. There is no consensus among Badiou’s English-translators about the 
translation of this word, which in English can be (and indeed is) translated 
into both ‘sense’ and ‘meaning’. 
113 Badiou, “The Formulas of l’Etourdit,” 85. In a comment on Badiou’s 
definition of religion Žižek (PV 182) poses the following, for the present 
context, very relevant question: “The key question about religion today is: 
can all religious experiences and practices be contained within this 
dimension of the conjunction of truth and meaning? Does not Judaism, with 
its imposition of a traumatic Law, adumbrate a dimension of truth outside 
meaning […]? And, at a different level, does not the same go for Saint Paul 
himself?” I will return to this question in chapter five in my discussion of 
Žižek’s ‘materialist theology’. 
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this, in philosophy the relationship between truth and meaning is 
a ‘face to face’ relationship, a relationship of opposition or 
confrontation in which philosophy ‘subtracts’ the truths 
produced in the domains of art, science politics and love, 
distinguishing or ‘separating them from the law of the world’, 
and thus ‘making holes in meaning’ (C 24).  
By defining religion in this manner, that is, by referring (in 
fact merging) it to the concept of meaning, Badiou (C 136; TC 
79; LW 387) once again takes his lead from Lacan. Indeed, he 
explicitly points out the particular text in the Lacanian oeuvre 
that serves as the source of inspiration for this definition of 
religion. Or, in Badiou’s (LW 553) own words: “The text of 
Lacan from which I draw the equation religion = meaning is 
none other than the letter in which he announced, in January 
1980, the dissolution of the École Francaise de Psychoanalysis 
[…].” Therefore, a short detour into Lacan’s thoughts on religion 
might serve as a helpful background to Badiou’s critical 
engagement with religion, but also as an opportunity to raise one 
or two critical questions.  
When it comes to religion, the premise or starting point of 
Lacan is, like in virtually all other matters, Sigmund Freud. In 
The Future of an Illusion Freud (1961a, 18) famously argues that 
religion serves as defence-mechanism against the threefold cause 
of human suffering: ‘the terrors of nature, the cruelty of fate and 
the privations of culture’. Religion is, as he puts it in Civilization 
and its Discontents, an “[…] attempt to procure a certainty of 
happiness and a protection against suffering by a delusional 
remoulding of reality […]” (Freud 1961b, 81). On the whole 
Lacan affirms this picture of religion as a form of consolation in 
so far that it ‘consists in avoiding the emptiness’ at the centre of 
existence (Lacan 1992, 160) and (self-)delusion in so far that it 
‘negates truth as the cause of the subject’ (Lacan 2007, 741).114  
However, there are of course also differences on this matter, 
and a crucial point on which Lacan differs from Freud is on the 
question of the future prospects for religion. Freud (1961a, 56) 
 
114 On critique of religion in Freud and Lacan, see Alexandre Leupin (2004, 
105-123) and James DiCenso (1999, 30-49). My account of religion here in 
the work of Freud and Lacan is by necessity somewhat simplistic and rather 
one-sided. Recently, several new interesting studies have convincingly 
shown that Judeo-Christian theology and religion is not only criticised, but 
plays a much more ambivalent and indeed constructive role in both Freud 
and Lacan (Santner 2001; Reinhard & Lupton 2003; Pound 2007). 
However, this is not the place to engage further in this discussion.    
Against the Metaphysics of Finitude 
 
86 
 
                                                
basically shares the confidence of the Enlightenment in rational 
progress and trusts that, at some point in the future, science and 
psychoanalysis (being scientific in Freud’s view) will replace 
religion. Lacan is, to say the least, less optimistic. As he 
dramatically proclaims in a famed interview he gave at a 
conference in Rome in 1974: “Psychoanalysis will not triumph 
over religion. Religion is inextinguishable. Psychoanalysis will 
never triumph over it - it will either survive or not survive.”115 
So, why does Lacan believe that religion is inextinguishable? 
The answer is given in the same interview: “Religion”, he says, 
“can make sense of anything, no matter what, out of human life 
for example. […] From the beginning ‘religious’ meant making 
sense out of formerly natural things.”116 By virtue of its power to 
give meaning to life and to everything that happens to us in life 
religion will not be defeated easily, and least of all by science, 
whose introduction of ‘countless absolutely earth-shattering 
things into people’s lives’, in Lacan’s perspective, might very 
well end up benefiting rather than eliminating religion.117 As a 
way of creating continuity, consistency and unity out of the 
things that shatter our lives, the concept of meaning is for Lacan 
not only the religious concept par excellence, but also in bleak 
contrast to two of the most essential concepts of psychoanalysis, 
namely the Freudian ‘unconscious’ and Lacanian ‘real’.  
It is from this perspective that we should read Lacan’s (1977, 
7-8) warning in the beginning of Seminar XI not to confuse the 
hermeneutic demand to ‘seek the ever new and never exhausted 
 
115 Lacan, “Press Conference by Doctor Jacques Lacan at the French 
Cultural Center.” On the different perceptions of the relations between 
psychoanalysis, science and religion in Freud and Lacan, see Jacques-Alain 
Miller (2004). 
116 Lacan, “Press Conference by Doctor Jacques Lacan at the French 
Cultural Center.” On this connection between religion and meaning, see 
also Lacan (1977, 7-8; 1980a, 9-10; 1980b, 17-20). 
117 Lacan, “Press Conference by Doctor Jacques Lacan at the French 
Cultural Center.” In his essay Religion, Psychoanalysis Jacques-Alain 
Miller (2004, 18-19) instructively elaborates on this point in the following 
way: “After having given its laws, science has allowed itself to act, to 
master, and to possess—as Descartes said, “to be and to have.” In this 
production it has damaged nature. This has given birth to many movements, 
including social and political. […] This is also what gives a future to 
religion through meaning, namely by erecting barriers—to cloning, to the 
exploitation of human cells—and to inscribe science in a tempered 
progress. We see a marvellous effort, a new youthful vigour of religion in 
its effort to flood the real with meaning.” 
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signification with what psychoanalysis calls interpretation’. In 
contrast to the hermeneutic search for meaning, which Lacan 
explicitly associates with ‘the religious register’ on the same 
pages, psychoanalytical interpretation aims at creating a truth. 
This is a property that psychoanalysis shares with science and 
thus an important point at which it can be distinguished from 
religion (Fink 1995, 57-58). One obviously detects here a strong 
source of inspiration for Badiou’s critical opposition, outlined in 
the previous chapter, to the hermeneutic strand in philosophy. 
This stark opposition between (a religious and hermeneutical) 
operation of meaning and a senseless truth , which Badiou (TC 
78-79) sees as prefigured in Freud and systematically developed 
in Lacan, is the key distinction that Badiou’s employs to 
critically separate himself from religion. Or as he puts in relation 
to Lacan: “It is certainly thanks to Lacan’s implacable knife, to 
the sure way he sliced between the logic of sense and the logic of 
truth, that we have the whole conceptual apparatus in which the 
abjection of pious discourse was made perceptible” (C 136).  
 
Religion and Science 
Although Badiou is thus most certainly inspired by Lacan in his 
view, indeed critique, of religion, there are at least two important 
issues on which Badiou disagrees with Lacan on this matter and 
actually seems to be much closer to Freud. Namely on the 
question of the future of religion and on the question of the 
relationship between religion and science, which is in Badiou’s 
case (basically), mathematics. Another essential issue on which 
Badiou disagrees with Lacan is on the status and possible future 
of philosophy. This disagreement is, as we shall see, not without 
relevance to our context. When it comes to the notorious issue of 
the relationship between religion and science, Badiou’s position 
is, just like Freud’s, good old-fashioned enlightenment 
rationalism. Science, or to be exact the science of mathematics, 
which is the only true rational science in Badiou’s eyes,118 is the 
sole bulwark against all kinds of superstition, obscurantism and 
spirituality (TW 16-17, 27). And on the offensive side, Badiou 
 
118 This seems, at best, to be a rather strange claim. But Badiou is indeed 
infamous for his polemical statements on the natural sciences, especially 
biology, which he simply describes as “[…] that wild empiricism disguised 
as science […]” (TW 17). For a critical discussion of Badiou’s 
understanding the natural sciences, see Brassier (2005) and Johnston 
(2008a).        
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sees mathematics  as the most effective weapon against religion, 
the means by which the death of God must be effectuated. Why? 
Because: “[…] mathematics teaches us that there is no reason 
whatsoever to confine thinking within the ambit of finitude” 
(TW 19). More precisely, since the mathematics of set theory 
was invented by Georg Cantor at the end of the 19th century, it 
has invited us to think infinity separately from its millenary 
theological collusion with the One (B 30), that is, to think that it 
exists in a wholly banal sense in the form of a number (NN 82). 
Or, in the words of Badiou (B 124): “That the infinite is a 
number is what a set-theoretic ontology of the manifold finally 
made possible after centuries of denial and enclosure of the 
infinite within theology’s vocation. This is why the ontology of 
number is an important item in the secularization of the infinite. 
Indeed, it is the only way to be freed from both religion and the 
romantic motif of finitude.” So, to put it bluntly, in Badiou’s 
view, aided by mathematical set theory, the time has come to 
finish off religion; the future prospects of religion do not look 
too bright, which brings us to the next issue.  
Although he was not under any illusion that it was likely to 
happen within the foreseeable future, Freud’s (1961a, 56) 
viewpoint was nevertheless that at some point in the course of 
human history science would inevitably prevail over and replace 
religion. If we take Badiou’s words at face value, he seems to 
agree with Freud, contrary to Lacan, that religion really has no 
future. Indeed, this (no) future has already been inaugurated: 
“Our times are undoubtedly those of the disappearance of the 
gods without return” (B 30). Badiou (B 23) openly admits this 
divergence between Lacan and himself: “Lacan […] can 
certainly not be suspected of clerical complacency. Yet he 
contended that it is strictly impossible to finish up with religion 
once and for all. Now, my conviction on this matter is the 
opposite. I take the formula ‘God is dead’ literally.”119 So, how 
does Badiou imagine that we ‘finish up with religion once and 
for all’?  
Badiou briefly touches upon this question in the preface to 
Briefings on Existence. Here Badiou very neatly distinguishes 
between three different perceptions of God: The encountered 
God of religion, the conceptual God of metaphysics and the 
 
119 On Badiou’s stance on the future prospects of religion, see also The 
Century (TC 166) and Badiou, “A Conversation with Alain Badiou.” 
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absent God of poetry.120 At the end of this text Badiou also gives 
some hints as to how he imagines that these three different 
perceptions of God are abrogated. To finish with the encountered 
God of religion, which Badiou sees as having been dead for a 
while, because God cannot really be encountered anymore, is a 
political problem. “The problem” Badiou (B 30-31) says “is to 
ward off the disastrous effects wrought by any obscure 
subjectivation of this death [of God].” As to the annulment of the 
God of metaphysics, Badiou’s (B 31) answer is that to achieve 
this “[…] thought must accomplish its course in the infinite.” 
This is, as Badiou also likes to phrase it, the task of ‘secularizing 
the infinite’ through an ontology of mathematical set theory. 
Concerning the abolishment of the third God, the God of the 
poets, this is the business of poetry itself. Poetry “[…] must 
cleanse language from within by slicing of the agency of loss 
and return. That is because we have lost nothing and nothing 
returns” (B 31). According to Badiou (MP 77) this task has 
partly been commenced within the poetry of Paul Celan. In 
Badiou’s view, a contemporary atheism is thus what breaks with 
all of these three notions of Gods, and especially with the notion 
of God sustained by the theme of our finitude. 
Let me end this detour on Lacan’s thoughts on religion with a 
brief comment on the question of the future of philosophy in 
Lacan and Badiou. Badiou has written extensively on Lacan and 
at the centre of this engagement is the question of the 
relationship between Lacan, and more generally psychoanalysis, 
and philosophy. In a text on Lacan’s ‘antiphilosphy’, Badiou (C 
228-229) outlines Lacan’s view on this relationship in the 
following way: “Psychoanalysis also has to provide a basis on 
which to judge philosophy in the illusions it propagates, illusions 
that in Lacan’s eyes appeared unlikely to have a brilliant future 
ahead of them, and in any case a much less certain one than the 
illusions of the religious, which, for structural reasons, he held to 
be infinitely more tenacious.” What Badiou is referring to here is 
perhaps the following harsh comment on the future of 
philosophy stated by Lacan (1980b, 17) in a small piece he wrote 
just before his death: “I rise up in revolt, so to speak, against 
philosophy. What is sure is that it is something finite and done 
 
120 I will return to this text and Badiou’s distinction between these three 
perceptions of God in the following sections as I engage in Badiou’s 
polemics against ‘Romanticism’ and his critique of Heidegger’s ‘poetic 
suturing of philosophy’.   
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with. Even if I expect some rejects to grow out of it. Such 
regrowths are common enough with finite things.”121 As 
mentioned in the previous chapter and in stark contrast to what 
Lacan asserts in this quotation, philosophy is in Badiou’s 
opinion, in no way coming to an end. Actually, the most 
important impetus in Badiou’s philosophy since Being and Event 
is perhaps to have done with any idea that philosophy as such 
isn’t possible anymore. So, Badiou ‘retaliates’ not only by 
stamping Lacan as an ‘antiphilosopher’, but by tying him to the 
theme of finitude (LW 481; C 136) and thus in the end to the 
dubiousness of religion.122 This is done partly through the 
mediation of Heidegger, who was one of Lacan’s great sources 
of inspiration, but who, in Badiou’s eyes, is also, along with 
Kant, the philosopher of finitude par excellence. In short, what 
Badiou blames Lacan for is his use of the Heideggerian notion of 
‘being-towards-death’: “Lacan believes he can also connect the 
Freudian concept of death drive to Heidegger’s existential 
analysis, which defines Dasein as being-for-death.”123 Badiou’s 
point here is of course that through his embracement of the 
notion of ‘being-toward-death’ Lacan ends up advocating our 
limited, finite, ‘only human’ mortal nature, in short our 
finitude.124 
 
121 The English translation of Lacan’s text is Bruno Bosteels’ (2008, 157-
158), who quotes the same passage in his article “Radical Antiphilosphy.” 
122 I am not capable of judging if this is a fair reading of Lacan, however, it 
is worth noticing that even one of his greatest disciples, namely Žižek (PV 
110), admits that: “Unfortunately, there is also a Lacanian version of the 
philosophy of finitude […].” 
123 Badiou, “Lacan and the Pre-socratics,” 14. However, as Žižek (TN 180) 
points out, there is a shift in the 1960s in Lacan’s use of the notion of death-
drive away from this attempt to connect it to Heidegger’s notion of being-
towards-death, toward an understanding of it as the ‘undead’ lamella, the 
indestructible-immortal life that persists beyond death. 
124 Let me note in passing that an important criticism against Badiou has 
been advanced by Žižek concerning the understanding of the Freudian 
notion of death-drive, which Badiou (e.g. LW 509) sometimes is a bit too 
quick to lump together with everything else linked to the theme of death 
and finitude. What Badiou misses by doing this is, according to Žižek (PV 
110): “The proper Freudian paradox that what explodes the constraints of 
our finitude is the death-drive if self.” (See also Žižek, “Badiou: Notes on 
an ongoing debate,” 9). What is of particularly importance about this 
discussion of notion of the death-drive is that Žižek argues that Badiou 
needs this concept to bridge what otherwise ends up being an 
insurmountable severance between the (mortal) human animal of being on 
the one hand and the (immortal) subject of a truth-event on the other. Or to 
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To conclude this section one could say that in more general 
terms Badiou’s (B23) charge against Lacan is that he, unlike 
Badiou himself, does not take the formula ‘God is dead’ literally. 
No doubt Lacan would plead guilty as charged, precisely 
because from a Lacanian perspective taking this formula literally 
would be rather problematic. Let me, as a critical remark to 
Badiou, briefly propose why. One of Freud’s (1961c, 204) well-
known points in his critical analysis of the myth of the murder of 
the primal father is that the father does not lose his sway over his 
sons just because they kill him, but  as a result of his death, ends 
up turning into a far more powerful divine figure. Against this 
background Lacan (1977, 59) argues that “[…] the true formula 
of atheism is not God is dead […] the true formula of atheism is 
God is unconscious.” In short, it is only when we realize that 
God still haunts us even (or maybe especially) after his death, 
that a genuine atheism is possible. As Žižek (HTRL 93) 
suggests, Lacan’s point is perhaps best illustrated through the 
following joke: A man is sent to a mental institution, because he 
believes that he is a grain of seed. The doctor at the mental 
institution does his best and finally convinces the man that he is 
not a grain of seed, but a man. And so the man is released. No 
sooner has he left the hospital than he is back trembling and very 
scared, claiming that there is a chicken outside the door and he is 
afraid that it will eat him. “Dear fellow”, says his doctor, “you 
know very well that you are not a grain of seed, but a man”. “Of 
course I know that”, the patient replies, “but does the chicken 
know it?” Zupančič (2008b, 15-16) brilliantly and instructively 
reformulated this joke in the following way:  
 
rephrase it, according to Žižek (TTS 160, 163-64), Badiou needs the death-
drive to explain what it is about the human animal that makes it susceptible 
to the event. Eric L. Santner (2005, 112) has proposed a similar criticism: 
“The ‘vital disorganization’ inaugurated by a ‘truth-event’ happens not 
simply to an animal pursuing its predatory interests but one whose animal 
life has already been amplified – one might even say disrupted, 
disorganized – by what Fred referred to as Triebschicksal or ‘drive destiny’. 
What Badiou seems to lose sight of here is, in a word, nothing less than the 
difference between animal instinct and human drive.” This critique is 
somewhat overlapping with Žižek’s (TTS 163-164) abovementioned 
reservation against Badiou’s (mis)understanding of the Kantian conception 
of finitude, which in Žižek’s (TTS 66) perspective is precisely the 
introduction of the same ‘undead’ or ‘inhuman’ domain of human 
existence, that the Freudian notion of ‘death-drive denotes. I will return to 
and explore this discussion in a greater extend in chapter four on the 
theories of subjectivity in Žižek and Badiou.   
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In the enlightened society of, say, revolutionary terror, a man is put 
in prison because he believes in God. With different measures, but 
above all by means of an enlightened explanation, he is brought to 
the knowledge that God does not exist. When dismissed, the man 
comes running back, and explains how scared he is of being 
punished by God. Of course he knows that God does not exist, but 
does God also know that?  
 
Žižek’s (HTRL 93) succeeding comment on this joke is that 
“[…] it is not enough to convince the patient about the 
unconscious truth of his symptoms, the unconscious itself must 
be brought to assume this truth.” In other words, only when you 
realize that ‘God is unconscious’, that God is not just a 
subjective illusion, which can be dissolved simply by being told 
or proclaiming that he does not exist, is it possible to approach a 
true atheist position where it is not only oneself, but also God 
himself, who knows he is dead. In line with Žižek (PV 352) I am 
tempted here to ask if not the cry of the Christian God on the 
cross – ‘My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me’ (Mark 
15:34; Matt. 27:46) – is exactly an expression of such a God who 
has realized his own (imminent) death? That is, a God, to put it 
the words of G.K. Chesterton (2007, 130), who “[…] seemed for 
an instant to be an atheist.” 
 
To Have Done with Romanticism  
Now, let us take a closer look at the most thorough example of 
Badiou’s critique of the metaphysics of finitude, namely his 
dismissal of romantic philosophy, or what he also calls 
‘Romanticism’. In short Badiou (TW 26) defines ‘Romanticism’ 
as any thinking that determines the infinite as a horizontal 
correlate for the finite, and he emphasizes that: “Today in 
particular, what essentially subsists of Romanticism is the theme 
of finitude.”125 Badiou (TW 27) explicitly stages his critique of 
Romanticism as a confrontation with religion in general, but also 
more specifically with the recurrent ‘return to religion in 
philosophy’. Or, in Badiou’s (TW 27) own more colourful terms: 
 
125 Or as Badiou put is in one of his interviews: “The real romantic heritage-
-which is still with us today--is the theme of finitude. The idea that an 
apprehension of the human condition occurs primordially in the 
understanding of its finitude maintains infinity at a distance that's both 
evanescent and sacred, and holds it in the vicinity of a vision of being that's 
still theological.” Badiou, “Being by numbers – Lauren Sedofsky talks with 
Alain Badiou,” 86. 
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That this critique is urgently required is confirmed by the spectacle 
– also very Romantic – of the increasing collusion between 
philosophy (or what passes for philosophy) and religions of all 
kinds, since the collapse of Marxist politics. Can we really be 
surprised at so-and-so’s rabbinical Judaism, or so-and-so’s 
conversion to Islam, or another’s thinly veiled Christian devotion, 
given that everything we hear boils down to this: that we are 
‘consigned to finitude’ and are ‘essentially mortal’?126   
 
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, this critique of 
Romanticism is part of a more comprehensive move by Badiou 
to re-establish philosophy as such at a time when it has become 
commonplace to declare its end. And a survey of some aspects of 
this move is therefore necessary. 
 
Badiou’s Platonic Gesture  
Badiou’s countermove against the prophecy of ‘the end of 
philosophy’, perhaps most famously declared by Heidegger,127 
but according to Badiou (MP 27; C 9, 95; D 5; IF 45), a 
conviction shared by all of the major orientations in 
contemporary philosophy, is a return to Plato, or the execution of 
what he describes as a ‘Platonic gesture’ (MP 96). Obviously, 
there is also a polemical aspect to this declaration of 
Platonism.128 However, as Badiou (C 10) explicitly underlines, 
his return to Plato is: “Not in order to restore the prescriptive 
figure from which modernity has wished to subtract itself, but to 
examine whether there is not another Platonic act on basis of 
which the future of our thought must be supported.” This ‘other 
Platonic act’ has at least three closely connected aspects or 
elements.129 The first element is an affirmation that Plato is the 
 
126 This quotation also obviously suggests, as I have argued in the previous 
chapter, that it would be a serious mistake to understand Badiou’s book on 
Paul as part of a return to religion in contemporary philosophy. 
127 See Heidegger’s (1993) lecture “The End of Philosophy and the Task of 
Thinking” from 1964. 
128 See, for instance, Badiou, “Plato, dear Plato,” 39, Badiou, ”Politics and 
Philosophy– An interview with Alain Badiou,” 123 and Badiou, “Being by 
numbers – Lauren Sedofsky talks with Alain Badiou,” 87. 
129 Badiou’s engagement with Plato and Platonism has - to a greater or 
lesser degree - been present in all of his works since Being and Event. It is 
thus a long and complex affair still developing (the title of his seminars at 
ENS has since 2006 been and still is Pour aujourd’hui: Platon!), which I 
cannot do justy to here. However, to avoid any misunderstandings let me 
just for the record stress that Badiou’s ‘Platonic gesture’ is of course not a 
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founding historical and conceptual configuration – and not, as it 
has become fashionable to claim, the nihilistic forgetting – of a 
singular mode of thought.130 The second consists in a double 
rupture – with the Romanticism which has had a decisive 
influence on philosophy from Hegel to Heidegger, and with what 
currently goes by the name of ‘Platonism’. The third aspect 
involves a parallel extensive rereading of Plato’s metaphysics in 
terms of a remoulding of the relationship both between 
philosophy and mathematics and between philosophy and poetry. 
I will focus mainly on the first part of the second aspect, 
Badiou’s rupture with Romanticism, which as we shall see, is 
itself a double rupture. A rupture with the modern 
disentanglement of philosophy and mathematics, and a rupture 
with contemporary philosophy’s ‘suture’ to poetry. However, 
this second aspect cannot be entirely isolated from the two other 
aspects and some detours into these are thus unavoidable. The 
framework that Badiou sets up for (and throughout) this 
threefold gesture forms the (platonic) conception of philosophy 
that he outlines for the first time and perhaps most systematically 
in his Manifesto for Philosophy. Since this is the conceptual and 
narrative background of Badiou’s critique of Romanticism, I will 
have to begin my exposition of the latter with a review of this 
conception of philosophy.  
Philosophy is fundamentally Platonic for Badiou (MP 34) 
because it is a specific form of thinking that began with Plato, 
when the latter created one single conceptual space, or what 
Badiou names a space of ‘compossibility’, in which what Badiou  
considers to be the perpetual conditions of philosophy could be 
declared and thought together. These conditions are, as noted in 
the previous chapter, the ‘generic-procedures’ or ‘truth-
procedures’ that (might) follow the events, which from time to 
time occur in the fields of science, art, politics and love, and that 
(might) induce a truth in these fields (BE 4; MP 37; C 23). 
However, what interests Badiou about Plato’s philosophy is not 
only the claim that the philosophy is conditioned by something 
 
return to the transcendent dimension of Platonism ; rather, it is an attempt to 
work out a ‘Platonism of the multiple’, that is, a Platonism that in the wake 
of modern mathematics acknowledges the multiplicity of being and thus 
gives up any recourse to the One (MP 103).  
130 In accordance with this Badiou (MP 97-102; C 9; D 100-102; H 36-45) 
also criticizes contemporary philosophy for its ‘anti-Platonism’, see for 
instants Manifesto for Philosophy, Conditions, Gilles Deleuze: The Clamor 
of Being and Handbook of Inaesthetics. 
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outside itself, but also the claim that philosophy is characterized 
by a specific relationship to these conditions, which has to do 
with Plato’s conception of truth. According to Badiou (C 11) 
philosophy itself does not produce any truths, but is “[…] an 
operation carried out on the basis of truths, one that disposes the 
‘there is’ of truth and their epochal compossibility.” More 
precisely, philosophy makes the truths produced in the domains 
of science, politics, art and love manifest by distinguishing them 
as ‘truth’ from opinion or knowledge (HI 15). It is in this sense 
that we should understand Badiou’s (C 43) assertion, that 
philosophy has nothing to do with hermeneutics; philosophy is 
not about the interpretation of its conditions, rather philosophy is 
an act. More precisely philosophy is, as I have already implied, 
the act through which the truths conditioning philosophy are 
separated from the ordinary circulation of sense, opinion and 
knowledge. Badiou (C 24) terms this separating act ‘seizing’:  
 
The act of seizing […] picks truths out from the dross of sense, 
separating them from the law of the world. Philosophy is subtractive 
in that it makes holes in sense, or causes an interruption in the 
circulation of sense, so that it may come that truths are said all 
together. Philosophy is a sense-less or mad (insensé) act, and by the 
same token rational.131 
 
This act of seizing the truths produced by art, science, politics 
and love is performed by means of philosophy’s ‘operational 
category of Truth’ in which all the contemporary truths produced 
in the four domains of science, art, politics and love can co-exist, 
or, enjoy a space of ‘compossibility’.132 All of these conditions, 
that is, all of the four truth-procedures, must be present and 
seized at the same time for philosophy to be possible. As a 
consequence of this, there are at least two instances in which 
philosophy as such dissolves. Firstly, if just one of these 
conditions are somehow absent there cannot, strictly speaking, 
be philosophy. Secondly, if philosophy privileges one (or more) 
 
131 This seizing is, as Badiou (C 13) also make clear, a double both active 
and passive movement: “Philosophy is the site through which (non-
philosophical) truths seize us and are seized as such.”  
132 The philosophical category of Truth (with a capital T) is, and must 
remain, empty. As Badiou (C 11) says: “It operates, but it presents 
nothing.” Badiou (C 13) also likens this operation to ‘a sort of pincer 
movement’: in one and the same movement separating out and keeping 
together the truths that it seizes.    
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of the four truth-procedures and thus subordinates itself to or 
identifies itself with a particular truth-procedure. Badiou (MP 
61-68) terms this a ‘suturing’ of philosophy to its conditions.133 
So, for instance in Marxism philosophy tends to form a suture to 
politics, or in Positivism we have a suturing to science. In other 
words, a suture is formed, when “[…] philosophy delegates its 
functions to one or other of its conditions, handing over the 
whole of thought to one generic procedure. Philosophy is then 
carried out in the element of its own suppression to the great 
benefit of that procedure” (MP 61). As we shall see, 
Romanticism falls prey to both of these issues. Thus, in 
summary, three of the most significant elements that Badiou 
takes on and develops from Plato are (i) that philosophy is 
conditioned by something other than itself, (ii) that philosophy is 
about creating a space of compossibility in which all four of 
these conditions can be declared to exist together and distinctive 
at the same time, and (iii) that the central category for 
philosophy to seize its conditions and create this space of 
compossibility is Truth. 
But there is another aspect, probably the most important, that 
Badiou adopts from Plato, namely the insistence on a founding 
and necessary entanglement of philosophy and mathematics. The 
insistence on the utmost importance of mathematics to 
philosophy is certainly a continuous and general theme in 
Badiou’s work. However, in the case of his critique of 
Romanticism, and the attempt to re-establish philosophy that this 
critique is part of, it must also be perceived more specifically 
against the backdrop of his ambiguous relationship with 
Heidegger.134 On the very first pages of Being and Event Badiou 
(BE 2) explicitly acknowledges the most important debt he owes 
 
133 In Manifesto for philosophy the concept of ‘suture’ constitutes the basic 
principle through which Badiou on a few pages organizes the history of 
19th and 20th century philosophy in a rather superficial but also very 
enlightening way. As we shall see, in this period philosophy is indeed, in 
Badiou’s view, characterized, and thus partly annulled, by its different 
sutures to its conditions. 
134 I cannot give a detailed account of this relationship here, which would as 
a minimum demand an exhaustive exegesis of the meditation (11) on 
Heidegger in Being and Event. I will look further into some aspects of the 
critique of Heidegger proposed by Badiou in the Manifesto for Philosophy 
at the end of this chapter. For a more thorough discussions of different 
aspects of the relationship between Badiou and Heidegger, see: Nancy 
(2004), de Beistegui (2005), Lacoue-Labarthe (2007) and Clemens and 
Roffe (2008).   
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to Heidegger: “Along with Heidegger, it will be maintained that 
philosophy as such can only be re-assigned on the basis of the 
ontological question.”135 However, this quotation not only 
confirms a Heideggerian inspiration in respect to ontology, it 
furthermore implies that Badiou’s attempt to ‘reassign 
philosophy as such’ is also prefigured in Heidegger. Although 
one could say – and Badiou does – that Heidegger gave up on 
this and instead declared the ‘end of philosophy’. Precisely 
because of this, Heidegger is also a major opponent in Badiou’s 
attempt to re-establish and rearrange philosophy according to the 
question of being.136 At the heart of this opposition lays the 
platonic issue of the relationship between mathematics and 
philosophy. Badiou’s (MP 32) insistence, in opposition to 
Heidegger, on the continuation of the latter, on the possibility of 
taking one more step in the configuration that began with Plato, 
can be summarized exactly as the attempt to repeat Plato’s 
founding entanglement of mathematics and philosophy. 
Romanticism, on the other hand, is to Badiou (TW 24) just 
another word for the disentanglement of mathematics and 
philosophy. So, how should we understand this disentanglement? 
How did it come about? That is the question I will try to answer 
in a moment. But first, we need to take a closer look at what this 
founding entanglement of mathematics and philosophy consists 
in.  
According to Badiou, the entanglement between mathematics 
and philosophy, introduced by Plato, had two significant 
consequences. Firstly, it was through the inauguration of the 
matheme into the poetic thought of being that philosophy was 
born as a new thought of being, untied from poetry. Contrary to 
Heidegger, Badiou (BE 126) does not understand this 
 
135 Badiou (B 33) also praises Heidegger for having reintroduced the 
question of being in the short, but important text “The Question of Being 
Today”. 
136 Again, this is a rather complex matter, however, in Badiou’s (BE 10-11) 
view the core of it is, as he  polemically states it in Being and Event, that: 
“Heidegger still remains enslaved, even in the doctrine of withdrawal and 
the un-veiling, to what I consider, for my part, to be the essence of 
metaphysics; that is, the figure of being as endowment and gift, as presence 
and opening, and the figure of ontology as the offering of a trajectory of 
proximity. I will call this type of ontology poetic; ontology haunted by the 
dissipation of Presence and the loss of the origin.”  In other words, Badiou 
relates in roughly the same way to Heidegger as Heidegger relates to 
Nietzsche: Despite its critique of the metaphysics of presence Heidegger’s 
philosophy remains itself part of the same metaphysics.   
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overlapping in the thought of being as “[…] that of a forgetting, 
but rather that of a supplement […] in the form of a caesura and 
an interruption.” Although Badiou hereby agrees with Heidegger 
in that there has been a ‘platonic turn’ in the eyes of Badiou, this 
turn does certainly not, as Heidegger suggests, inaugurate a 
forgetting of the question of being; on the contrary, it is the very 
institution, the beginning, of ontology proper. According to 
Badiou (BE 126), what Plato did by introducing the matheme 
was not to cover up ontology as the native figure of western 
philosophy, but rather to found this figure by untying thought 
from its enchainment to the poem. Secondly, the relationship to 
mathematics also had significant consequences for the category 
of truth, because it imposed “[…] an interruption of the collusion 
organized by the poem between truth and the sacred authority of 
the image or of the story” (C 36). So, it is really through 
mathematics that philosophy attains a concept of truth which, 
founded on an event that has no objective verifiable content, 
interrupts or breaks with knowledge or the general opinion. The 
relation between philosophy and mathematics established by 
Plato is thus absolutely imperative for Badiou.  
However, there is also an attempt on Badiou’s behalf to 
modify an aspect of this relationship. In contrast to Plato, 
Badiou’s insistence on a necessary entanglement of mathematics 
and philosophy does not entail that he on account of mathematics 
simply expels poetry from philosophy, since on Badiou’s (HI 36-
45) own terms this would strictly speaking be an annulment of 
philosophy all together. But, there is surely a hierarchy or a 
priority between mathematics and poetry in Badiou’s (BE 126) 
philosophy, since: “The Greeks did not invent the poem. Rather, 
they interrupted the poem with the matheme.” And there is no 
doubt also a conflict between them, but a conflict in terms of a 
resemblance, since poetry, at least in its modern form, like 
mathematics is a means of subtraction in terms of its ‘method of 
disobjectivation’ (MP 76).137 Thus, for Badiou it seems to be a 
question of maintaining a tension between mathematics and 
poetry, rather than excluding the one over the other. While Plato 
ended up banishing the poets from the polis and Heidegger in his 
return to the pre-Socratics wanted to exclude mathematics from 
philosophy, Badiou (HI 44) wants to follow Pessoa’s example 
 
137 According to Badiou there are principally two different methods of 
disobjectivation in poetry represented by Mallarmé and Rimbaud. See 
Badiou Conditions (chapter 5 and 6). 
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and take a path in between: “Pessoa’s modernity lies in casting 
doubt on the pertinence of the Platonism/anti-Platonism 
opposition: The task of the thought-poem is neither allegiance to 
Platonism nor its reversal.”  
 
Philosophy’s Suturing to Art and Disentanglement from 
Mathematics  
This finally brings us back to the contemporary proclamation of 
the ‘end of philosophy’ and Badiou’s critique of Romanticism 
and its adherence to the theme of finitude. Because, in Badiou’s 
(MP 67) view, the problem of most of today’s philosophy is first 
of all its continued suturing to one of its conditions, namely art, 
or more precisely poetry. If we dig a little deeper, this suturing 
has its origin in a disentanglement of philosophy and 
mathematics which commenced in the 19th century with the 
advent of Romanticism, as well as in philosophy’s attempt to 
disconnect itself from two other sutures (which ultimately also 
has its root in the romantic disentanglement of philosophy and 
mathematics). Badiou (TW 27) sees this double-incident of 
philosophy’s disentanglement from mathematics and suturing to 
poetry as the basis of the wide-spread presupposition of the ‘end 
of philosophy’, and, what is the mere flipside of this 
presupposition, “[…] the increasing collusion between 
philosophy (or what passes for philosophy) and religions of all 
kinds […]”. Badiou’s double rupture with this double-incident 
therefore invokes a severe critique of the metaphysics of 
finitude.  
So how did the romantic disentanglement of mathematics and 
philosophy come about? In Badiou’s (TW 23) exposition of the 
history of philosophy it is easy to trace how from Plato all the 
way through Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz up to and including 
Kant, mathematics played a very important role in philosophy as 
the singular form of thinking that “[…] allowed the inaugural 
break with superstition and ignorance.” Or in other words, 
mathematics has always been the most powerful means to 
secularize and thus enable philosophy’s attempt to think the 
infinite apart from the One. “But the philosophy of 
Romanticism”, as Badiou (TW 24) puts it, has “[…] shaped the 
conviction that philosophy can and must deploy a thinking that 
does not at any moment internalize mathematics as condition for 
that deployment.” And so with the advent of romantic 
philosophy, in which Hegel is the decisive figure, philosophy 
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separates itself from mathematics.138 This separation came about 
first of all through the historicism, or what Badiou (TW 25) also 
depicts as a ‘temporalization of the concept’, which was 
introduced by romanticism.139 As, Badiou (TW 26) explains: 
 
It was the newfound certainty that the infinite or true being could 
only be apprehended through its own temporality that led the 
Romantics to depose mathematics from its localization as a 
condition for philosophy. Thus the ideal and atemporal character of 
mathematical thinking figured as the central argument in this 
deposition.  
 
Thus Romanticism establishes a still highly effective polemical 
opposition between mathematics, depicted as static and lifeless, 
and time as the fundamental element of dynamic life (TW 25-
26). In the tenet of Romanticism: Is not the ‘abstract poverty’ of 
cold mathematics obvious compared to the richness and vitality 
of real concrete life? Against this background, mathematics loses 
its status as a resource for thinking infinity; also infinity must be 
thought as a historical concept. More specifically, the old status 
of mathematics as the main resource for thinking infinity is taken 
over by philosophy itself.  
Badiou’s main example here is Hegel, in so far that Badiou 
wants to illustrate the inauguration of historicism through an 
examination of Hegel’s analysis of the infinite. According to 
Badiou, the change that occurs in the relationship between 
philosophy and mathematics is due to the fact that in Hegel’s 
 
138 In the “Introduction” to the Science of Logic Hegel (1989, 53) does 
indeed explicitly call for such a separation of philosophy from mathematics: 
“Spinoza, Wolf and others have let themselves be misled in applying it 
[mathematics] also to philosophy and in making the external course 
followed by Notion-less quantity, the course of the Notion, a procedure 
which is absolutely contradictory. Hitherto philosophy had not found its 
method; it regarded with envy the systematic structure of mathematics and, 
as we have said, borrowed it […]. However, the exposition of what alone 
can be the truth method of philosophical science falls within the treatment 
of logic itself; for the method is the consciousness of the form of the inner 
self-movement of the content of logic.”    
139 Of course one wonders here how Badiou can completely ignore that in 
modern philosophy from Nietzsche to Foucault history has served as an 
important resource for critique. And even in pre-modern philosophy history 
was used as a critical weapon. Thus Spinoza’s critique of the Judaic-
Christian religion in Tractatus Theologico-Politicus was done, not on the 
basis of mathematic, but on the contrary on basis of early historical-critical 
method in biblical exegesis. 
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analysis in the Science of Logic, the mathematical infinite is 
represented as a concept, rather than as a domain of objects 
(numbers and figures), which had been the common way of 
representation in mathematics since Plato.140 By representing the 
mathematical infinite in terms of a concept Hegel sets it on par 
with the philosophical concept of the infinite. And in short, 
Badiou’s (TW 37) complaint is that by doing this (representing 
the mathematical infinite as a concept) Hegel crucially turns the 
relationship between philosophy and mathematics into a 
relationship of rivalry.  
This radically changes the perspective on the relationship 
between the mathematical and the philosophical infinite. In his 
reading of a passage from the section on the ‘infinity of 
quantum’ in Science of Logic, in which Hegel examines the 
mathematics of  the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Badiou 
(TW 19) praises the latter for seeing “[…] before anyone else: 
ultimately, mathematics proposes a new concept of the infinite.” 
However, and this is where Badiou’s criticism begins, in Hegel’s 
perceptive (in which the relationship between the mathematical 
and the philosophical infinite is one of rivalry) this new 
mathematical conception of the infinite is in the end just a 
necessary stage on the passage to a more adequate speculative or 
philosophical concept of  infinity. Or, as Badiou (TW 37) 
critically notes: “Once instructed by philosophy as to the true 
concept of the infinite we see that its mathematical concept is no 
more than a crude, dispensable stage on the way to the former.” 
In the end Hegel identifies the mathematical infinite with what 
he famously terms the ‘bad’ infinite (schlechte Unendlichkeit), 
that is to say, the infinite perceived as an endless succession of 
finite elements (like for instance a line of numbers 1, 2, 3…). As 
such the ‘bad’ infinite is noting but the endless repetition of one 
finite element after another. However, Badiou not only disagrees 
with Hegel about whether the mathematical infinite can be 
reduced to this concept of ‘bad’ infinite, he vigorously rejects the 
latter’s conception of the ‘good’ (philosophical) infinite. This of 
course raises the question of what the characteristics of this 
Hegelian, and more widely the romantic philosophical concept 
 
140 In the following I will keep to Badiou’s label designations ‘the 
philosophical infinite’ and ‘the mathematical infinite’, thought the 
prevailing terminology in the field of philosophical research in the infinite 
is ‘the metaphysically infinite’ and ‘the mathematically infinite’ (Moore 
2002).   
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of the infinite are, and how it is different from the mathematical 
infinite as Badiou understands it. 
In short, Badiou’s (TW 26) answer to these questions is that 
romantic philosophy “[…] established the idea that the genuine 
infinite only manifests itself as a horizontal structure for the 
historicity of the finitude of existence. But both the representation 
of the limit as a horizon and the theme of finitude are entirely 
foreign to mathematics, whose own conception of the limit is 
that of a present-point and whose thinking of requires 
presupposition of the infinity of its site.” While the mathematical 
conception of an abstract and empty infinity is indifferent to 
temporality, the conception of the infinite forwarded by 
Romanticism is thought in relation to the theme of finitude. With 
Romanticism, infinity becomes the un-crossable limit against 
which man appears in all his fragile and ephemeral historicity. 
At the same time infinity, as an unreachable horizon of 
finiteness, also becomes an irredeemable lost object of an 
insatiable yearning. Infinity is thus placed in opposition to frail 
materiality and historical mortality, or in short finitude. And it is 
precisely the theme of finitude that is the heart of the matter in 
Badiou’s (TW 28) critique of Romanticism’s devaluation of 
mathematics: “There is a very tenacious and profound link 
between the disentanglement of mathematics and philosophy and 
the preservation, in the inverted or diverted form of finitude, of a 
non-appropriable or unnameable horizon of immortal divinity.” 
Hampering the continued mathematical secularization of the 
infinite by localizing the infinite as a horizontal correlative for 
the historicity of finitude, Romanticism thus keeps the door open 
for a return of the divine. The theme of finitude re-sacralises 
existence with its nostalgic longing after and its latent promise of 
an unattainable infinity. Again, for Badiou the stakes of this are 
obvious: “As long as finitude remains the ultimate determination 
of existence, God abides. He abides as that whose disappearance 
continues to hold sway over us, in the form of the abandonment, 
the dereliction, or leaving-behind of Being” (TW 28). But more 
precisely what God is it that abides with Romanticism? Badiou’s 
answer is, as we shall see, first and foremost the God of the 
poets. This brings us to Badiou’s critique of the contemporary 
philosopher of finitude par excellence, namely Martin 
Heidegger. 
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Heidegger Revisited 
Romanticism designates the period in which philosophy is 
characterized by its disentanglement from mathematics, but as 
mentioned earlier it is also a period characterized by 
philosophy’s suturing to poetry.141 Yet, poetry is not the only 
condition that philosophy has been sutured to in the wake of 
Romanticism. As a consequence of its disentanglement from 
mathematics, philosophy has since the beginning of the 19th 
century in fact been the captive of a whole network of sutures to 
its conditions (MP 64). The most important of these being the 
scientific or Positivist, and the Marxist. In his Manifesto for 
philosophy, Badiou describes how these two sutures have 
hampered philosophy from the nineteenth century and well into 
twentieth century. However, philosophy did also try to resist 
these sutures. And actually the most effective resistance 
paradoxically turned out to be forming a new suture, namely a 
suture to art, first of all to poetry. Or as, Badiou (MP 66) puts it:  
 
If, in the nineteenth century and beyond, philosophy endured the 
dual suture to its political condition and its scientific condition, it is 
entirely understandable that, especially since Nietzsche, the 
temptation to be delivered through suturing to another condition is 
wielded onto it. Art was fully designated. What culminates with 
Heidegger is the anti-positivist and anti-Marxist effort to put 
philosophy in the hands of the poem.  
 
This period of philosophy’s suture to poetry that begins in the 
nineteenth century overlaps to some degree with what Badiou 
calls ‘the age of poets’ (MP 69). A title that alludes to the fact 
that while philosophy through its suture to poetry gave way on 
its own project, poetry concurrently took on parts of this project. 
Thus the age of poets is characterized by a number of poets like 
Hölderlin, Mallarmé, Rimbaud, Trakl, Pessoa, Mandelstam and 
Celan who are doing a sort of philosophy instead of philosophy 
itself (MP 69-77). According to Badiou though, the age of poets 
came to an end with Paul Celan, in whose poems Badiou (MP 
86) “read, as poetically stated, the avowal that poetry no longer 
suffices to itself; that it requests to be relieved of the burden of 
 
141 In Handbook of Inaesthetics and The Century Badiou furthermore 
extends this critique of Romanticism to art. For a thorough study, that 
places Badiou’s discussion of Romanticism in relation to the immense field 
of literature on this subject, see Justin Clemens (2003) book The 
Romanticism in Contemporary Theory. 
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the suture, that it hopes for a philosophy relieved of the crushing 
authority of the poem.” And this brings us back to the 
proclamation of the end of philosophy and to Heidegger.   
In Badiou’s view, Heidegger’s designation of modern science 
and the totalitarian state as the main effects of technology is not 
completely off the mark, since Heidegger hereby actually 
highlights the two dominant sutures that thought must separate 
itself from if it is not to vanish in its philosophical form. 
However, in stark opposition to Badiou, the path that Heidegger 
suggests is not a return to philosophy, since in Heidegger’s view 
philosophy as such has been realized as technology and has thus 
come to an end. Instead Heidegger delegates thought to its 
artistic condition, to poetry (MP 66-67). Thus, in Badiou’s 
opinion, philosophy has still not taken Celan’s request to un-
suture itself from poetry seriously; on the contrary, the suture has 
been widely sustained, by Heidegger and his successors. In this 
sense Romanticism still prevails (MP 66; H 6; IF 42).142 As 
Badiou (MP 67) puts it: “[…] what has given potency to the 
poeticizing suture, and thus to Heidegger, is far from having 
been undone, indeed has never even been examined.”143  
Hence while Badiou credits Heidegger for exposing 
philosophy’s sutures to its scientific and political conditions, he 
is fiercely opposed to the Heideggerian narrative of technology 
as the nihilist culmination of the history of metaphysics as 
forgetting of being, or in other words technology and nihilism as 
the realization of philosophy. Not only because Heidegger 
through this narrative, and his delegation of thought to the poem, 
proclaims the end of philosophy, but because he, in Badiou’s 
(TW 42) view, hereby also proclaims the return of religion: “In 
Heidegger himself the characterisation of metaphysics as history 
 
142  The successors Badiou have in mind are first and foremost the French 
philosophers Jacques Derrida, Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-
Labarthe. But of course Heidegger’s heirs are far more wide-ranging. See 
Clemens and Roffe (2008).     
143 Although Heidegger certainly is Badiou’s main target of critique in his 
discussion of the relationship between philosophy and poetry, he 
nevertheless also acknowledges a certain debt to the latter: “I want to retain 
from Heidegger the devaluation of philosophical aesthetics and the critical 
limitation of the effects of the Platonic procedure of exclusion. On the other 
hand, I want to contest the idea that philosophy is, as is claimed, in 
conditions that are those of its end and that this end must be sutured to the 
authority, one without argument, of the poem” (C 40). See also Manifesto 
for philosophy (MP 74). 
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of being is inseparable from a proclamation whose ultimate 
expression, it has to be admitted, is that ‘only a god can save 
us’.” While Heidegger and his successors certainly have 
exercised a devastating critique of metaphysic as onto-theology, 
not just in its classical form, but in all its modern and 
postmodern guises, paradoxically, the same critique keeps the 
door open for the re-sacralisation of the world. It makes possible 
“[…] the hypothesis of a return of the Gods, of an event wherein 
the mortal danger to which the annihilating will expose Man – 
technology’s civil servant – would be surpassed or conjured 
away by a sheltering of Being […]” (MP 51). Thus under the 
reign of Heidegger’s thought, philosophy is “caught between the 
depletion of its historical possibility and the coming without 
concept of a salvational turnabout” (C 4). A ‘salvational 
turnabout’ that Badiou (MP 51) sees Heidegger as placing in the 
hands of the poets: “To say ‘only a God can save us’ means: the 
thinking that poets teach […] may uphold at the heart of nihilism 
the possibility, devoid of any way or means open to utterance, of 
a resacralization of the Earth.” In other words, the God that 
abides with the assertion of the end of philosophy is the God of 
the poets (B 28).144 However, according to Badiou (CT 31), the 
critical abolishment of the God of the poets is first of all the task, 
not of philosophy, but of poetry. 
So to summarize: Badiou’s critique of Romanticism, 
including his engagement with Heidegger, can be seen as an 
attempt to dissolve philosophy’s contemporary suture to the 
poem by way of enacting a platonic ‘re-entanglement’ of 
philosophy with mathematics. It is through this manoeuvre that 
he claims that it is possible to expel the religious tendencies in 
romantic philosophy’s return to the One in the form of the theme 
of finitude.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have outlined the (predominantly negative) 
notion of religion implicit in Badiou’s work by examining the 
way in which he both directly and indirectly relates to the issue 
of religion through his engagement in a number of philosophical 
and political polemics. More precisely, I have focused on three 
different but interrelated polemical incidents in which Badiou 
 
144 For critical discussion of Badiou’s reading of Heidegger see the first 
chapter of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe’s (2007, 19-37) book Heidegger and 
the Politics of Poetry. 
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engages critically with religion: his critique of what I have called 
the metaphysics of finitude, his attempt against the contemporary 
prophesies of its end to re-establish the autonomy of philosophy, 
and his critique of religion as a strategy to marginalize his rivals.   
From a strictly theological perspective, the significance of 
Badiou’s critical engagement with the metaphysics of finitude 
does perhaps not so much concern the critique of religion that 
this engagement also involves. Not only because the implicit 
critique of religion that can be extracted from Badiou’s critique 
of the metaphysics of finitude does not really in any aspect 
surpass the more sophisticated traditional critiques of religion 
from Hume to Freud, but perhaps even more so because it is very 
questionable to which degree (if any at all) any real existing 
religion would be able to actually recognize itself in and thus be 
affected by Badiou’s critique, since his engagement with religion 
in its concrete forms (religious texts, practices and institutions) is 
next to none. In line with this, two questions arise. Firstly, does 
not Badiou’s rather broad definition of religion as the equation of 
meaning and truth risk complete over-determination, so that 
anything can be designated as religion, and secondly, does this 
definition of religion really encompass all religious experiences 
and practices? Or, as Žižek (PV 182) stresses in a passage from 
The Parallax View, following a discussion of Lacan’s contrast 
between meaning and truth and the critical comments on religion 
proposed in his 1974 Rome interview: “The key question about 
religion today is: can all religious experiences and practices in 
fact be contained within this dimension of the conjunction of 
truth and meaning? Does not Judaism, with its imposition of a 
traumatic Law, adumbrate a dimension of truth outside meaning 
(which is why Judaism is the mortal enemy of any Gnostic 
obscurantism)? And, at a different level, does not the same go 
for Saint Paul himself?” But the key-question is of course, to 
what extent Badiou’s ‘critique of religion’ is actually at all 
directed against religion or theology as such. As I emphasized at 
the beginning of this chapter, it seems rather to be the case that 
there are other issues at stake in this critique, namely, besides the 
critique of the metaphysics finitude, an attempt to restore the 
autonomy of philosophy and to marginalise philosophical rivals, 
like Heidegger. This confirms that religion seems first of all to 
have a polemical function in Badiou’s philosophy. And in this 
respect, it might actually even be an advantage to present a 
caricature.  
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If Badiou’s critique of finitude nevertheless has something 
important to offer theology, it is because it clarifies, on at least 
two issues, the stakes with which theology is currently 
confronted. Firstly and most importantly Badiou’s critique of 
finitude holds a serious warning for theology (although it was 
almost certainly not the intention) of the temptations of so-called 
‘post-metaphysical’ thought. ‘Deconstruction’, ‘weak thought’ 
and other forms of contemporary ‘post-metaphysical’ philosophy 
might keep a space open for religion, but apparently only at the 
risk of abandoning the very possibility of thinking God, and thus 
in the end of compromising theology as such; at least if theology 
is to be something more than a purely negative or apophatic 
theology.145 Secondly, Badiou’s critique of the metaphysics of 
finitude implies the insistence on an important distinction 
between what we are (mortal animals) and what we can do 
(participate in a truth). Such a distinction is certainly not foreign 
to Christian theology. And though there is, as Badiou himself has 
pointed out, an essential and (perhaps) absolute difference 
between the way in which this distinction is perceived in 
Badiou’s philosophy and in Christian theology,146 it might give 
occasion for theology to consider and think through the potential 
of this distinction in our present situation.  
Let me end by suggesting that the severe critique of the 
influential theme of finitude in today’s philosophical scene 
should not be taken as a denial by Badiou of the finite aspect of 
our existence or of the problematic consequences such a denial 
might have, but what he is denying is that this should be a 
pressing or even particularly important problem. As we have 
seen, Badiou seems to think of the question of our infinity or 
even our ‘immortality’ as a far more important issue. Or, as he 
 
145 This is of course not to imply that theology is supposed to be unaware of 
this issue (which in some sense has been the most urgent issue for theology 
ever since Kant’s Critique of pure Reason). A substantial example of a 
contemporary theologian who has not only remarked, but also tried - in an 
extraordinary lucid and forceful way - to respond to ‘the fact that we no 
longer dare to think God’ is Eberhard Jüngel (1983, vii).  
146 Badiou emphasizes this difference in the way which this distinction is 
made in his own philosophy versus in Christian theology through the 
following opposition between Paul Ricoeur and himself: “[…] it is 
decidedly impossible to say, as does Ricoeur: ‘You are worth more than 
your acts’. It is the very opposite that must be affirmed: ‘It can happen, 
rarely, that your acts are worth more than you’.” Badiou, “The Subject 
Supposed to be Christian: On Paul Ricoeur’s Memory, History, Forgetting,” 
9.   
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points out in a recent essay discussing Simon Critchley’s book, 
Infinitely Demanding: “Yes, we have the utmost difficulty in 
accepting our limitedness and so on. But if there exists 
something like the possibility of an infinite demand, there is 
something infinite in human nature. And maybe the problem 
sometimes is not at all to accept our finitude, but to accept our 
infinite dimension.”147 
 
 
147 Badiou, “On Simon Critchley’s Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of 
Commitment, Politics of Resistance,” 156. 
  
                                                
Chapter 3 
 
Materialism or Theology? Yes, Please! 
 
 
And the Word became flesh 
John 1:14 
 
Introduction 
In his introduction to a lecture given in 2007 at the European 
Graduate School, Slavoj Žižek sketches a by now rather familiar 
contemporary antagonism between ‘the rise of religious 
fundamentalism’ and, as he puts it, ‘a very vulgar materialism 
claiming that religion is basically stupid and ethically hurtful’, 
propagated above all by the troika of ‘New Atheism’ (Richard 
Dawkins, Christopher Hitchin, Sam Harris).148 However, as 
Žižek rightly emphasizes, we should absolutely reject this 
antagonism as a false alternative. The reason we should refuse a 
choice between these two positions is not only that it represents a 
caricature of both materialism and religion, but also because it 
obscures the true antagonism or dividing line running between 
on the one hand both of these positions (which, as Žižek (MC 
92) suggests, might in fact turn out to be two sides of the same 
coin) and on the other hand a third position in terms of an 
alternative genuine materialism. Badiou’s remark in an interview 
given in 2005 that “[…] in the present world the great and 
fundamental problem is not between the religious way and the 
non-religious way” could perhaps be read in a similar manner.149 
Yet there is also another and from my perspective even more 
important reason to reject this false alternative, namely that it 
 
148 A video-recoding of Žižek’s lecture is available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G9S3vvPe9IM (entered 24 Marts 2010). 
In Monstrosity of Christ Žižek (MC 94) links this antagonism to politics in 
the following way: “[…] the recent popularity of scientific materialist direct 
attacks on religion […] is certainly sustained by the ideological need to 
present the liberal West as bastion of Reason against the crazy Muslim and 
other irrational fundamentalist.” 
149 Badiou, “An Interview with Alain Badiou: Universal Truths and the 
Question of Religion,” 41-42. Of course there is something very 
inconsistent or even self-contradictory in this remark, since as we have just 
seen in the previous chapter there is indeed a very rigid opposition between 
religion and non-religion at the centre of Badiou’s own work. 
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precludes a potentially fruitful dialogue between (a genuine) 
materialism and theology. 
 In this chapter I will explore the prospects of such a dialogue 
in four steps. First, I will begin by clarifying what is at stake in 
Badiou’s and Žižek’s concern for materialism, and by outlining 
the most fundamental, and apparently shared, characteristics of 
Badiou’s and Žižek’s materialism.   Second, I will test the 
soundness of Badiou’s materialism by going over the criticism of 
‘idealist dangers’ or even ‘religious tendencies’ in his philosophy 
as they have been advanced by Žižek.150 Badiou maintains that 
in contrast to the kind of materialism that he opposes – which 
risks coinciding with religious or spiritualist idealism – the 
materialism that he proposes entails a fully atheist position, so 
this is a quite important issue. Next, I will examine two episodes 
in Badiou’s work in which the issue of materialism and theology 
is raised explicitly. Common to these two episodes is that they 
both arise within the context of a discussion of Hegel. It is well-
know that one of Žižek’s most consistent philosophical 
endeavours has been a materialist re-actualization of Hegel, and 
lately in The Monstrosity of Christ he has even combined this 
endeavour with a ‘plea for a Hegelian reading of Christianity’. 
Thus, as we shall see, Hegel constitutes a key-reference in terms 
of the divergences between Badiou and Žižek on the issue of 
materialism and theology. Another quite important divergence, 
at least in the present context, is that whereas Badiou’s pledge to 
atheism seems to categorically exclude any positive reference to 
religion or theology, the numerous hints made by Žižek (EYS 
99-102; PF 100-104; TTS 113-119; PD 6; PV; 75-86, 103; MC 
82-101, 240, 268-303) about the materialist potential of 
Christianity suggest that in his case the elaboration of an atheist 
materialism in no way rules out an affirmative interaction with 
theology and religion. In the last part of the chapter I will 
 
150 It seems that to both Badiou and Žižek there is little if any difference 
between idealism and religion. Žižek is far from the only one to have traced 
idealist tendencies in Badiou’s professed materialist philosophy. 
Reservations towards various different aspects of idealism and doubts about 
the genuine materialist character of Badiou’s philosophy have been put 
forward by, among others, Brassier (2005, 140), Osborne (2007, 24; 27), 
Johnston (2008a, 29; 32; 38; 44) and Feltham (2008, 57). More 
unconcealed accusations of the ‘religious’ character of aspects of Badiou’s 
philosophy have been proposed by Bensaïd (2004, 98; 101), Smith (2004, 
93), Osborne (2007, 25-26) and Johnston (2008a, 35; 38).  However, I will 
limit myself to Žižek’s critique.    
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elucidate this issue through an inquiry into the differences in 
Badiou’s and Žižek’s reading of the doctrine of incarnation.  
The Split of Materialism 
In Materialism and Empirio-criticism: Critical Comments on a 
Reactionary Philosophy published in 1908, Lenin famously 
depicts the history of Western philosophy as largely a struggle 
between two characterizations of reality: idealism and 
materialism.151 Lenin’s depiction echoes Friedrich Engels’ 
(1996, 20-21) account in Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of 
Classical German Philosophy of the two diverging answers 
given throughout the history of philosophy to the question of the 
relationship between thinking and being: 
 
The answers which the philosophers gave to this question split them 
into two great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of spirit to 
nature and, therefore, in the last instance, assumed world creation in 
some form or other […] comprised the camp of idealism. The others, 
who regarded nature as primary, belong to the various schools of 
materialism (Engels 1996, 21). 
  
According to both Badiou and Žižek, this struggle continues with 
unrelenting strength today.152 However, they also agree that 
there is a noticeable difference from the previous historical 
stages of this struggle, namely that the traditional frontline of the 
struggle, the dividing line between the two camps, has been 
displaced. In the words of Badiou (LW 526): “[…] I argue that 
rather than opposing emancipatory materialism to a putative 
bourgeois idealism we should divide materialism itself.” Thus 
 
151 In Lenin’s (1970, 166) words: “Could the struggle between materialism 
and idealism, the struggle between the tendencies or lines of Plato and 
Democritus in philosophy, the struggle between religion and science, the 
denial of objective truth and its assertion, the struggle between the 
adherents of supersensible knowledge and its adversaries have become 
antiquated during the two thousand years of the development of 
philosophy?” 
152 In 2008 Badiou and Žižek thus organized a conference in London 
entitled “Materialism Today” celebrating Lenin’s book. As they put it in the 
conference announcement: “2008 will be the centenary of Lenin’s 
Materialism and Empiriocriticism, the book which focused on the ongoing 
struggle between materialism and idealism. Where do we stand today with 
regard to this struggle? The aim of this conference is to clarify the 
coordinates of this struggle, with Alain Badiou’s new masterpiece Logiques 
des Mondes as the central point of reference.” 
http://www.bbk.ac.uk/news/news-releases/20070618/ (entered 23 March 
2010). 
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both Badiou and Žižek have as their declared ambition to present 
a materialism which is not merely meant to dispute, as Žižek (PV 
4) puts it, ‘idealist obscurantism’, but which first of all opposes 
itself to a certain ‘mechanical materialism’, or in Badiou’s (LW 
2) case a ‘democratic materialism’.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Badiou employs the 
expression ‘materialist dialectics’ to designate the kind of 
materialism that he proposes as an alternative to ‘democratic 
materialism’. The latter is associated by Badiou (LW 2) with a 
contemporary paradigm of ‘bio-politics’ in which the finite 
organic life is promoted as an ethical, political and 
epistemological fulcrum; or in short, in which we are subjected 
to ‘the dogma of our finitude’. Badiou’s (LW 3-4) ‘materialist 
dialectics’ aims to rectify the claim of ‘democratic materialism’ 
that ‘there is only bodies and language’ by adding ‘except that 
there are truths’, and to do so without succumbing to the 
temptation of ‘endorsing an aristocratic idealism’, as Badiou puts 
it. It is evident from Badiou’s (LW 3-4) remarks in the preface to 
Logics of Worlds that he, at least to some extent, understands his 
‘materialist dialectics’ as a continuation of the ‘dialectical 
materialism’ promoted by Althusser (and by Badiou himself in 
his earlier writings), but that he refrains from using the latter 
term because of its biased history. In any case, this reference 
might seem surprising considering Badiou’s (BE 4) explicit 
rejection of dialectical materialism in the introduction to Being 
and Event. Indeed, it might even be quite confusing for someone 
who has only read books like Saint Paul or Metapolitics, which 
are outright anti-dialectic. On the other hand, the usage of the 
term ’dialectical materialism’ and the attempt to renew the 
tradition that this term designates is not exactly something new 
to Badiou, whose very first publication was a text entitled “Le 
(re)commencement du matérialisme dialectique” on Althusser’s 
Reading Capital and For Marx. It is likewise a very frequently 
used term in Theory of the Subject. All this raises the following 
very reasonable question: What is Badiou, a dialectician or an 
anti-dialectician? This question is one of the most controversial 
issues in the reception of Badiou’s work, and its answer has far 
reaching consequence for the understanding of several key 
aspects of his philosophy.153 Moreover, the issue of dialectics is, 
 
153 Put simply, the bone of contention in this debate is whether or not Being 
and Event signals a far-reaching displacement in Badiou’s work from 
dialectics to (anti-dialectical) mathematical subtraction. This issue is very 
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as we shall see in the following, not without consequences for 
Badiou’s understanding of theology. 
Žižek (PV 387) on the other hand fully embraces ‘dialectal 
materialism’ as the label for his position underlining the 
common-ground between Badiou and himself in their shared 
“[…] conviction that the time has come openly to assume this 
problematic term […].” Thus, in the preface to what Žižek (PV 
4) himself describes as his magnum opus, The Parallax View, he 
announces that the wager of this book is to begin the 
rehabilitation of the philosophy of dialectical materialism 
through a proper theorization of the notion of the ‘parallax gap’. 
However, both Žižek’s preoccupation with a reformation of 
materialism and the use of the term ‘dialectical materialism’ go 
much further back in his work. As Adrian Johnston (2008b) 
demonstrates in his outstanding book, Žižek’s ontology, such a 
reformation of (dialectical) materialism is indeed an important 
inherent element in what he argues is the very centre and most 
continuous aspect of Žižek’s philosophical work, namely the 
elaboration of a ‘transcendental materialist theory of 
subjectivity’ based on a Lacanian rereading of the key figures of 
German Idealism. That theology has a part to play in this project 
is hinted by Žižek (IR 37; PD 6), not only through his reading in 
The Indivisible Remainder of Schelling’s Weltalter, a profoundly 
theological text, as ‘the founding text of dialectical materialism’, 
but also explicitly in his provocative claim in The Puppet and the 
Dwarf that: “[…] to become a true dialectical materialist, one 
should go through the Christian experience.” Although Žižek 
sympathises with Badiou’s attack on the bio-political paradigm 
of ‘democratic materialism’ (and the watered-down vitalism 
 
important in terms of how the relationship between being and event should 
be understood. Again to put it simply: Does the event signal an absolute 
break with being (the ‘evental site’), or is there a more dialectical 
relationship between being (the ‘evental site’) and event? Peter Hallward 
(1998; 2003; 2004), and as we shall see Žižek, argues that the former is the 
case, while Bruno Bosteels (2001; 2002; 2004; 2005b) defends the latter 
point of view, arguing that the concern with the (dialectical materialist) 
problem of how to think novelty without any recourse to transcendence is a 
continuous issue in Badiou’s work. And he (2005b 608) urges Badiou’s 
critics to at least recognize the constant struggle in Badiou’s work to avoid 
treating the evental process as transcendent by separating it absolutely from 
the situation. For Badiou’s own comments on the matter of dialectic, see 
Badiou, “Can Change be Thought?,” 246-253 and Badiou, “Beyond 
formalization: An interview,” 122-25. See also Johnston’s (2007c) 
clarifying account of this controversy. 
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underpinning it) the main target of his own critique seems first of 
all to be confined to a ‘vulgar’ scientific materialism.154 This and 
other significant differences aside, Žižek and Badiou do 
fundamentally agree on the need to propose an alternative 
(dialectical) materialism, not only against obscurantist idealism, 
but also against reductive or mechanical materialism. How then, 
more precisely, is the kind of (dialectical) materialism advocated 
by Badiou and Žižek different from the ‘vulgar’ materialism that 
they oppose? And what exactly is the problem with the latter?   
To put it plainly, the main problem with the type of 
materialism against which Badiou and Žižek oppose themselves 
seems to be that it is both too materialist, in the sense that it 
precludes itself from accounting for a series of important 
(immaterial) human phenomena, and not materialist enough, in 
the sense that it still implicates a certain tendency towards 
idealism. Although both Badiou (TS 193) and Žižek (MC 287) 
maintain along with Engels and Lenin that materialism must 
always assert the primacy of matter over thought, the material 
over the immaterial, they also both uphold that the alternative 
materialism they have in mind in no way entails the jettison of 
fundamental philosophical notions of immaterial phenomena 
such as subjectivity, freedom and truth; on the contrary, their 
rather counter-intuitive assertion is that the only proper way to 
ground and uphold these notions is exactly through an entirely 
materialist ontology. As Žižek (MC 93) explains in an approving 
comment on Logics of Worlds: 
 
This makes clear the true stakes of Badiou’s gesture: In order for 
materialism to truly win over idealism, it is not enough to succeed in 
the ‘reductionist’ approach and demonstrate how mind, 
consciousness, etc., can nonetheless somehow be accounted for 
within the evolutionary-positivist materialist frame; on the contrary, 
the materialist claim should be much stronger: it is only materialism 
which can accurately explain the very phenomena of mind, 
consciousness, etc.; and, conversely, it is idealism which always-
already ‘reifies’ them, which is ‘vulgar’. 
 
So, put differently, the claim here seems to be that the kind of 
materialism proposed by Badiou and Žižek is a materialism 
which paradoxically defends and explains the autonomy of the 
immaterial order of subjectivity, transcending any absolute 
 
154 Žižek’s most thorough discussion of this matter is thus found in his 
engagement with contemporary Cognitive Science in The Parallax View.  
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opposition between thinking and being, mind and matter, but 
without reducing the one to the other.155 That is, a materialism, 
which supposedly surpasses the traditional philosophical 
opposition between naturalism and freedom. Yet, another way to 
describe this sort of materialism that Badiou and Žižek advocate 
would be in terms of immanence and transcendence: like any 
kind of materialism worth its name, it entails an assertion of pure 
immanence, but, and this is the heart of the matter, it also claims 
that this immanence is of such a character that it nevertheless 
generates transcendent phenomena. And this brings us to the 
most central feature of such a non-reductive materialism, namely 
the assertion of an ontological ‘openness’ or ‘incompleteness’ of 
reality. For both Badiou and Žižek, the fundamental axiom for 
the construction of a general ontology is, as Badiou states in the 
first meditation of Being and Event, that ‘the One is not’, or in 
Žižek’s Lacanian parlour, that ‘the big Other does not exist’.156 
A genuine non-reductive materialism acquires acceptance of the 
full ontological consequence of this (the inexistence of the 
One/big Other). In The Parallax View (in a chapter interestingly 
entitled ‘Building Blocks for a Materialist Theology’) Žižek (PV 
79) attempts to explain more precisely what this means through 
the following contrast:  
 
That is the difference between idealism and materialism: for the 
idealist, we experience our situation as ‘open’ insofar as we are 
engaged in it, while the same situation appears ‘closed’ from the 
standpoint of finality, that is from the eternal point of view of the 
omnipotent and all-knowing God who alone can perceive the world 
 
155 It is, as Johnston (2007d, 6) points out in his excellent review of The 
Parallax view, this aspect which in Žižek’s mind makes his materialism 
‘dialectical’: “What makes Žižek’s materialism specifically dialectic, on his 
account, is its ability to elucidate the material genesis of the more-than-
material phenomena and structures.” In Logics of Worlds Badiou (LW 4) 
provides the following more formal, but nevertheless parallel, definition of 
dialectic: “Let’s agree that by ‘dialectic’, following Hegel, we are to 
understand that the essence of all difference is the third term that marks the 
gap between the two others.” 
156 In Žižek’s wide-ranging rending of Lacan he refers repeatedly to the 
notion of the ‘big Other’, which he employs in various different ways, just 
as he also uses Lacan’s expression ‘the big Other doesn’t exist’ (l’Autre 
n’existe pas) in more than one way. Here, the non-existence of the big 
Other basically designates the fact that there is no kind of guarantee of 
global meaning holding together being as an organic whole. However, the 
fact that the One/the big Other does not exist, does not mean, as both Žižek 
(IR 206; LA 71) and Badiou (BE 23) emphasize,  that it does not function.     
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as a closed totality; for the materialist, the ‘openness’ goes all the 
way down, that is, necessity is not the underlying universal law that 
secretly regulates the chaotic interplay of appearances – it is the ‘All’ 
itself which is non-All, inconsistent, marked by irreducible 
contingency.   
 
It is worth noting, particularly in the present context, that Žižek 
also links materialism with the acknowledgment of the big 
Other’s non-existence more explicitly, namely with reference to 
the fundamental event in Christian theology, the death of Christ: 
“[…] the singular point of the emergence of materialism is 
signalled by Christ’s words on the cross ‘Father, why have you 
forsaken me?’ — in this moment of total abandonment, the 
subject experiences and fully assumes the nonexistence of the big 
Other.”157 This concession of the big Other’s inexistence, the 
‘death of God’, is crucial as it is Žižek’s (TTS 60; PV 168) claim 
that the ontological incompleteness of reality, which follows 
from this, is what allows for the possibility of subjective 
freedom.  
But, what does it mean that a genuine materialist ontology, 
founded on the assertion of the non-existence of the One/the big 
Other, is characterized by ‘openness’ or ‘incompleteness’? As 
hinted in the above quotation, the Lacanian logic of ‘non-All’, 
which is a recurrent element in Žižek’s writings, offers an 
instructive way to clarify this (PV 168; MC 100).158 Simplifying 
things a bit, and leaving out the logic symbols Lacan uses, we 
can say that Lacan distinguishes between two inherently 
antagonistic formulas: the ‘masculine’ and the ‘feminine’.159 The 
masculine formula states that: ‘All X are submitted to the phallic 
function’ [but] ‘there exists an X who is not submitted to the 
phallic function’. The feminine formula states that: ‘There does 
not exist any X who is exempt from the phallic function’ [but] 
‘Not-all X are submitted to the phallic function’. The logic of the 
masculine formula is the logic of the ‘constitutive exception’, i.e. 
 
157 Žižek, “Afterword: Lenin’s choice,” 180. I will examine this statement 
and its consequences along with more thoroughly in chapter five, which 
focuses more explicitly on Žižek’s (materialist) conception of theology.   
158 ‘Non-All’ or ‘not-All’ is Žižek’s preferred translation of ‘Pas-tout’ a 
key-term in Lacan’s formulas of sexuation. Others, such as Bruce Fink, the 
translator of senimar XX (On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and 
Knowledge) in which Lacan (1998, 78-81) introduced his formulas of 
sexuation, prefers ‘not-whole’. I will keep to Žižek’s translation. 
159 Here I roughly follow Žižek’s (FTKN 121-123) presentation of the 
formulas in For They Know Not What They Do. 
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the logic according to which the exception confirms the rule, 
exemplified for instance in the religious idea that everything 
obeys natural causality – with the exception of the God who 
guarantees the laws of nature. The logic of the feminine formula, 
on the other hand, states that while nothing escapes natural 
causality, not all obey natural laws. Not in the sense that there is 
something outside the order of causality, something that escapes 
it, but in the sense that it is the ‘totality’ of the order of causality 
itself which is inconsistent, non-All. As Žižek (PV 168) implies 
in the following quote, these two logics of the ‘formulas of 
sexuation’ thus constitute a helpful way to distinguish a ‘non-
reductive’ materialism from the kind of materialism that it is 
opposed to:  
 
In order to specify the meaning of materialism, one should apply 
Lacan’s formulas of sexuation: there is a fundamental difference 
between the assertion ‘everything is matter (which relies on its 
constitutive exception – in the case of Lenin who, in Materialism 
and Empirio-criticism, falls into this trap, the very position of 
enunciation of the subject whose mind ‘reflects’ matter) and the 
assertion ‘there is nothing which is not matter’ (which, with its other 
side, ‘non-All’ is matter,’ opens up the space for the explanation of 
immaterial phenomena). 
 
In this perspective a genuine materialism has nothing to do with 
the assertion proposed by many materialists, including it seems 
the Lenin of Materialism and Empirio-criticism, of a ‘fully 
existent external reality’, or the ‘inert density of matter’ (MC 
92).160 Rather, genuine materialism is a position which accepts 
the ontological ‘nothingness’ or ‘void’, and thus the 
incompleteness, of reality itself (MC 92). Hence Žižek’s (MC 
95) emphasis: “[…] ‘material reality is non-all’, not ‘material 
reality is all there is’, is the true formula of materialism.” Or, as 
he (MC 240) puts it elsewhere “[…] the basic axiom of today’s 
materialism is for me the ontological incompleteness of reality.” 
However, the drawback of ‘vulgar’ materialism is not only that it 
is too crude; that it in a sense is too materialist when it claims 
that ‘material reality is all there is’. According to Žižek (MC 92), 
‘vulgar’ materialism is also not materialist enough, because it 
 
160 Žižek’s point in his critique of Lenin’s assertion of this kind of 
materialism in Materialism and Empirio-criticism is precisely that there is 
no place for dialectics (as that which elucidates the material genesis of the 
more-than-material phenomena). See Žižek, “Afterword:  Lenin’s Choice,” 
179. 
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can all too easily serve as a support for a ‘Gnostic, spiritualist 
obscurantism’, or simple amalgamate with idealism, as Žižek 
(MC 99) suggests it does in the case of cognitive scientist, David 
Chalmers: “So when David Chalmers proposes that the basis of 
consciousness will have to be found in a new, additional, 
fundamental – primordial and irreducible – force of nature […] 
does he not thereby provide a new proof of how idealism 
coincides with vulgar materialism?” But why do we have this 
overlap? Precisely because in the end vulgar materialism and 
spiritual obscurantism, or in short idealism (it adds up to the 
same thing in Žižek’s book), presuppose the same outdated, 
substantialist conception of matter, conforming to the coherent, 
mechanistic world picture of Galileo and Newton (PV 209; see 
also Johnston 2007d, 8). Or in short, a conception of matter, 
which ignores the twentieth-century evolution of natural 
sciences.161 
And this brings us to another of Žižek’s (IR 208-231; PV 
165, 172-173, 201-203; MC 88-92) most frequent references, 
where he discusses how we should understand this ontological 
incompleteness that he sees as the most important mark of 
materialism, namely quantum physics. The crucial lesson of 
quantum physics, as well as other contemporary sciences such as  
neuroscience, which Žižek (PV 165) discusses thoroughly in The 
Parallax View, is that it accomplishes a desubstantializing of 
substance: “Quantum physics posits as the ultimate reality not 
some primordial elements but, rather, a kind of string of 
‘vibrations’, entities which can only be described at 
desubstantialized processes […].” It makes possible a conception 
of matter characterized by openness and contingence, or, to 
borrow a term from Catherine Malabou (2008, 5-6; 15-31; 68-
70), which Žižek (PV 209) himself employs, by a certain 
‘plasticity’. In short: A conception of matter that resonates with 
the incompleteness of reality. In The Monstrosity of Christ, 
Žižek (MC 89) applies the two diverse readings of the so-called 
‘principle of uncertainty’ proposed by Einstein and Heisenberg 
as an illustration of the contrast between an idealist position, 
 
161 See Johnston (2007d, 8-9) for an elaboration of this point. Johnston 
(2008b, 107) sketches the dilemma that, according to Žižek, confronts any 
materialist who persists in this conception of matter, not admitting the 
ontological inconsistency of reality, in the following way: “Succinctly 
stated, if one maintains that the Real of material being isn’t barred […], 
then one must either deny the existence of subjectivity […] or regress into 
the crude versions of the Real-versus-Ideal dichotomy.”  
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which merely sees the incompleteness of our knowledge 
demonstrated by quantum physics as an epistemological gap, and 
a materialist position, which grounds this incompleteness 
ontologically in reality itself: “For Einstein, this principle of 
uncertainty proves that quantum physics does not provide a full 
description of reality, that there must be some unknown features 
missed by its conceptual apparatus. Heisenberg, Bohr, and 
others, on the contrary, insisted that this incompleteness of our 
knowledge of quantum reality indicates a strange incompleteness 
of quantum reality itself, a claim which leads to a breathtakingly 
weird ontology.” Thus, when Žižek talks about ‘incompleteness’ 
he is not merely referring to our knowledge of the world, but the 
world itself. Or, as he (TTS 158) formulates it in The Ticklish 
Subject: “[…] what looks like an epistemological limitation of 
our capacity to grasp reality […] is the positive ontological 
condition of reality itself.” In other words, there is a split or gap 
in reality itself, a gap or a void inherent in being, so to speak. 
Drawing an explicit parallel in The Monstrosity of Christ to 
quantum physics, Žižek (MC 90) seems to suggest that this is 
precisely also the point of Badiou’s ontology of pure 
multiplicity; that is, an ontology in which being, as a 
consequence of the non-existence of the one, is nothing but 
multiplicities of multiplicities with no end point, or rather, as 
Badiou puts it: “The end point is of necessity also a 
multiplicity.” Namely, as he clarifies: ”The multiplicity which is 
the multiplicity of no multiplicity at all, the thing is also no-
thing: the void, the empty multiplicity, the empty set.”162 So, for 
Badiou there is indeed a gap or a void inherent to being itself.   
Considering that it is supposedly the essential materialist 
feature, it might come as a surprise that according to Žižek (TTS 
55) it was Kant who was the first to recognize the inconsistency 
or incompleteness of reality, namely in terms of our failure to 
grasp the whole of being. This is why Žižek (TTS 38-39) asserts 
that there is a materialist aspect in Kant’s transcendental 
idealism (in fact in German Idealism as such), and even that: 
“The only consistent materialist position is that the world does 
not exist – in the Kantian sense of the term, as a self-enclosed 
whole” (CWZ 97).163 But Žižek (TTS 55) also argues that Kant 
 
162 Badiou, “Towards a New Concept of Existence,” 65-66. See also Being 
and Event meditation 4-5. 
163 It is against the backdrop of his recognition of this incompleteness that 
we should understand Žižek’s (PV 94) characterization of Kant as the 
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did not go far enough in his transcendental turn in that he did not 
recognize that “[…] the limitation of our knowledge […] is 
simultaneously the limitation of the very object of our 
knowledge, that is, the gaps and voids in our knowledge of 
reality are simultaneously the gaps and voids in the ‘real’ 
ontological edifice itself.” Only Hegel recognized this. Indeed, 
this recognition consists in Žižek’s (TTS 55; cf. PV 27) view 
precisely in “[…] the crucial Hegelian gesture of transposing 
epistemological limitation into ontological fault.” Or, as he 
(FTNK xxix; cf. PV 25) proposes elsewhere: “Is not this shift 
also the shift from Kant to Hegel? From tension between 
phenomena and Thing to an inconsistency/gap between 
phenomena themselves?”164 In relation to the example of 
quantum physics we might thus say, metaphorically speaking, 
that Einstein’s interpretation of the ‘principle of uncertainty’ is 
still too ‘Kantian’, whereas only the interpretation presented by 
Heisenberg and Bohr is fully ‘Hegelian’. What is most important 
to note in this context, however, is that according to Žižek (MC 
259) this passage from Kant to Hegel, from the gap between 
immanence and transcendence to the minimal gap in immanence 
itself, from external to inherent limitation, also constitutes ‘the 
passage from idealism to materialism’. As we shall see in the 
 
philosopher of freedom. On the basis of a passage from Critique of 
Practical Reason, in which Kant (1993, 154) claims that were we to gain 
access to the noumenal domain the conduct of man would be turned into 
mere mechanism, Žižek (TTS 25; PV 22-23) argues that Kant’s point is that 
our failure to grasp the whole of being is the very condition of our freedom. 
Interestingly, in The Plague of Fantasies, Žižek (PF 105-106) appoints the 
occasionalism of Malebranche as the forerunner of Kant in this respect 
insofar as Malebranche’s main argument for his occasionalism is that “[…] 
if divine causality were to become directly observable, this would make us 
slaves of God and change God in to a horrifying tyrant (this idea was later 
taken up by Kant, in his notion that it is only our epistemological limitation 
– our ignorance of noumenal causality – which makes us free moral 
beings).”  
164 One of the essential consequences of this ‘ontologicalization’ of 
incompleteness, this passage from Kant to Hegel, is, as outlined very 
clearly by Johnston (2008b, 143), an inversion of the relationship between 
noumenal and phenomenal, transcendence and immanence: “So the 
immanence of phenomenal reality isn’t ‘not all’ because of the withdrawal 
of a transcendent noumenal being; on the contrary, a transcendent noumenal 
being is posited precisely because the immanence of phenomenal reality is 
‘not-all’. In Žižek’s view, a core component of his own philosophical 
materialism is this inversion of idealism’s prioritization of transcendence 
over immanence.”  
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next section, this difference between epistemological and 
ontological incompleteness is at the very heart of Žižek’s 
criticism of Badiou.165  
To sum up, we can say that for Badiou and Žižek materialism 
must split in a double sense. First, materialism is split in the 
sense that both Badiou and Žižek claim that we are in an urgent 
need of a materialism which is capable of opposing not only a 
classical idealism, but rather, and more importantly, another 
branch of materialism. Furthermore, both Badiou and Žižek 
claim that the materialism that they propose is a non-reductive 
materialism, which in contrast to the kind of ‘vulgar’ materialism 
that they both oppose, is capable of accounting for important, 
immaterial phenomenon such as subjectivity and freedom. 
Second, for both Badiou and Žižek, genuine materialism is 
characterized by a ‘spilt’ in the sense that they both base their 
materialism on the idea of some sort of ontological gap or void, 
an incompleteness of reality, following from the acceptance of 
the non-existence of the One/big Other.  
This, and the other similarities outlined above, not to mention 
Žižek’s numerous endorsing comments on Badiou, might have 
left the impression that Badiou and Žižek are more or less in full 
agreement with each other, not only on the issue of what a 
genuine materialism looks like, but also on the basic ontological 
traits of such a materialism. But, as we shall see in the following 
section, this agreement is indeed only apparent.  
 
Kantian Trouble …   
For more than a decade now, Žižek has carried on a detailed and 
multifaceted discussion of numerous aspects of Badiou’s work, 
such as Badiou’s critique of postmodernism, his engagement 
with Lacan, his reading of Paul, and his conception of politics – 
just to mention some of the most imperative and determining 
issues. Yet even though Žižek has been among Badiou’s most 
positive and eager advocates, and no doubt one of his most 
competent readers, he has also been one of Badiou’s harshest 
 
165 Against this backdrop, the following remark made by Žižek (OB 89) in 
On Belief becomes highly relevant for the present discussion: “At the level 
of theology this shift from external to inherent limitation is accomplished 
by Christianity.” Žižek is here referring to the ‘materialist’ shift from the 
external gap in Judaism between man and God as the sublime, absolute 
Other to the inherent gap in God himself in Christianity. I will return to this 
important issue in my discussion of Žižek’s understanding of incarnation in 
the last section of this chapter. 
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critics.166 This critique is itself many-sided and complex, 
concerning, for example, disagreements on the Freudian notion 
of ‘death drive’ (TTS 159-161; PV 110; IDLC 394-395) and the 
Lacanian notion of the Real (FTKN lxxxi-lxxxviii), criticism of 
Badiou’s separation of politics from state and economy (Žižek 
2001, 270-272; PV 324-328; IDLC 399-412), quarrels about 
diverging notions of the subject (TTS 158-162), accusations that 
Badiou’s notion of event is modelled on the religious idea of 
miracle (TTS 136; Žižek 2001, 325), and so on. However, as 
implied by Žižek himself and convincingly demonstrated by 
Johnston (2007a; 2007b), there is also a persistent core in this 
critique, namely the recurrent assertion of a deep-rooted 
‘Kantianism’ at the heart of Badiou’s philosophical system, 
which seems to constitute the common source of more or less all 
these aspects criticized by Žižek. More precisely, Žižek (TTS 
166; OWB 107; CWZ 137; PV 56) consistently locates this 
Kantianism, or Kantian aspect of Badiou’s philosophy, in the 
latter’s fundamental differentiation between being and event.   
This gap between being and event, between what is and what 
‘happens’, does indeed constitute, as Žižek (TTS 128) notes, the 
elemental axis of Badiou’s mature philosophical system. 
Following Clement and Feltham (2004, 9), we can say that 
Badiou’s most fundamental ontological term is ‘situation’. In 
Badiou’s ontology, everything is thus perceived as a ‘situation’. 
Even ontology (the discourse on being qua being) itself, Badiou 
(BE 25) maintains, must be thought of as a situation.167 Badiou 
(E 25; cf. BE 24) defines a ‘situation’ as “[…] a multiple 
composed of an infinity of elements, each one of which is itself a 
multiple.” Or to put it in the language of set theory: a situation is 
the (infinite) elements that belong to a given set (e.g. the set of 
rational numbers, or the set of university students). Moreover, 
any multiplicity presented in a situation is also always 
‘structured’, which simply means that it is presented according to 
 
166 Johnston (2007b; 2007a) presents an exhaustive examination of Žižek’s 
critique of Badiou in his two articles – “There is Truth, and then there is 
truths–or, Slavoj Žižek as a Reader of Alain Badiou” and “From the 
Spectacular Act to the Vanishing Act: Badiou, Žižek, and the Politics of 
Lacanian Theory” – upon which I draw in the following.   
167 In Logics of Worlds Badiou uses the term ‘world’ synonymously with 
situation, or rather, this shift in terminology is part of Badiou reworking of 
the concept of situation. I will keep to the conception of the situation 
outlined in Being and Event, since this is the conception that Žižek’s 
critique is based on. 
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a consistent process of unification. What structures the situation 
is a series of measures and operations that determine or identify 
what belongs and what does not belong to the situation, by 
counting multiplicities as elements of the situation. This is what 
enables an element to count as a member in a given situation 
(e.g. to count as a rational number, or to count as a university 
student). So in one sense the situation is simply the result of this 
structuring operation, which Badiou (BE 24) also calls the 
‘count-as-one’. Defined in this way, a situation can always only 
present its elements as what Badiou (BE 25) calls ‘consistent 
multiplicity’, that is, as one or a coherent element. However, 
since this consistency or unity is the result of a (counting) 
operation, and not an inherent ontological feature, it retroactively 
implies that there is something upon which this operation 
operates, something prior to the counting operation, which is not 
itself unified or structured – in other words, something which is 
inconsistent. As Badiou (BE 25) points out, the counting 
operation thus splits the multiple in two, which is to say, into 
‘consistent multiplicity’ and ‘inconsistent multiplicity’. But all 
that can be presented of inconsistent multiplicity in a situation is 
what counts for nothing according to the measures of this 
situation, or what Badiou (BE 55) terms ‘the void’; and thus all 
that we can ever know of being is presented to us as unified or 
consistent multiplicity. In summary: although what holds for 
being qua being, according to Badiou’s (BE 23; TW 227) most 
fundamental claim, is that ‘the one is not’, that ‘there is no 
whole’, the world as we experience and know it, being in terms 
of a situation, is nevertheless normally presented as consistent, 
that is, as unified and whole, and thus stabile and predictable. 
However, it may happen from time to time in a site of 
structural weakness in a situation, and in an entirely contingent 
and unpredictable way, inaccessible to the knowledge of the 
situation, that an event takes place, and in a flash implies the 
inconsistency of being as the void at the heart of every situation. 
Since the event occurs in a completely contingent and 
unpredictable way, it cannot be reduced to or deduced from the 
situation in which it occurs – it emerges out of nothing so to 
speak. Neither can the event be proved, known or accounted for 
in terms of the situation. It has no ontological guarantee; “There 
is no acceptable ontological matrix of the event” (BE 190). The 
event is always, as Badiou puts it (BE 181), ‘undecidable’ from 
the standpoint of the situation, in relation to knowledge, and can 
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therefore also always be denied by those who believe only in the 
bare facts of the situation: was it really a political revolution, or 
just a simple outburst of disorder and crime? An amorous 
encounter, or simple sexual desire? This undecidability of the 
event is due to the fact it has always-already disappeared the 
moment that it happens; strictly speaking we never encounter an 
event in the present moment, ‘now’, it is always only recognized 
as such retrospectively, through the act of deciding to name it an 
event. The event “[…] can only be revealed in the retroaction of 
an interventional practice […]” (BE 178). Another way to put 
this is to say that an event can only be identified from a 
subjective engaged position. Moreover, the implications of the 
event, the void it manifests in the situation, is maintained and 
unfolded solely through the interventions of the subjects who are 
faithful to it and who hereby may perhaps, step by step, devise a 
new way of reordering the terms of the situation that will make 
legible what they truly are.168 The consequence of all this is, to 
put it in the words of Badiou (BE 190), that: “[…] ontology has 
nothing to say about the event.” Rather, this is the job of 
philosophy. This kind of philosophy, which asserts that a wholly 
contingent and unpredictable event can take place in spite of the 
order of being, indeed emerging out of nothing but this very 
order, is what Badiou (SP 66) in his book on Paul describes as a 
‘materialism of grace’.      
It is against this background of what Žižek (TTS 166) 
considers to be an absolute separation of being and event in 
Badiou’s philosophy that we should understand his repeatedly 
stated claim that: “[…] although Badiou is adamantly anti-
Kantian […] at a deeper level his distinction between the order 
of the positive Knowledge of Being and the wholly different 
Truth-Event, remains Kantian.” In The Parallax View, Žižek 
resumes and develops this critique of Badiou, incorporating it 
into his underlying discussion of the confrontation between 
materialism and idealism, arguing that precisely because of his 
distinction between being and event, Badiou remains stuck 
within, or perhaps rather regresses into, the domain of idealism. 
 
168 Badiou’s examples of this process are numerous, counting the French 
revolution, Georg Cantor’s invention of set theory and Arnold Schönberg’s 
creation of atonal music. But, as pointed out by Žižek (TTS 141; PD 174) 
and others (Critchley 2000, 21; Dews 2004, 110), Badiou’s best and in any 
case most well-developed exemplification of the truth-event is probably 
presented in his reading of the Pauline epistles.  
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e 
vental site’: 
 
                                                
Later in the same book, in a short but very enlightening 
comparative discussion of the different notions of the event in 
Heidegger, Deleuze and Badiou, Žižek (PV 166) once again 
repeats his critique of this ‘Kantian’ distinction in Badiou’s 
philosophy, and moreover suggests that the conception of the 
event constitutes a new significant battlefield of materialism and 
idealism:  
 
Badiou, on the contrary [to Deleuze], asserts the radical ‘dualism’ 
between Event and the order of being. It is here, on this terrain, that 
we should locate today’s struggle between idealism and materialism: 
idealism posits an ideal Event which cannot be accounted for in 
terms of its material (pre)conditions, while the materialist wager is 
that we can get ‘behind’ the event and explore how Event explodes 
out of the gap in/of the order of Being.  
 
It is worth noticing that Žižek’s distinction in this quote between 
an idealist and a materialist notion of the event is based on the 
claim that even though an event is an immaterial phenomenon, 
we are nevertheless able to account for its ontological pre-
conditions. Failing to present such an account, and thus failing to 
account for the ontological status of the event, is in Žižek’s view 
equal to backsliding into idealism, which, as he clearly implies, 
is what he thinks happens in Badiou’s case.169 However, as 
Žižek (PV 167) does indeed acknowledge immediately after 
proposing this critique, Badiou is in fact well aware of the kind 
of idealist danger that lurks in his rigorous separation of being 
and event. In a revised version of the small text “L’événement 
comme trans-être”, in what overtly appears to be an attempt to 
guard himself from exactly these kind of accusations, Badiou 
(TW 100-101) emphasizes how he actually counterbalances the 
distinction between being and event with his concept of th
‘e
 
169 To complicate matters further, Žižek is not completely consistent in his 
stance toward Badiou’s notion of the event. Thus, in some of his earlier 
texts, first of all On Belief (OB 112) and The Puppet and the Dwarf  (PD 
134-135), he refers to Badiou’s notion of the event in a way that cannot but 
appear as if he fully embraces it. As argued by Johnston (2007a, 13), one 
way to explain this apparent self-contradiction would be to read Žižek’s 
later critique of Badiou as part of a process of self-critique. Indeed, after the 
publication of The Puppet and the Dwarf in 2003, Žižek has actually been 
more consistently critical in his stance. 
Materialism or Theology? Yes, Please! 
 
126 
 
event is nothing but a part 
of a given situation, nothing but a fragment of being. I have called 
 any case still an abyss 
et
 
e event is, as it were, an abyssal self-grounded 
autonomous act. You cannot derive that event from or reduce it to 
                                                
It is necessary to point out that as far as its material is concerned, the 
event is not a miracle. What I mean is that what composes an event 
is always extracted from the situation, always related back to a 
singular multiplicity, to its state, to the language connected to it, etc. 
In fact if we want to avoid lapsing into an obscurantist theory of 
creation ex nihilo, we must accept that an 
this fragment of being the evental site.170 
 
But this attempt on Badiou’s part to ward off idealist suspicions 
of a miraculous or magical creation ‘ex nihilo’, by referring to 
the immanent location of the event in terms of the ‘evental site’ 
and by designating the ‘materiality’ of this site as a ‘fragment of 
being’, does not nevertheless solve the problem in Žižek’s view. 
It merely displaces it. Because even if we accept Badiou’s 
description of the evental site as a ‘fragment of being’, there is, 
as Žižek (CWZ 136) explains in the following remark from one 
f his conversations with Glyn Daly, ino
b ween the evental site, and the event:  
We have a similar point with Badiou, where the idea is that event is 
something that emerges out of nothing. You have in the positive 
reality of being what Badiou calls site événementielle, the potential 
site of the event, but th
some order of being.  
  
Actually, Badiou (PS 71) himself, sometimes quite overtly, 
confirms this portrayal, for instance in this passage from Saint 
Paul: “[…] the event’s sudden emergence never follows from 
the existence of an evental site. Although it requires conditions 
of immanence, that sudden emergence nevertheless remains of 
the order of grace.” Thus, Žižek’s critical reservation is in no 
way completely unjustified. Despite this, Žižek (PV 167) 
acknowledges, as he makes clear in his discussion of the event in 
 
170 Let me just note that this quote is part of a piece of text (one page or so) 
that was not part of the original text published in Court traité d’ontologie 
transitoire in 1998, and that the issue that Badiou (TW 100) addresses in 
this piece of text, which was added to the English translation published in 
Theoretical Writings from 2004, is precisely the question of: “What are the 
characteristic traits of the event, at least within the register of thing of 
being?” This revision might thus be read as an answer from Badiou to the 
accusations of the miraculous or ex nihilo character of his conception of the 
event proposed by Žižek (TTS 135), and in particular Bensaïd (2001), in the 
period just previous to the publication of Theoretical Writings. 
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 in the aforementioned conversation with Glyn 
aly going over once again his critique of Badiou’s conception 
of 
 
the unity of being and event. 
That is to say, how does the order of being have to be structured so 
The Parallax View, that on Badiou’s terms, “[…] an Event is 
nothing but its own inscription into the order of Being, a 
cut/rupture in the order of Being on account of which Being can 
never form a consistent All.” But in Žižek’s view this is still a 
too idealist, not materialist enough, conception of the event. In a 
passage from The Parallax View, in which he comments directly 
on the above quotation from Badiou’s text on the event as trans-
being, Žižek (PV 167) therefore insists that concerning the 
question of the conception of the event:  “[…] we should go a 
step further than Badiou is ready to go: there is no Beyond of 
Being which inscribes itself into the order of Being––there is 
nothing but the order of Being.” So what does Žižek more 
precisely mean by this? What does asserting that ‘there is 
nothing but the order of being’ in terms of thinking the event 
mean? Žižek’s point seems to be once again that to really be a 
materialist through and through, including on the terrain of the 
event, one must be able to give a full account of the immanent, 
material preconditions, not only of the location (the site) of the 
event, but of the event itself. In other words, the event cannot be 
ontologically of some other order than being. As Žižek (CWZ 
137) explains
D
the event: 
Now my problem with this [Badiou’s] logic of event is that I am 
more and more convinced that it is too idealistic. In contrast, what 
the Lacanian notion of drives tries to account for – and this I think is 
maybe the ultimate materialist problem – is, to put it very simply, 
how an event can emerge from the order of being. How does being 
explode into event? Although he would reject this insinuation, I 
think that on this question even Badiou remains stuck in some kind 
of Kantian opposition between being, which is simply a deposited 
order of being, and the magical moment of the event of truth. The 
materialist problem is how to think 
that something like event is possible? 
 
In his book on Deleuze, Organ without Bodies, Žižek (OWB 
107) takes his critique of Badiou a step further, suggesting that 
Badiou’s distinction between being, as the concern of ontology, 
and event, as that which precisely cannot be addressed by 
ontology, is itself the result of an even more profound dualism in 
Badiou’s philosophy, which he (TTS 130) touched upon in The 
Ticklish Subject, pointing out that in contrast to the order of 
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aterialism there is no room for absolute dualism, not 
bet
                                                
being, the event “[…] belongs to a wholly different dimension – 
that, precisely, of non-Being.” Due to Badiou’s identification of 
the event as specifically exceptional, since it is an instance of 
what is not being qua being, in Žižek’s opinion, he cannot but 
rely on a dualism between being and something otherwise than 
being, which is nevertheless not nothing (the event). So in other 
words, Žižek’s complaint does not concern Badiou’s assertion of 
non-being, not at all; his complaint is that Badiou in the end, not 
to compromise the exceptionality of the event, situates this non-
being beyond being, as something other-than-being, instead of at 
the level of being itself.171 What Žižek seems to be aiming at in 
his critique of Badiou seems to be the old insight that in a 
genuine m
ween being and the event, not even between being and non-
being.172 
Against this backdrop, we can also say that the bone of 
contention for Žižek is, as implied in the above footnote on the 
question of the role of dialectics in Badiou’s philosophy, the 
question of what mediates between the order of being, or more 
precisely the evental site, and the event. Or, to phrase it in yet 
another way, Žižek’s materialist complaint is that Badiou’s 
insistence on the inexplicability of the event seems to compel 
 
171 In a discussion of Badiou’s and Deleuze’s ontologies, Daniel W. Smith 
(2004, 93) proposes a similar critique: “For Deleuze, a purely immanent 
ontology is one in which there is nothing ‘outside’ Being or ‘otherwise’ 
than Being […] Badiou […] is forced […] to reintroduce an element of 
transcendence, which appears in the form of the event. For Badiou, there 
can be no ontology of the event, since the event itself produces an 
‘interruption’ in being, a ‘tear’ in its fabric: the event is supplemental’ to 
ontology, ‘supernumerary’.” In his book on Deleuze, Badiou himself (D 91-
92) in a sense confirms these allegations of ‘transcendence’: “[…] I cannot 
bring myself to think that the new is a fold of the past […]. This is why I 
conceptualize absolute beginnings […] and singularities of thought that are 
incomparable in their constitutive gesture […]. Deleuze always maintained 
that, in doing this, I fall back into transcendence and into the equivocity of 
analogy. But, all in all, if the only way to think a political revolution, an 
amorous encounter, an intervention of the sciences, or a creation of art as 
distinct infinities […] is by sacrificing immanence (which I do not actually 
believe is the case, but that is not what matters here) and the univocity of 
Being, then I would sacrifice them.”       
172 As Johnston (2007a 10) notes in his article on Žižek’s critique of 
Badiou: “[…] one would claim, as Žižek insinuates, that the hallmark of 
materialism is a refusal to allow for the possibility of this gesture of setting 
apart a category of non-being beyond being, a gesture that marks the first 
step on the path back to idealism.” 
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egarding Hegel and the 
uestion of mediation or dialectics, this brings us to the next 
 Hegel.  
                                                
him to uphold an unsurpassable dualism between being and 
event. In other words, what Žižek’s critique eventually seems to 
imply is that Badiou ends up thinking being in terms of the 
masculine constitutive exception, rather than the feminine logic 
of not-All, that he does not really manage to uphold the 
incompleteness of reality and hence neither a genuine 
materialism. Ironically, Badiou, the anti-Kantian par excellence, 
seems to be reluctant towards making what Žižek describes as 
‘the passage from Kant to Hegel’. R
q
section, on Badiou’s reading of
 
Badiou as a Reader of Hegel 
Hegel is, in several different ways, an essential and constant 
point of reference in Badiou’s work, all the way from his Maoist 
pamphlets Théorie de la contradiction and De l’idéologie in the 
1970s through especially Theory of the Subject, but also Being 
and Event in the 1980s, up until his latest major work, Logics of 
worlds, published in 2006. Of great importance for Badiou’s 
relationship to Hegel is the above mentioned issue of dialectical 
materialism, which Badiou clearly embraced in his early work 
until he (presumably) broke with it in Being and Event, only to 
(apparently) return to, at least some variation of it, in Logics of 
worlds.173 Although Badiou’s relationship to Hegel thus seems 
to be multifaceted, involving a certain ambiguity as well as 
fluctuation, the question for Badiou is not, in the words of Bruno 
Bosteels (2004, 156), “[…] whether Hegel should be revived, but 
rather which Hegel.” Or, as another of Badiou’s commentators 
declares: “[…] it remains that in Badiou’s work there is no 
significant break with the philosophy of Hegel” (Barker 2002, 
34). However, the aim here is not to offer any in depth, and 
much less any exhaustive, examination of the complex character 
of this relationship, only to examine a few rather brief instances 
in the course of Badiou’s engagement with Hegel, in which he 
comments on the well-known theological themes or aspects of 
the latter’s philosophy.174 More precisely, Badiou’s reading of 
 
173 See Bruno Bosteels (2004; 2005) for a more precise account of these 
matters. 
174 Besides Sam Gillespie’s (1996) article “Hegel Unsutured (An 
Addendum to Badiou)” and a forthcoming  chapter by Bruno Bosteels in 
the introductory anthology Alain Badiou: Key Concept (Bartlett & Clemens 
2010) not much work has been done, at least not to my knowledge, 
explicitly on Badiou’s relationship to Hegel.  
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ink, in light of the fact that Badiou follows Lenin in a 
aterialist reading’ of Hegel,175 between materialism and 
econd Hegelian dialectic, which he labels 
                                                
Hegel is of interest in the present context exclusively in terms of 
a possible l
‘m
theology.  
 
Materialist Dialectic 
In a few rather condensed paragraphs in the first part of Theory 
of the Subject, Badiou explicitly comments on a key theological 
aspect of Hegel’s philosophy, namely the Trinitarian character of 
his dialectic.176 To get a better grip on and to understand what is 
at stake on these pages, it is necessary to start out with a close 
examination of their immediately preceding context.177 Badiou 
begins his discussion in Theory of the Subject with a remarkable 
reading of Hegel’s Science of Logic, claiming that we need to 
identify and distinguish between two dialectical matrices in 
Hegel. An idealist dialectic of alienation in which “[…] the idea 
of a simple term which unfolds itself in its becoming-other, in 
order to come back to itself as an achieved concept” and a 
materialist dialectic of scission in which “[…] there is no unity 
that is not split” (TS 4). So, whereas the first dialectic has a 
simple or an un-split term as its starting point, the second begins 
with a split term. Badiou names this second materialist dialectic, 
‘dialectic of scission’. After this initial division of Hegel, Badiou 
presents a detailed account of the three fundamental elements or 
stages in the s
 
175 As Lenin (1963, 104) famously states in his Philosophical Notebooks: “I 
am in general trying to read Hegel materialistically: Hegel is materialism 
which has been stood on its head (according to Engels) – that is to say, I 
cast aside for the most part God, the Absolute, the Pure Idea, etc.” 
176 However, already on the very first pages of the book, Badiou (TS 4-5) 
makes the following interesting link between Hegel and theology: “Already 
with the Church Fathers, those great founders of conceptual history, it was 
necessary to account for the fact that God, the absolute form of the One, 
was able to pulverize a universe of such lasting multiplicity. […] Hegel is 
the modern conjurer of this ecclesiastical question. Instead of saying that 
there is creation of the Whole by the One, Hegel will show that the Whole 
is the history of the One, so that the space of the multiple is the effect of the 
time required for the concept.” 
177 The overall task, which I will not go further into here, that Badiou sets 
out to accomplish in Theory of the Subject is, in short, to provide Marxism 
with a materialist and dialectical philosophy able to match its political 
programme, which, Badiou argues (against Althusser and by the help of 
Lacan), implies a concept of the subject. See Bosteels (2009) for a lucid 
introduction. 
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‘sc
                                                
ission’, ‘determination’ (of the split term) and ‘limit’ (of 
determination).  
In his remarks on ‘something’ in the first chapter of Science 
of Logic, Hegel does not, according to Badiou (TS 5), begin with 
‘something’, but rather with a difference. More precisely, the 
‘minimal difference’, between ‘something’ (Etwas) and 
something ‘other’ (Anderes), established by Hegel (1989, 82-90) 
through the operation in the beginning of the chapter, where 
being and nothing are the same thing posited twice. Since this 
minimal difference is established by a repetition, it has, as 
Badiou (TS 6) notes, no ‘qualitative support’: “This only differs 
from that by the statement of the difference, by the literal 
placement. […] There is A, and there is Ap (read: ‘A as such’ 
and ‘A in another place’, namely the place p distributed by the 
space of placement, or P).”178 However, the important insight of 
Hegel is that everything exists as split in itself between 
‘something’ (Etwas) and something ‘other’ (Anderes); or, in 
Badiou’s terminology, every ‘force’ exists as split between 
something ‘as such’ (A) and something ‘in another place’ (Ap). 
In short, what Hegel demonstrates is, as Badiou states, that: “We 
must thus posit a constitutive scission: A = (AAp).”179 It is the 
same kind of inherent scission that Badiou (TC 55-56) has in 
mind when he, in The Century, refers to the ‘minimal difference’ 
between the geometrical figure and background in Kasimir 
Malevich’s painting, White on White. Such a constitutive 
scission is, according to Badiou, the starting point of any genuine 
dialectic. From here Badiou moves on to the second aspect of the 
dialectical movement: the question of ‘determination’, i.e. the 
question of what determines the split force. As implied in the 
above, it is not ‘something as such’ (A) that determines what 
something (A=AAp) is; rather, this is determined by the effect of 
‘space of placement’ (P) on ‘something as such’ (A). Or, in 
 
178 It should be noted that, Badiou (TS 6) underlines that ‘space of 
placement’ is to be understood not only in a spatial, but in a temporal sense 
as well. 
179 To make this point, Badiou often refers to Mao’s dictum: ’One divides 
into two’. However, this ’two’ has nothing to do with any kind of dualism. 
Rather, for both Hegel and Badiou, the twosome designates that the one is 
split from within, not between two parts, but between something and 
nothing. The ’other’ (anderes), or in Badiou’s (TS 5-7) case ’the space of 
placement’, is not ’something’, but strictly speaking ’nothing’. Thus, as 
Badiou (NN 19) says elsewhere: “[…] no Hegelian […] would admit the 
universal validity of the principle of identity.” 
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 the Subject will learn during the further course of the 
boo
to establish a rule of orthodoxy (dialectical materialism) against 
Badiou’s words: “Now, Hegel says that what determines the split 
term, what gives it its singularity of its existence, is not of course 
A, the generic term closed in on itself. It is rather Ap, A 
according to the effect or the whole into which it is inscribed.” 
The algorithm for the process of determination, the placement of 
a force and its resulting division, is thus: Ap(A). The third aspect 
of the Hegelian materialist dialectic is described by Badiou (TS 
11) as the ‘determination of the determination’.  This is the 
counter-process, which limits the process of determination. And 
more precisely “[…] a process of torsion, by which a force 
reapplies itself to that from which it conflictually emerges (TS 
11).” It is the process in which a force is able to turn its inner 
scission against itself and twist, or force, its way through the 
impasse of its own structural placement, thus limiting and 
exceeding the process of its determination (TS 11-12). The 
algorithm of this counter-process is: A(Ap). As the reader of 
Theory of
k, this is the (rare) process through which a subject comes in 
to being. 
Finally, Badiou also describes how the dialectical process 
might trigger – as a reaction – two extreme forms of relapses. 
The first is a deviation ‘to the right’, which in a return to the 
established order, claims that ‘nothing really took place but the 
place’, and thus denying the limitation of determination via the 
torsion of the force, or, as Badiou (TS 12) says, “[…] the 
possibility of the new inherent in the old.” The schema for this 
‘rightist’ deviation, which Badiou (TS 206) terms ‘mechanist 
materialism’, is Ap(Ap) = P. The second is a deviation ‘to the 
left’, which as ‘a radicalism of novelty’ asserts the absolute and 
intact purity of the original force, and thus “[…] denying, so to 
speak, the old inherent in the new, that is, determination.” The 
schema for this ‘leftist’ deviation, which Badiou (TS 206) names 
‘dynamicist materialism’, is A(A) = A. Badiou illustrates these 
two relapses via a reference to the two major heresies that 
marked the early history of the Christian church (or perhaps 
even, as Badiou suggests, the entire history of Christianity). 
Namely ‘rightist’ Arianism, in which Christ is perceived as 
wholly human (pure P), and ‘leftist’ Gnosticism, in which Christ 
is perceived as wholly divine (pure A). Badiou ends his 
excursion into the history of the Church with praise for Hegel, 
because, according to Badiou (TS 17), Hegel precisely helps us 
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e that Badiou himself does not always seem to 
ersist in.           
ningless or contradictory duality of the finite and 
the infinite:   
o himself (the 
Father) and himself-placed-in-the-finite (the Son).180 
(in meditation twenty-one) that all the parameters of his doctrine 
                                                
both of these relapses into the illusions of purity. As we shall 
see, this is advic
p
 
Hegel’s Theological Model 
After his careful outline of the threefold dialectical movement of 
‘scission’, ‘determination’ and ‘limitation’, Badiou illustrates, in 
the following section of the book, how the implicit model of this 
Hegelian dialectic is in fact Christian theology. Hence, Badiou 
(TS 15) begins his analysis of Hegel’s theological model by 
identifying ‘the principle of incarnation’ as that, which 
establishes the ‘split term’ and thus the starting point of the 
aforementioned dialectic of scission. Incarnation is, in Badiou’s 
vocabulary, that which provides a dialectical meaning to an 
otherwise mea
 
What gives it [the contradictory duality between the finite and the 
infinite] meaning is its historicization in scission, which makes the 
infinite ex-sist in the finite. Therein lies the necessary stroke of 
genius of Christianity. For this to happen, God (A) is indexed (Ap) 
as specific out-place of the splace of the finite: this is the principle of 
the Incarnation. God becomes man. God divides int
 
This is, as Badiou (TS 16) expresses it, the point of scission that 
the Council of Nicea will settle “[…] in the well-known 
dialectical axiom: ‘The Son is consubstantial with the 
Father’.”181 As indicated in the above quotation, Badiou’s 
attitude towards this ‘dialectical axiom’ of incarnation appears 
here to be rather sympathetic. Something that he seems to 
reaffirm in Being and Event, where he, illustrating his suggestion 
 
180 ‘Out-place’ (horlieu) and ‘splace’ (esplace) are two neologisms coined 
by Badiou. ‘Horlieu’ is a contraction of ‘hors-lieu’. By ‘out-place’ we 
should, according to the translator of Theory of the Subject, understand 
something like “[…] ‘out of place’ or off-site’, as when someone is hors-
jeu, off-side, in soccer” (Bosteels 2009, xxxii). ‘Esplace’ is a contraction of 
‘espace de placement’ (space of placement) and, again according to the 
translator, “It can be understood as a near-synonym for ‘structure’ or even 
‘symbolic order’, even though there is no strict parallelism with either 
Althusser or Lacan (Bosteels 2009, xxxi).  
181 Badiou is of course here referring to ‘ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρί’ in the second 
article of the Nicene Creed. 
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of the event are actually present in Christianity, conspicuously 
underlines that:  
 
The ultimate essence of the evental ultra-one is the Two, in the 
especially striking form of a division of the divine One – the Father 
and the Son – which, in truth, definitively ruins any recollection of 
divine transcendence into the simplicity of a Presence (BE 212).   
 
It is somehow hard not to take this statement as an indication on 
Badiou’s behalf that the figure of incarnation holds a potential in 
terms of thinking through the particular mode of (trans-)being of 
the event (the ultra-one) as ‘an unfounded multiple’. Yet, as we 
shall see in the following section, by the time of Saint Paul, not 
only is any such indication excluded by the fact that Badiou here 
links the event exclusively to the resurrection, but whatever 
sympathies Badiou might have had towards the incarnation have 
evidently vaporized completely. Nevertheless, in Theory of the 
Subject, Badiou lingers on in the theological terminology, 
describing the other two aspects or stages of the Hegelian 
dialectical process in the following way. The second dialectical 
stage […] designates the determination of the (infinite) identity 
of God by marking in the splace of the finite. The radicality of 
this determination is the Passion: God qua Son dies” (TS 16). 
And the third stage […] designates the counter-determination 
(the limit of death) by the infinity of the Father: the Son is 
resurrected and rejoins (Ascension) the Father’s bosom, which 
represents a figurative outplace” (TS 16). So, to sum up, the 
implicit theological content of ‘scission’, ‘determination’ and 
‘limit’ is incarnation (the consubstantiality of the infinite and the 
finite), the passion (the death of the finite) and resurrection (the 
non-death of the infinite).  
Concerning the outcome of this dialectical movement, this is 
where Badiou’s rather short-lived theological enthusiasm ends 
and his critique of Hegel begins: “At the end of this redemptive 
adventure, you find in heaven a God who reconciles in himself, 
in his historical self-unfolding, the finite and the infinite. And on 
earth, what subsists is only the simple empty trace of the 
complete process […].” In short, Hegel’s (supposedly) 
materialist dialectic, modelled on theology, is ultimately a 
circular movement, in which the end point does not exceed, but 
leads right back to the starting point, and thus the dialectical 
process does nothing but return us to status quo, to ‘the right side 
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of the Father’.182 In Badiou’s reading, Hegel’s potentially 
materialist dialectic thus relapses back into idealism. And so, 
Badiou (TS 18) insists that: “Hegel […] must be divided once 
again.” This time between a dialectic of circularity, which 
despite commencing in a materialist manner with a ‘split’ term, 
on account of its Trinitarian urge to integrate or ‘reconcile’ this 
split term back into a redemptive Absolute, ends in idealism, and 
a materialist dialectic of periodization, which has the same 
starting point, but proceeds in terms of a spiralled movement, 
rather than moving in circles, and thus does not lead back to 
anything. At this point in the book, Badiou takes leave (at least 
for a little while) from Hegel to focus on the elaboration of such 
a materialist dialectic of periodization: “Hegel has been given 
the proper salute, for us to take things up again from zero. For 
we must think periodization through to the end” (TS 21).  
 
Badiou’s (Mis)reading of the Negation of the Negation 
Yet Hegel returns for a brief, but remarkable, appearance at the 
end of part one of Theory of the Subject where Badiou suggests 
that he reveals, in a short well-known passage at the end of Logic 
of Science in which he implies that a genuine dialectics requires 
a fourth term, that he in fact did have an intuition of a proper 
materialist dialectic of periodization. More precisely, Badiou (TS 
48) designates this materialist intuition of Hegel’s in the 
following way: “To count the negative (or difference), which is 
the very principle of contradiction, not as simple universal, but 
as Two, and thus to establish the period as quadruple: such is the 
materialist intuition at the supreme point of Hegel’s Logic.” In 
other words, with his brief consideration of a period of 
quadruplicity, rather than a triplicity, Hegel was on the right 
materialist track of a ‘spiralled’ dialectic. Yet according to 
Badiou (TS 48), this intuition of Hegel’s is unfortunately at once 
annulled by the ‘obsessive’ (Trinitarian) theme of the circular 
return to the beginning, or in other words, the insistence on 
reconciliation instead of a double scission. Although this short 
excursion back into the Hegelian dialectic was clearly meant as a 
 
182 This ‘return of the Father’ is, as we shall see in the next section, an 
important reason why Badiou, in his book on Paul, rejects Hegel’s reading 
of the Christ-event. As Badiou (SP 43) underscores, Paul’s ‘discourse of the 
Son’ “[…] can only be accomplished through a sort of decline of the figure 
of the Master [Father].” According to Badiou (SP 42) the figure of the 
Master characterizes the Greek and Jewish discourse, both of which he 
explicitly designates ‘discourses of the Father’.     
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closing remark by Badiou, this insight into Hegel’s ‘materialist 
moment’ seems to raise more questions than answers. Questions 
like: Did Badiou perhaps give up on Hegel too soon? Is another 
reading, not only of Hegel, but also his underlying theological 
model, perhaps possible? A reading, which is closer to the true 
materialist dialectic that ‘counts negativity twice’ as Badiou 
suggests? 
It is quite clear that Badiou’s main quarrel with Hegel’s 
dialectic concerns the conceptualization of its third moment, the 
‘determination of determination’, or, in Hegelian terms the 
‘negation of the negation’. Even if Badiou (TS 48), as we have 
just seen, acknowledges the potential for another, more 
materialist, reading of Hegel’s Science of Logic, he eventually 
concludes that Hegel’s dialectic remains circular and therefore 
idealist. In other words, Badiou adheres to a reading of the 
Hegelian ‘negation of the negation’ or ‘sublation’ (Aufhebung) 
as an annulment of negativity, which, in theological terms, 
institutes a reconciliation of the Father and the Son as the 
(Absolute) endpoint, rather than sustaining an ongoing 
(spiralled) process of scission. As Oliver Feltham (2008, 73) 
implies in his introduction to Badiou’s philosophy, Badiou’s 
reading in Theory of the Subject here echoes Mao’s rejection of 
the Hegelian notion of ‘negation of the negation’ in the polemics 
that he advances against Engels in Practice and 
Contradiction.183  There is certainly nothing surprising in this, 
since Mao is a key reference, not only in Theory of the Subject, 
but in all of the preceding works that Badiou published during 
the 1970s (see Bos
This link is nevertheless not without some interest in the 
present context, if we take into consideration the critical reading 
 
183 Mao (Tse-Tung 2007, 181) articulates his critique in the following way: 
“Engels talked about the three categories, but as for me I don’t believe in 
two of those categories. (The unity of opposites is the most basic law, the 
transformation of quality and quantity into one another is the unity of the 
opposites quality and quantity, and the negation of the negation does not 
exist at all.). […] There is no such thing as the negation of the negation. 
Affirmation, negation, affirmation, negation … in the development of 
things, every link in the chain of events is both affirmation and negation. 
Slave-holding society negated primitive society, but with reference to 
feudal society it constituted, in turn, the affirmation. Feudal society 
constituted the negation in relation to slave-holding society but it was in 
turn the affirmation with reference to capitalist society. Capitalist society 
was the negation in relation to feudal society, but it is, in turn, the 
affirmation in relation to socialist.” 
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of Mao’s Practice and Contradiction proposed by Žižek in his 
recent major work In Defence of Lost Causes from 2008. The 
centre or key target of Žižek’s critique is precisely Mao’s 
rejection of Hegel’s ‘negation of the negation’. According to 
Žižek (IDLC 185), Mao was right in rejecting the standard 
notion of ‘dialectical synthesis’ (‘negation of the negation’) as 
‘reconciliation of opposites’, but he was very wrong in 
formulating this rejection in terms of an ontology of ‘eternal 
struggle of opposites’, because this will in Žižek’s (IDLC 185) 
view get him tangled up in the non-dialectical notion of ‘bad 
infinity’ (i.e. the infinite reduced to an endless succession of 
finite elements). Mao opposes continued division, or scission, of 
his dialectic of contradiction to ‘dialectical synthesis’ of the 
Hegelian ‘negation of the negation’, but by doing this he fails, in 
Žižek’s (IDLC 191) eyes, “[…] to grasp how the ‘negation of the 
negation’ is not a compromise between a position and its 
excessively radical negation, but, on the contrary, the only true 
negation. And it is because Mao is unable to theoretically 
formulate this self-relating negation of form itself that he gets 
caught in the ‘bad infinity’ of endless negating, scissions into 
two, subdivision…” How then does Žižek, more precisely, 
understand the ‘negation of the negation’ as the ‘only true 
negation’? This is actually one of the essential concerns in 
Žižek’s (SOI 7) persistent attempt, announced in his very first 
(English-language) book,  “[…] to reactualize Hegelian 
dialectics by giving it a new reading on the basis of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis”, and it is therefore also a constantly recurring 
issue in Žižek’s work.184 In brief, the essential message of 
Žižek’s many variations on this theme, is, that the Hegelian 
notion of ‘negation of the negation’ should be read, not as a 
transition to a higher third stage of a synthesis that ‘sublates’ or 
‘reconciles’ all differences and negativity, but rather as a 
repetition and radicalization of the first negation (the antithesis) 
that will shatter the very framework in which the first negation is 
negation and thus in a certain sense no longer appear as a 
negation (SOI 176; FTKN 30-33 + 186; TN 120-124; TTS 70-75 
 
184 It is probably evident by now that Žižek’s Hegel does not exactly fit the 
orthodox picture of Hegel. In short, one could, in the words of Johnston 
(2007d, 5), say that: “Žižek’s Hegel is the exact opposite of what he usually 
is conceived to be––not an idealist metaphysician of the all-consuming 
conceptual synthesis of a thereby totalized reality, but, instead, a materialist 
thinker of (in Lacanese) a not-All Real shot through with antagonisms, 
cracks, fissures, and tensions.”       
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+ 85-85). Or, in Žižek’s (IDLC 189) own words: “After all, what 
is the Hegelian ’negation of the negation’? First, the old order is 
negated within its own ideologico-political form; then, this form 
itself has to be negated.” Against the backdrop of this reading of 
‘negation of the negation’, Žižek (IDLC 194) very instructively 
summarizes what he takes to be the problematic political 
consequence of Mao’s rejection of this notion: 
 
His problem was precisely the absence of the ‘negation of the 
negation,’ the failure of the attempts to transpose revolutionary 
negativity into a truly new positive order: all temporary stabilizations 
of the revolution amounted to just so many restorations of the old 
order, so that the only way to keep the revolution alive was the 
‘spurious infinity’ of endlessly repeated negation which reached its 
apex in the Great Cultural Revolution. 
 
Though Žižek does mention Badiou more than once in the course 
of his critique of Mao, he does not at this point explicitly relate 
his critique of Mao to Badiou. However, later on in the book, in 
a section dedicated to Badiou’s politics, Žižek (IDLC 407) raises 
Badiou’s understanding of the ‘negation of the negation’, not as 
outlined in Theory of the Subject, but with reference to a recent 
interview with Badiou in which he declares that: “Contrary to 
Hegel, for whom the negation of the negation produces a new 
affirmation, I think we must assert that today negativity, properly 
speaking, does not create anything new. It destroys the old, of 
course, but does not give rise to a new creation.”185 According to 
Žižek (IDLC 408) this rejection of Hegel will lead Badiou to the 
problem of the right measure or calibration of negativity in the 
procedure of subtraction, which Žižek (IDLC 406-412) considers 
to be both a theoretical and political dead end. Instead, Žižek 
(IDLC 410) provocatively suggests that the Badiouian key 
notion of ‘subtraction’ should actually be read as a parallel to 
(his understanding of) the ‘negation of the negation’, and not, as 
Badiou himself sometimes seems to suggest, as an antipode to 
Hegelian dialectics. As Žižek (IDLC 410) puts it:  
 
In this precise sense, subtraction already is the Hegelian ‘negation of 
the negation’: the first negation is a direct destruction. It violently 
‘negates’/destroys the positive content that it opposes within the 
same shared field of reality; a subtraction proper, on the contrary, 
 
185 Badiou, “’We Need a Popular Discipline’: Contemporary Politics and 
the Crisis of the Negative,” 652. 
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changes the coordinates of the field itself within which the struggle 
is taking place.  
 
Is this not precisely a dialectic that ‘counts negativity twice’, that 
is, the kind of dialectic that Badiou calls for? And if so, then 
perhaps Žižek can do what Badiou apparently will not, that is, 
provide another, more materialist, reading, not only of Hegel, but 
also his underlying theological model? I will return briefly to this 
question of Žižek’s reading of Hegel’s dialectic in the final 
section of this chapter. But first, let’s take a look at Saint Paul, 
and see how Badiou’s dismissal of Hegel’s (and more generally, 
any) dialectical reading of the Christ-event, not to mention the 
incarnation, gets him into a muddle that will drive him 
hazardously close to the kind anti-philosophical conception of 
the event, which he himself elsewhere fiercely renounces, and 
which, by Žižek’s standards, would be deemed as nothing but ill-
concealed idealism. 
 
Saint Paul Revisited 
In the beginning of his book on Paul Badiou reels off a string of 
names of philosophers, who have previously examined the figure 
of Paul; hereby not only placing himself in venerable company, 
but also underlining that he is entering a well-trodden path. One 
of the predecessors mentioned by Badiou (SP 5) is Hegel. While 
Badiou doesn’t go into a more detailed discussion, like the one 
he carries out of Nietzsche’s reading of Paul, Hegel’s name 
nevertheless comes up a few times during the course of the book, 
most substantially in chapter six, entitled “The antidialectic of 
Death and Resurrection”. In this chapter Badiou (SP 66) attempts 
to ‘de-dialecticalize the Christ-event’ by demonstrating that 
Paul’s account of this event is in fact radically anti-dialectical. 
Though Badiou only refers directly to Hegel on half a page at the 
beginning of the chapter, where he explicitly criticizes the 
latter’s dialectical conception of the Christ-event, this Hegelian 
conception is, as the title of the chapter indicates, nevertheless 
the main target of Badiou’s critique throughout the chapter.186 
 
186 Incidentally, in The Time that Remains, Giorgio Agamben (2007, 100-
101) also criticizes Hegel’s dialectical reading of Paul, namely for not being 
messianic enough. However, contrary to Badiou, Agamben (2007, 99) 
acknowledges that Aufhebung, the fundamental term of Hegelian dialectics, 
can be traced back (via Luther’s translation) to Paul’s use in Romans (3:31) 
of the Greek verb ‘katargein’. Like Badiou, Agamben (2005, 99) thus also 
acknowledges the theological model of Hegel’s dialectic, but in contrast to 
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But Badiou also criticizes Hegel in a more implicit manner, since 
his attempt to ‘de-dialecticalize the Christ-event’ involves 
purifying Paul’s position entirely from any link to the highly 
dialectical themes of incarnation and trinity, which are at the 
heart of Hegel’s philosophy. It thus seems as if a decisive 
displacement has occurred in Badiou’s reading of Hegel: In Saint 
Paul the issue at stake is no longer, as it was in Theory of the 
Subject, an alternative between an idealist and a materialist 
dialectic, but, as we will see in the following, between dialectic 
tout court and, to put it in Badiou’s Pauline terms, a ‘materialism 
of grace’. 
The concise, but unmistakable, critique of Hegel’s dialectical 
conception of the Christ-event that Badiou raises on the first 
pages of chapter six in Saint Paul, has two interconnected 
aspects. Firstly, Badiou (SP 65) criticizes Hegel for the function 
that he assigns to death in his dialectic, referring to the famous 
passage in the Phenomenology of Spirit on ‘tarrying with the 
negative’, in which Hegel (1998, 19) suggests that ‘the life of 
spirit is the life that withstands death’. Secondly, Badiou (SP 65) 
objects that, caught up in Hegel’s dialectical apparatus, the event 
of the resurrection just becomes a moment in the self-
development of the Absolute, whereby “[…] the event as 
supernumerary givenness and incalculable grace is dissolved into 
an auto-foundational and necessary deployed rational protocol.” 
Whereas this second point of critique is obviously related to the 
critique that Badiou raised in Theory of the Subject against the 
‘circularity’ of Hegel’s theological informed dialectic, there is no 
critique of death, of negativity as such, in Theory of the Subject. 
However, this ‘new’ critique raised against (Hegel’s) dialectics 
in Saint Paul is of course not new at all, but part of Badiou’s 
more general critique of the theme of finitude.187  
 
Badiou, he does not only see Hegel’s use of this model as a question of 
reiteration: “That Hegel’s dialectic is nothing more than a secularization of 
Christian theology comes as no surprise; however, more significant is the 
fact that (with a certain degree of irony) that Hegel uses a weapon against 
theology furnished by theology itself and that this weapon is genuinely 
messianic.” Does this not suggest that theology should be split and perhaps 
even split in the same way as Badiou insists on splitting Hegel in Theory of 
the Subject, that is, along the lines of idealism and materialism? 
187 Something which becomes particularly clear when Badiou (SP 73), in a 
few sentences towards the end of the chapter, brings up Heidegger: “[…] 
Paul is obviously not the dialectician he is sometimes taken to be. It is not a 
question of denying death by preserving it, but of engulfing it, abolishing it. 
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Against Hegel’s dialectical appropriation of the Christ-event 
Badiou (SP 66-68) opposes what he calls Paul’s anti-dialectical 
position, maintaining that for Paul death is in no way part of the 
operation of salvation, it has no redemptive function, death 
cannot be constitutive of the Christ-event.188 What constitutes an 
event in Christ is solely the resurrection. The evental grace of the 
resurrection is not, as Badiou (SP 66) underlines alluding to 
Hegel, subordinated to the ‘labour of the negative’ and neither 
can it therefore be appropriated as a moment of the Absolute; 
rather, grace “[…] is affirmation without preliminary negation 
[…]. It is pure and simple encounter.” The point of this de-
dialecticalization of the Christ-event, claims Badiou (SP 66), is 
that it will allow us to establish a wholly secularized 
‘materialism of grace’ “[…] through the strong and simple idea 
that every existence can one day be seized by what happens to it 
and subsequently devote itself to that which is valid for all […].” 
However, all this raises several questions. First, what is the 
background against which Paul’s (presumably) anti-dialectical 
position should be understood? That is, why, more precisely, 
cannot death be (part of) the operation of salvation for Paul? Or 
to put it yet another way, what is it that leads Badiou to assert a 
radical dissociation between Christ’s death and his resurrection? 
Second, what are the consequences that Badiou draws from this?  
 
‘Death Is Not, and Can Never Be, an Event’ 
To understand why Badiou, in his reading of the Pauline letters, 
drives a wedge between the death of Christ and the event of 
resurrection, we will need to take a closer look at his account of 
what death means and how it functions in Paul. In his exposition 
of the ‘division of the subject, introduced in the preceding 
chapter (five) and developed further in the succeeding chapters, 
Badiou construes the Pauline opposition between life and death, 
and the corresponding opposition between spirit and flesh, in the 
following way.  For Paul, this opposition of life and death, spirit 
and flesh, has nothing to do with the Platonic dualism of body 
soul and body (SP 55-56), or with the biological distinction 
between life and death as moments in a cycle of creation and 
decay (SP 68). Rather life and death, spirit and flesh, designate 
 
Neither is Paul, like the early Heidegger, a proponent of being-towards-
death and finitude.”   
188 As Badiou (D 77) says elsewhere: “For me […] death is not, and can 
never be, an event.”  
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two ‘subjective paths’, that is, two existential attitudes, or ways 
of living one’s life (SP 55-56; 68). The meaning of these two 
subjective stances in Paul is further illuminated by Badiou 
through the reading he presents in the succeeding chapters (six 
and seven) of Saint Paul. In summary, we can say that while the 
path of the flesh (death) is a subjective stance caught in the 
vicious cycle in which the law itself incites the desire of its 
transgression, that Paul famously describes in chapter seven in 
the Epistle to the Romans; the subjective stance of spirit (life) is 
the subjective stance, which, through fidelity to the Christ-event, 
is able to break out of this cycle. Sin is therefore not to break the 
law, but not to break with the law, that is, sin is to remain stuck 
in the vicious cycle of law-desire in which one takes pleasure in 
feeling guilty about ones transgressions.189 These two opposed 
existential attitudes, the way of the flesh and the way of the 
spirit, death and life, which Badiou finds in Paul, obviously 
match his own distinction, as outlined for instance in Ethics 
(especially E 40-57), between the human animal, the individual 
who is determined by his self-content life-rhythm, and the 
subject of truth breaking with this. And for Badiou, between 
these two existential attitudes there is not, and cannot be, any 
relationship, only a radical rupture.  
Concerning the function of Christ’s death on the cross then, 
according to Badiou (SP 68-69), this death basically signals 
man’s equality to God: What Christ’s death shows is that man is 
not only capable of inventing death (the instituting of the vicious 
cycle of law and desire by Adam), but also of inventing life, of 
producing truth, of being true to an event and thus becoming an 
immortal subject of that truth-event. In short, Christ’s death 
simply indicates that eternal life is accessible to every human 
being, that anyone can be seized by the grace of a truth-event 
and take part in the domain of immortality. Or, in Badiou’s (SP 
69) words: “The operation of death […] constructs the site of our 
divine equality within humanity itself.” So, once more: it is not 
the death of Christ, but the resurrection alone that constitutes the 
event.190 Death merely prepares the site for the event of 
 
189 As Badiou (SP 72) notes, in his attempt to break with this sinful logic of 
enlivening self-mortification, Paul is actually close to his great detractor, 
Nietzsche. In his Genealogy of Morals the latter describes a similar logic of 
vitalizing mutilation of life at play in the Christian ‘ascetic ideal’ (Nietzsche 
2003, 93).  
190 In Badiou’s reading, Paul reserves the operation of salvation exclusively 
to the event of resurrection, separating it completely from Christ’s death on 
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resurrection by making manifest that the infinite dimension of 
immortal truth is also accessible to mortal human beings. Thus, 
not only is there no dialectical relationship between death and 
resurrection, there is no relationship at all: “[…] there is an 
absolute disjunction between Christ’s death and his resurrection” 
(SP 70). Or, in Badiou’s terminology: there is no relation at all 
between the ‘evental site’ (Christ’s death) and the event; the 
event of resurrection is a ‘pure’ event, an absolute rupture, 
entirely new. Yet is this not very close to the position that 
Badiou (TS 10-12, 16-17; BE 210-211), in his outline in Theory 
of the Subject of the dialectical relapses, describes as a ‘leftist 
relapse’, and in Being and Event criticizes under the heading of 
‘speculative leftism’ (or in theological terms ‘Manichaeism’); 
that is, the position of ‘absolute of novelty’, which denies the 
possibility of the old (the site/death) inherent in the new 
(event/resurrection)? And is not the assertion of such a radical 
rupture, absolute break, one of the main features that Badiou 
ascribes to antiphilosophy, namely the radically groundbreaking 
act or event? 
 
The Lure of Anti-dialectics 
The conception of death outlined above and the resulting 
assertion of a radically anti-dialectical position will lead Badiou 
(59; 73-74; 102) to purify Paul’s position completely from any 
association with the doctrine of incarnation and Trinitarian 
theology.191 Of course this raises the question of how Badiou 
explains the relationship between the Father and the Son if he 
doesn’t want to make use of either the doctrine of incarnation or 
the doctrine of trinity. In contrast to the (philosophical) 
relationship between the Master and the Disciple, Badiou (SP 
59) describes the Son as “one whose life is beginning.” And he 
continues: “The possibility of such a beginning requires that God 
the Father […] has assumed the form of the Son.” Spontaneously 
one thinks here of incarnation, but according to Badiou this is 
 
the cross. In Badiou’s (SP 68) words: “For Paul death cannot be the 
operation of salvation.” Such a reading is of course not only in conflict with 
a Hegelian dialectical reading, but with a whole tradition going back to at 
least Martin Luther, of reading Paul as an exemplary model of ‘theologia 
crucis’. For a critique of ‘Badiou’s wilful misreading of the role of the 
death of Christ in Paul’s theology’ see L.L Welborn (2009).     
191 Let me just note in passing that while Badiou (SP 59) claims that: “Paul 
has no interest at all in such Trinitarian questions”, Paul does actually hint 
at the Trinitarian character of God in 2 Corinthians 13:13. 
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not at all the case. So how does Badiou explain that ‘God the 
Father assumes the form of the Son’? He does so by referring to 
what Badiou himself admits to be an ‘enigmatic term’ – the 
‘sending’ of the Son. As Badiou (SP 59) puts it: “Later, theology 
will indulge in all sorts of contortion in order to establish the 
substantial identity of the Father and the Son. Paul has no 
interest at all in such Trinitarian questions. The antiphilosophical 
metaphor of the ‘sending of the son’ is enough for him, for he 
requires only the event and refuses all philosophical 
reinscriptions of this pure occurrence by means of the 
philosophical vocabulary of substance and identity.” The 
opposition outlined here by Badiou between the ‘Trinitarian 
establishment of the substantial identity of the Father and the 
Son’ and the ‘sending of the son’ suggests that Badiou 
understands the ‘sending of the son’ as the abolition of the 
‘substantial identity of the Father and the Son’, or in short, the 
leave-taking with the metaphysical notion of a transcendent 
God/Father. An interpretation that Badiou (SP 73-74) confirms 
when he later in Saint Paul underlines that: 
 
It is essential to remember that for Paul, Christ is not identical with 
God, that no Trinitarian or substantialist theology upholds his 
preaching. Wholly faithful to the pure event, Paul restricts himself to 
the metaphor of ‘the sending of the son’. As a result, for Paul, it is 
not the infinite that died on the cross. Certainly, the construction of 
the evental site requires that the son who was sent to us, terminating 
the abyss of transcendence, be immanent to the path of the flesh, of 
death, to all the dimensions of the human subject. In no way does 
this entail that Christ is the incarnation of God, or that he must be 
thought of as the becoming-finite of the infinite. 
 
However, my assertion is that Badiou’s antidialectical rejection 
of the doctrines of incarnation and trinity, replacing them with 
the ‘enigmatic term’ of ‘sending the son’, does not, as he claims, 
lead to the ‘terminating of the abyss of transcendence’, quite the 
contrary. By rejecting the doctrines of incarnation and the trinity 
(over the simple ‘sending the son’) Badiou precludes himself 
from giving a more precise answer as to why and how the 
‘sending of the son’ is equivalent to having done with the 
transcendent Father. Rather, it seems to beg the question of what 
happens to the Father after the sending of the son, and thus 
paradoxically uphold the very idea of a transcendent God. Does 
not the ‘sending’ of someone also necessarily imply a sender? To 
put it plainly: Dismissing the Trinitarian dialectics of incarnation 
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and claiming an absolute separation, or the non-identity of the 
Father and the Son through the ‘sending’ of the latter, in no way 
automatically makes the former disappear, nor does it terminate 
his transcendence. Quite the opposite, it appears to merely 
strengthen the transcendence of the Father as being absolutely 
disjoined from, or wholly ‘Other’ than the Son. In Badiou’s 
terminology one could say: Will not the assertion of an absolute 
disjunction, the rejection of any dialectical relation, between the 
evental site and the event in the end lead to an (idealist) 
conceptualization of the latter’s miraculous ‘creatio ex nihilo’? 
Badiou, as we know, is not unaware that such an idealist danger 
is lurking in his conception of the event. According to Badiou 
(TW 100-101), this is precisely what the notion of evental site is 
designed to remedy. By designating it as a ‘fragment of being’, 
Badiou (TW 101) seems to suggest that the ‘evental site’ is 
capable of anchoring the event in the situation, but with 
compromising its ‘supplementary’ and exceptional character. 
But, as we have already seen, in Saint Paul, the evental site 
(death) in no way forms a ‘bridge’ between the event and the 
situation in which it takes place; quite the contrary, Badiou’s (SP 
70) assertion is that there exists an ‘absolute disjunction between 
Christ’s death (the evental site) and the event of his 
resurrection’. Here Badiou seems to contradict his own 
(self?)critical reading of Pascal earlier in the same book (SP 50-
53), in which he, as I argued in chapter one, via Paul distances 
himself from a conception of the event as a miracle without any 
relation to the situation in which it occurs. Apparently Badiou 
has trouble keeping the necessary distance to what seems to be 
an inherent ‘antiphilosophical’, or in Žižek’s terms ‘idealist’, 
tendency in his own philosophy.192 
 
Incarnation and Representation 
However, it is not only Badiou’s emphasis on the ‘sending the 
son’, but also his understanding of the incarnation and more 
generally the doctrine of trinity, that is problematic. What is 
 
192 In his article Radical Philosophy, Bosteels (2008, 181-187) suggests that 
Badiou has a tendency, especially in his critical engagement with 
antiphilosophical figures like Paul and Nietzsche (whom he also admires), 
to embrace certain aspects of the very anti-philosophy that he is trying to 
combat. Bosteels’ suggestion could be understood as a parallel to Žižek’s 
(much more confrontational) allegations of idealism; though normally 
Bosteels (2004, 151; 2005b; 614-615) is a strong defender of Badiou 
against allegations of idealist and anti-dialectical tendencies.  
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significant about Badiou’s rejection of the incarnation (and the 
doctrine of the trinity) in Saint Paul is that it is obviously based 
on animosity towards its declaration of ‘the substantial identity 
of Father and Son’. This is an issue which takes us to the very 
heart of the doctrine of incarnation, if not the very heart of 
Christian theology as such.193 So let’s take a closer look at 
Badiou’s perception of the incarnation and the issue of the 
substantial identity of Father and Son. Badiou’s assertion of the 
‘substantial identity between Father and Son’ in Saint Paul 
suggests a shift in his perspective in relation to Theory of the 
Subject. In the latter, Badiou does not once refer to ‘substantial 
identity between Father and Son’, however, he does use the 
expression ‘The Son is consubstantial with the Father’ (alluding 
to the Nicene Creed). Badiou (TS 15-16) also qualifies 
‘consubstantiality’ further, namely as an inherent scission in 
God: Although God the Father and God the Son are ‘of the same 
being (substance)’ there is a difference between them, but a 
difference with ‘no qualitative support’, that is, a non-substantial 
difference (the incarnation is the formula of this non-substantial 
scission). One could argue that conceptualizing this is precisely 
the point of the technical term ‘homoousion’ (ὁμοούσιον), 
created by the Nicene Fathers.194 In Saint Paul, by contrast, 
Badiou in no way qualifies his reference to the ‘substantial 
identity between Father and Son’ in a similar way. 
 Badiou does not go into any extensive discussions or give 
any direct definition of incarnation in Saint Paul, but he does 
nevertheless provide an indirect definition. At the very end of 
 
193 As Jean-Luc Nancy (2008, 151) puts it: “[…] we are well aware that the 
heart of Christian theology is constituted by Christology, that the heart of 
Christology is the doctrine of incarnation and that the heart of the doctrine 
of incarnation is the doctrine of homoousia […].” 
194 In his detailed exposition of the theological discussions surrounding the 
term ‘homoousia’ (ὁμοούσια) Christopher Stead (1997, 160-172.) implies 
that in creating this technical term, the Nicene Fathers did in fact 
(unintentionally) contribute to destabilizing and displacing the Aristotelian 
conception of being (οὐσία) as self-identical. Thus the prefix ‘homo’ 
challenges the unity of the divine substance, while at the same time being in 
opposition to the Arians emphasizing the unity of the hypostases 
(ὑπόστᾰσις) or persons of the trinity, especially the consubstantiality 
between Father and Son. In this light, the doctrine of ‘homoousia’ could be 
read, not as a confirmation of the pure substantial sameness of identity, but 
as an alternative conceptualization of identity, which, qua its inherent 
scission, indeed undermines any substantialist notion of identity. 
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chapter seven in the paragraph on the ‘sending of the son’, which 
I have already quoted in the above, Badiou underlines that 
although Christ must be fully immanent to all dimensions of 
human life, including death, this does not in any way entail that 
“[…] Christ is the incarnation of God, or that he must be thought 
of as the becoming-finite of the infinite.” This exact description 
of the incarnation as the ‘becoming-finite of the infinite’ is 
echoed in Badiou’s (HI 3, 11; TC 116, 153-54) critical 
discussions in Handbook of Inaesthetics and The Century of 
what he terms the ‘romantic schema’ in modern art, which he 
regards as part of the broader tendency of ‘romanticism’ 
mentioned in the previous chapter. To put it briefly, Badiou 
criticizes the romantic schema of privileging art as the singular 
place of truth, of its celebration of human finitude, and most 
importantly in the present context, of entailing a transposition of 
the schema of incarnation, and the specific conception of infinity 
that it involves, into the domain of art. Thus in The Century, 
Badiou (TC 153-154) describes one of the main features of the 
romantic conception of art in the following way: 
 
Art is the descent of the infinity of the Ideal into the finitude of the 
work. The artist, elevated by genius, is the sacrificial medium of this 
descent. This is a transposition of the Christian schema of the 
incarnation: the genius lends Spirit the forms it has mastered so that 
the people may recognize its own spiritual infinitude in the finitude 
of the work. Since in the end it’s the work that bears witness to the 
incarnation of the infinite, romanticism cannot avoid making the 
work sacred. 
 
From this quote it is quite clear that Badiou perceives of 
incarnation in terms of representation: We recognize the infinite 
ideal in the finite work, the finite work bears witness to the 
infinite ideal, or in other words, the heavenly infinite Father is 
represented on earth in the finite body of the Son.195 The 
 
195 The best illustration of the conception of infinity criticized by Badiou in 
his polemic against romanticism is, as Hallward (2003, 67) suggests, 
perhaps the Kantian sublime. For Kant, the sublime designates an 
experience of something which cannot be represented, but which is alone 
indicated through this impossibility of its representation. However, in the 
end the Kantian sublime remains within the constraints of a representational 
logic, because, as Žižek (SOI 205) put it in his sketch of Hegel’s critique of 
Kant, “Precisely when we determine the [sublime] Thing as a transcendent 
surplus beyond what can be represented, we determine it on the basis of the 
field of representation […].” 
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preconditions of this logic of representation (in fact any logic of 
representation), ascribed by Badiou to the incarnation, is 
precisely God’s substantial identity with himself.196 For the Son 
to be a representation of the Father, the latter must be self-
identical, in the sense of being stable, consistent, without 
differing.197 Interestingly, the delineation of incarnation given in 
Saint Paul and in the discussion of romantic art, thus hints that 
Badiou has abandoned his earlier suggestion in Theory of the 
Subject that in the Christian conception of God there is an 
inherent scission in God’s self-identity, since such an inherent 
scission would ruin the logic of representation. In short: if there 
is an intrinsic, non-substantial difference or gap between God 
(the Father) and God (the Son), then God (the Son) cannot 
represent God (the Father); rather, God (the Son) has to be God 
(the Father).198 But actually Badiou already annuls this 
suggestion of an inherent scission in God in Theory of the 
Subject. It is evident that Badiou in his reading of Hegel’s 
theologically modelled dialectic in Theory of the Subject 
ultimately also here understands the incarnation in terms of a 
logic of representation. According to Badiou, in Hegel’s 
dialectic, after his death the resurrected God (the Son) rejoins, or 
is reconciled with, himself (the Father), seated in heaven from 
eternity to eternity, which thus in the end portrays the incarnated 
 
196 Let me just note in passing that in part of the theological tradition, the 
identity between the Father and the Son is actually not perceived, as implied 
by Badiou’s perception of the incarnation, in substantialist terms but, rather, 
in relational terms (see Jüngel 2006, 28).     
197 In chapter three of Difference and Repetition, Gilles Deleuze (2004, 164-
208) convincingly illustrates how what he calls ‘the dogmatic image of 
thought’, which is characterised first of all by representation, is founded on 
the idea of a stable and serene, a substantially identical, world. As Deleuze 
(2004, xvii) notes on the very first page of this book: “The primacy of 
identity, however conceived, defines the world of representation.” Deleuze 
(ibid.) explicitly links this kind of thinking to Hegel. As we shall see, Žižek 
presents a quite different reading of Hegel on precisely this point, and thus 
it is not surprising that this issue constitutes one of the key concerns in 
Žižek’s (OWB 45-55) book on Deleuze.  
198 In Žižek’s (FTKN 35-37) reading, Hegel presents a similar conception 
of self-identity when the latter unmasks that the core of the tautological 
formula of the Judeo-Christian God, ‘God is God’ (Exodus 3,14), is pure 
contradictions as a non-substantial difference or self-relating negativity. 
Actually Žižek (FTKH 36) is staggeringly close to the Badiou of Theory of 
the Subject in his formulation of this point: “Therein consists, in short, the 
Hegelian conception of identity: identity of an entity with itself equals the 
coincidence of this entity with the empty place of its ‘inscription’.” 
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God (the Son) as an earthly mediator representing the heavenly 
God (the Father). Or, as Badiou (TS 16) puts it: “Seated to His 
own right side, God (the Son) is no more than the immutable 
intercessor for the tribunal of God (the Father).” 
If we should try to place Badiou’s reading of Hegel’s 
dialectic, and thus also its underlying theological model, in 
relation to the struggle between materialism and idealism, there 
is little doubt that Badiou (TS 117-121) would place Hegel as 
well as the Christian doctrines of incarnation and trinity on the 
side of idealism. But at the same time, Badiou himself comes 
precariously close to the idealist side of this dividing line in his 
anti-dialectical quest to purge Paul of every trace of incarnation 
and trinity by asserting the absolute separation of the death of 
Christ and his resurrection. However, the pressing question is of 
course whether Badiou’s indirect portrayal of Trinitarian 
theology as circular and the incarnation as counterpart to 
representational logic is really the only possible, or in fact even a 
fair, reading. As implied in the above, Žižek’s Hegelian reading 
of the Christian tradition might provide another, indeed 
materialist, conception of the Trinitarian dialectic. Furthermore, 
in the course of their interpretation of Hegel’s reflections on 
comedy, both Žižek (2006) and Alenka Zupančič (2008b) have 
suggested a rather different understanding of the incarnation; in 
Hegel Christ is constituted, not as a mere mediator or a sublime 
expression of infinity, as Badiou claims, but precisely as a break 
with representational thinking as such.  
 
The ‘Minimal Difference’ of Incarnation 
The doctrine of incarnation concerns the two natures of Christ. 
Or to put it in other words, it concerns Christ’s relationship to 
the divine nature, to God-the-father from whom he is born, and 
Christ’s relationship to the human nature in which he is 
incarnated. In his considerations on the figure of Christ, Žižek 
(e.g. OWB 67; 103) sometimes describes these two relationships 
– Christ’s relationship to God-the-father and his relationship to 
other men – in the exact same way, namely in terms of what he 
calls the ‘minimal difference’. In The Parallax View, Žižek (PV 
105) moreover identifies this minimal difference as the essential 
issue of true comedy, which is why, as he notes, that 
Kierkegaard is right when he “[…] insisted that there is a 
comical side to Christianity: is there anything more comical than 
incarnation, this ridiculous overlapping of the Highest and the 
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Lowest, the coincidence of God, the creator of the universe, and 
a miserable man?” However, Kierkegaard is not the first 
philosopher to notice a connection between comedy and 
incarnation, as Alenka Zupančič (2008b, 39) points out in her 
book on comedy, in the Phenomenology of Spirit, Kierkegaard’s 
major official opponent, Hegel, “[…] works out and establishes a 
direct passage from comedy to the very core of Christianity (as 
revealed religion), which he discusses in the subsequent section, 
focusing particularly on the moment of incarnation.” As this 
indicates, the example of comedy might constitute a useful way 
to illustrate Žižek’s understanding of incarnation as ‘minimal 
difference’. The issue of comedy is moreover a very appropriate 
example in the present context, because it permits us, as we shall 
see, to return to the matter of the relationship between 
incarnation and the representation, which was the core in the 
discussion of Badiou’s interpretation of the doctrine of 
incarnation. Even more importantly, by means of Žižek’s 
scattered comments on comedy, supplemented by Zupančič’s 
more detailed discussion of this subject, it is possible to identify 
and clarify a strong link between incarnation and materialism. 
But let us begin by trying to nail down more precisely what 
Žižek means by ‘minimal difference’. 
In fact, Žižek (e.g. PV 36) uses ‘minimal difference’ to 
designate one of the most fundamental and recurrent thought-
figures in his philosophy, namely the idea of the same 
characterised by an inherent split, a non-coincidence with itself. 
Presumably Žižek has obtained the notion from Badiou, who in 
his book The Century uses ‘minimal difference’ as a 
characterization of Malevich’s famous painting White on White. 
This painting, which we have touched upon above, shows a 
white square against a white background. It alludes, as Badiou 
(TC 55) puts it, to “[…] a minimal difference, the abstract 
difference of ground and form, and above all, the null difference 
between white and white, the difference of the Same – what we 
could call vanishing difference.”199 Here the gesture of repetition 
 
199 Thus, Žižek (e.g. FTKN lxxxviii; OWB 103) often refers to this passage 
on Malevich in The Century. However, he also sometimes characterizes the 
minimal difference as a ‘Deleuzian’ term referring to Deleuze’s 
conceptualization of ‘pure difference’ developed in particularly Difference 
and Repetition, but also in Logic of Sense and The Time-Image, both of 
which Žižek (OWB 64; PV 122) explicitly refers to on this matter (see also 
Organs without Bodies in which there is a whole section entitled ‘minimal 
difference’ [OWB 60-74]).     
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of the same, the white affirmation of white background, creates a 
gap or a ‘minimal difference’ between white and white (in the 
same). The difference in question in ‘white on white’ is thus not 
grounded in any positive substantial properties.  Another, 
philosophical, illustration of what is meant by this minimal 
difference, which I have already talked about in the previous 
section on Badiou, could be the Hegelian conception of the 
‘constitutive scission’ of identity, elaborated in the beginning of 
the Science of Logic. As I emphasized in my exposition of 
Theory of the Subject, this scission was generated precisely 
through the mere repetition of the same, of ‘something’ (A) and 
‘something in another place’ (Ap). Or to rephrase it in Žižek‘s 
(PV 38) wording:  “The difference between S1 and S2 is […] not 
that of two signifiers, but that of the signifier and its 
reduplicatio, that is to say, the minimal difference between a 
signifier and the place of its inscription, between one and zero.” 
Žižek (FTKN 7-60) deals in detail with this issue in Hegel in the 
first chapter of one of his earliest books. Very appropriate for the 
present context, he (FTKN 35) takes his starting point in a 
passage from the Science of Logic in which Hegel (1989, 415) 
offers an analysis of the tautology ‘God is God’.200 In fact, 
Zupančič employs the very same example from Hegel to 
illustrate the notion of the minimal difference in a discussion of 
comedy and love in her book The Shortest Shadow. Here she 
(Zupančič 2003, 168) offers the following very lucid reading of 
Hegel’s argument: 
 
[…] let us determine more precisely what this ‘minimal difference’ 
is. […] to take a more sophisticated example from the Hegelian 
theory of tautology: if I say ‘a is a’ the two ‘a’s are not exactly the 
same. The very fact that  one appears in the place of the subject and 
 
200 What Hegel (1989, 415) does in this passage is, as Žižek (FTKN 48) 
explains, nothing less than subvert the ‘principle of identity’ (e.g. A=A) by 
unmasking how the tautological repetition of the same in ‘God is God’ 
produces a ‘void’ or ‘pure contradiction’ (a minimal difference) as 
constitutive of God’s identity. Apropos my brief ‘speculation’ on the 
doctrine of ‘homoousia’ in the above section; could this doctrine not be 
read in a similar ‘tautological’ way? Žižek does in fact explicitly relate this 
Hegelian ‘subversive’ conception of identity (condensed in the famous 
formula ‘substance is subject’) with the Judeo-Christian notion of God, 
although not via the doctrine of ‘homoousia’, but with reference to Exodus 
3:14, when he (FTKN 48) claims that “[…] only the Judaic-Christian God, 
the one of the tautology ‘I am what I am’, can be said to be subject.” 
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the other in the place of the predicate introduces a minimal 
difference between them. 
 
As I have already implied, both Žižek (PV 105; cf. OB 90) and 
Zupančič (2003, 167; 2008b, 36) argue that there is something 
comical about this minimal difference, and that this comical 
aspect is also at stake in incarnation, in the figure of Christ. More 
precisely, the comical aspect has to do with the fact that the 
minimal difference, as Hegel pointed out, subverts the 
consistency of identity (see FTKN 48). One of the examples that 
Žižek employs to illustrate this point is Charlie Chaplin’s The 
Great Dictator. In this movie, Chaplin appears in the double 
form of the dictator Hynkel, and the Jewish barber, hence 
producing a difference, not between the Thing in itself and its 
appearance but, rather, an almost imperceptible difference 
between these two appearances. Žižek’s (OB 90) point is, as he 
states in On Belief, that as “[…] Chaplin demonstrate[s], there is 
always something comic in this unfathomable difference that 
undermines the established identity ([…] Hynkel IS the Jewish 
barber).” Another comical example that both Žižek (PV 109) and 
Zupančič (2003, 168) use to make the same point is the 
following punch line from a Marx Brothers movie: ‘Look at this 
guy, he looks like an idiot, he acts like an idiot, but this should 
not deceive you—he is an idiot!’ As Žižek (PV 109) notes this 
joke is properly comical, because “[…] instead of a hidden 
terrifying secret, we encounter the same thing behind the veil as 
in front of it, this very lack of difference between the two 
elements confronts us with the “pure” difference that separates 
an element from itself.” And, as we shall see in a moment, it is 
indeed something along the very same lines that is revealed 
through the Christian ‘joke’ of incarnation.   
This (comical) subversion of the established identity through 
the confrontation with its own minimal difference is, according 
to Žižek, also what makes the notion of minimal difference 
properly materialistic. As he (PV 168) points out in The Parallax 
View: “[…] the notions of parallax gap and of ‘minimal 
difference’ obey the logic of the non-All.” The basic assertion of 
the Lacanian logic of non-All logic is, as outlined in the above, 
the incompleteness of reality, which, as we know, is for Žižek 
(MC 240) precisely ‘the basic axiom of today’s materialism’. 
And what true materialist comedy does, that is, the kind of 
comedy in which the comic motor is the minimal difference, is 
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precisely to unmask and embody the incompleteness of reality 
itself. Or as Zupančič (2008b, 47) formulates it:  
 
The reason for which comedy is, indeed, profoundly materialistic is 
not simply that it reminds us of, and insists upon, the mud, the dirt, 
dense and coarse reality as our ultimate horizon (which we need to 
accept), and as a condition of our lives. Comedy is materialistic 
because it gives voice and body to the impasses and contradictions of 
this materiality itself. This is the true incarnation involved in 
comedy. 
 
Now that we have a basic idea of the notion of minimal 
difference, which is at the very heart of both comedy and 
incarnation, let us turn to Žižek’s and Zupančič’s analyses of 
comedy, focusing in particular on their (Hegelian) considerations 
on the abolishment of representation and how this relates to the 
issue of incarnation, including the materialistic aspect of the 
latter implied by Zupančič in the above quote. 
In her book on comedy The Odd One Inn Zupančič begins her 
investigation of Hegel’s thoughts on comedy with a short 
instructive outline of the context of the section on comedy in 
Phenomenology of Sprit. This outline elucidates how the close 
connection that Hegel establishes between comedy and 
Christianity (particularly incarnation) as revealed religion is 
emphasized through the very composition of Phenomenology of 
Spirit, since the section on ‘the revealed religion’ follows 
immediately after Hegel’s exposition of the triad of epic, tragedy 
and lastly comedy in the last part of the preceding section 
entitled ‘Religion in the form of art’. As Zupančič (2008b, 23) 
notes, the key issue for Hegel in this last part (of the latter 
section), termed ‘the spiritual work of art’, is the theme of 
representation. According to Zupančič (2008b, 23), Hegel 
describes the three forms of spiritual art (the epic, the tragedy 
and the comedy) as three different ways of mediating a split 
between the individual and the universal.201 In summery, 
Zupančič (2008b, 27-28) depicts these three different 
relationships of mediation in the following manner: “[…] in the 
epic, the subject narrates the universal, the essential, the 
absolute; in tragedy, the subject enacts or stages the universal, 
 
201 Or, rather, as Zupančič (2008b, 23) herself points out, Hegel names this 
split, which constitutes the starting point of the part on ‘the spiritual works 
of art’, in several different ways. However, she mainly uses the pair 
individual/universal.  
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the essential, the absolute; in comedy, the subject is (or becomes) 
the universal, the essential, the absolute. Which is also to say that 
the universal, the essential, the absolute, becomes the subject.”202 
The crucial point here is that this succession, sketched by Hegel, 
from the epic through tragedy to comedy constitutes, as noted by 
Zupančič (2008b, 23), a gradual abolishment of representation; 
that is, while both the narrative language of the epic and the 
actor staging the tragedy represents the universal, the subject of 
comedy is the universal. This is crucial, because it is precisely 
this feature that indicates a parallel between comedy and 
incarnation. As, Žižek (PV 105) puts it in The Parallax View, 
commenting on Hegel:  
 
[…] the passage from tragedy to comedy concerns overcoming the 
limits of representation: while, in a tragedy, the individual actor 
represents the universal character he plays, in a comedy, he 
immediately is this character. The gap of representation is thus 
closed, exactly as in the case of Christ who, in contrast to previous 
pagan divinities, does not ‘represent’ some universal power or 
principle […]: as this miserable human, Christ directly is God.      
 
In the succeeding passage, Žižek (PV 106) elaborates how both 
in the case of comedy and incarnation this ‘gap’ that he refers to, 
which constitutes the pre-condition of the logic of representation, 
is closed in a ‘properly Hegelian’ or dialectical way, that is to 
say, not by simply opposing it but, rather, by radicalizing it. 
Thus, in comedy, the gap or difference, which in tragedy 
separates the actor from his stage character, is transposed into 
the person himself as an inherent minimal difference. The 
 
202 My italics. In tragedy we start with the concrete subject and we ascend 
to abstract universality, in comedy, on the other hand, we have the opposite 
movement: we start with abstract universality and descend to concrete 
subjective universality. Or, as  Zupančič (2008b, 37) puts it: “In tragedy the 
acting subject, via the various ordeals that befall her, has to let […] some 
universal idea, principle, or destiny shine through her. In comedy, in 
contrast, some universality (‘tramp’, ‘worker’, ‘misanthrope’ …) has to let 
a subject in all his concreteness shine through it […].” According to 
Zupančič (2008b, 38) this ‘movement of the universal from the abstract to 
the concrete’ is precisely Hegel’s definition of comedy. In his comments on 
comedy in Hegel, Žižek (PV 107) also touches upon this ‘movement of the 
universal’; explicitly linking it to the figure of Christ, he describes it in 
terms clearly echoing the notion of minimal difference: “The universals 
undermined by Christ are ‘abstract’ substantial universals (presented in the 
guise of the Jewish law), while ‘concrete’ universality is the very negativity 
of undermining abstract universals.” 
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precise same movement is at stake in the incarnation: in the 
figure of Christ the gap or difference between God and man is 
transposed into God himself (PV 106; cf. PV 6). The climax of 
this movement is, as Žižek (PV 106) notes, Christ’s cry on the 
cross: Father, why have you forsaken me?203 
Before I elaborate any further on Žižek’s thoughts on 
incarnation, I want to return for a short moment to Badiou’s 
reading in Theory of the Subject of Hegel’s dialectic. As I have 
already argued in the above, Badiou’s reading of the Hegelian 
dialectic and the theological model grounding implies a logic of 
representation, because according to Badiou (TS 16) in Hegel’s 
dialectic the resurrection cancels out the incarnation and death of 
God by ‘restoring him to his own right side’ and thus leaving his 
transcendence intact, which means that in the end Christ was 
nothing but the heavenly God’s earthly representative. This is 
also why Hegel’s (theologically modelled) dialectic, according to 
Badiou, in the end remains idealist rather than truly materialistic. 
It should be quite evident from their emphasis on Hegel’s critical 
attitude toward the logic of representation that neither Žižek nor 
Zupančič would agree with the interpretation presented by 
Badiou. Indeed, Zupančič (2008b, 39-40) explicitly suggests a 
completely opposing interpretation of Hegel’s reading of the 
 
203 Another helpful way of illustrating this passage is Hegel’s critique of the 
Kantian conception of the sublime, which Žižek examines in The Sublime 
Object of Ideology. As, Žižek (SOI 203) explains, to Kant “The Sublime is 
[…] the paradox of an object which, in the very field of representation, 
provides a view, in a negative way, of the dimension of what is 
unrepresentable.” Or, put differently, in Kant’s conception of the sublime 
“[…] the place of the Thing is indicated through the very failure of its 
representation” (SOI 204). After this characterization, Žižek’s (SOI 205) 
outlines the essence of Hegel’s critique of the Kantian sublime in the 
following way:  “Hegel’s reproach of Kant (and at the same time of Jewish 
religion) is […] that it is Kant himself who still remains a prisoner of the 
field of representation. Precisely when we determine the Thing as a 
transcendent surplus beyond what can be represented, we determine it on 
the basis of the field of representation […].” The most interesting thing 
about this is that Hegel, as implied by Žižek in the last quote, explicitly 
draws a parallel between the movement beyond the logic of representation, 
which in the end still characterises Kant’s sublime, and the passage in the 
field of religion from Judaism to Christianity. This means, as Žižek (PD 80) 
notes in The Puppet and the Dwarf, that: “Christ is not ‘sublime’ in the 
sense of an ‘object elevated to the dignity of a Thing’, he is not a stand-in 
for the impossible Thing-God; he is rather […] nothing but the rupture/gap 
which makes Christ not fully human.” See also On Belief (OB 89). 
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dialectical dimension of Christianity, in which she concludes that 
the key point of this Hegelian reading is rather that: 
 
[…] revelation and incarnation also imply that with Christ’s death on 
the Cross (that is the death of the self or subject that incarnates the 
Essence) it is the transcendent God himself who dies, the Beyond as 
such. The death of Christ, which Hegel reads as an intrinsic moment 
of the Resurrection, does not mean that after it the Essence, 
untouched in itself, returns to the Beyond and reestablishes the latter. 
For this would imply that we have remained stuck with the 
representative logic of Greek gods as universal powers that are not 
limited by their own individual appearance […].204   
 
From Žižek’s Hegelian musings on the doctrine of incarnation, 
as he unfolds them for instance in The Monstrosity of Christ, it is 
quite clear that he is in full agreement with Zupančič’s reading, 
although he does not, as she does, explicitly link these 
considerations with Hegel’s critique of representation. 
According to Žižek, the essential point of incarnation is precisely 
that since Christ is not only God’s representative, but is God, 
then once God is incarnated, once he becomes man, there is no 
way back, there is no longer any God that dwells in a 
transcendent Beyond with whom Christ could be reconciled after 
he died on the cross and to whom we can pray or sacrifice. And 
the same goes for Christ: since he is a man, once he is dead, what 
we are left with is the spirit of a believing community, which 
exists only insofar that the subjects that constitute it act as if it 
exists. In a crucial passage in The Monstrosity of Christ, Žižek 
(MC 32-33) formulates it in the following way:   
 
The lesson of Christian Incarnation (God becomes man) is that to 
speak of divine Persons outside Incarnation is meaningless, at best a 
remainder of pagan polytheism. Of course, the Bible says ‘God sent 
and sacrificed his only Son’––but the way to read this is: the Son 
was not present in God prior to Incarnation, sitting up there at his 
side. Incarnation is the birth of Christ, and after his death, there is 
neither Father nor Son but ‘only’ the Holy Spirit, the spiritual 
substance of the religious community.    
 
As he clearly indicates in The Monstrosity of Christ, Žižek (MC 
254) is quite well aware of the Trinitarian consequences implied 
in this quotation, namely the complete identification of the 
‘economic’ and the ‘immanent’ trinity: “[…] what was going on 
 
204 My italics. 
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in the earthly reality of Palestine two thousand years ago was a 
process in the very heart of God himself; there was (and is) no 
higher reality backing it up.” So far Žižek’s thoughts on the 
incarnation have mainly been explained in terms of its 
consequences; but what, more precisely, does this process ‘in the 
very heart of God himself’ involve? If, as Jean-Luc Nancy 
(2008, 151) says, the heart of Christology is the doctrine of 
incarnation and Christology is the very heart of theology, then 
what does Žižek’s considerations on incarnation tell us about his 
conception of God?  
The short answer is that it is Žižek’s assertion that in the 
figure of Christ we have a notion of God as a ‘gap’, namely God 
as the inherent minimal difference between God and God, well 
illustrated, as Žižek (FTKN 48) himself suggests, in the famous 
formula from Exodus 3:14: ‘I am what I am.’ According to Žižek 
(PD 24), the gap, as we find it in most other religions, between 
man and God is in Christianity transposed into God himself, so 
that God no longer is the God of Beyond separated by a gap, but 
is this gap as such. This is indeed a ‘materialist’ reading of the 
incarnation, because insofar as the incarnation closes, or rather, 
transposes the external gap between man and God, between here 
and beyond, into God himself, it eliminates the very basis, not 
only of representation, but of idealism. As Žižek (PV 106) points 
out, this transposition, which takes its starting point in 
incarnation, is fully completed in Christ’s cry on the cross 
‘father, why have you forsaken me?’; the point at which God 
loses his faith in and becomes alienated from himself (MC 48, 
59). This is, as Žižek (MC 57) emphasizes in his Hegelian 
musings in The Monstrosity of Christ, the point at which the 
alienation or ‘kenosis’ of man and God overlaps.205 The 
Christian God, or Christ given he is the only possible 
identification of God (MC 31), is thus identical to man, because, 
according to Žižek (PV 123), what characterizes man, the human 
animal, is not his difference from other animals, but precisely an 
inherent (minimal) difference or gap in man himself between a 
 
205 On this matter of ‘double kenosis’, but also more generally, Žižek’s 
reading is quite close to Catherine Malabou’s (2005, 82; 91-93; 111-113) 
more systematic exposition of Hegel’s theological reflections in her 
outstanding book The Future of Hegel, to which Žižek (MC 104; 106) 
refers on several occasions. As Malabou (2005, 82) notes in his translation 
of the Letter to the Philippians, Luther translates κένωσις as Entäußerung 
(’the separation of the self through an externalization’), which is the term 
Hegel uses to describe ’alienation’ (together with Entfremdung). 
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human and an inhuman dimension. Thus the gap that separates 
God from God and man from man is what unites God and man 
(PV 106). This also means that what separates Christ from other 
men is nothing but the same inherent minimal difference that 
separates man (including Christ) from himself. Confronting this 
inherent gap in man himself, this self-alienation in which God 
and man concur, is exactly what characterizes the ‘Christian 
experience’ that anyone who wants to become a true dialectical 
materialist must go through according to Žižek (PD 6). 
Let me conclude this chapter by briefly summarizing the two 
highly important theological consequences of Žižek’s (radical) 
Hegelian reading of the incarnation. The first consequence is that 
with the incarnation, with the birth of Christ, God disappears 
from the transcendent world, which at the same time disappears 
with him. This is the materialist insight exposed by Christ’s cry 
on the cross: The non-existence of the big Other. The other 
consequence is, as Žižek (OB 90) emphasizes in On Belief, that 
this first consequence, however, does not simply mean the 
abolishment of transcendence; rather, transcendence is made 
accessible in the concrete as the immanent transcendence of the 
minimal difference. It is the question of how more precisely we 
should understand such an immanent transcendence that I will 
address in the next chapter, outlining Žižek’s and Badiou’s 
conceptions of subjectivity.206 
 
206 Let me just note in passing that there is also another sense in which the 
consequence of Žižek’s dialectical materialism is not strictly speaking the 
abolishment of transcendence. Although Žižek, following Hegel’s critique 
of the Kantian ‘thing-in-itself’, argues that the transcendent, noumenal 
domain is an illusion generated out of the immanent plane of phenomena, 
he does not conclude that transcendent illusions are therefore not real or 
that they will necessarily disappear; on the contrary, it seems to be his point 
that due to the constitution of the immanent plane of phenomena, due its 
incomplete nature, it will inevitably give rise to transcendent illusions. In 
Organs without Bodies, Žižek (OWB 60-61) describes this Hegelian stance 
in the following way: “For Hegel, the gap between phenomena and their 
transcendent Ground is a secondary effect of the absolutely immanent gap 
of/in the phenomena themselves. ‘Transcendence’ is the illusory reflection 
of the fact that the immanence of phenomena is ruptured, broken, 
inconsistent. To put it in somewhat simplified terms, it is not that 
phenomena are broken, that we have multiple partial perspectives, because 
the transcendent Thing eludes our grasp; on the contrary, the specter of this 
Thing is the ‘reified’ effect of the inconsistency of phenomena. […] 
immanence generates the spectre of transcendence because it is already 
inconsistent in itself.” 
  
Chapter 4 
 
The Return of Immortality 
– Theories of the Subject in Badiou and Žižek 
 
 
The immortality of the soul 
is a matter which is of so 
great consequence to us 
and which touches us so 
profoundly that we must 
have lost all feeling to be 
indifferent as to knowing 
what it is.   
                     Blaise Pascal 
 
Introduction 
Coming from someone who sees himself as a full-blown 
materialist and militant atheist it undoubtedly has a strange ring 
to it when Badiou (LW 1) poses the following question on the 
very first page of his latest major work, Logics of Worlds: “Who 
today would speak of the separability of our immortal soul, other 
than to conform to a certain rhetoric?” The question is of course 
rhetorical, signalling that this is in fact precisely what Badiou is 
going to speak about. Several times throughout the book Badiou 
(LW 40, 49, 71, 86, 87, 507, 511, 513) thus repeats the peculiar, 
or in our modern ears perhaps even slightly embarrassing, 
assertion that man is not only a mortal being, but also a being 
who is capable of immortality. The fact that Badiou (E 12, 14, 
16, 27, 36, 43, 51, 75, 78) also advances this assertion numerous 
times in his small book on ethics, published in 1993, suggests 
that he is not just ‘conforming to a certain rhetoric’. However, 
this claim of immortality, which is related not merely to 
Badiou’s conception of ethics but also to his critique of the 
metaphysics of finitude, has to be understood against the 
backdrop of the theories of the subject and truth that he presents 
in Being and Event and develops further in Logics of Worlds. 
Yet, Badiou is not the only philosopher (or even the only 
materialist philosopher) around claiming to have something to 
say about this presumably outdated and suspiciously religious-
sounding issue of immortality. On several occasions throughout 
the more recent parts of his oeuvre, Žižek (PF 113; TTS 52, 66, 
The Return of Immortality 160 
 
294; OWB 169; PV; 62, 110, 115, 118 182; IDLC 54, 148, 395) 
too employs this term, above all in his elaborations of
subjectivity. So what should we make of this rather strange 
return to the theme of immortality, a fundamental theological 
theme if there ever was one, in the works of two blatant atheist 
philosophers? And what exactly does ‘immortality’ refer to 
according to Badiou and Žižek, if not to a ‘simple’ religious and 
idealist idea of eternal life in another world? This is one of the 
issues I will try to shed some light on in this chapter.  
In both Badiou’s and Žižek’s work, the theme of immortality 
is, as I have faintly indicated, closely intertwined with a number 
of other issues. This means that a proper account of the theme of 
immortality involves an exposition of (at least) some of these 
issues. Besides, several of these issues, of which the notion of 
the subject is the most important, are themselves of patent 
theological interest. Thus, let me point out a few overlapping 
themes, which both Badiou and Žižek (although in somewhat 
different ways) relate to their use of the terms ‘immortal’ and 
‘immortality’, and which I will touch upon throughout this 
chapter.  
To begin with, both Badiou (LW 511) and Žižek (PV 117-
118) associate immortality with something inhuman in man, 
something in which he exceeds his own nature, an excess which 
for both of them has to do with the incomplete nature of being. 
Moreover, this inhuman, excessive dimension, which 
paradoxically is precisely what makes man human, what sets him 
apart from other animals, is for both of them closely connected 
to the issue of freedom. To put it crudely, for Badiou and Žižek 
it holds that if man can become immortal it is basically due to his 
inhuman capacity for freedom. Yet they both see freedom as also 
involving, indeed even relying on, an element of contingency, or 
in theological terms a moment of grace. Furthermore, this 
capacity for freedom, which according to both Badiou (LW 34) 
and Žižek (PV 202) consists – in its most basic form – in a 
rupture with our own immediate interest, a break away from the 
prevailing order of things, is also the fulcrum of any genuine 
conception of ethics. This agreement is without doubt (partly) 
due to a common inspiration from Jacques Lacan, even though 
he is also at the heart of Badiou’s and Žižek’s most serious 
disagreement concerning their conceptions of the subject. This 
brings us to the issue to which both Badiou (E 12, 132) and 
Žižek (TTS 66) primarily relate the term of immortality, the 
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issue that will be the focal point of this chapter, namely the 
notion of the subject. This notion is what unites and ties together 
the above issues to which Badiou and Žižek relate the term 
‘immortal’ or ‘immortality’.207 
In contrast to many of the significant continental philosophers 
in the second part of the 20th century, such as Martin Heidegger, 
Jacques Derrida and Giorgio Agamben, who have been critical if 
not directly dismissive of the subject, Badiou and Žižek are 
united in their insistence on and effort to renew this perhaps 
most fundamental notion of modern philosophy.208 That said, the 
subject that we find in both Badiou’s and Žižek’s work has, as 
we shall see, very little in common with the notion of the subject 
that has been so heavily problematized in the course of the 20th 
century.209 Indeed, both of them consider their philosophical 
fidelity toward the subject to be perfectly compatible with the 
kind of critique launched by ‘theoretical anti-humanism’ against 
any notion of an autonomous, rational, self-transparent, or in 
short, ‘centred’, subject.210 The subject proposed by Badiou and 
Žižek is by no means a return of the humanist configuration of 
 
207 Let me just note as a preliminary clarification that my intention in what 
follows is not to give an exhaustive account of the theories of the subject in 
Badiou and Žižek. Rather, I want to apply their conceptualization of this 
notion and their explicit disagreements on the matter (which naturally 
entails introducing their conceptualization of the subject) as a way to 
elucidate their understanding of immortality and a number of issues related 
to this theme. As another consequence of this approach, I will not enter into 
a general discussion of the ‘subject’ or related notions such as the ‘self’ and 
‘subjectivity’, which are very extensive and complex discussions. 
208 Badiou (MP 43) and Žižek (“Descartes and the Post-traumatic Subject,” 
9) are fully in line with the well-known, predominate narrative of the 
Cartesian subject as the moment of inauguration of modern philosophy.    
209 With this intention to re-conceptualise and re-establish the subject as an 
indispensable philosophical notion, Badiou and Žižek are in a certain sense 
on par with the influential attempt led by German philosophers like Dieter 
Henrich and Manfred Frank to counteract the so-called ‘death of the 
subject’ (Johnston, 2008b, 5-6; Grøn 1995, 123-124). But besides the 
insistence on maintaining the notion, there seems to be far more that 
separates than unites these two attempts to re-conceptualize the subject. 
Žižek comments explicitly on Henrich and Frank – with whom he shares an 
inspiration from German Idealism – in his essay “The Cartesian Subject 
versus the Cartesian Theatre” (247-248) and in Enjoy your Symptom! (EYS 
86-89).    
210 On this issue, see the last chapter in Badiou’s book The Century (TC 
163-178) and Žižek’s introduction to the anthology Cogito and the 
Unconscious (Žižek, “Introduction: Cogito as a Shibboleth,” 3-4). 
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Man, whose imminent disappearance was infamously predicted 
by Michel Foucault (2002, 420) on the closing pages of the 
Order of Things. On the other hand, both Badiou and Žižek are 
no less opposed to the (post)structuralist reduction of the subject 
to ‘subject-positions’, to the mere effect of discursive and 
institutional ‘interpellation’/‘subjectivation’.211 Thus while both 
Badiou and Žižek, in different ways, introduce a theory in which 
the subject is re-conceptualized as fundamentally de-centred, and 
thus adhere to the new ‘Copernican turn’ enacted through 
Freud’s subject of the unconscious, they also both in their own 
way remain true to the basic Cartesian heritage of the cogito. 
Indeed, in their opinion there is no opposition between these two 
positions. In contrast to the traditional perception of the Freudian 
subject of the unconscious as anti-Cartesian, as the very 
undermining of the Cartesian illusion of a rational subject, 
Badiou (BE 431-432) and Zizek (e.g. TTS 62) are in full 
agreement with Lacan’s (1977, 47) claim that the Cartesian 
cogito is in fact the same as the psychoanalytical subject of the 
unconscious. As Žižek states in his introduction to Cogito and 
the Unconscious, a collection of essays on the Cartesian cogito 
and its reception in psychoanalysis:  
 
Lacan’s underlying thesis here is even more radical than with the 
unconscious: not only has the Freudian subject nothing to do with 
the self-transparent, unified self-consciousness, it is the Cartesian 
subject itself […]: the standard philosophy of subjectivity, as well as 
the critics of the notion of ‘unified transcendental subject’, both 
misrecognize […] the gap that separates the Cartesian subject (when 
it is ‘brought to its notion’ with Kant) from the self-transparent ego, 
or from man, from the ‘human person’. What they fail to see is that 
the Cartesian subject emerges precisely out of the ‘death of man’: 
‘transcendental subjectivity is philosophical antihumanism at its 
purest.212 
 
To summarize the account offered by Žižek (OB 133-135) in his 
book On Belief of this Lacanian claim that the Cartesian cogito is 
equal to the subject of the unconscious, we can say that what 
 
211 See, for example, Žižek’s (SOI 173-178) discussion of the differences 
between a Lacanian and a post-structural notion of the subject in The 
Sublime Object of Ideology. 
212 Žižek, “Introduction: Cogito as a Shibboleth,” 3. When Žižek (FTKN 
147) says that ‘the Cartesian cogito emerges out of death of man’ he refers 
to Descartes’ method of radical doubt as a gesture of self-withdrawal in 
which the subject is desubstantialized and reduced to a pure void. 
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Freud’s subject of the unconscious has in common with the 
Cartesian cogito is basically the idea that the subject is not some 
kind of hard kernel, but rather a void, a point of pure 
negativity.213 This void or gap that remains after the gesture of 
radical doubt, that cannot be fully identified with the Ego, is 
what Lacan refers to in his well-known saying that the subject 
(S) is ‘barred’ ($). In both Badiou’s and Žižek’s case, the attempt 
to re-conceptualize the subject is to a large extent inspired by 
and closely linked to this Lacanian notion of the subject.214 
All of the abovementioned general similarities aside, Badiou 
and Žižek, as I will try to demonstrate in the following, actually 
conceptualize the subject in quite different ways with substantial 
consequences. Anticipating things a bit one could say that their 
disagreement broadly has to do with the fact that, while Badiou 
(IT 62) in his conception of the process of subjectivation begins 
with an affirmation, the affirmation of something new in the 
situation, in Žižek’s (TTS 159) view, the precondition for such 
an affirmation is a preceding negation, which he associates with 
the subject. Or, in other words, whereas the subject, according to 
Badiou, always succeeds (is a result of) an affirmation, in 
Žižek’s terms the subject precedes (and enables) such an 
affirmation. This discrepancy will lead Žižek (TTS 158-167) to 
criticize Badiou for not being able to account properly for what it 
is more precisely that makes man capable of affirming 
 
213 In the same passage in On Belief Žižek (OB 134-135) furthermore 
explains how Kant’s ‘transcendental apperception’ functions as the 
‘vanishing mediator’ between Descartes’ cogito and Freud’s subject of the 
unconscious, which elucidates his reference to Kant in the above quotation. 
While taking his lead from Lacan in relation to the parallel between the 
cogito and the subject of the unconscious, Žižek follows in the footsteps of 
Hegel (1989, 584) when he suggests that it was Kant who first raised the 
subject to the form of a notion (the ‘transcendental apperception’). Žižek 
(TN 9-44) outlines the relationship between the Cartesian, Kantian 
(Hegelian) and Freudo-Lacanian subject in much greater detail in the first 
chapter of Tarrying with the Negative. 
214 Badiou (BE 1; LW 48) explicitly acknowledges his debt to Lacan on this 
issue both in Being and Event and Logics of Worlds. Žižek (SOI 153-199) 
deals extensively with the issue of the Lacanian subject among other places 
in The Sublime Object of Ideology. The other paramount source of 
inspiration in Žižek’s conception of the subject is the philosophical tradition 
of German idealism. As he puts it in a recent interview: “[…] I just take 
literally Lacan’s indication that the subject of psychoanalysis is the 
Cartesian cogito - of course, I would add, as reread by Kant, Schelling, and 
Hegel.” Žižek, “Liberation Hurts: An Interview with Slavoj Žižek”.  
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something new in a situation, which normally merely offers us 
endless repetition; or in Badiou’s wording, what it is more 
specifically about the human animal that enables it to become an 
immortal subject of truth. As I have already implied (in chapter 
two), the Freudian notion of ‘death drive’215 will be at the centre 
of this discord between Badiou and Žižek, and in relation to this 
notion, also the (Kantian) theme of finitude considered by 
Badiou to be a contemporary remnant of religion.216 
The notion of death drive moreover indicates a theologically 
relevant difference between Badiou and Žižek on the issue of 
immortality. Like Badiou, Žižek (PV 123) also associates the 
death drive with religion, or more precisely a ‘theological 
dimension’ in man, but he does so in a far more appreciatory 
way than Badiou, who, as I just said, associates the death drive 
with religion pejoratively by relating it to the theme of finitude. 
Furthermore, and once again in contrast to Badiou, Žižek does 
not relate the notion of death drive to human finitude, or at least 
not in Badiou’s sense of the term; rather Žižek (PF 113; TTS 66, 
390; PV 182; HRL 63) explicitly relates it to immortality. Which 
brings us to another aspect of this difference between Badiou and 
Žižek. Whereas Badiou (LW 513) explicitly emphasizes his 
distance from any theological idea of immortality, preferring 
instead to refer to philosophers like Plato, Aristotle and 
Nietzsche, Žižek (PV 123) apparently has no problem 
associating his considerations on immortality with a ‘theological 
dimension’. This is not to imply that what really counts in the 
end is an explicit (positive) interest or involvement in theology. 
Rather, the essential underlying question in the following will 
be: Is there a lesson to be learned for theology, not merely on the 
issue of immortality, but particularly in relation to the issues of 
subjectivity and freedom from Badiou’s and Žižek’s supposedly 
‘non-theological’ consideration on these matters?  
 
215 Just to clarify: In the following I will for the sake of convenience adhere 
to Žižek’s own practice of referring to the ‘Freudian’ notion of death drive, 
although a more fitting designation of Žižek’s conception of the death drive 
would be ‘Freudo-Lacanian’, since Žižek in this case clearly reads Freud 
through Lacan. On Lacan’s reading of the death drive see Dylan Evans 
(2010, 32-33).    
216 Stated more explicitly in Badiou’s (BE 432; C 202; IT 86) terms his 
dispute with Lacan, and thus indirectly with Žižek, on the issue of the 
subject concerns the localization of the void (or in Lacanian vocabulary the 
Real) and more specifically whether the void should localized in being or in 
the subject. 
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‘Keep Going!’ 
In his critical (but nonetheless appreciative) review essay, The 
Subject Supposed to be a Christian on Paul Ricoeur’s major 
work, Memory, History, Forgetting, Badiou’s main argument is 
that the theory of the subject that Ricoeur unfolds in this book 
cannot be understood without its specific basis in Christian 
theology. Clearly this is also Badiou’s main complaint against 
Ricoeur; this is what he points out as the source of his 
disagreement with Ricoeur. Ricoeur’s subject is too entangled 
with the essential Christian themes of guilt and forgiveness.217 In 
addition, Badiou considers it to be ‘a lack of civility’ that 
Ricoeur does not more openly adhere to this.218  
However, it is obviously quite tempting to turn this 
accusation against Badiou himself. Indeed, at first impression 
Badiou’s accusation, his hostility toward the Christian 
theological basis of Ricoeur’s theory of subject, might if 
anything strike one as a ‘lack of civility’ considering that his 
book on Paul is perhaps his own best exemplification of what he 
understands by a ‘process of subjectivation’ in general. 
Moreover, when it comes to explaining this process in detail, that 
is, explaining its singular elements such as ‘intervention’, 
‘fidelity’ and ‘decision’, he (BE 212-222; LW 425-435) seeks 
the assistance of two major theological thinkers, or as Badiou 
prefers ‘antiphilosophers’, namely Pascal and more lately 
Kierkegaard. So, to put it in an equally polemical manner: 
Perhaps it is Badiou’s own subject that is supposed to be a 
Christian? Or in other words, can Badiou’s own theory of the 
subject really be understood without including Christian 
theological notions such as ‘grace’, ‘leap of faith’, ‘belief’ and 
‘immortality’?  
As tempting as this suggestion might sound in the ears of a 
theologian, the answer is nevertheless no doubt positive: 
Badiou’s theory of the subject can be understood perfectly well 
without any reference whatsoever to theology or to 
Christianity.219 Indeed, Badiou (LW 46) insists that his theory of 
 
217 Badiou, ”The Subject Supposed to be a Christian,” 6-9. 
218 Ibid. 8. 
219 As is quite clear from his discussion of the notion of ‘fidelity’ in 
meditation twenty-four of Being and Event, Badiou (BE 254) primarily 
models this notion, not on Pascal’s Christian faith, but on mathematical 
deduction (See Hallward 2001b, 27). The same goes for his notion of 
‘decision’; although he refers to Kierkegaard as an illustrative example, the 
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the subject, in contrast to a psychological, phenomenological or 
narrative conception of the subject, is essentially ‘formal’. 
‘Formal’ here means, as he (LW 47) explains in Logics of 
Worlds, “[…] that ‘subject’ designates a system of forms and 
operations.”220 This does not, of course, mean that this theory 
does not have a reminder to offer theology in regards to how the 
dynamics of (Christian) subjectivity might be understood and 
conceptualized. Not least, when we take into consideration that 
the ‘operations’ constituting Badiou’s subject are conceived first 
of all as a response to the question of what it means to be true to 
something, indeed to something which is not immediately 
verifiable by the normal standard of the situation. However, 
before we take a closer look at Badiou’s theory of the subject, let 
us first turn more explicitly to the question of immortality.  
 
‘We Must Live as Immortal’ 
The issue concerning immortality introduced by Badiou on the 
very first page of Logics of Worlds is – even if in an indirect 
manner – at the very centre of the book and closely tied to the 
revised theory of the subject that Badiou presents in this work. 
This becomes quite apparent when Badiou (LW 507) in his 
conclusion states that now (i.e. against the backdrop of the whole 
book) he is in a position to answer the ‘daunting’ question: What 
is it to live? Immediately qualifying his statement by stressing 
that: “‘To live’ obviously not in the sense of democratic 
materialism […], but rather in the sense of Aristotle’s enigmatic 
formula: to live ‘as an Immortal’.” As this quote clearly 
indicates, the reference to immortality has to be understood as 
part of Badiou’s (LW 1) attempt to disassociate himself from 
today’s ‘natural belief’ of democratic materialism characterized 
by the assertion that ‘there is only bodies and language’, or in 
short ‘the dogma of our finitude’. Although there has occurred a 
 
main resource in his conceptualization of this notion (presented in the 
section “Theory of Points” in Logics of Worlds) is the mathematical 
discipline of topology. 
220 There is nevertheless a conspicuous ambiguity or tension in Badiou’s 
conception of the subject between his rigid formalistic language of 
mathematics, and his vivid exemplifications/illustrations and unmistakable 
existentialist pathos (signalled also by his references to Pascal, Kierkegaard 
and Sartre). Indeed, Badiou has himself suggested in a comment on the 
notion of subject that his project might be described as “[…] something like 
a Sartrean thought of mathematics […]”. Badiou, “Can Change Be 
Thought? A Dialog with Alain Badiou,” 242. 
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slight shift in terminology, the immediate context of Badiou’s (E 
7) employment of the term ‘immortal’ in Logics of Worlds is 
thus basically the same as in his 1993 book Ethics in which his 
frequent references to the immortal nature of man are part of a 
ferocious polemic against what he (E 11) sees as the attempt of 
the contemporary ‘ethical ideology’ to reduce man to a 
(victimized) mortal animal.221 In short, Badiou’s celebration of 
immortality has to be understood in relation to his critique of 
what I in chapter two termed ‘the metaphysics of finitude’. This 
also gives us a first preliminary clue to Badiou’s comprehension 
of the term ‘immortal’. Insofar as Badiou (B29; NN 36, 86; C 
99) considers the motif of finitude to be a remnant of religion, 
his use of the term ‘immortal’ as an opposition to this motif, 
seems to indicate that he takes ‘immortal’ to mean something 
quite different than in its traditional sense in which it has strong 
religious connotations. So, what does Badiou actually mean by 
‘immortal’? And why does he, in what seems as an almost self-
contradictory manner, insist on using this ‘religious’ term 
(indeed along with other religious terms such as ‘grace’, 
‘resurrection’, and ‘eternity’) in his critique of the religious motif 
of finitude? 
In his discussion of the abovementioned ‘daunting’ question 
in the conclusion of Logics of Worlds Badiou (LW 513) 
explicitly rejects that the reference to immortality should be 
taken in any religious sense: ”I need neither God nor the divine. I 
believe that it is here and now that we rouse or resurrect 
ourselves as Immortals.” In other words, ‘immortal’ in Badiou’s 
conception of the term is referring to something we are in this 
present world, in this present life, and not to something we might 
become in some future metaphysical afterlife. To live as 
Immortal, as Badiou understands it, has to do with and is part of 
human life itself. And thus man’s mortality does not prevent that 
he might also ‘live as an immortal’. As Badiou declares in 
Ethics: “The fact that in the end we all die, that only dust 
remains, in no way alters Man’s identity as immortal at the 
instant in which he affirms himself as someone who runs counter 
to the temptation of wanting-to-be-an-animal to which 
circumstances may expose him.” On the other hand Badiou (LW 
 
221 In Logics of Worlds Badiou (LW 2) levels the precise same objection 
against democratic materialism: “In order to validate the equation 
‘existence = individual = body’, contemporary doxa must valiantly reduce 
humanity to an overstretched vision of animality.” 
The Return of Immortality 168 
 
                                                
511) does, as this quote indicates, nevertheless insist that to live 
as an immortal is something quite different than to live our 
ordinary human life, that the immortal dimension of man cannot 
be entirely reduced to his humanity, that there is a part in man 
which exceeds his humanity. Paradoxically it is, according to 
Badiou (LW 511; cf. E 16), precisely this excessive, ‘inhuman’, 
as he puts it, part in us that makes us distinctively human. That 
is, it is (only) through a certain inhuman trait that the human 
animal distinguishes itself from other animals.222 According to 
the conception of the human that Badiou (LW 507-514) presents 
in the conclusion of Logics of Worlds, the human being is 
thought of both as an internal difference, in the sense that a 
human is always also not human or ‘inhuman’, and as an 
external difference, in the sense that this internal difference sets 
the human animal apart from all other animals.223 Thus, proper 
human life, i.e. immortal life in Badiou’s terms, is a kind of life 
which in a certain sense is external or alien to the existence of 
the individual who lives this life.224  
To put it another way, man is characterized by an inherent 
split. Man is, as Badiou (SP 55-57, 63-64) makes particularly 
clear in his book on Paul, divided between two modes of 
existence or two ways of life. On the one hand man lives the 
purely ‘survivalist’ life of a mortal animal in which he is 
basically dictated by his self-interests and desires. This is the 
way of life that Badiou (SP 79) in Saint Paul designates with 
Paul as the ‘path of the flesh’; that is, a way of life in which we 
are delivered to ‘the repetitive automatism of a desire’. And like 
Paul, in the famous passage on sin and law in Romans 7, Badiou 
(LW 510; E 43, 90) also associates this path or way of life with 
death insofar that he in Logics of World as well as in Ethics 
relates it to the notion of ‘death drive’.225 On the other hand man 
can, Badiou asserts, also live life as immortal (in Pauline terms 
 
222 See also the last chapter in The Century on this aspect of inhumanity in 
man (TC 173-178). 
223 For an elaboration of this argument see Ed Pluth, “Alain Badiou, 
Kojève, and the Return of the Human Exception.” 
224 Badiou shares this definition of the human as a being who is alienated 
from himself, who is characterized by an inherent split, with Freudo-
Lacanian psychoanalysis and thus also with Žižek. But as we shall see in 
the following Badiou and Žižek conceptualize this spilt quite differently.  
225 As mentioned in chapter two, Badiou and Žižek have quite diverging 
readings of this notion. I will return to the question of how this difference is 
expressed in their conceptions of the subject at the end of this chapter.    
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life according to the ‘path of the spirit’). The immortal way of 
life is what makes it possible for us to break away from a life in 
which we are dictated solely by our desires; or as Badiou (LW 
509) states: “[Immortal] Life is what gets the better of drives.” 
To live according to this way of life ‘as immortal’ is in Badiou’s 
(LW 71, 86; E 12, 16, 40, 59) vocabulary more precisely to be a 
‘subject of truth’. Or, as he (LW 86) puts it in Logics of Worlds, 
“[…] through the discipline demanded by participating in a truth, 
the human animal will be accorded the chance […] of an 
Immortal becoming.” And it is this capacity and experience of an 
immortal becoming by participating in a truth that constitutes the 
abovementioned inhuman part in us, which according to Badiou 
defines humanity as such (LW 71).226 Although Badiou in a 
certain sense opposes these two ways, and clearly subordinates 
the first to the second, one cannot have the second way of life, as 
Badiou (E 84) stresses, without the first: “The Immortal exists 
only in and by the mortal animal.” That is to say, even if we can 
transcend mere mortality and live as immortal, this does not 
mean that we can negate absolutely our mortality.227 We will, in 
our immortality, be split between a mortal and an immortal way 
of life. The proper universal form of the subject is, as Badiou (SP 
64) points out in Saint Paul, a ‘divided subject’. If, as I have just 
argued, what Badiou understands by living as an immortal is 
equal to being a subject of truth, then we will obviously need to 
take a closer look at Badiou’s conception of the subject. But 
before I do that, let me just point out a few other interesting 
features of Badiou’s notion of immortality.    
Strictly speaking, in Badiou’s perspective, man is not 
immortal and he is not a (divided) subject of truth, rather this is 
something he might become, but only insofar that an event 
happens. A fact which means that man’s immortality hangs on 
the chance of the occurrence of an event. This has, as Badiou 
 
226 The reason that Badiou uses the ‘term’ inhuman about the human 
capacity and experience of truth is not merely to suggest that through truth 
man can become something more or other than human; the term also seems 
to refer to the power that truth has over man. As he explains in Ethics: 
“Unfortunately, one cannot simply ‘renounce’ a truth. The denial of the 
Immortal in myself is something quite different from an abandonment, a 
cessation: I must always convince myself that the Immortal in question 
never existed […]. For the Immortal, if I recognize its existence, calls on 
me to continue; it has the eternal power of the truths that induce it.”    
227 In Ethics Badiou (E 83-84) describes how any attempt to do this by 
forcing truth to its absolute always ends in terror.  
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(LW 512) admits in the conclusion of Logics of Worlds, given 
rise to some objections against him from critics who “[…] see in 
this ‘luck’ [chance] the mark of an aristocratism, a transcendent 
arbitrariness—of the kind that has always been linked to the 
doctrines of Grace.” Against such objections Badiou (LW 514) 
maintains the metaphor of grace and insists that: “Several times 
in its brief existence, every human animal is granted the chance 
to incorporate itself into the subjective present of a truth. The 
grace of living for an Idea […] is accorded to everyone and for 
several types of procedure.” Badiou’s argument here seems to be 
that the events which enable us to become subjects of truth are 
not that rare after all. An additional counter-argument is 
presented by Badiou in Saint Paul where he in the conclusion of 
the book denies that to become a subject we will have to wait for 
an event to happen. This is not the case, because, as he (SP 111) 
stresses, “Many events, even very distant ones, still require us to 
be faithful to them.” Furthermore, as the last part of the above 
passage from Logics of Worlds clearly suggests, Badiou 
conceives the gracious element of an event along the line of a 
Pauline notion of grace, that is, a notion of universal grace in 
which the possibility to become a subject of truth is something 
that is ‘accorded to everyone’. 
Besides inaugurating the process of a truth, and thus 
constituting the absolutely necessary condition for becoming a 
subject, an event is also what institutes the division between the 
mortal way of life of the human animal and the immortal way of 
life of a subject of truth. And it is worth noting that Badiou here 
once again finds an illustrative model of his thought (of an 
‘evental’ division of man) in the Pauline letters. More precisely, 
Badiou locates the core of this model of the split subject in 
Paul’s declaration in Romans 6:14 that the resurrection event 
entails that man is not under the law, which indicates the path of 
the flesh, but under grace, which indicates the path of the spirit. 
“We maintain”, as Badiou (SP 63-64) puts it, “that evental 
rupture always constitutes its subject in the divided form of a 
‘not…but’, and that it is precisely this form that bears the 
universal.”228 With this issue of the event as the ground of the 
 
228 As Badiou states explicitly in a recent interview, he finds that Paul 
‘explains in a very pure manner’ the three central elements which Badiou 
takes to be fundamental in conceptualizing the subject: the dependence on 
an event, the process of subjectivization and the construction of a universal 
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divided subject we touch upon the important question concerning 
the role of, and relationship between, negation and affirmation in 
Badiou’s theory of the subject. I do not wish go into the details 
of this complex question, I merely want to stress a – to the 
present context – relevant point which Badiou also indicates in 
his treatment of the Pauline formula of ‘not…but’. Namely that 
even if living life ‘as immortal’, as a subject of truth, clearly 
involves a negation of the ordinary state of things (‘not’ under 
law), it is nevertheless a primarily affirmative way of life in the 
sense that it is only through the affirmation of an exceptional 
truth and event upon which this truth is based (‘but’ under grace) 
that man finally becomes an immortal subject of truth.229  
Although the immortal life that man might attain by 
becoming a subject of truth consists in a way of life intrinsic to 
our mortal life and not in some sort of eternal afterlife, it 
nevertheless involves a different mode of time. In chapter five in 
his book Deleuze: The Clamor of Being Badiou discusses the 
question of time and truth in detail. Contrasting himself to 
Deleuze who, according to Badiou (D 64), conceptualizes truth 
in terms of memory and thus as continuity, Badiou (D 64-65) 
insists that truth should be thought of as a radical interruption in 
time, and thus more in terms of forgetting than memory. He 
describes this particular form of forgetting that he associates 
with truth and the experience of this forgetting in the following 
way:   
 
[…] this forgetting is not the simple forgetting of this or that, but the 
forgetting of time itself: the moment when we live as if time (this 
time) had never existed, or, in conformity with the profound maxim 
of Aristotle, as if we were immortal […]. This, to my mind, is the 
real experience of (political) revolutions, (amorous) passions, 
(scientific) interventions, and (artistic) creations. It is in this 
abolition of time that is engendered the eternity of truth. 
 
Thus, the time of immortality is eternity, but the eternity of a 
specific truth, which according to Badiou is always a concrete 
process of creation. Indeed, as Badiou (LW 512) states in Logics 
 
truth. Badiou, “A Discussion of and around Incident at Antioch: An 
Interview with Alain Badiou,” 7.     
229 Badiou presents a short but instructive account of his view on the 
relationship between negation and affirmation in terms of his theory of the 
subject in a debate with Simon Critchley on the latter’s book Infinitely 
Demanding. See Badiou, “Comments on Simon Critchley’s Infinitely 
Demanding,” 16.  
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of Worlds: “[…] truths are eternal because they have been 
created and not because they have been there forever.” In 
contrast to ordinary ‘historical’ time which has precisely ‘been 
there forever’, Badiou’s ‘eternality’ is a rupture with or cut in the 
flow of historical time established through the creation of a truth 
(of something genuinely new), thereby transcending this flow, 
overcoming its historical context.230  
Let me end this section with a brief remark on Badiou’s 
apparently paradoxical use of terms with strong religious 
connotations such as ’immortality’ and ’grace’. In his short essay 
‘Alain Badiou, Kojève, and the Return of the Human Exception’ 
on the conclusion of Logics of Worlds, Ed Pluth (2009, 197; 202) 
suggests that the revival of such religious terms in Badiou’s 
philosophy should be taken as an ironic gesture. Pluth supports 
(2009, 203) this assertion by arguing that: “Just as Badiou talks 
about his theory of the infinite as a banalization and 
secularization of what had always had religious connotations, he 
could say he is doing the same for the religious terms that evoke 
what was formerly sacred about human life. He renders 
immortality and eternity banal, in a sense. He makes resurrection 
trivial and ordinary.” I believe that Pluth is quite right in 
asserting that Badiou intends to secularize these terms which are 
usually associated with religion; indeed in the case of grace, 
Badiou (SP 66) states so explicitly himself. However, I do not 
think that Badiou necessarily is ironic in his treatment of these 
terms or that he wants to render them banal, trivial or ordinary. 
On the contrary, I think that viewed against the backdrop of 
Badiou’s insistent effort to re-establish the autonomy of 
philosophy, his treatment of these terms should be taken quite 
seriously. Namely as an attempt to exploit their forcefulness in 
this effort by inducing them with a new, not religious, but 
philosophical meaning. Let us now turn to Badiou’s conception 
of the subject. 
 
A Subject to Truth  
Badiou (BE 391; HI 55) opens the thirty-fifth meditation in 
Being and Event entitled ‘Theory of the Subject’ with the 
following brief, but also rather dense, definition of a subject: “I 
term subject any local configuration of a generic procedure from 
which a truth is supported.” Almost twenty years later in Logics 
 
230 Badiou (LW 9-33) explains his conception of eternal (truths) in detail in 
the long preface to Logics of World. 
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of World, Badiou (LW 47) confirms this definition, in a more 
straightforward formulation: “[…] a subject is ultimately nothing 
but the local agent of a truth […].”231 As both these short quotes 
clearly imply, according to Badiou (LW 50), a subject is always 
a subject of truth. We are only ever subjects in relation to a local 
(finite) production of a generic (infinite) truth.232 In other words, 
if there is no process of truth there is no subject, insofar that the 
subject according to the above definition is a ‘local configuration 
of a truth-procedure’. The subject never pre-exists the process of 
truth (E 43). In a certain sense, a truth thus always precedes the 
subject as Badiou also puts it.233 The same goes for Badiou’s 
philosophical conceptualization of these notions: His theory of 
truth precedes his theory of the subject, which is also clearly 
manifest in the architecture of Being and Event. This means that 
to be able to really grasp what Badiou means by the term 
‘subject’ we will have to take a closer look at his 
conceptualization of truth. Or, as Badiou emphasizes in a short 
essay on his notion of the subject from 1989: “To conceptualize 
the subject […] makes no sense except from the point of view of 
a doctrine of truth which has been so completely recast as to go 
well beyond the critique of correspondence theories, and to out-
radicalize hermeneutics of unveiling.”234  
The fulcrum of Badiou’s conception of truth is a (Platonic) 
distinction between truth and knowledge, which, as he (BE 327; 
 
231 See Bosteels (2009 xxiii-xxvi) for a useful outline of some of the 
displacements and continuations in Badiou’s theory of the subject from 
Theory of the Subject through Being and Event to Logics of Worlds. I focus 
on the two latest books in which Badiou presents his theory of the subject in 
the same distinct conceptual language, which (on the whole) has 
characterized his philosophy ever since the publication of Being and Event. 
232 Let me just restate that according to Badiou (BE 392), a subject of truth 
does not merely designate an individual subject; rather it can also be a 
collective or even a mixture of individuals and a collective. While love 
obviously only affects the two individuals concerned, politics only concerns 
a collective dimension (the political subject is purely collective). Science 
and art, on the other hand, involve a ‘mixed’ subject. 
233 Badiou, ”On a Finally Objectless Subject,” 93.       
234 Ibid., 94. Here Badiou (ibid., 94-95) also lists the five following 
definitions of the subject, which his own (the above stated) formalistic 
definition of the subject precludes: “(a) A subject is not a substance. […] 
(b) Nor is a subject an empty point. […] (c) A subject is in no sense the 
organizing of a meaning of experience. It is not a transcendental function. 
[…] (d) A subject is not an invariant of presentation. […] (e) A subject is 
neither a result nor an origin.”   
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MP 73, 93; C 134; IT 61, 178) stresses on several occasions, is 
an absolutely crucial feature, not merely of his own philosophy, 
but of any philosophy worthy of the name.235 Knowledge, as 
Badiou (BE 328-329) defines it, is in short the identification and 
classification (by the means of language) of the different 
elements of a situation based on a capacity to judge. While 
knowledge is thus basically (a vital part of) what constitutes and 
upholds the stability, consistency and order of the situation, a 
truth is, as Badiou (BE 327; cf. MP 37, 80; E 70; C 134) 
repeatedly states with reference to Lacan, “[…] always that 
which makes a hole in a knowledge.” More precisely, this ‘hole’ 
in knowledge is made through what Badiou places under the 
slightly differing titles of ‘generic procedures’, ‘procedures of 
subtraction’ or simply ‘truth-procedures’. Based on his 
distinction between knowledge and truth, Badiou’s (IT 61) 
conceptualization of this procedure could be described in 
preliminary terms as a theory about how ‘something new’, which 
does not comply with the order of knowledge of the situation, is 
produced, gradually entailing a displacement of the 
epistemological register of the situation and point by point 
enforcing its recognition as part of this situation and hereby also 
producing new knowledge or what Badiou (TW 133) calls 
‘veridicalities’.236 This indicates another crucial feature of 
Badiou’s (IT 61) conception of truth: truth is a process, ‘truth is 
a path’, as he expresses it with reference to Hegel. 
However, my description so far obviously lacks a crucial 
element of Badiou’s conception of the process of truth. Just as 
the process of truth is what makes a subject possible, the 
absolutely necessary precondition in order for a process of truth 
to begin is, according to Badiou (TW 114), that something 
 
235 Badiou (BE 295-314, 355-387) provides a quite complicated argument 
for this distinction based on modern set theory in Being and Event. He (TW 
127) summarizes the essence of this argument in the short text Truth: 
Forcing and the Unnameable: “There can be no doubt that the opposition 
between constructible sets and generic sets provides a purely immanent 
ontological basis for the opposition between knowledge and truth.” 
236 In this sense Badiou’s theory of truth also offers an epistemology, an 
explanation of the emergence of new knowledge. As Badiou (E 62) 
emphasizes: “A truth punches a ‘hole’ in knowledges, it is heterogeneous to 
them, but it is also the sole known source of new knowledge.” Let me just 
emphasize that this new knowledge, which Badiou (BE 329-331) terms 
‘veridicity’, is not to be confused with truth as such. Truth is not a matter of 
(adequate) knowledge or of illumination, but of intervention. 
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happens; to be exact, that the normal situation is supplemented, 
as Badiou (e.g. TW 124; HI 55) would say, by the occurrence of 
an event. This is a decisive feature separating truth from 
knowledge (MP 36): 
 
The truth or generic procedures stand out from the cumulation of 
fields of knowledge by their eventful origin. As long as nothing 
happens, asides from that which conforms to the rules of a state of 
things, there can admittedly be cognition, correct statements, 
accumulated knowledge; there cannot be truth.    
 
Yet, although Badiou (BE 182; TW 101) certainly perceives an 
event as ‘a point of rupture’ with the ordinary state of things, as 
something that ‘does not belong’ to the situation, it is 
nevertheless not the event as such, which ‘makes a hole in 
knowledge’. Rather, what the event does is that it makes 
manifest ‘for the duration of a lighting flash’ the void that 
according to Badiou’s (BE 52-59; cf. HI 55) mathematical 
ontology grounds the situation, but which cannot be represented 
or ‘counted’ as anything but nothing in the situation.237 What 
makes a hole in knowledge is the bringing of this void into being 
in the form of what Badiou (in terms of ontology) calls a 
‘generic multiplicity’ or a ‘generic subset’, through the 
subtraction of a truth-procedure. In an interview with the Israeli 
newspaper Haaretz, Badiou instructively sums up the process 
that I have just described in the following way: “For me, the void 
is the heart of every situation. But this is perfectly thinkable by 
the means of the purest rationality, that is, mathematics. I’d add 
that a great event […] is precisely what renders the void manifest 
in the situation. A truth envelops this void; it presents it in the 
situation in which it was formerly unrepresented.”238 In this 
(infinite) process of creating a generic multiplicity and thus 
‘subtracting’ a truth from knowledge a subject emerges. Indeed, 
 
237 That nothing is what grounds the situation does not mean that the 
situation is not grounded in being, in so far that “[…] being-nothing is as 
distinct from non-being as the ‘there is’ is distinct from being” (BE 53).  
238 It is important to note here that what, strictly speaking, is ‘presented’ in 
the situation is not the generic multiplicity of truth as such; insofar that the 
latter is incomplete in its infinite composition it cannot be stated (we cannot 
know) what truth is. What can nevertheless be stated (what we can know) is 
what will have been if a truth attains completion. This is what Badiou (BE 
401; TW 133) refers to as ‘veridicalities’ or ‘forced statements’, which is 
elements of knowledge that are simultaneously connected and disconnected 
with truth (entailing a reorganization of the knowledge of the situation). 
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the subject emerges as a finite moment within this infinite 
process, as a ‘local configuration of a truth-procedure’. So, 
wherein does this process more precisely consist?  Or in other 
words: In what does a truth-procedure consist? 
The process of truth always begins, as I have just stressed, 
with a situation being supplemented by an event. One of 
Badiou’s (BE 182; TW 114-115, 124; IT 62) recurrent 
definitions of an event is, as we know, that it is what is 
‘undecidable’ from within the situation in which it happens. As 
he (IT 62) explains in a lecture from 1999: “Take the statement: 
‘This event belongs to the situation.’ If it is possible to decide, 
using the rules of established knowledge, whether this statement 
is true or false, then the so-called event is not an event.” 
According to Badiou (IT 62; cf. BE 201) the undecidable nature 
of the event, the fact that it cannot be determined through the 
knowledge of the situation in which it happens, means that “A 
wager will have to be made.” The undecidable event will have to 
be decided in a ‘leap of faith’ as Hallward (2003, 126) describes 
it. A subject is the one who makes this decision, the one who 
risks this leap of faith. Or, in Badiou’s (IT 62) words: “To begin 
with, a subject is what fixes an event, because he or she takes the 
chance of deciding upon it.” Set against this background it 
cannot come as a surprise that Badiou in his elaborations on the 
relationship between decision, truth and subject in Logics of 
Worlds summons Kierkegaard as the key-witness to his 
conception of the decision, his ‘theory of points’. Certifying his 
concordance with the latter, Badiou (LW 432) thus states that: 
“[…] Kierkegaard understands just as we do that the decision 
imposed by the treatment of a point—the occurrence of the 
choice—is truly the moment when one has the chance of 
incorporating oneself into a process of truth […].”239 
 
239 Let me just note in passing, Simon Critchley’s critique of Badiou on this 
point. Critchley (2000, 24; 2008, 1933) has on several occasions accused 
Badiou of what he call a ‘heroism of the decision’. Badiou responded to this 
critique in a short commentary essay on Critchley’s book Infinitely 
Demanding. Here he makes clear that while he agrees with Critchley to 
oppose any kind of ‘Heideggerian pathos of authenticity’ (the origin of 
which he (LW 428) in Logics of Worlds locates in Kierkegaard), he is 
nevertheless of the opinion that it is possible to have a heroism without any 
notion of authenticity. Or, as Badiou puts it: “I define heroism as the 
possibility for an individual to become a subject. […] And there is some 
heroism, not at all because it is much more authentic to be a subject than to 
be an individual or something like that, but simply because the becoming- 
The Return of Immortality 177 
 
                                                                                                                                              
This decision or choice in which an individual incorporates 
himself into a process of truth is also, finally, what Badiou (HI 
54) means by freedom. Freedom is to choose truth as an 
affirmation of the pure chance of an event and to stay true to this 
choice; in short: to be a subject of truth. In Badiou’s conception, 
freedom is thus, as Hallward (2003, 167) notes, ‘an exceptional 
and fragile achievement’ without any ontological foundation or 
guarantee; something which on the contrary needs to be upheld 
through the labour of a subject. Hence, in terms of the classical 
distinction between ‘negative’ freedom (as the absence of 
obstacles, barriers or constraints) and ‘positive’ freedom (as the 
capacity of autonomous action) Badiou’s (LW 34) conception 
clearly belongs to the latter. Yet, this is not to imply that Badiou 
thinks that freedom is absolutely unbounded, that it is not 
associated with any constrictions. On the contrary, once a choice 
is made, the subject is in a sense completely determined, bound 
by its choice, insofar that the subject must submit itself to certain 
restrictions and measures of discipline to realize and uphold its 
choice. Mathematics also serves as the model for Badiou in this 
matter: “In mathematics we have first a kind of primitive 
freedom which is the freedom of the choice of axioms. But after 
that, we have a complete determination, along some logical 
rules. So we have thoroughly to accept the consequences of our 
first choice. And this acceptation is not freedom, but constraint, 
necessity, hard intellectual work to find the correct proof.”240 
But, this is not the only thing that limits the freedom of the 
subject: Even though it is the subject who freely decides the 
event and hereby inaugurates a process of subjectivation, the 
possibility of becoming a subject does not strictly speaking 
depend on us, but on the chance that an event occurs in the first 
place.  
It is, as I have already indicated, this dependence on an 
element of chance or contingency that Badiou refers to when he 
resorts to the theological the term ‘grace’ as a designation of the 
event. Commenting on his use of this term in an interview with 
Peter Hallward, Badiou explains that: “What interests me in 
 
subject goes beyond the popular limits of our existence as individuals.” 
(Badiou, On Simon Critchley’s Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of 
Commitment, Politics of Resistance,” 159). In other words, Badiou’s claim 
seems to be that his use of the notions ‘individual’ and ‘subject’ is value-
free, un-biased. I think that any reader of Logics of Worlds or Ethics would 
hesitate to confirm such an assertion. 
240 Badiou, “Democracy, Politics, Philosophy: an obscure knot.” 
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Saint Paul is the idea – very explicit in his writings – that the 
becoming of a truth, the becoming of a subject, depends entirely 
on a pure event, which is itself beyond all the predictions and 
calculations that our understanding is capable of.”241 Of course, 
Badiou (cf. SP 66) stresses that he uses ‘grace’ in a laicized 
sense. Such a laicized notion of grace is, as he puts it, “Simply, 
[…] a grace that requires no all powerful, no divine 
transcendence.”242 Thus, our dependency on an event should not 
be understood in (orthodox) ‘theological’ terms: the chance of an 
event emerges, not because it is given to us by someone or 
something (transcendent, divine), but only because there is 
literally nothing in which it can be grounded. In the interview 
with Hallward, Badiou justifies his distinction between a 
religious and a laicized notion of grace through a reference to the 
incalculability, or contingency, of the event: “[…] if every grace 
is a divine gift, we cannot avoid the idea of an ultimate, divine 
calculation, even if that calculation exceeds our 
understanding.”243  Yet, Badiou’s characterization of the event as 
gracious still bears with it the connotations of redemption in the 
sense that what the contingent event offers us is the chance of 
being something more than (it redeems us from being) merely a 
living animal determined by our ordinary interests, the chance to 
 
241 Badiou, “Politics and Philosophy – An interview with Alain Badiou,” 
125. 
242 Ibid. To some such a laicized, or as Badiou (SP 66) puts it elsewhere, 
‘materialist’, notion of grace is simply meaningless. Thus, in an article on 
Badiou, John Milbank (2007, 134) claims that: “To speak of grace without 
God can only mean to speak apophatically of God.” I disagree. As I have 
argued in the previous chapter, I find that the opposition between Christian 
theology and materialism is a false one. Not only do I think it is possible to 
have a (materialist) notion of grace without God, I also think it is possible 
to reconcile a materialist notion of grace with God, but not with the 
absolute, transcendent God, which according to Milbank (2009, 111) is the 
only true God. Milbank (2005, 396) does not reject the compatibility of 
theology and materialism; indeed in his essay “Materialism and 
Transcendence” he argues that any real non-reductive materialism 
necessarily must be grounded in theology, but precisely in an (orthodox 
catholic) theology in which God is absolute and transcendent. However, as 
noted by Clayton Crockett (2006, 556) in a critical comment on Milbank’s 
essay: “If matter must be ontologically grounded outside itself, then its 
designation as materialism seems to be a stretch and may even do violence 
to the term.”   
243 Badiou, “Politics and Philosophy – An interview with Alain 
Badiou,”124.   
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transcend ourselves and become a subject of truth.244 It is the 
world in which the happening of events is possible that “[…] 
saves us from every finite dis-grace” as Badiou put it on the last 
page of Logics of Worlds.    
To return to my exposition of the process of truth, we can say 
in sum that the wager of deciding that an event has taken place is 
what inaugurates the subject as a ‘local configuration of a truth-
procedure’. However, deciding the event is far from the only 
thing it takes to become a subject of truth. In brief, Badiou (BE 
223-245, 410-430; TW 105-120; IT 58-68) organizes the process 
of subjectivization implicated in a truth-procedure in three 
interconnected gestures or operations: ‘intervention’, ‘fidelity’ 
and ‘forcing’. So, how are we to understand these three 
operations, in what do they consist?  
I have already accounted for the essential part of what Badiou 
understands by ‘intervention’, namely the gesture of deciding 
that the event belongs to the situation. However, it needs to be 
added that this decision cannot be reduced to a private affair of 
the subject; the event must be decided publically by ‘naming’ it, 
as for example Paul, according to Badiou (SP 88), names the 
Christ-event ‘resurrection’. Insofar that from the perspective of 
the situation it remains questionable if there has been an event or 
not, an intervention is, as Badiou (BE 207) notes, always illegal, 
except to the subject who intervenes, who makes a leap of faith 
and decides that the event belongs to the situation by naming it. 
The ‘nomination’ or naming of the event is thus the ‘material 
evidence’, as Badiou (SP 88) put is, of a decision, and the 
inauguration of a process of subjectivation which constitutes the 
only trace of the vanished event.  
This trace of the event is extended through the fidelity of the 
subject to the vanished event. More precisely, the operation of 
fidelity basically consists in discerning and grouping together the 
elements of a situation by examining or inquiring about their 
connection or non-connection to the name of the event. 
Comparing fidelity to the count-as-one operation, Badiou (BE 
329) explains that the operation of fidelity: “[…] designates 
another mode of discernment: one which, outside knowledge but 
within the effect of an interventional nomination, explores the 
connections to the supernumerary name of the event.” And he 
(BE 32)) elaborates: “When I recognize that a multiple which 
belongs to the situation […] is connected––or not––to the name 
 
244 Ibid., 129. 
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of the event I perform the minimal gesture of fidelity […].” 
Fidelity is thus the operation of examining the situation from the 
perspective of the event, and thereby creating a new organization 
of the situation, like a counter-state or sub-state, as Badiou (BE 
233) puts it. This furthermore implies, in the words of Badiou 
(BE 233), that “There is always something institutional in a 
fidelity […].” In Being and Event, one of Badiou’s recurrent 
examples of such an ‘institutional’ operator of fidelity is the 
church. As he (BE 392) explains: “In Christianity, the church is 
that through which connections and disconnections to the Christ-
event are evaluated […]. As Pascal puts it, the church is 
therefore literally ‘the history of truth’ since it is the operator of 
faithful connection and it supports the ‘religious’ generic 
procedure.”245 Badiou (BE 392) moreover suggests that the 
heresies in the history of Christianity could be explained as 
deriving from the always present suspicion that an operator of 
fidelity (the church) is not itself faithful to the (Christ-) event of 
which it is a trace. So in sum, it is quite clear that to Badiou (BE 
329; SP 14) fidelity is neither a subjective capacity nor a matter 
of knowledge or illumination, but an organizing activity of a 
subject, or as he puts it, “[…] the work of a militant.”  
However, this does not mean that being a subject of truth is a 
matter that does not concern knowledge at all. In fact, the 
operation forming the third and final part of the process of 
subjectivation involved in a truth-procedure does indeed have to 
do with knowledge insofar that this operation concerns the 
matter of what can be stated about truth in the situation, and how 
such statements are produced. Badiou refers to this operation as 
‘forcing’ because it is based upon a method of that name 
developed by the mathematician Paul Cohen. In the 
abovementioned lecture from 1999 Badiou (IT 65; cf. BE 400-
403) gives the following condensed explanation of forcing:   
 
[…] we can always anticipate the idea of a completed generic truth. 
The generic being of a truth is never presented. A truth is 
uncompletable. But what we can know, on a formal level, is that a 
truth will always have taken place as a generic infinity. This allows 
the possible fictioning of the effects of such a truth having-taken-
place. That is, the subject can make the hypothesis of a Universe 
wherein this truth, of which the subject is a local point, will have 
 
245 As I noticed in chapter one, it quite clearly appears here as if Badiou 
considers religion to be a (domain of) truth-procedure on par with politics, 
science, art and love. See also Boer (2009, 163-165).    
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completed its generic totalization. I call the anticipatory hypothesis 
of the generic being of a truth, a forcing. A forcing is the powerful 
fiction of a completed truth. Starting with such a fiction, I can force 
new bits of knowledge, without even verifying this knowledge. 
 
Such bits of forced knowledge are, as I have already mentioned, 
what Badiou (BE 401; TW 133) calls ‘veridicalities’ or ‘forced 
statements’. In this perspective the theological body of 
knowledge or fictions grouped under the title of ‘eschatology’ 
might be considered as an example of such a forced statement.246  
Now we are in a position to understand more precisely 
Badiou’s definition of a subject. That the subject is a ‘local 
configuration of the truth-procedure’ basically means that 
Badiou conceives of the subject in terms of the three above-
described gestures or operations of ‘intervention’, ‘fidelity’ and 
‘forcing’. A subject is the one who intervenes in the situation by 
deciding that the undecidable event belongs to the situation; the 
one who exercises fidelity towards the event by relating to the 
situation as someone that, because he wagers on the event, will 
begin to examine the situation in the perspective of the event, 
that is, to discern the elements in the situation that are connected 
or non-connected to the name of the event; and the one who 
forces into knowledge what truth will have been if it was 
completed.  
 
‘Fail Again. Fail Better.’ 
The question of the subject is indisputably one of most central 
and persistent issues in Žižek’s wide-ranging writings on 
philosophy, psychoanalysis, politics, culture, theology etc. It is 
moreover among the more consistent notions in his philosophy. 
His two main resources for conceptualizing the subject are, as I 
have already indicated, Freudo-Lacanian psychoanalysis and the 
philosophy of German Idealism – above all Hegel. Thus, Žižek 
has on several occasions emphasized that his most urgent project 
is to shed light on how the conceptions of subjectivity in these 
two traditions – the Freudo-Lacanian ‘death drive’ and the 
German Idealist ‘self-relating negativity’ (condensed in the 
famous formula I = I) – are in fact complementary. Or, as he 
recounts it in his unmistakable style in an interview from 2003: 
 
 
246 With Exodus (ch. 1-15) as his example, Roland Boer (2006, 113-115) 
suggests something along these lines in his reading of the notion of 
‘forcing’ in his article “On Fables and Truths.”      
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If you were to ask me at gunpoint, like Hollywood producers who 
are too stupid to read books and say, ‘give me the punchline,’ and 
were to demand, ‘Three sentences. What are you really trying to do?’ 
I would say, Screw ideology. Screw movie analyses. What really 
interests me is the following insight: if you look at the very core of 
psychoanalytic theory, of which even Freud was not aware, it’s 
properly read death drive – this idea of beyond the pleasure 
principle, self-sabotaging, etc. – the only way to read this properly is 
to read it against the background of the notion of subjectivity as self-
relating negativity in German Idealism. That is to say, I just take 
literally Lacan’s indication that the subject of psychoanalysis is the 
Cartesian cogito – of course, I would add, as reread by Kant, 
Schelling, and Hegel.247 
 
In the first part of the following outline of Žižek’s conception of 
the subject the focus will be on how we should understand 
Žižek’s above-quoted claim that Luther, or more broadly 
Protestantism, constitutes the predecessor of the notion of 
modern subjectivity that was initiated in its rudimentary form by 
Descartes and fully elaborated by the German idealists (above all 
by Hegel) and in Freudo-Lacanian psychoanalysis. In the second 
and most extensive part of the outline, the focus will be on the 
notion of death drive as another term for this notion of modern 
subjectivity, first of all because Žižek (TTS 66; PV 182) 
explicitly relates this notion, which he (PV 123) refers to as a 
‘theological dimension’, to the themes of freedom and 
immortality, but also because it plays an important part in 
Žižek’s critical discussion of Badiou’s theory of the subject. 
However, I will begin by developing a little further my brief 
remarks in the beginning of the chapter on Žižek’s theory of the 
subject in general. 
Following Lacan, Žižek makes an important distinction 
between the self or the ‘ego’, that is, the symbolic identity 
produced through various processes of subjectivation, and the 
subject as that which eludes this identification. This distinction 
reflects the basic insight of Freudo-Lacanian psychoanalysis: 
There is an unconscious subject adhering to a logic, which, far 
from being arbitrary or irrational, does not correspond to the ego, 
and which is not disclosed through self-consciousness, but 
manifests itself in phenomena such as dreams and slips of the 
tongue. These two notions designate two different aspects of 
 
247 Žižek, “Liberration Hurts - An Interview with Slavoj Žižek”. See also: 
and Conversations with Žižek (CWZ 61) and Žižek, “Humanism is Not 
Enough - An Interview with Slavoj Žižek”. 
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subjectivity. More precisely, according to Žižek (TTS 159), 
‘subjectivity’ is the name for the ‘irreducible circularity’ 
between the two aspects of ‘subjectivation’ as the process 
through which our symbolic identity is produced and the 
‘subject’ as that which evades this identity. So, how is this 
circular relationship to be understood? 
As Adrian Johnston (2008b, 9) notes in his study of Žižek’s 
Ontology Lacan’s description of the ego as an ‘enveloping series 
of imaginary identifications’ evokes the popular metaphorical 
image of an onion. Like an onion, the ego is constituted in a 
series of succeeding layers. This image also allows a 
rudimentary depiction of the subject. If we peel off all the layers 
of the ego one by one, what we eventually get to when we reach 
the centre of the onion is not some hard kernel, rather we are left 
with nothing, or nothing but a void. At its most radical, the 
subject is this nothingness, this void or point of negativity. As 
Žižek (PV 150) puts it in The Parallax View: “The subject 
proper is empty, a kind of formal function, a void which remains 
after I sacrifice my ego (the wealth that constitutes my 
‘person’).” 
 It is this negativity that prevents us from coinciding fully 
with the imaginary identification of the ego, from identifying 
wholly with the ‘ideological interpellations of the state 
apparatus’ to use Althusser’s vocabulary. In other words, the 
subject forecloses the possibility of any ultimate or complete 
subjectivation. This foreclosure is, as I have already mentioned, 
what Lacan has in mind when he says that the subject is ‘barred’ 
($). However, we must be cautious in our reading here. That the 
subject is barred should not be understood in the sense that the 
subject is somehow beyond the grasp of the procedures of 
identification, as something that these procedures fail to grasp. 
Rather, the subject emerges through this very failure of 
subjectivation (SOI 175; PV 244). Or, as Žižek explains: “[…] 
the intimate link between subject and failure lies not in the fact 
that ‘external material social rituals and/or practices forever fail 
to reach the subject’s innermost kernel, to represent it adequately 
[…] but, on the contrary, in the fact that the ‘subject’ itself is 
nothing but the failure of symbolization […]”.248 With the failure 
of subjectivation, the subject emerges as a negativity or void, 
which not only forecloses the totality of the process of 
subjectivation, but also fuels this process. As Žižek (TTS 159) 
 
248 Žižek, “Class Struggle or Postmodernism? Yes, please!,” 119-120. 
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notes: “[…] the subject’s endeavour to fill in the gap 
retroactively sustains and generates this gap.” So, to formulate it 
in a somewhat paradoxical way: what drives the process of 
subjectivation is the attempt to fill in the void, which emerges as 
the failure of this very process. The subject is thus at once its 
own impetus and obstacle, it is what both drives and hinders the 
process of subjectivation, both its condition of possibility and its 
condition of impossibility (TTS 161). This is what Žižek (TTS 
159) refers to when he says that ‘subjectivity’ is the name of the 
‘irreducible circularity’ between subject and subjectivation.249 
 
‘Not Only as Substance, but Also as Subject’ 
On several occasions throughout his musings on the issue of 
subject, Žižek more than implies that what he understands as the 
notion of modern subjectivity (i.e. the Cartesian Cogito as 
revised by German Idealism and Freudo-Lacanian 
psychoanalysis) has its predecessor in Christianity, or to be 
precise, in Protestantism.250 One such occasion is in his 
abovementioned introduction to the anthology Cogito and the 
Unconscious in which Žižek makes the following proposal:  
 
[…] one can say that Martin Luther was the first great antihumanist: 
modern subjectivity is not announced in the Renaissance humanist 
celebration of man as the ‘crown of creation’, that is, in the tradition 
of Erasmus and others (to which Luther cannot but appear as a 
‘barbarian’), but rather in Luther’s famous statement that man is the 
excrement who fell out of God’s anus. Modern subjectivity emerges 
when the subject perceives himself as ‘out of joint’, as excluded 
 
249 It was, as Žižek (TTS 169) remarks in a note in The Ticklish Subject, 
probably Fichte who was the first to describe this paradoxical circularity of 
subjectivity: “Perhaps the first – and still unsurpassed – description of this 
paradox was provide by Fichte’s notion of Anstoss, the ‘obstacle/impetus’ 
that sets in motion the subject’s productive effort of ‘positing’ objective 
reality: this Anstoss is no longer the Kantian Thing-in-itself – an external 
stimulus affecting the subject from outside – but […] a foreign body at the 
very heart of the subject. Subjectivity is thus defined not by a struggle 
against the inertia of the opposed substantial order, but by an absolute 
inherent tension.”  
250 The modern notion of the subject, in another more strictly etymological 
sense, also has its basis in Christian theology. Thus, in God as Mystery of 
the World Eberhard Jüngel (1983, 126) argues that due to the representation 
of the three divine hypostases (lat. subjectum) as persons (Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit) in the doctrine of trinity “[…] there is implicitly operating a 
terminological change which will conceive subjectum as a Self, a ‘subject’ 
in the modern sense of the word.”  
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from the ‘order of the things’, from the positive order of entities. For 
that reason, the ontic equivalent of the modern subject is inherently 
excremental: there is no subjectivity proper without the notion that, 
at a different level, from another perspective, I am a piece of shit.251    
 
At first sight this might look like just another of Žižek’s endless, 
colourful, and admittedly sometimes slightly superficial, 
illustrations. However, more recently, in The Monstrosity of 
Christ, Žižek has actually developed this suggestion in much 
greater detail through an extensive reading of Hegel’s 
theological writings, and in particular of his understanding of the 
incarnation and the theme of the death of God. Indeed, there is 
more to this slightly bizarre allusion to Luther than Žižek 
explicitly says in the particular context, because, as argued by 
Catherine Malabou (2005, 79f.), who like Žižek sees Hegel as 
the first to fully formulate the notion of modern subjectivity, 
Hegel’s notion of subjectivity has its main source of inspiration 
in Christian, indeed Protestant (even Lutheran), theology.252 This 
is something that Žižek recognizes as well, and by doing so he 
seems tacitly to also acknowledge that in a certain sense the 
same goes for his own Hegelian notion of the subject. 
In a crucial section entitled ‘The Double Kenosis’ of his first 
essay in The Monstrosity of Christ, Žižek (MC 58) implies how a 
fully developed notion of the modern subject was reached by 
Hegel as a response to the philosophical ‘problem of subjectivity 
gripped by absolute solitude and loneliness’ that grew out of the 
 
251 Žižek, “Introduction: Cogito as a Shibboleth,” 4. Žižek (EYS 179; TTS 
157; PV 187) proposed this claim as early as in his 1992 book Enjoy your 
Symptom!, that is, long before his so-called ‘Christian turn’, and he 
reaffirms it both in The Ticklish Subject and more recently in The Parallax 
View.  
252 See also Jüngel (1982, 63-100) on this issue of Hegel’s relationship to 
(Lutheran) theology. Due to his Hegelian reading of Christianity and his 
(MC 260) emphasis on the death of God as ‘the subversive core of 
Christianity’, Žižek is naturally closer to Protestant than to (most of) 
Catholic theology, which he also hints himself (MC 266, 293). As he puts 
in a recent essay: “The standard notion that Paul created Christianity as we 
know it is fully justified: it was Paul who shifted the center from Christ’s 
acts and teachings to the redemptive quality of his death.[…] In the history 
of Christianity, it was Protestantism which was ‘Pauline’, focusing on the 
death of God, in contrast to ‘Johannine’ Orthodoxy and ‘Petrine’ 
Catholicism. No wonder, then, that the most interesting moments in 
Catholic theology occur when it unexpectedly comes close to 
Protestantism.” Žižek, “From Job to Christ: A Pauline Reading of 
Chesterton,” 39.  
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radical critique of religion launched by the Enlightenment 
thinkers, but which they themselves were unable to resolve. In 
other words, the philosophical problem experienced as the 
unsurpassable distance between man and the Absolute, which in 
Hegel’s (1977, 190) famous words already existed in its pre-
philosophical form “[…] as the feeling that ‘God Himself is 
dead’, upon which the religion of more recent times rests […].” 
The epitome of this problem is the claim of Kant’s critical 
philosophy that we can always only know the divine Absolute as 
something unknowable, or that the transcendent God of 
traditional metaphysics is banished from the realm of reason. For 
Hegel, the passage through this ‘nihilism of transcendental 
philosophy’ is, as Žižek (MC 58) emphasizes, an absolute 
necessity. He is very well aware that we cannot go back and re-
establish a positive relationship that bridges the distance between 
man and the Absolute. There is no return to the grand 
metaphysical systems of Spinoza and Leibniz. Instead, Hegel 
argues that the only way to link man and the Absolute is by 
transposing the distance between man and the Absolute into the 
Absolute itself, thus linking man and the Absolute through this 
common distance. Or in Žižek’s (MC 58; PV 106) words: “The 
only solution is […] the very redoubling of alienation, the insight 
into how my alienation from the Absolute overlaps with the 
Absolute’s self-alienation: I am “in” God in my very distance 
from him.” The proper dialectical trick is, as Žižek (PV 106) 
says elsewhere, the very feature that apparently separates me 
from God is in fact what unites me with God.  
However, as Žižek (MC 58) immediately acknowledges, this 
raises another crucial problem: “how are we to think the link 
between these two ‘alienations,’ the one of the modern man from 
God (who is reduced to an unknowable In- Itself, absent from the 
world subjected to mechanical laws), the other of God from 
himself (in Christ, incarnation)?” Following Malabou’s reading 
of Hegel, Žižek (MC 59) identifies the theological model of what 
Žižek refers to as ‘double kenosis’ upon which Hegel’s solution 
to this problem is based:  
 
In order for (human) subjectivity to emerge out of the substantial 
personality of the human animal, cutting links with it and positing 
itself as the I=I dispossessed of all substantial content, as the self- 
relating negativity of an empty singularity, God himself, the 
universal Substance, has […] to appear as a singular miserable 
human individual in all its abjection, i.e., abandoned by God. 
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Hegel’s theological solution to the philosophical problem of 
subjectivity is to ‘sublate’ the alienation (kenosis) of man from 
God by transposing this alienation (kenosis) into God himself. 
That is to say, we become ourselves only in the very alienation 
from ourselves. Or, as Žižek underlines with reference to Luther: 
“[…] there is no subjectivity without the reduction of the 
subject’s positive substantial being to a disposable ‘piece of 
shit’.”253 Such a ‘reduction of the subject’s positive substantial 
being’ to a point of pure self-relating negativity requires, as 
Žižek argues, a ‘double kenosis’ (alienation), it requires that God 
is alienated not only from man, but also from God himself. To 
spell out the theological terms of this model, which makes up the 
precondition for Hegel’s conception of modern subjectivity as 
radical alienation, as self-relating negativity, the death of Christ 
on the cross is thought of as the death of God himself, that is, as 
affecting not only Christ as a human being, but also the divine 
substance itself, not only his human, but also the divine 
nature.254 Or as Žižek‘s (MC 59
 
For subjectivity to emerge—not as a mere epiphenomenon of the 
global substantial ontological order, but as essential to Substance 
itself—the split, negativity, particularization, selfalienation, must be 
posited as something that takes place in the very heart of the divine 
Substance, i.e., the move from Substance to Subject must occur 
within God himself. 
  
In other words, to become a subject in the Hegelian sense of the 
term, that is, as self-relating negativity, as the inherent ‘minimal 
difference’ of I = I, we must, in a dialectical move of ‘negation 
of negation’, transpose or ‘sublate’ the negativity of the subject 
into the Absolute itself. For the subject as self-relating negativity 
to emerge, negativity has to be posited in the order of 
Being/Substance itself. We must, to paraphrase Hegel’s famous 
words from the preface of Phenomenology of Spirit, ‘conceive 
 
253 Žižek, “Introduction: Cogito as a Shibboleth,” 4. 
254 This radical meaning of the phrase ‘God is dead’ was, as argued by 
Eberhard Jüngel (1968, 104), only made possible by Luther’s revision of 
the doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum. On this matter see also 
Frederiek Depoortere’s (2007a) article “’God Himself is Dead’: Luther, 
Hegel, and the Death of God.” 
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the absolute not only as substance, but also as subject.’255 Only 
by transposing man’s self-alienation into Being itself, only by 
claiming that man’s inherent gap equals an inherent gap in Being 
itself, does this alienation, this gap, become his essence rather 
than something that he has to overcome. Thus, the Hegelian 
logic that provides the solution to the problem of modern 
subjectivity is, according to Žižek (MC 71-72), not to heal the 
wound (subject) of alienation/negation by directly healing it, but 
rather to fully identify with this wound by getting rid of the 
presupposed intact/whole body (substance) into which the 
wound is a cut by repeating the alienation/negation. In On Belief, 
Žižek (OB 104) also describes this logic as the basic insight of 
Christianity: “The basic Christian insight is […] [that] getting rid 
of the wound, healing it, is ultimately the same as fully and 
directly identifying with it – this is the ambiguity inscribed into 
the figure of Christ.”  
In sum, Žižek implicitly acknowledges, what is more 
explicitly argued by Malabou, namely that it is through this 
dialectical negation of negation, based on the theological model 
of Christ’s death as the death of God himself, the ‘double 
kenosis’ of divine subjectivity, that Hegel, the Christian 
philosopher according to Žižek (MC 291, cf. 267), arrives at the 
logic that characterises the fully modern notion of subjectivity. 
As he (PD 88) says in The Puppet and the Dwarf: “Both 
Christianity and Hegel transpose the gap which separates us 
from the Absolute into the Absolute itself.” 
 
Why Humanism Is Not Enough 
It is also against the background of his Christian-Hegelian 
understanding of the death of God as ‘double kenosis’ we should 
understand Žižek’s (MC 57, 75; cf. TN 29-30; SOI 225-227) 
rejection of the kind of humanist atheism based on the 
Feuerbachian-Marxist critique of religion according to which 
God is nothing but an ideological projection, the alienating 
production of our own collective imagination.256 What is wrong, 
according to Žižek, with this claim is not that it is too radical, but 
on the contrary, that it is not radical enough. Against this 
 
255 Or as Žižek (OWB 45) puts it: “This is what Hegel’s motto ‘one should 
conceive the Absolute not only as Substance, but also as Subject’ means: 
‘subject’ is the name for a crack in the edifice of Being.” 
256 See also Žižek, “Humanism is not enough – An interview with Slavoj 
Žižek.” 
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humanist, Feuerbachian-Marxist version of atheism, Žižek (MC 
75) calls for a ‘properly Christian gesture’. That is, a Christian-
Hegelian reading of the death of God, in which not only man, but 
God himself stops believing in God. Or, as he (PD 15, cf. MC 
48, 237) puts it in The Puppet and the Dwarf: “In the standard 
form of atheism, God dies for men who stop believing in Him; in 
Christianity God dies for Himself.” This ‘Christian-Hegelian 
atheist’ insistence on that ‘God dies for himself’, or in term of 
kenosis, that alienation is not just a process in us, humans, but 
something which takes place in the divine substance itself, offers 
a genuine materialist lesson that the standard humanist 
Feuerbachian-Marxist atheism misses. That is to say, the 
materialist lesson – manifested in Christ’s cry of dereliction on 
the cross ‘My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me’ (Mark 
15:34; Matt. 27:46) – that there is no big Other, that Being itself 
is incomplete. It is precisely against this setting that we should 
comprehend Žižek’s (PD 6) paradoxical claim in The Puppet and 
the Dwarf that “[…] to become a true dialectical materialist, one 
should go through the Christian experience.” Moreover, as 
implied in the preceding, the Feuerbachian-Marxist critique of 
religion also has a lesson to learn from Christianity in terms of 
atheism.257  
In relation to subjectivity, the consequence of this materialist 
insight, which the Feuerbachian-Marxist critique of religion 
misses according to Žižek (MC 59), is that man’s alienation is 
not a ‘distortion’ of the true human substance so that all we have 
to do is to re-appropriate the alienated substance; rather this 
alienated substance is the very basis of human subjectivity, or in 
other words, this alienation is not something to be overcome, on 
the contrary it is, according to Žižek (SOI 5), what defines la 
condition humaine as such.258    
 
257 Echoing the above-quoted claim, Žižek has thus recently, in a lecture 
given at the annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion in 2009, 
furthermore proposed that: “Not only is atheism the truth of Christianity but 
one can only be a true atheist by passing through the Christian experience. 
All other atheisms continue to rely on some form of the big Other.” See 
Žižek, ”Whither the ‘Death of God’: A Continuing Currency?” 
 
258 Žižek’s critique can be summarized in the words of Arne Grøn (2008, 8-
9; cf. 2009) who have proposed a similar critique of the Feuerbachian 
critique of religion: “Critiques of religion that reduce religion to human 
interpretations as projections […] tend to create a new illusion: the idea 
that, once we have got rid of religion, we are free to unfold our true 
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As Žižek (MC 32) himself is well aware, the result of his 
Hegelian reading of the death of God as equal to the death of not 
only the Son but also the Father, is the abolishment of the kind of 
absolute transcendence that has traditionally been ascribed to the 
Judeo-Christian God. Considering the considerable critique that 
has been raised in the course of time by theology against Hegel 
on this issue, it cannot come as a surprise that a similar type of 
critique has been levelled against Žižek from the theological 
camp.259 For instance in a recently published excellent essay by 
the Catholic theologian Frederiek Depoortere (2007, 498) in 
which he explicitly “[…] aims at evaluating Žižek’s claim that 
the Incarnation should be understood as the end of God’s 
transcendence.”260 Depoortere’s (2007b, 519-520) conclusion is 
that Žižek is indeed guilty of ‘a complete abandonment of 
superior transcendence’. Depoortere moreover suggests that the 
consequence of this might be that Žižek, instead of combating 
capitalism, due to this abandonment of superior transcendence, 
ends up doing the precise opposite. To my knowledge, Žižek has 
not countered any such charges against himself or against Hegel 
directly. However, he has discussed extensively in more general 
terms the question of the relationship between immanence and 
transcendence in Hegel’s philosophy. So, let us take a brief look 
at how Žižek conceives this relationship. 
In Žižek’s reading, Hegel does not simply eradicate God’s 
transcendence. That is, Hegel does not merely abolish the gap 
between man and God; rather, he displaces this gap into God 
himself. To put it in other words, in Žižek’s reading, Hegel does 
not simply break with the idea that reality is grounded in some 
transcendent Entity outside itself, or in Lacanese, with the 
(masculine) logic of the constitutive exception; rather he 
 
humanity. The inhumanity of humans then is ‘parked’ as it were in 
religion.” 
259 The objection that Hegel abolishes any real transcendence has recently 
been advanced for example by William Desmond (2003, 206) in his book 
Hegel’s God: a counterfeit double? where he argues that rather than 
overcoming the division between reason and faith, man and God, brought 
about by the Enlightenment thinker’s critique of religion, Hegel’s 
abolishment of transcendence radicalizes this division. See also Malabou 
(2005, 91-102) for an exposition of (some of) the theological objections 
against Hegel including his (alleged) termination of God’s transcendence. 
260 Let me just note in passing that in his contribution to The Monstrosity of 
Christ, John Milbank (2009, 112, 117) also voices this charge of the 
annulment of God’s transcendence, but without elaborating it any further. 
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introduces the (feminine) logic of not-All, the idea that reality 
itself is not a consistent Whole. This displacement effects the 
conception of the relationship between transcendence and 
immanence. One way to describes this, would be to say, as 
Adrian Johnston (2008b, 143) does, that Hegel reverses the 
relationship between transcendence and immanence from an 
idealist prioritization of transcendence over immanence to a 
materialist prioritization of immanence over transcendence. In 
Organ without Bodies, Žižek (OWB 61) explains the crucial 
point of this ‘reversal’ in the following way: “Therein lies 
Hegel’s true lesson: immanence generates the spectre of 
transcendence because it is already inconsistent itself.” And a 
few pages further into the book he (OWB 65) elaborates: “The 
tension between immanence and transcendence is […] secondary 
with regard to the gap within immanence itself: ‘transcendence’ 
is a kind of perspective illusion, the way we (mis)perceive the 
gap/discord that inheres to immanence itself.” So, how more 
precisely, should we conceive of such a ‘gap in immanence’?261 
The best way to clarify the kind of inherent gap or immanent 
transcendence that Žižek has in mind here is perhaps via a well-
known Lacanian illustration from the field of topology, namely 
the Möbius strip. Indeed, in For They Do Not Know, Žižek 
(FTKN 218-219) explicitly suggests that the difference between 
a Kantian external gap and a Hegelian inherent gap may be 
illustrated topologically through the distinction between a broken 
circle (Kant) and the Möbius strip (Hegel). In his Introductory 
Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, Dylan Evan (2010, 116) 
gives the following very helpful definition of the Möbius strip:  
 
The moebius strip is […] a figure which subverts our normal 
(Euclidean) way of representing space, for it seems to have two 
sides, but in fact has only one (and only one edge). Locally, at any 
point, two sides can be clearly distinguished, but when the whole 
strip is traversed it becomes clear that they are in fact continuous. 
The two sides are only distinguished by the dimension of time, the 
time it takes to traverse the whole strip.  
 
Thus, the immanent transcendence exemplified by the topology 
of the Möbius strip basically consists, as noted by Alenka 
Zupančič (2008b, 54), in the paradox that while there is only one 
 
261 I have already touched upon this issue of immanent transcendence in a 
preliminary manner in my discussion of Žižek’s conception of the 
incarnation at the very end of the last chapter. 
The Return of Immortality 192 
 
                                                
surface, and as such nothing but pure immanence, there is 
nevertheless at every point of this pure immanence (of the strip) 
also another side and thus continuously a kind of 
transcendence.262 In a comment on Hegel’s idealism tucked 
away in a footnote in The Monstrosity of Christ, Žižek (MC 107) 
describes this paradoxical notion of immanent transcendence in a 
way that cannot but recall Evan’s above depiction of the Möbius 
strip. Referring to Hegel’s specific version of idealism, Žižek 
explains that: 
 
[…] its core resides in the assertion that finite (determinate, positive- 
substantial) reality is in itself void, inconsistent, self-sublating. From 
this, however, it does not follow that this reality is just a shadow, a 
secondary reflection, etc., of some higher reality: there is nothing but 
this reality, and the “suprasensible is appearance qua appearance,” 
i.e., the very movement of the self-sublation of this reality. […] This 
is why Hegel cannot be situated with regard to the opposition 
between transcendence and immanence: his position is that of the 
absolute immanence of transcendence. In other words, his position 
can be grasped only in a temporal shift: first, one asserts 
transcendence (in an apophatic way)—immanent/immediate positive 
reality is not all, it has to be negated/overcome, it points beyond 
itself; then, this overcoming is posited as thoroughly immanent: what 
is beyond immediate reality is not another higher reality, but the 
movement of its negation as such.  
 
Thus, with this Hegelian conception of ‘absolute immanence of 
transcendence’, which, due to its ‘Möbius-strip-character’, 
exceeds our Euclidean representation of space, Žižek is not 
merely guilty of abandoning a ‘superior transcendence’ over an 
‘interior transcendence’, as Depoortere suggests; rather, he is 
guilty of the far more severe crime of deconstructing the very 
opposition between immanence and transcendence.    
 
The Maladaptive Animal 
In the introduction of this chapter I indicated that I think that 
Žižek’s reading of the Freudian notion of ‘death drive’ is of 
immense importance to the discussion in this chapter, not only 
because it is closely related to the significant theological themes 
 
262 In contrast to Zupančič, who opposes this notion of inherent 
transcendence to theological transcendence, Žižek (OB 90) clearly relates it 
to theology insofar that he, as we have also seen in the previous chapter in 
terms of the notion of ‘minimal difference’, conceives Christ exactly as an 
embodiment of this kind of transcendence. 
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of subjectivity, freedom and immortality in focus here, but also 
because Žižek (OB 90; PV 123) explicitly relates it to a ‘divine’ 
or ‘theological’ dimension in man. Thus, the main questions I 
will try to answer in this sector are the following: How are we to 
understand Žižek’s (CWZ 61) comparison of subjectivity as self-
relating negativity, with death drive? In what way does death 
drive, as Žižek (PV 202, 210, 231) argues, make up the condition 
of possibility for freedom, and how does he define freedom? In 
what sense are we to understand Žižek’s (PF 113; TTS 294; PV 
62) claim that death drive is what makes man immortal? And 
lastly, wherein lies the ‘theological’ dimension in all this? I will 
furthermore attempt to sketch out Žižek’s (TTS 160-161) 
objection against Badiou that the latter needs death drive as a 
‘vanishing mediator’ between being and event to explain 
properly how it is possible that the human animal can become an 
immortal subject of truth. However, to clarify these matters it is 
necessary to provide conceptual framework in terms of a more 
general introduction of Žižek’s conception of ‘death drive’, 
including its relation to the notions of ‘instinct’ and ‘desire’.263 
In For They Do Not Know What They Do and later again in 
The Ticklish Subject Žižek brings up the old politico-
philosophical issue of the (pre-historic) origin of the reign of 
law. That is: How did man go from being a mere animal to a 
being of language bound by the symbolic order? How was the 
passage from a natural into a civil or cultural state brought 
about? The answer given by classical Political Philosophy is of 
course the famous narrative of the ‘social contract’. But in 
Žižek’s (FTKN 205) view this is an inconsistent explanation 
insofar that “[…] the fiction of a ‘social contract’ presupposes in 
advance what is or should be its result, its final outcome – the 
presence of individuals who act according to rules of a civilized 
rational order […].”  According to Žižek (TTS 36; FTKN 206), 
the passage from a natural to a cultural state cannot be accounted 
for in terms of a smooth continuous transition, something has to 
intervene between these two states. What the evolutionary 
narratives of social contract silently presuppose is, according to 
Žižek (TTS 36), a kind of ‘vanishing mediator’ which is neither 
nature nor culture. So, what is this vanishing mediator?  
 
263 Let me as a preliminary clarification emphasize that in the Lacanian 
interpretation of the notion that Žižek subscribes to the ‘death drive’ is not a 
separate drive but, rather an aspect of every drive (Evans 2010, 33).  
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Although dismissive of evolutionary narratives, being a good 
materialist, Žižek (TTS 36) must of course also reject any 
(idealist) account that would want to explain this mediating 
intervention with reference to some sort of external, transcendent 
cause. Man did not become what he is through a “[…] spark of 
logos magically conferred on Homo sapiens […].” Instead, 
Žižek’s (CWZ 80) claim is that the transition from nature to 
culture is enabled by a ‘malfunction’, a failure, in nature itself. 
As he (CWZ 65) puts it in one of his conversations with Glyn 
Daly: “We cannot pass directly from nature to culture. 
Something goes terribly wrong in nature: nature produces an 
unnatural monstrosity and I claim that it is in order to cope with, 
to domesticate, this monstrosity that we symbolize.” As the last 
part of the quote suggests, and as Žižek (TTS 37) explicitly 
underlines in his discussion in The Ticklish Subject, the symbolic 
order of law (culture) is thus not, as it is usually asserted, aimed 
at controlling our natural instincts and inclination (nature) but, 
rather directed against something in us which is not natural, 
namely this moment of thoroughly derailed, malfunctioning, 
denaturalized ‘nature’. Indeed in the effort to domesticate this 
malfunctioning (de)nature “[…] man’s natural propensities are, 
rather, on the side of moral law against the excess of ‘unruliness’ 
that threatens his well-being” (TTS 37). As Žižek (TTS 289) 
emphasizes later in the same book, one should never forget that 
the law is ultimately in the service of the ‘pleasure principle’ 
which dictates our daily functioning in accordance with the 
upholding of our welfare;264 that is to say, the law is not opposed 
to our natural instincts as it is claimed in the standard story of 
‘nature versus culture’, rather the law and the natural instincts 
are united in their attempt to constrain the derailed (de)nature of 
man endangering his self-preservation. This mediating moment 
of malfunction, this intersection between nature and culture, 
which made possible the transition between these two states, 
only to ‘vanish’ under the domesticating reign of symbolic law 
 
264 Freud formulated his thesis on the death drive precisely in response to 
phenomena which could not be explained on the basis of the ‘pleasure 
principle’, phenomena that were ‘beyond the pleasure principle’, and its 
directive of self-preservation. In Žižek’s (CWZ 61) words: “In trying to 
explain the functioning of the human psyche in terms of the pleasure 
principle, reality principle and so on, Freud became increasingly aware of a 
radical non-functional element, a basic destructiveness and excess of 
negativity, that couldn’t be accounted for. And that is why Freud posed the 
hypothesis of death drive.“ 
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and the ‘pleasure principle’, is, according to Žižek (TTS 36; 
FTKN 207; CWZ 65), nothing less than the emergence of the 
(death) drive.265 
In the English translation and reception of Freud’s work, 
most notably in the Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Work of Sigmund Freud, there has been an 
unfortunate tendency to translate both ‘drive’ (Trieb) and 
‘instinct’ (Instinkt) as instinct (Evans 2010, 46). However, as 
Žižek (like many others before him) repeatedly insists, we must 
not ignore this important distinction made by Freud.266 
‘Instincts’ have to do with biological needs such as the need to 
eat or the need to propagate. Another key feature is that instincts 
 
265 In his discussion of contemporary neurosciences in The Parallax View, 
Žižek (PV 174-250) advances a similar argument against what he sees as 
their inconsistent accounts of the emergence of consciousness. Although he 
agrees with the neurosciences that consciousness (the mental) emerges from 
the brain (the neuronal), Žižek argues that it is not possible to pass directly 
from brain to consciousness, there must be a mediating intervention. As he 
(PV 177) declares toward the end of the third chapter of the book: “The 
wager of Chapter 4 of this book, the hypothesis it endeavours to 
substantiate, is that this missing concept—a kind of absent Cause of 
cognitivist accounts—is none other than what German Idealism called 
selfrelating negativity and Freud called ‘the death drive’.”  Moreover, as 
Žižek also importantly explains in his discussion of the neurosciences, the 
possibility condition for the death drive to emerge is the not-All character 
of reality itself. It is the incompleteness of being/nature that makes possible 
its own derailing/malfunctioning. As Adrian Johnston (2007d, 8) puts it in 
his review of the book: “Relatively early in The Parallax View, Žižek 
appeals […] to a notion of being as shot through with holes and void; […] 
This perforation of being provides the minimal opening needed for the 
introduction of the psychoanalytic motif of conflict into ontology itself 
[…].” So, in other words, the precondition for Žižek’s theory of the subject 
presented in this chapter is the kind of dialectical materialism presented in 
the prior chapter. 
266 Another serious mistake in the reception of the notion of death drive is, 
according to Žižek, to read it in terms of Freud’s own dualistic framework 
of Thanatos and Eros as part of a conflict between two different forces. As 
he stresses in his discussion of Catherine Malabou’s book Les nouveaux 
blessés on Freud and neuroscience: “When Malabou varies the motif that, 
for Freud, Eros always relates to and encompasses its opposite Other, the 
destructive death drive, she […] conceives this opposition as the conflict of 
two opposed forces, not, in a more proper sense, as the inherent self-
blockade of the drive: ‘death drive’ is not an opposite force with regard to 
libido, but a constitutive gap which makes drive distinct from instinct […].” 
Žižek, “Descartes and the Post-traumatic Subject,” 22. See also Evans 
(2010, 48). For a reading in line with the one suggested by Žižek see Gilles 
Deleuze (2004, 18-19) Difference and Repetition. 
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are relatively fixed and directly related to their objects (Evans 
2010, 85). Furthermore, and most importantly, an instinct can be 
satisfied, for instance by eating or copulating, thus once a need is 
fulfilled the instinct finds peace (OB 94). In contrast to 
biological instincts, ‘drives’ are not directly bound to a specific 
object. As Dylan Evans (2010, 46, cf. OB 93-94) puts it: “The 
drives differ from biological needs in that they can never be 
satisfied, and do not aim at an object but rather circle perpetually 
around it.”267 Thus, while instincts pursue the object of need 
directly, the drive circulates repeatedly around its object. This 
fundamental and very important difference between instincts and 
drives can also be illustrated in a helpful way through the 
following anecdote presented by Žižek in On Belief, concerning 
a laboratory experiment on rats described by Jacques-Alain 
Miller in one of the latter’s seminars.  
In the first part of the experiment it is, as Žižek (OB 103) 
explains, observed how a rat reacts if it is moved from a 
labyrinthine arrangement in which it has free access to a desired 
object (e.g. a piece of good food), into another arrangement in 
which the rat can see and thereby knows where the desired 
object is, but cannot gain access to it. As an alternative, a series 
of similar objects of inferior value are made easily accessible. 
How does the rat react? At first it tries to get to the ‘original’ 
object, but soon it renounces it and instead turns to some of the 
substitute objects. So, in short, the rat “[…] will act as a 
‘rational’ subject of utilitarianism” as Žižek (OB 103) puts it. In 
the second part of the experiment the rat is let loose in the same 
labyrinthine arrangement in which the ‘original’ object is 
inaccessible, but only after the scientists have performed a 
surgical operation on the rat, ‘messing about with its brain in 
ways about which it is better to know nothing’ (OB 103). So, 
what happens?  
 
267 Although Žižek (CWZ 61) relates the death drive to nature in the sense 
that it has emerged out of nature, but precisely as something which can 
nevertheless not be reduced to nature (‘an unnatural monstrosity produced 
by nature’); thus, in his Lacanian reading “[…] the Freudian death drive it 
is not a biological category but has a philosophical dignity.” This reading 
differs from Freud’s own reading in which the death drive was in fact 
perceived as a biological force. But, according to Žižek (SOI 4): “[…] we 
have to abstract Freud’s biologism: ‘death drive’ is not a biological fact, but 
a notion indicating that the human psychic apparatus is subordinated to a 
blind automatism of repetition beyond the pleasure-seeking, self-
preservation, accordance between man and his milieu.”  
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The rat insisted: it never became fully reconciled with the loss of the 
‘true’ object and resigned itself to one of the inferior substitutes, but 
repeatedly returned to the ‘true’ object and attempted to reach it. In 
short, the rat in a sense was humanized, it assumed the tragic 
‘human’ relationship towards the unattainable absolute object which, 
on account of its very inaccessibility, forever captivates our desire 
(OB 103). 
 
In other words, before the rat was ‘humanized’ it was perfectly 
able to adapt to its environment, to act like a ‘rational subject of 
utilitarianism’ and replace the inaccessible ‘original’ object with 
an accessible substitute. But after the rat’s nature was derailed, 
after ‘something had gone terribly wrong’ (to put it 
euphemistically) in its brain, it became a ‘maladaptive’ animal; it 
began to display a ‘stubborn attachment’ to the impossible 
object. The inaccessible object becomes an ‘obsession’, 
something to which the rat is excessively attached, something to 
which it returns again and again seeking to obtain it. According 
to Žižek (OB 94), it is exactly this ‘closed loop’ of perpetual 
repetition of the same failed gesture which characterises the 
drive. It is this gesture of ‘stubborn attachment’ that makes man 
the maladaptive animal; or, as Žižek (PV 231) underscores in 
The Parallax View:   
 
[…] we should bear in mind the basic anti-Darwinian lesson of 
psychoanalysis repeatedly emphasized by Lacan: man’s radical and 
fundamental dis-adaptation, mal-adaptation, to his environs. At its 
most radical, ’being-human’ consists in an ‘uncoupling’ from 
immersion in one’s environs, in following a certain automatism 
which ignores the demands of adaptation—this is what the ‘death 
drive’ ultimately amounts to. […] ‘death drive’ as a self-sabotaging 
structure represents the minimum of freedom, of a behavior 
uncoupled from the utilitarian-survivalist attitude. 
 
Although man is thus in a certain sense determined by a 
malfunction, a failure to adapt to his surroundings, it is, as 
implied in the last part of the quote, also (though it might seem 
counter-intuitive) this very mal-adaptive automatism of the death 
drive that due to its ‘uncoupling’ from the normal run of things, 
grounds a break with determinism and thus enables a genuine act 
of freedom (I will elaborate in a moment on what such an act of 
freedom consists in when I turn to the difference between drive 
and desire). It would therefore clearly be a mistake to assume, on 
account of this aspect of automatism characterizing the death 
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drive, that Žižek with this notion reintroduces some sort of 
quasi-instinctual energy opposing the natural instincts in service 
of the pleasure principle (as Freud did). Rather, the maladaptive 
automatism of the drive death is the emergence of the unnatural 
‘in-between’ dimension of man per excellence, namely his 
subjectivity. Or, in Žižek’s (TT 52) words: “[…] the death drive 
is not the pre-subjective noumenal Real itself, but the impossible 
moment of the ‘birth of subjectivity’, of the negative gesture of 
contraction/withdrawal that replaces reality with membra 
disjecta […].” However, this notion of man as a malfunctioning, 
mal-adaptive, animal brings us not only to the issue of 
subjectivity as such, but also to the question of how we should 
understand Žižek’s (CWZ 61, 65) equation of the German 
idealist notion of subjectivity as self-relating negativity and the 
Freudian notion of death drive.268 According to Žižek, it is 
namely this element of rupture of the human-being with its 
milieu, even with its own nature, related to a malfunction or a 
fundamental failure, that unites these two notions of the subject. 
This, somewhat counter-intuitive, equation of the subject with 
death drive is perhaps more patent in the (many) cases when 
Žižek (e.g. PV 102; TTS 61) in his description of the German 
idealist notion of subjectivity, turns to the Hegelian metaphors of 
‘monstrosity’ and the ‘night of the world’ as a moment, a 
‘vanishing mediator’, of ‘mad’ self-withdrawal that constitutes 
the subject as such. Still, Žižek (CWZ 64-65) also makes this 
link in a more explicit manner, for example in one of his 
conversations with Glyn Daly: 
  
What psychoanalysis enables us to grasp is that death drive is a kind 
of inherent condition of the symbolic order. To put it in slightly 
simplistic terms: at its most elementary, symbolization exists as a 
kind of secondary stop-gap measure in the sense that it consists of an 
attempt to patch things up when something goes terrible wrong. And 
what interests me is this dimension at which something goes terrible 
wrong. […] To put it in a different way, what interests me so much 
already in German Idealism is the idea that with negativity (death 
drive) there is neither nature nor culture, but something in 
between.269 
 
268 See also Žižek, “Liberation Hurts: An Interview with Slavoj Žižek” and 
Žižek, “Humanism is Not Enough - An Interview with Slavoj Žižek”. 
269 A similar point is made in a more implicit manner by Žižek (PV 210f.) 
in his discussion of the Portuguese neuroscientist Antonio Damasio’s 
conception of the self in The Parallax View. In a critical remark on 
Damasio, Žižek (PV 227) notes that the latter “[…] leaves out of 
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Thus, paradoxically, in Žižek’s view the automatism of the drive 
death does not designate an additional kind of natural function 
determining the cause of man, rather it designates a dimension of 
autonomy in man that since Descartes has been associated with 
the term ‘subject’.        
 
The Immortal Insistence of Death Drive 
Žižek ends his anecdote about the rat-experiment by 
emphasizing another paradoxical key feature of the death drive 
at which I have already hinted in the above, namely its excessive 
and also potentially self-harming character. What the death drive 
designates is, in Žižek’s (OB 104) words, the fact that “[…] 
humans are not simply alive, but possessed by a strange drive to 
enjoy life in excess of the ordinary run of things – and ‘death’ 
stands simply and precisely for the dimension beyond ‘ordinary’ 
biological life.” It is this thrust to go (on) beyond biological life 
(and death) that Žižek (PV 62) identifies with human 
immortality: “The paradox of the Freudian “death drive” is 
therefore that it is Freud’s name for its very opposite, for the way 
immortality appears within psychoanalysis, for an uncanny 
excess of life, for an ‘undead’ urge which persists beyond the 
(biological) cycle of life and death, of generation and 
corruption.”270 Thus, in the most basic sense, what the strange 
assertion of immortality of man frequently advanced by Žižek in 
his more recent work refers to is this unnatural urge to live life in 
an excessive way beyond biological self-preservation, ‘beyond 
the pleasure principle’, towards something which cannot be 
reduced to mere biological life.271 Although, the ‘death’ in death 
 
consideration the proper empty core of subjectivity ($) which, insofar as it 
explodes the frame of life-regulating homeostasis, coincides with what 
Freud called the death drive. The chain equivalence thus imposes itself 
between the ‘empty’ cogito (the Cartesian subject, Kant’s transcendental 
subject), the Hegelian topic of self-relating negativity, and the Freudian 
topic of the death drive.”  
270 This is also why Žižek (TTS 166; PV 110; IDLC 395) repeatedly 
underscores that the Freudian notion of death drive, in contrast to Badiou’s 
(LW 509) reading of it, has nothing to do with the notion of finitude as 
referring to man as ‘only mortal’.  
271 In The Plague of Fantasies Žižek (PF 113) moreover relates the 
immortality of death drive to the Freudian unconscious: “[…] as Freud 
emphasizes repeatedly, there is no notion or representation of death in the 
unconscious: the Freudian Todestrieb has absolutely nothing to do with the 
Heideggerian Sein-zum-Tode. Drive is immortal, eternal, ‘undead’: the 
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drive does thus designate neither a ‘nihilistic’ craving for self-
annihilation (PV 62) nor the mere fact of man’s 
mortality/finitude (PV 110), it can, as Alenka Zupančič (2000, 
250) notes, nevertheless “[…] be ‘mortal’ precisely because it is 
indifferent to death (as well as to life), because it is not 
preoccupied with death, because death does not interest it.” 
Moreover, Žižek’s use of the term ‘immortality’, also seems to 
refer to the fact that there is a certain timeless aspect about the 
death drive. ‘Stubbornly attached’ to and ‘endlessly circulating’ 
around its object, the death drive is in a certain sense beyond 
time; in its endless repetitive circular movement, it is in a way 
indifferent to the passage of time. As, Žižek stresses in The 
Parallax View: “This rotary movement, in which the linear 
progress of time is suspended in a repetitive loop, is drive at its 
most elementary. This, again, is ’humanization’ at its zero-level: 
this self-propelling loop which suspends/disrupts linear temporal 
enchainment.” 
Žižek does not explicitly discuss his understanding of 
immortality in relation to religion, but since the immortality of 
death drive is, as Žižek (PV 62) emphasizes, beyond both life 
and death, it is apparently not compatible with the religious 
notion of immortality as a sort of continued life in the afterlife, at 
least not in its traditional conception. It is, however, worth 
noting in passing that in The Ticklish Subject Žižek does actually 
bring up immortality in relation to a key figure of modern 
Christian theology, namely Kierkegaard. Here Žižek (TTS 293-
294; cf. PF 112-113) suggests the following parallel between the 
notion of ‘death drive’ and Kierkegaard’s notion of ‘sickness 
unto death’ concerning precisely the issue of immortality: “[…] 
like the Kierkegaardian sickness unto death, the death drive is 
not a mark of finitude, but its very opposite, the name for 
‘eternal (spectral) life’, the index of a dimension of human 
existence that persists forever, beyond our physical death, and of 
which we can never rid ourselves.” However, this ‘horrifying’ 
persistency beyond life and death is not the only aspect of 
immortality that unites Kierkegaard’s sickness unto death and 
the Freudian death drive. According to Žižek (TTS 293), 
 
annihilation towards which the death drive tends is not the unsurpassable 
limit of man qua finite being. Unconsciously, we all believe we are 
immortal – there is no death-anxiety [Todesangst] in our unconscious, 
which is why the very phenomenon of ‘consciousness’ is grounded in our 
awareness of our mortality.”  
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Kierkegaard’s sickness unto death designates a form of despair 
which must be distinguished from the standard despair of the 
individual who is split between the certainty that death is the 
end, and his desire to believe that death is not the end. In 
contrast, the despair of sickness unto death involves the reverse 
paradox of an individual who knows that death is not the end, 
that he has an immortal soul, but who desperately wants to 
believe that death is the end, because he, as Žižek (TTS 293) 
puts it, […] cannot face the exorbitant demands of this fact (the 
necessity to abandon vain aesthetics pleasures and work for his 
salvation) […].” In other words, the immortality characterizing 
both the Kierkegaardian sickness unto death and the Freudian 
death drive involves an ethical aspect, an (unbearable) ethical 
demand. This common ethical aspect is further illuminated in the 
following comment by Žižek (WTDR 69-70) on the relationship 
between Kierkegaard and Badiou:  
 
And is this not the same dilemma as that of Kierkegaard’s ‘sickness 
unto death’? We are not afraid to discover that we are mortal, but, 
rather, that we are immortal. Here, one should link Kierkegaard with 
Badiou: It is difficult, properly traumatic, for a human animal to 
accept that his life is not just a stupid process of reproduction and 
attaining pleasures, but that it is in the service of a Truth. 
 
It is well-known that Kierkegaard explicitly relates the despair of 
sickness unto death with the theological notion of ’sin’. 
Although Žižek does not make such a connection, he does 
however, as we shall see in a moment, briefly imply a parallel 
between death drive and the theological notion of ‘sin’. But, first 
we need to return to our more general exposition of the death 
drive and the important distinction made by Žižek between drive 
and desire. 
In his discussion in The Ticklish Subject of the transition from 
nature to culture, Žižek (TTS 37) underlines, as I have already 
mentioned, that the role of the law (culture) is, in service of the 
‘pleasure principle’, to pacify, not man’s natural instincts, but 
“[…] his excessive love for freedom, his natural ‘unruliness’, 
which goes far beyond obeying animal instinct […]”, or in short, 
the death drive. The law does this by prohibiting the object to 
which the drive is excessively attached, which forces open the 
closed loop of the drive, replacing the continuous circulation 
around one object with a successive movement from one 
substitute object to another. Another way to put it is that the 
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law’s prohibition of the object introduces a lack which 
constitutes what Lacan terms the ‘metonymy of desire’; that is, 
the infinite sliding from one substitute object to another, driven 
by the loss of the original object, which is in fact nothing but is 
own lack. Desire, as the endless transgressing thrust toward the 
‘Thing’ (Lacan’s term for the lost/forbidden object of desire), is 
therefore not prior to the law, but, as Paul already knew, 
instituted by the law itself (HTRL 42; Evans 2010, 99). The law 
is thus not aimed at regulating man’s desire, rather desire is a 
product of the law’s attempt to regulate the drives and thus in a 
certain sense part of this regulation. The metonymy of desire is 
furthermore sustained by the fantasy fostered by the law that the 
Thing is not really impossible (nothing but lack), but merely 
forbidden, and that it therefore at some point will be possible to 
obtain it; or in short, the fantasy that desire might actually be 
satisfied. But, as Žižek (AF 80) underlines: “Desire is […] 
always and by definition unsatisfied, metonymical, shifting from 
one object to another, since I do not actually desire what I want. 
What I actually desire is to sustain desire itself, to postpone the 
dreaded moment of its satisfaction.”  
Thus, on the one hand, the culture state of desire returns man 
to something that resemblances his ‘natural’ state insofar that the 
dialectic of law-desire turns him away from his excessive 
‘struckness’ in the endlessly repeated circular movement of the 
drive, towards the more ‘rational choice’ of a substitute object. 
On the other hand, the ‘second nature’ of desire is not exactly 
‘natural’ in the sense of a biological instinct. Rather, desire can 
never be satisfied by its substitute object, it always replaces it 
with another object and so on. And in contrast to the biological 
instincts, but like the drives, desire is strictly speaking not related 
to an object (‘I do not desire what I want’) but, rather to the lack 
of an object. Or in other words, like in the case of the drive, 
desire is related to a gap. It is however, as Žižek (OB 92-98; PV 
60-63) emphasizes, paramount to distinguish between the gap of 
the drive and the gap of desire, if we want to avoid a highly 
misleading confusion between drive and desire. The gap that 
characterizes desire is, as I have already hinted, the external gap 
between the substitutable object (that I want) and the 
forbidden/lost Thing (that I desire). In contrast, the gap that 
characterises the drive is, according to Žižek (OB 92; PV 61), 
the inherent gap between its ‘goal’ and its ‘aim’. That is, the gap 
between the object around which the drive circulates endlessly 
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(goal) and this very endless circulation around the object itself 
(aim). This finally brings us back to the issue of theology.  
In On Belief, Žižek explicitly relates this discussion of the 
difference between desire and drive to Christianity. In the section 
entitled ‘God Resides in Detail’, Žižek applies the contrast 
between Judaism and Christianity to illustrate this difference 
(and vice-versa). Following Hegel, Žižek (OB 89; cf. SOI 201-
207; FTKN xxx-xxxi) suggests that Judaism is the religion of the 
Sublime, insofar that it perceives God as the transcendent 
irreprehensible wholly Other, or in Lacanian terms, as the 
impossible God-Thing.272 In other words, Judaism follows the 
logic of desire. In contrast, Christianity renounces this 
transcendent God-Thing of the Beyond with its fundamental 
message that Christ (this miserable human-being) is God (the 
Sublime).273 By claiming the absolute identity between God and 
man, Christianity acknowledges that there is really nothing (no 
Thing) beyond appearance, or more correctly, as Žižek (OB 89) 
puts it “[…] Nothing BUT the imperceptible X that changes 
Christ, this ordinary man, into God.” That is to say, although 
Christianity ‘inverses the Jewish sublimation into a radical 
desublimation’, this inversion is not merely a (Feuerbachian) 
reduction of God to man, but rather the manifestation of the 
divine dimension in man (OB 90). So, in what does this X, this 
divine dimension in man, consist? Žižek’s (OB 90) answer is 
that:  
 
 
272 According to Lacan’s (1992, 112) definition in seminar VII what 
characterizes sublimation is precisely that “[…] it raises an object […] to 
the dignity of the Thing.” Besides designating the lost object of desire, 
Lacan’s notion of the Thing also conveys the notion of a ‘real’ beyond 
symbolization and representation, an unknowable X outside the grip of 
language, which has clear affinities with the Kantian ‘thing-in-self’ (Evans 
2010, 205). 
273 It is worth noting that Žižek (OB 92) in the same context proposes that: 
“[…] tragedy and comedy are also to be opposed along the axis of the 
opposition between desire and drive. As Lacan emphasized throughout his 
teaching, not only is desire inherently ‘tragic’ (condemned to its ultimate 
failure), tragedy itself […] is ultimately always the tragedy of desire. Drive, 
on the contrary, is inherently COMIC in its ‘closing the loop’ and 
suspending the gap of desire, in its assertion of the coincidence, identity 
even, between the sublime and the everyday object.” Though he does not 
say it explicitly, this proposition clearly suggests that Žižek understands 
Christianity, which he (PV 105-107) as we know associates with comics, as 
the religion of drive. 
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[…] far from being the Highest in man, the purely spiritual 
dimension towards which all humans strive, the ‘divinity’ is rather a 
kind of obstacle, of a ‘bone in the throat’ – it is something, that 
unfathomable X, on account of which man cannot ever fully become 
MAN, self-identical. The point is not that, due to the limitation of his 
mortal sinful nature, man cannot ever become fully divine, but that, 
due to the divine spark in him, man cannot ever fully become MAN. 
 
As we know by now this ‘imperceptible X’ (the inherent 
‘minimal difference’) that Christ manifests, which according to 
Žižek is what prevents man from becoming fully man, is of 
course that which also goes under the name of the subject, the 
Cartesian Cogito, the self-relating negativity of German 
idealism, the Lacanian $ or the Freudian death drive.274 In 
Žižek‘s words, Christ “[…] stands for the excess of life, for the 
‘undead’ surplus which persists over the cycle of generation and 
corruption […].” In terms of the issue of the difference between 
desire and drive, we could say that the Christian transposition in 
the figure of Christ of the gap between man and God into God 
himself, conforms to the transposition of the external gap 
between the substitutable object (that I want) and the 
forbidden/lost Thing (that I desire) into an inherent gap in the 
object itself around which the drive circulates.275 Thus, the 
Christian ‘inversion of Jewish sublimation into a radical 
desublimation’ is not merely the demythologization of desire; it 
is the manifestation of the dimension of drive in man. Or, to put 
it in other words: by manifesting the divine dimension in man 
through its message of Christ on the cross as the death the God, 
Christianity makes it possible to (re)enter the domain of drives. 
By making manifest through his sacrifice on the Cross of the 
absolute identity between the sublime Thing and miserable 
human-being (the everyday object) Christ suspends the gap of 
desire and (re)closes the loop of drive. 
At the end the same section in On Belief, Žižek (OB 105) 
indicates that the fundamental narrative of Christianity, the story 
of the Fall, could be read as a parallel to the psychoanalytical 
conception of the emergence of the death drive: “The story of the 
 
274 This excessiveness which prevents the full identity of man with himself 
is also how we should understand Žižek’s claim that what characterizes 
man is his inhuman dimension. 
275 As Žižek (PV 61) emphasizes elsewhere, the difference between desire 
and drive is precisely that “[…] desire is grounded in its constitutive lack, 
while drive circulates around a hole, a gap in the order of being.” 
The Return of Immortality 205 
 
                                                
(Adam’s) Fall is evidently the story of how the human animal 
contracted the excess of Life which makes him/her human – 
‘Paradise’ is the name for the life delivered of the burden of this 
disturbing excess.” So, perhaps we should reverse – in an 
admittedly completely anachronistic manner – the suggestion 
made by the German philosopher, Jakob Taubes (1957, 137), 
that Freud was the last great advocate of the Christian doctrine of 
Original Sin. Is not the Christian doctrine of Original Sin the first 
great advocacy of the Freudian notion of death drive? Is this not 
what Žižek hints at?  
However, Žižek (OB 105) furthermore suggests that 
Christianity also releases or ‘redeems’ man from the 
excessiveness of the death drive: “Out of love for humanity, 
Christ then freely assumes, contracts onto himself, the excess 
(‘Sin’) which burdened the human race.” Yet, this redemption 
does certainly not consist in the obliteration of this excess. The 
‘redemption’ from the excess of death drive offered by 
Christianity is not a ‘healing of the wound’, but rather the 
possibility of accepting it. In short, in Žižek’s Hegelian reading, 
the redemption is the wound, the Fall, itself. As he (MC 273; cf. 
TTS 71; PD 118; OWB 14) emphasizes repeatedly through his 
Hegelian reading of the Fall: “God does not first push us into sin 
in order to create the need for Salvation, and then offer himself 
as the Redeemer from the trouble into which he got us in the first 
place; it is not that the Fall is followed by Redemption: the Fall 
is identical to Redemption, it is “in itself” already 
Redemption.”276 So, what exactly is this redemption, this 
possibility that Christ opens up with his death, which is already 
the Fall itself? Žižek’s (MC 273) answer is: “The explosion of 
freedom, the breaking out of the natural enchainment—and this, 
precisely, is what happens in the Fall.”  Or, as he (PD 86) puts it 
elsewhere: “[…] for Christianity, the Fall is really not a Fall at 
all, but ‘in itself’ its very opposite, the emergence of freedom. 
There is no place from which we have fallen; what came before 
was just stupid natural existence.” This returns us to the above-
mentioned question of how more precisely we should understand 
this freedom that Žižek relates to the death drive. What does the 
freedom that the death drive enables look like?  
 
The Freedom of Self-sabotage 
 
276 On Hegel’s reading of the Fall, see Stephen Houlgate (2004, 83-92) 
“Religion, Morality and Forgiveness in Hegel’s Philosophy.” 
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As we already know, Žižek (FTKN 206; CWZ 94, 135; PV 202, 
210, 231) clearly links death drive with freedom. The death drive 
as a ‘self-sabotaging structure’ is what enables a break with the 
determinism of both our natural instincts and our ‘second nature’ 
in terms of the cultural dialectic of law and desire in service of 
the pleasure principle. This rupture with the normal run of things 
made possible by the death drive represents, as Žižek (PV 231) 
puts it, ‘the minimum of freedom’. So, according to Žižek, 
freedom in its most elementary form is a rupture, a break with 
determinism. As he (PV 202) states in The Parallax View:  
 
At its most elementary, freedom is not the freedom to do as you like 
(that is, to follow your inclinations without any externally imposed 
constraints), but to do what you do not want to do, to thwart the 
‘spontaneous’ realization of an impetus. This is the link between 
freedom and the Freudian ‘death drive,’ which is also a drive to 
sabotage one’s inclination toward pleasure.277 
 
  
It thus make good sense that Žižek (PV 202), just prior the 
quoted passage, defines the act of saying ‘no’ as the most 
elementary act of freedom.278 But is this break really equal to 
freedom as such in Žižek’s perception? And if so, how are we to 
understand it without turning it into some kind of magical 
annulment of causality? A more careful reading of Žižek on this 
point will make clear that freedom can not simply be identified 
with a break with determinism; indeed in Žižek’s view freedom 
is itself in a certain sense a form for determinism or causality.  
Thus, in relation to his discussion in The Parallax View of 
neuroscience, Žižek (PV 203) explicitly states that: “‘Freedom’ 
is not simply the opposite of deterministic causal necessity: as 
Kant knew, it means a specific mode of causality, the agent’s 
self-determination.”  To further illustrate and elaborate what he 
means by this specific mode of causality, Žižek (PV 203) 
suggests that we should take as our starting point a kind of 
 
277 Žižek ends this passage by stating that: “Here, Badiou is wrong: the 
elementary ethical gesture is a negative one, the one of blocking one’s 
direct inclination.” I will return to this claim in the next and final part of 
this section when I sketch out Žižek’s (TTS 160-161) objection against 
Badiou that the latter needs death drive as a ‘vanishing mediator’ between 
being and event.    
278 See also Žižek, “Neighbors and Other Monsters – A Plea for Ethical 
Violence,” 140.  
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Kantian antinomy of freedom. This antinomy consist in the 
following impasse: “[…] if an act is fully determined by 
preceding causes, it is, of course, not free; if, however, it 
depends on the pure contingency which momentarily severs the 
full causal chain, it is also not free.” There is only one way out of 
this impasse; the only solution of this Kantian antinomy of 
freedom is, according to Žižek, to introduce what he names a 
‘second level reflexive causality’. And he (PV 203) describes 
how this specific mode of causality makes up freedom in this 
way: “I am determined by causes (be it direct brute natural 
causes or motivations), and the space of freedom is not a magic 
gap in this first-level causal chain but my ability retroactively to 
choose/determine which causes will determine me.”279 Thus, a 
free act is not simply what sets off a new causal sequence; rather 
it is the retroactive act of indorsing which causal sequence will 
determine me.280   
Žižek explains the retroactive character of this ‘second level 
reflexive causality’ through a useful opposition between what he 
terms the ‘ordinary historical notion of time’ and the notion of 
time displayed in a passage in Henri Bergson’s Two Sources of 
Morality and Religion. In the ‘ordinary historical notion of time’, 
possibilities precede their realization, whereas the Bergsonian 
notion of time is characterized by the assertion that an act 
(realization) retrospectively opens up its own possibility. Rather 
than thinking of times as succeeding moments all loaded with 
multiple possibilities just waiting to be realized, according to the 
Bergsonian notion of time, an event only even becomes possible 
after it has happened, and so it is not determined by its past, 
rather it changes the past retrospectively by now appearing as a 
 
279 Žižek (OWB 114) more explicitly relate this solution to Kant in Organs 
without Bodies: “As Kant already knew, freedom does not mean simply a 
cause that supplements material causes but means of a reflexive cause that 
determines which (material) cause will determines us. Freedom means that I 
am never entirely victim of circumstances: I always dispose of a minimum 
of freedom to determine which circumstances will determine me […].”  
280 In Organs without Bodies Žižek (OWB 114) emphasizes how such a 
(retrospective) free act and the notion of time that it presupposes is 
conditioned by the ontological incompleteness of reality: “The solution [to 
how to account for the possibility of a ‘second level reflexive causality’] 
lies precisely in the notion of noncompleteness of physical causality: 
freedom retroactively determines the causal chain that comes to determine 
me, and this minimal space of choice is sustained by the inherent 
indeterminacy of the physical processes themselves.”      
The Return of Immortality 208 
 
                                                
(realized) possibility.281 Žižek (PV 201-203) illustrates this point 
with a reference to a scene from Steven Spielberg’s film 
Minority Report. In this scene, the main-character of the film 
(played by Tom Cruise) is on the verge of shooting his son’s 
murderer (as he was predetermined to do according to the visions 
of the three ‘precognitives’), but blocks his own decision. 
According to Žižek, this negative act is a genuine act of freedom 
precisely because: “It does not simply ‘change the future’; it 
changes the future by changing the past itself (in the Bergsonian 
sense of inserting a new possibility into it).” Although Kant is 
certainly the philosopher of freedom, in Žižek’s (PV 94) view, 
freedom is not, as this film-example also makes clear, an 
invariant noumenal foundation, but rather a momentary break 
that happens from time to time.    
Let me end this exposition of Žižek’s conception of freedom 
by noting that it is not merely Kant to whom Žižek relates this 
notion of freedom as the retrospective act of determining the 
causes that determine me. In The Ticklish Subject he describes 
Nicolas Malebranche’s occasionalist doctrine of grace in 
somewhat similar terms. Thus, at the end of the section entitled 
‘Towards a materialist Theory of Grace’, Žižek (TTS 118-119) 
explains how: “Malebranche is not afraid to draw the radical 
conclusion: at the level of content, everything is decided […] 
God prompts us, produces feelings and movements in us; we are 
completely ruled by motives. The margin of freedom lies only in 
the subject’s capacity to withhold or grant his consent from or to 
a motive – freedom is a power ‘which the soul has, to suspend or 
to give consent to motives, which naturally follow interesting 
perceptions’.” And with this rather brief suggestion, I will now 
move on to the final part of this section and thus the conclusion 
of the present chapter, namely the critique raised by Žižek 
against Badiou in regard to the notion of death drive. 
 
Concluding Remarks on Badiou and the Death Drive 
As I have already implied (in this chapter as well as in the 
second chapter), Žižek has some serious critical concerns in 
terms of Badiou’s (E 38-39, 90; LW 509) hostility towards the 
Freudian notion of death drive. Indeed, in The Ticklish Subject, 
Žižek (TTS 145) even proposes that: “When Badiou adamantly 
opposes the ‘morbid obsession with death’, when he opposes the 
 
281 Bergson (2007b) presents a short and very instructive account of this 
argument in his brilliant essay “The Possible and the Real.” 
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Truth-Event to the death drive, and so on, he is at his weakest, 
succumbing to the temptation of the non-thought.” What Žižek 
considers to be non-thought in Badiou’s philosophy I will return 
to in a moment. In a brief excurse in his 2008 book In Defense of 
Lost Causes, Žižek offers two explanations for Badiou’s 
(mistaken) opposition to the notion of death drive. The first 
reason for Badiou’s reluctance is, according to Žižek, due to the 
fact that he relates the death drive to the ‘religious’ motif of 
finitude. But, as we have just seen in the above, in Žižek’s view 
the death drive has nothing to do with the pathos of finitude and 
obsession with mortality, on the contrary. So, as Žižek (IDLC 
395) puts it, “What Badiou misses here is the fact that ‘death 
drive’ is, paradoxically, the Freudian name for its very opposite, 
for the way immortality appears within psychoanalysis: for an 
uncanny excess of life, for an ‘undead’ urge which persists 
beyond the (biological) cycle of life and death, of generation and 
corruption.” The second reason for Badiou’s dismissal of the 
death drive is, according to Žižek (IDLC 394), an all too crude 
opposition in Badiou’s (e.g. IT 62; D 91-92) philosophy between 
the rupture of the event as the introduction of genuine novelty 
and repetition as an obstacle for the rise of anything truly new.282  
But, why does Žižek, as is clear from the above-quoted 
passage from The Ticklish Subject, find Badiou’s opposition to 
the notion of death drive so problematic? Or, to put it in other 
words, what is it that Badiou, according to Žižek, leaves 
unthought when he dismisses this notion? As demonstrated by 
Adrian Johnston (2007d, 165) in an article on Žižek’s reading of 
Badiou, the heart of the matter in Žižek’s critique of Badiou’s 
hostility to the notion of death drive is not this hostility as such, 
but a more fundamental matter concerning the very core of 
Badiou’s theory of the subject, namely the question of how 
Badiou explains what makes a mere human animal, caught up in 
a life dictated entirely by its self-interests and desire, capable of 
suddenly taking the decision to be true to an event and thus 
becomes a subject of truth. Or, to put it in terms of Badiou’s 
Pauline formula of ‘not…but’: What is it that enables the 
 
282 In terms of this (important) issue of the relationship between difference 
and repetition, Žižek (IDLC 396) is for once on the side of Badiou’s rival: 
“It is at this point that one should turn to Deleuze against Badiou, to 
Deleuze’s precise elaborations on repetition as the very form of the 
emergence of the New.” Žižek (OWB 9-15) elaborates his reflections on the 
notion of repetition (and the question of the new) in Deleuze in Organs 
without Bodies.   
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individual under the law to withdraw from (‘not’) the law, from 
the path of the flesh, in order to affirm (‘but’) the exception of 
the gracious event and thus becomes a subject, entering the path 
of the spirit? 
 Žižek touches upon this matter in his extensive discussion in 
The Ticklish Subject of the differences between Badiou’s 
philosophy and Lacanian psychoanalysis. In the section entitled 
‘The Lacanian Subject’, Žižek (TTS 159) outlines what he takes 
to be the core of the matter: “That is the difference between 
Lacan and Badiou: Lacan insists on the primacy of the (negative) 
act over the positive establishment of a ‘new harmony’ […] 
while for Badiou, the different facets of negativity […] are 
reduced to so many versions of ‘betrayal’ of (or infidelity to, or 
denial of) the positive Truth-event.” It is undoubtedly correct 
that Badiou, at least prior to Logics of Worlds, seems to describe 
any negative mode of relationship to an event as a 
disqualification for being a subject; that is, anyone who denies 
an event can of course never become a subject, and anyone who 
betrays his fidelity to an event is no longer a subject.283 But, the 
question is, whether Badiou, as Žižek seems to imply, refuses 
negativity as such in regard to the subject. Nevertheless, Žižek 
(TTS 159) is completely right, when he in the succeeding 
paragraph states that: “This difference between Badiou and 
Lacan concerns the precise status of the subject: Badiou’s main 
point is to avoid identifying the subject with the constitutive void 
of the structure […].” Badiou (BE 432; C 202-203; IT 86) has 
himself on more than one occasion declared this as the crucial 
difference between Lacanian psychoanalysis and his own 
philosophy. Žižek (TTS 159-160) elaborates further on this 
difference between Lacan and Badiou concerning the subject in 
the following way:  
 
For Badiou […] the subject is consubstantial with a contingent act of 
Decision; while Lacan introduces the distinction between the subject 
and the gesture of subjectivization: what Badiou […] describe[s] is 
the process of subjectivization – the emphatic engagement, the 
assumption of fidelity to the Event […] while the subject is the 
negative gesture of breaking out of the constraints of Being that 
opens up the space of possible subjectivization. In Lacanese, the 
 
283 In Logics of World Badiou (LW 45-78) revises his theory of the subject, 
so that the category now designates, not only the faithful subject, but three 
subjective figures, namely besides the faithful subject, also the two 
‘negative’ figures of the ‘reactive subject’ and the ‘obscure subject’.   
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subject prior to subjectivization is the pure negativity of the death 
drive […]. 
 
In other words, according to Žižek, Badiou wrongly equates the 
subject with the process of subjectivization, that is, to put it in 
Badiou’s terms, with the ‘operation’ of decision, fidelity and 
forcing by means of which we pass from being a mere human 
animal to becoming a subject of truth. What Badiou misses here 
is in Žižek’s (TTS 160) view the negative moment or dimension 
that grounds the decision to affirm the event, the dimension that 
makes it possible to engage in a fidelity to an event in the first 
place. And this dimension is precisely the self-sabotaging 
dimension of the death drive. Or as, Žižek (TTS 160) puts it:  
 
The Lacanian death drive (a category Badiou adamantly opposes) is 
thus a kind of ‘vanishing mediator’ between Being and Event: there 
is a ‘negative’ gesture constitutive of the subject which is then 
obfuscated in ‘Being’ (the established ontological order) and in 
fidelity to the Event.  
 
But, is the suggestion made by Žižek here, that Badiou dismisses 
any element of negation from his theory of the subject, really a 
fair depiction of Badiou’s theory of the subject? Although 
Badiou does indeed emphasize the affirmative character of the 
process of subjectivization, does he not also, for example in his 
book on Paul, imply – by employing the Pauline expression of 
‘not…but’ as a formula for the (divided) subject – that becoming 
a subject does in fact include an element of negation? To put it in 
other words, if the issue here is whether Badiou’s theory of the 
subject includes a negative dimension or not, I do not find 
Žižek’s critique completely fair. But, if the issue is whether or 
not Badiou manages to account properly for this negative 
moment, there is no doubt that Žižek is right in his critique. This 
second issue is made much more evident by Eric L. Santner 
(2005, 112), who has raised a similar critique against Badiou. In 
an excurse on Badiou in his chapter in the anthology The 
Neighbour, Santner very instructively points out the core of the 
problem in Badiou’s conception of the relationship between the 
pre-evental merely mortal human animal and the post-evental 
immortal subject of truth. He formulates it this way:  
 
The ‘vital disorganization’ inaugurated by a ‘truth-event’ happens 
not simply to an animal pursuing its predatory interests but one 
whose animal life has already been amplified – one might even say 
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disrupted, disorganized – by what Freud referred to as Triebschicksal 
or ‘drive destiny’. What Badiou seems to lose sight of here is, in a 
word, nothing less than the difference between animal instinct and 
human drive.  
 
In sum, according to Žižek (and Santner) the Freudian notion of 
death drive, and more generally Freudo-Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, would provide Badiou with an anti-humanist 
anthropology that, as a necessary supplement to his purely 
formal theory of the subject, would allow him to explain more 
precisely what it is about the human animal that makes it 
capable, in contrast to all other animals, of breaking with its 
immediate needs and desires in order to dedicate itself to a Cause 
beyond its own self-interests, in short, to become a subject of 
truth. 
 
 
  
                                                
Chapter 5 
 
From a Perverse to a Suffering God  
– Žižek’s Materialist Reading of Chesterton284 
 
 
Christianity is the only 
religion on earth that has 
felt that omnipotence 
made God incomplete. 
Gilbert K. Chesterton 
 
Introduction 
In chapter three I have argued that theology and materialism do 
not automatically exclude one another; that the relationship 
between them is not necessarily of an antagonistic or 
oppositional character. In the present and final chapter of this 
dissertation I want to raise the stakes: not only is the relationship 
between Christian theology and materialism not of an 
oppositional character, it is in fact of a dialectical character. Or 
at least, this is what I will be arguing that Žižek asserts.  
In the opening lines of his ‘Introduction’ to The Puppet and 
the Dwarf Žižek (PD 3) makes the suggestion that the time has 
come to reverse Walter Benjamin’s (2002, 253) first thesis from 
Thesis on the Philosophy of History in which he famously 
proposed that ‘historical materialism can easily be a match for 
anyone if it enlists the service of theology.’ In other words, 
Žižek’s suggestion here seems to be, that if theology is to realize 
its full potential, it has to enrol the service of materialism. This 
reading is affirmed by Žižek (PD 6) when he, just a few pages 
later, elaborates and supplements his opening reversal of
 
284 The responses to Žižek’s theological engagement are growing rapidly 
both in the more general reception of his work (e.g. Kay (2003), Butler 
(2005), Sharpe and Boucher (2010)) and in theological circles (e.g. Blanton 
(2004), Boer (2007), Crockett (2007), Depoortere (2007b), Kotsko (2006; 
2008a; 2008b; 2010), Milbank (2005; 2009; 2010), Pound (2008)). Thus, 
many of the theological themes (e.g. sacrifice, belief, law, agape, 
incarnation, the trinity, grace, iconoclasm, monotheism) and several of the 
theological thinkers (e.g. Paul, Pascal, Hegel, Schelling, Kierkegaard) 
touched upon by Žižek have been discussed in the reception of his work. 
However, as far as I know, there exists no account that focuses explicitly on 
Žižek’s reading of Chesterton, even though the latter is a key-figure in 
Žižek’s theological considerations. 
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Benjamin’s thesis by advancing the following remarkable 
assertion: 
 
My claim here is not merely that I am a materialist through and 
through, and that the subversive kernel of Christianity is accessible 
also to a materialist approach; my thesis is much stronger: this kernel 
is accessible only to a materialist approach––and vice versa: to 
become a true dialectical materialist, one should go through the 
Christian experience. 
 
The first thing to notice here is how Žižek has italicized ‘only’ 
thus emphasizing, as I have just implied, that if Christianity (and 
Christian theology) is to access its own subversive potential, then 
it must necessarily enlist the service of materialism. The other 
crucial thing to notice is of course that Žižek stresses the 
reciprocity of this claim. In brief: genuine materialism and 
Christian theology mutually presuppose each other. My 
approach in what follows will be to unfold the meaning and 
implications of this assertion of a dialectical relationship 
between theology and materialism through an account of Žižek’s 
reading of the English literary critic, novelist, poet, and writer of 
detective stories, but also ‘amateur theologian’, Gilbert Keith 
Chesterton.285 Chesterton is mentioned in Žižek’s (FTKN 29, 
192; EYS 83) work as early as in For They Do Not Know and 
Enjoy Your Symptom! in which he refers to the hints made by 
Chesterton at the end of his well-known ‘Defence of Detective 
Stories’ of how the law is itself scandalously founded upon an 
act of transgression. Yet, it is not until after his more extensive 
engagement with Christianity in The Fragile Absolute and On 
Belief that Žižek seriously considers Chesterton’s theological 
writing. In the succeeding period, however, Chesterton has been 
 
285 Although it is perhaps not customary to consider Chesterton a 
theologian, as Aidan Nichols (2008, xi) notes in the introduction to his book 
G.K. Chesterton – Theologian, Chesterton has nevertheless written 
extensively on theological issues and Christianity in general. Among other 
things he has published a highly estimated commentary on Thomas Aquinas 
and in Orthodoxy – a work that Žižek (MC 48) designates as ‘Chesterton’s 
theological masterpiece’, he sets out to “[…] discuss the actual fact that the 
central Christian theology (sufficiently summarized in the Apostles’ Creed) 
is the best root of energy and sound ethics” (Chesterton 2007, 5). Thus, 
even if Chesterton is not a theologian by profession, he is indeed, to borrow 
Stratford Caldecott’s (1998) expression, an ‘amateur theologian’ and in the 
best meaning of the word.         
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one of Žižek’s most recurrent and important theological 
references.286  
The reason why Žižek’s reading of Chesterton constitutes a 
particularly good illustration of the dialectical relationship that 
he claims exists between theology and materialism is that this 
reading, which is overtly sympathetic but nevertheless also 
critical, follows a trajectory of a displacement in Chesterton’s 
theological thought that goes from an idealist to a proper 
materialist dialectic. To phrase it in Žižek’s Lacanian 
vocabulary: a displacement from a theology grounded in the 
‘masculine’ logic of the ‘constitutive exception’ to a theology 
grounded in the ‘feminine’ logic of ‘not-All’.287 Or, in terms of 
the concept of God: a displacement from a (perverse) omniscient 
and omnipotent God to a (suffering) doubtful and impotent God. 
This theological displacement is at the centre of Žižek’s reading 
of Chesterton, but he touches upon some of the ontological, 
ethical and political consequences related to this displacement as 
well.288 Besides this issue of the relationship between theology 
 
286 In addition to the second chapter entitled “The Thrilling Romance of 
Orthodoxy” in The Puppet and the Dwarf Žižek has dedicated two essays 
explicitly to Chesterton, namely: “Hegel – Chesterton: German Idealism 
and Christianity” published in the Lacanian journal The Symptom in 2006 
and “From Job to Christ: A Pauline Reading of Chesterton”, which is 
basically an extended version of the 2006 text, printed in the 2009 
anthology Paul among the Philosophers. Furthermore, Chesterton plays a 
decisive part in the argument that Žižek unfolds in his 2007 article 
“Towards a Materialist Theology”. As the titles suggest, all four of these 
texts revolve around theological matters. It is, however, in The Monstrosity 
of Christ that Žižek refers most extensively to Chesterton and theology, but 
this is partly due to the fact that the first of his two contributions to this 
volume include a compilation of the aforementioned texts on Chesterton 
(minus the chapter in The Puppet and the Dwarf). In contrast, the second 
contribution contains a few ‘new’ comments on Chesterton in relation to 
Žižek’s discussion with John Milbank. In addition to these texts, which 
explicitly focus on Chesterton, there are lots of scattered references to the 
latter on several different matters in Welcome to the Desert of the Real, 
Bodies with Organs, The Parallax View, In Defense of Lost Causes and 
Violence. 
287 I described the difference between these two ‘logics’ (and their 
relationship to the issue of materialism and idealism) in detail in chapter 
three, but Žižek (MC 88-89) also gives a concise and clear account of them 
in his first essay in The Monstrosity of Christ.      
288 Žižek deals with the ontological consequences in the essay “Toward a 
Materialist Theology” (21f.), the ethical consequences in the last part of 
“From Job to Christ – A Pauline Reading of Chesterton” (50f.) and the 
political consequences in the final chapter in the Monstrosity of Christ (MC 
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and materialism, what also makes Žižek’s reading of Chesterton 
worthy of consideration is that it offers a helpful way to encircle 
and contextualize Žižek’s own position in a broader theological 
landscape. These matters will be in focus (particularly) in the 
second section of this chapter. I will, however, begin my 
exposition with an outline of Žižek’s critical account in The 
Puppet and the Dwarf of Chesterton’s so-called ‘Doctrine of 
Conditional Joy’ as an illustration of the ‘perverse’ version of 
Christianity, which according to Žižek (PD 53) “[…] forms the 
very core of ‘really existing Christianity’.” Thus, although Žižek 
is first of all interested in the critical and political potential of 
Christianity, his theological engagement includes a critique of 
religion as well; yet, a critique of religion, which, as Žižek 
himself fully acknowledges, is implicit to – at least part of – the 
Christian theological tradition itself.  
 
The Perverse Core of Christianity 
Žižek’s first extensive involvement with Chesterton, which is 
also his first real theological engagement with him, takes place 
in the second chapter of The Puppet and the Dwarf entitled ‘The 
Thrilling Romance of Orthodoxy’ (an explicit reference to 
Chesterton, who uses this phrase in one of the essays in his book 
Orthodoxy). The chapter begins with an exposition of the ‘basic 
matrix of paradoxical self-negating reversal’, which, according 
to Žižek (PD 35-36), constitutes the most ‘Hegelian’ and 
‘subversive’ feature of Chesterton’s work. More precisely, this 
‘basic matrix’ is, as Žižek (PD 35-36) explains, characterized by 
the dialectical process in which “[…] the external opposition 
(between Law and its criminal transgression) is transformed into 
the opposition, internal to the transgression itself, between 
particular transgressions and the absolute transgression that 
appears as its opposite, as universal Law.” The basic insight at 
stake here is perhaps best illustrated with one of Žižek’s absolute 
favourite references, namely Bertolt Brecht’s famous proverb: 
‘What is the robbery of a bank compared to the founding of new 
bank.’ Chesterton (2007, 131) deploys this dialectical matrix to 
expose, among other things, the inconsistency of so-called 
‘liberal’ critics of religion who in their fierce battle to free man 
from religious oppression end up sacrificing the very thing 
 
288f.). However, it is beyond the scope of the present chapter to go further 
into and give an exhaustive exposition of these consequences. 
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(freedom) they were fighting for. By drawing parallels to the 
current so-called ‘defence’ of liberal democratic values through 
the torture of terrorists who threaten these values, and more 
generally to the message of contemporary post-ideological 
‘politics’, that instead of trying to change the world, we should 
refashion ourselves through new ‘subversive’ forms of 
subjective practices, Žižek (PD 37-38) emphasizes the relevance 
of this matrix.  
 
Being the Instrument of the Big Other 
However, Žižek is first of all interested in Chesterton’s ‘basic 
matrix’, because it constitutes a useful means to disclose the 
perverse logic, which, according Žižek (TTS 248; OB 20), not 
only manifests itself in exceptional situations such as the 
aforementioned ‘torture of terrorists in the name of democracy’, 
but also constitutes one of the most decisive and tricky aspects of 
contemporary late-capitalist society.289 Capitalism has, as Marx 
and Engels (2002, 223) famously note in The Communist 
Manifesto, played a ‘revolutionary part’ in history in the sense 
that it ‘melts all solid into the air’ including the hierarchical and 
prohibitive structures of a traditional authoritarian social order. 
Yet, these traditional social structures served not simply as a 
suppressive mechanism, but also notably as the background 
against which man could assert his freedom. And according to 
Žižek (PD 53), perversion should be seen precisely as an attempt 
or a strategy to cope with a (modern) situation in which “[…] we 
can no longer rely on the preestablished Dogma to sustain our 
freedom, on the preestablished Law/Prohibition to sustain our 
transgression […].” Yet, to understand this claim fully we need 
to clarify the term ‘perversion’, which Žižek perceives in a 
broader sense than it is normally understood. More precisely, he 
extends the term beyond the sexual context to which it is 
traditionally linked, applying it instead primarily to political 
situations – thus for instance describing Stalinism and Nazism as 
utterly perverse political ideologies (e.g. TN 195; OB 139; IDLC 
227; PF 69; CWZ 114, 127-128).   
Like Lacan, Žižek (HTRL 105; Evans 2010, 139) defines the 
‘pervert’ as ‘a person who assumes the position of object-
 
289 This is a thesis which Žižek takes over from Lacan, who, in his late 
work, regards perversion as a ‘generalized hegemonic social structure’ 
(Chiesa 2007, 7).   
From a Perverse to a Suffering God 
 
218 
 
                                                
instrument of the will of the big Other’.290 A relevant example of 
a pervert, that Žižek (PD 16) himself refers to in the first chapter 
of The Puppet and the Dwarf, could be Judas. At least if we 
think of Judas in the terms proposed by Žižek (PD 15); that is, as 
someone who sacrifices his own salvation and assumes the role 
of the necessary tool in the greater Cause of God’s salvation of 
mankind.291 But, why would anyone do this? Žižek’s Lacanian 
answer is: Because the pervert finds enjoyment in occupying this 
instrumental position. More precisely, the pervert’s enjoyment 
derives, as Žižek (TN 71; PV 303; HTRL 105) notes, from the 
fact that he conceives of himself as absolved from (the 
responsibility of) his own actions insofar that he is merely a tool 
in the hands of the big Other’s will. Think, for instance, of the 
meticulous bureaucrat who with an ill-concealed satisfaction in 
his voice tells you: ‘Sorry, but I am just following the rules.’292 
Yet, another trait of perversion is, according to Žižek (TN 71; 
TTS 248), that the pervert, in contrast to for example the 
hysteric, knows the will of the big Other. Again, think of the 
bureaucrat who rhetorically asks you: ‘don’t you think I know 
the rules.’ However, what is particularly in focus in Žižek’s 
interest in perversion is the question of the law. As Žižek (PF 17) 
explains in The Plague of Fantasies, what distinguishes the 
pervert is that:  
 
 
290 As Žižek (HTRL 7-21) notes in his exposition of the notion in How to 
Read Lacan the ‘big Other’ has several features. Here the ‘big Other’ 
(operating at the symbolic level) is understood in its primary sense as ‘the 
subject’s presupposition of an ideal order that guarantees the ultimate 
meaning and consistency of the subject’s experience’ (EYS 58). 
291 Of course Judas’ betrayal takes on an even more perverse character if 
we, as Žižek (PD 15) suggests, see it as provoked by the ‘secret injunction’ 
in Christ’s statement to his disciples that ‘truly, one of you will betray me’ 
(Matt. 26:21). As Žižek (PD 16) stresses, in a certain sense, “[…] the entire 
fate of Christianity, its innermost kernel, hinges on the possibility of 
interpreting this act [Christ’s injunction to betray him] in a non-perverse 
way.” 
292 A more extreme version of this example would be the Nazi-criminal 
Adolf Eichmann. Thus, according to Žižek (CWZ 127-128; cf. PF 300), 
Eichmann cannot be properly understood in Hannah Arendt’s terms of ‘the 
banality of evil’; that is, as an ‘ordinary’ man caught up in bureaucratic 
machinery, eager to fulfil his duty, promoting his career and so on. In 
contrast to Arendt’s claim, Žižek (CWZ 127-128) argues that Eichmann 
was indeed a pervert; that we need to see his behaviour (and the behaviour 
of Nazi-bureaucrats in general) as closely tied to an ‘obscene economy of 
enjoyment’.  
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[…] in contrast to the ‘normal’ subject, for whom the law functions 
as the agency of prohibition which regulates (access to the object of) 
his desire, for the pervert, the object of his desire is Law itself – the 
Law is the Ideal he is longing for, he wants to be fully acknowledged 
by the Law, integrated into its functioning …  
 
Thus, in sum, Žižek counter-intuitively portrays the pervert not 
as a subversive rebel who liberates the repressed flipside of 
normality, but as a closet-conservative whose transgressions (and 
the pleasure he gets form these) are intimately tied to a secrete 
belief in the Law as such, or in other words, in the existence of 
the big Other. As Žižek (TTS 247) stresses, ‘perversion is not 
subversion’. Quite the contrary, perversion is a conservative 
‘solution’ to the problem of the decline of authorities, or in 
theological terms, the death of God.293 And now, let’s return to 
Chesterton. 
 
The Limit of ‘Conditional Joy’ 
Despite his obvious veneration for Chesterton, Žižek 
nevertheless, as mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, 
presents a severe critique of him. More precisely, Žižek’s 
critique is aimed at the kind of principle or logic best captured in 
what Chesterton half-jokingly calls the ‘Doctrine of Conditional 
Joy’. And as we shall see, the issue of perversion is at the very 
heart of this critique. But first, let us take a closer look at 
Chesterton’s doctrine.   
In chapter four of Orthodoxy, Chesterton (2007, 40) sets out 
in his typical counter-intuitive manner to show how fairy tales 
are not only not pure non-sense, but indeed ‘entirely reasonable 
things’. And, to cut a long story short, his argument is that what 
makes them reasonable is precisely that they follow the logic 
summarized in the ‘Doctrine of Conditional Joy’. So, what is the 
 
293 In The Puppet and the Dwarf Žižek (PD 53) describes this ‘solution’ in 
the following way: “[…] today’s desperate neoconservative attempts to 
reassert ‘old values’ are also ultimately a failed perverse strategy of 
imposing prohibitions that can no longer be taken seriously.” It is, 
according to Žižek (HTRL 91-92), against this backdrop that we should 
understand Lacan’s reversal, in Seminar II, of Dostoevsky’s famous 
suggestion in The Brothers Karamazov: if God does not exist, the result is 
not, as Dostoevsky suggests, that everything is permitted, but on the 
contrary, that nothing at all is permitted. Or, as Žižek (HTRL 92) puts it: 
“Instead of bringing freedom, the fall of the oppressive authority […] gives 
rise to new and sterner prohibitions.” 
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message of this doctrine? Chesterton (2007, 46) describes it in 
this way:  
 
The note of the fairy utterance always is, ‘You may live in a palace 
of gold and sapphire, if you do not say the word ‘cow’’; or ‘You may 
live happily with the King’s daughter, if you do not show her an 
onion.’ This vision always hangs upon a veto. All the dizzy and 
colossal things depend upon a small thing withheld. All the wild and 
whirling things that are let loose depend upon one thing that is 
forbidden. 
 
This quote offers two important insights. First, it illustrates the 
fundamental message of the Doctrine of Conditional Joy, namely 
that our joy is always conditioned by an omission, that we can 
only enjoy something fully, if we at the same time renounce 
something else. In other words, the basic ‘you-may-if-you-don’t’ 
structure of the ‘Doctrine of Conditional Joy’ is equivalent to the 
(‘masculine’) logic of a constitutive exception, which Žižek (MC 
82-101), as we saw in chapter three, relates to idealism. The 
second thing that the quote illustrates is that this founding 
exception is completely arbitrary: The exception that allows me 
to live in a palace of gold and sapphire is that I do not say the 
word ‘cow’. And more importantly, according to Žižek (PD 41-
42), Chesterton implies that the function of this arbitrary 
limitation (‘if you don’t say cow’) of our access (‘you may live 
in’) to an object (‘a palace’) is to remind us that this object “[…] 
is given to us through an inexplicable arbitrary miraculous 
gesture of divine gift […].” What is crucial in the present context 
is that although the Doctrine of Conditional Joy is here related to 
fairy tales, for Chesterton this doctrine summarizes, as Žižek 
(PD 41) notes, ‘the basic Christian lesson’ contained in fairy 
tales.  
If we now turn to Žižek’s exposition of Chesterton’s position 
in the second chapter of The Puppet of the Dwarf, we cannot fail 
to notice how, after having provided a series of entertaining 
illustrations of the logic at stake in Chesterton’s Doctrine of 
Conditional Joy, what appeared to be unreserved enthusiasm is 
quite abruptly replaced by a far more critical attitude. The 
starting point of Žižek’s critique is Chesterton’s inversion in the 
last chapter of Orthodoxy of the well-known and widespread 
conception that paganism as a joyful affirmation of life, while 
Christianity is supposed to force a regime of renunciation and 
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guilt upon life. Against this conception Chesterton’s (2007, 149; 
cf. PD 48) makes the following claim: 
  
The outer ring of Christianity is a rigid guard of ethical abnegations 
and professional priests; but inside that inhuman guard you find the 
old human life dancing like children, and drinking wine like men; for 
Christianity is the only frame for pagan freedom.  
 
Clearly Chesterton’s message in this passage is that Christianity 
serves as the exception which in fact allows us to enjoy the 
pleasures of paganism. Thus in other words, the underlying logic 
is the same as the ‘you-may-if-you-don’t’ structure of the 
Doctrine of Conditional Joy: You may enjoy your pagan 
freedom, if you do not believe in pagan Gods, that is, if you are a 
good Christian. But, what is the problem with this claim? 
Žižek’s incriminating answer is that this claim demonstrates 
the properly perverse nature of Chesterton’s Doctrine of 
Conditional Joy. In Chesterton’s reading of Christianity (in terms 
of the Doctrine of Conditional Joy) the Christian, like the 
pervert, is enabled to indulge in pleasures (‘dancing like children 
and drinking wine like men’) not despite of, but precisely 
because of his act of renunciation (‘rigid guard of ethical 
abnegations and professional priests’). Like the pervert, the 
enjoyment of being a Christian is conditioned by a belief in 
prohibition, or in more general terms, the Law, the big Other. 
Although, the focus here is on Chesterton’s reading of 
Christianity, according to Žižek (PD 53), this logic of perversion 
applies not merely for this particular reading, but is at the ‘very 
core of really existing Christianity.’ Žižek (PD 15-19) elaborates 
on this logic on several occasions throughout The Puppet and the 
Dwarf (subtitled precisely The Perverse Core of Christianity), 
describing among other things in the opening of the book how 
the ‘Christian pervert’ conjures a perverse God; that is, a God 
who incites man to sin only so that he afterwards, by sacrificing 
himself, can redeem man. Or, in terms of the law: God only gave 
the law to generate sin, so that he afterwards could assert himself 
as an omnipotent God with the power to absolve man from this 
sin (PD 118; cf. TTS 148). 
However, to be correct, Žižek (PD 53) does not simply 
characterize Chesterton’s reading of Christianity, and more 
generally ‘the core of existing Christianity’, as perverse, but as a 
perverse solution. More precisely it is, according to Žižek (PD 
53), a perverse solution to the abovementioned problem of ‘the 
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fall of authorities’ related to the rise of modernity. Yet, Žižek’s 
own understanding of Christianity also invites another more 
paradoxical reading: Namely that the Christian claim, that if we 
just believe that God sacrificed himself for our sins, then we are 
allowed to indulge in all kinds of transgressions, is a perverse 
‘solution’ to a problem that grew out of Christianity’s own 
declaration of the death of God. In this perspective, the Christian 
is a ‘pervert‘ insofar as he represses the message of the non-
existence of the big Other, which subsists at the very heart of 
Christianity itself in terms of Christ’s cry of dereliction on the 
cross. Thus, in a certain sense we can say that Žižek here exerts a 
critique of religion against Christianity which it is actually itself 
the root of; at least if we understand Christianity, as Žižek (PD 
171) suggests we should, as the ‘religion of atheism’ that 
‘attacks the religious hard core that survives in every belief in 
the existence of the big Other’. And so, to paraphrase Žižek (PD 
16), we could say that the ‘entire fate of Christianity, its 
innermost kernel, relies on the possibility of a non-perverse 
reading of the death of God’, that is, a reading in which God 
does not live on unaffected of his own death, remaining the 
exceptional guarantor of our deeds. In summary, the essence of 
Žižek’s objection against Chesterton is that although 
Chesterton’s writings contain the means to expose the logic of 
perversion imbuing our present culture, in the end his own 
version of Christianity obeys the very same logic – thereby 
maintaining the ‘religious hard core’ which it was supposed to be 
critical of. 
Against this background the burning question is of course: Is 
not another reading of Christianity, a reading which is not based 
upon the structure of the Doctrine of Conditional Joy, a reading 
which does not abide by the logic of perversion, possible? Žižek 
not only raises this question, he also indicates a possible answer. 
Thus, towards the end of his chapter on Chesterton in The 
Puppet and the Dwarf, Žižek (PD 51-52) proclaims that: “The 
crucial question here is: how does this ‘Doctrine of Conditional 
Joy’ relate to the Pauline suspension of our full commitment to 
earthly social obligations […]?” As Žižek (PD 53) explains, he 
understands this ‘Pauline suspension’ as a stance or an attitude 
that consists in living our lives in an as if not mode; that is, 
living, as he put it paraphrasing 1 Corinthians (7:29-31), in a 
way in which ‘you mourn as if you were not mourning, rejoice 
as if you were not rejoicing, buy as if you had no possessions’, 
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and so on.294 Now, let me cite Žižek’s (PD 52) answer to his 
‘crucial question’ of the relationship between Chesterton’s 
Doctrine of Conditional Joy and the Pauline attitude of ‘as if not’ 
in its full length:  
 
Are they two versions of the same principle? Are they not, rather, 
two opposed principles? In the ‘Doctrine of Conditional Joy’, the 
Exception (be home by midnight, etc.) allows us fully to rejoice, 
while the Pauline as if mode deprives us of the ability fully to rejoice 
by displacing the external limit into an internal one: the limit is no 
longer the one between rejoicing in life and its exception 
(renunciation), it runs in the midst of rejoicing, that is, we have to 
rejoice as if we are not rejoicing. The limit of Chesterton is clearly 
perceptible in his insistence on the need for firm external standards 
[…]. 
 
Again, Žižek’s basic objection against Chesterton’s reading of 
Christianity here is that, due to his ‘insistence on the need for 
firm external standards’, or to put it in terms of the Doctrine of 
Conditional Joy, his insistence on an exception constitutive to 
our (transgressive) behaviour, he remains within the framework 
of perversion. Now, the question, to which we shall turn in the 
next section, is: Is it possible to present another reading of 
Chesterton, a reading in which his conception of Christianity 
does not rest on the logic of perversion outlined above? That is, 
perhaps a more Pauline reading of Chesterton?  
 
A Pauline Reading of Chesterton 
In the opening of his 2009 essay “From Job to Christ: A Pauline 
reading of Chesterton”, Žižek (cf. FTKN 29, 78) affirms the 
standard view according to which Paul is the founder of 
Christianity insofar that he bestowed it with its most essential 
trait by shifting the centre from the acts and teachings of Jesus to 
the minimal message of Christ’s death and resurrection as an act 
of salvation.295 Or, to be correct: Žižek does in fact, and quite 
 
294 Žižek (PD 111-112) elaborates more thoroughly on this later on in the 
book during his discussion of Giorgio Agamben’s reading of Paul in The 
Time That Remains. Here Agamben (2005, 23f.) presents a more extensive 
reading of 1 Corinthians 7:29-31 and in particular of the Pauline formula 
‘as if not’ or ‘as not’ (w¨j mh\), which seems to be Žižek’s model. 
295 Let me just note in passing that Žižek (FTKN 78; cf. 29) already 
advances this type of reading of Paul in For They Do Not Know in which he 
notes how Paul’s “[…] rereading of the death of Christ gave Christianity its 
definitive contours.”   
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symptomatically, omit the resurrection, focusing entirely on the 
death of Christ (an issue I will return to later).296 According to 
Žižek, this theme of the death of God still constitutes a challenge 
today, and for reasons which are indeed consistent with the 
critique of the ‘perverse core’ of ‘really existing Christianity’ 
that he presents in The Puppet and the Dwarf. Or, as he 
formulates it himself: “Today, two thousand years later, this 
death of God is still an enigma: how to read it outside the pagan-
mythic topic of divine sacrifice or the legalistic topic of 
exchange (payment for sins)?”297 As we shall see, Žižek’s claim 
is basically that Chesterton, if he is read properly, offers us the 
potential for a non-perverse reading of the death of God. Indeed, 
his claim is even that it was “[…] Chesterton, who thought 
through the notion of the ‘death of God’ to its radical conclusion: 
only in Christianity God himself has to go through atheism.”298 
Thus, in what follows I will sketch out how Žižek identifies a 
displacement in Chesterton’s theological thought towards a 
conception of God which is consistent with a non-perverse 
reading of the death of God. This displacement moreover 
includes the potential for a shift ‘towards a materialist theology.’ 
 
To Have Done with External Standards 
In his reading of Chesterton in the essay “From Job to Christ”, 
Žižek begins where we left him in the previous section, that is, 
with a critique of what he in the above quote from The Puppet 
and the Dwarf described as Chesterton’s ‘need for firm external 
standards’, or in other words, his reliance on the (‘masculine’) 
logic of a constitutive exception. More precisely, Žižek’s point 
of departure is Chesterton’s famous ‘metaphysical thriller’ The 
Man Who Was Thursday, which, along with his short 
“Introduction to the Book of Job” and a few detours to 
Orthodoxy, constitutes the main textual basis of the reading of 
Chesterton that Žižek presents in this essay.  
In a key passage from the first part of this novel, Chesterton 
(1986, 44-46) describes the important episode which leads to the 
recruitment of the book’s main-character, named Syme, into a 
special taskforce of ‘philosophical policemen’ formed to fight 
nihilist philosophers and their political equivalents, anarchists. In 
brief, Syme accidentally encounters a police officer who arouses 
 
296 Žižek, “From Job to Christ: A Pauline Reading of Chesterton,” 39. 
297 Ibid. 
298 Ibid. 
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his curiosity when he reveals that he is a member of a special 
taskforce exclusively engaged in fighting philosophers, who, as 
he tells Syme, are far more dangerous than regular criminals. 
Why? Well, as it is explained to Syme, an ordinary crook, a thief 
for example, might violate a particular law by stealing, but his 
very wish to acquire more property shows that he nevertheless 
respects the idea of personal property; he just wants more of it 
for himself. Philosophers, on the other hand, disrespect the very 
idea of property as such; or, in short, philosophers not only 
disrespect a particular law; they disrespect the Law as such.   
As I have mentioned earlier, Žižek definitely acknowledged 
the dialectical, even Hegelian, element in Chesterton’s writing, 
nevertheless his basic complaint against Chesterton in his 
discussion of the passage from The Man Who Was Thursday 
summarised above is precisely that he is not dialectical, or rather 
Hegelian, enough. Because, as Žižek puts it, “What Chesterton 
doesn’t get is that universal(ized) crime is no longer a crime––it 
sublates (negates/overcomes) itself as crime and turns from 
transgression into a new order.299 And as he additionally 
explains, the crucial point that Chesterton does not recognize (at 
least at this point in the novel) is that the universalized crime that 
he assigns to the philosopher/anarchist lawbreaker should also be 
assigned to the lawmaker who in his act of instituting the law of 
Order does nothing different than the anarchist whose 
transgression aims at instituting the law of Chaos. Instead of 
acknowledging that the antagonism between crime and law is 
internal to the law itself, Chesterton indirectly insists on the need 
for the law as a firm external standard. Žižek summarizes his 
critique in the following manner: 
  
What Chesterton fails to perceive is that the ‘universalized crime’ 
that he projects into ‘lawless modern philosophy’ and its political 
equivalent, the anarchist movement that aims at destroying the 
totality of civilized life, is already realized in guise of the existing 
rule of law, so that antagonism between Law and crime reveals itself 
to be inherent to crime, the antagonism between universal and 
particular crime.300 
 
 
299 Žižek, “From Job to Christ: A Pauline Reading of Chesterton,” 40. Žižek 
(PD 42-53) advances a similar objection against Chesterton of not ‘being 
Hegelian enough’ in the second chapter of The Puppet and the Dwarf. 
300 Žižek, “From Job to Christ: A Pauline Reading of Chesterton,” 41. 
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However, immediately after raising this critique of Chesterton, 
Žižek continues his discussion of The Man Who Was Thursday 
by modifying the very same critique. Thus, stressing that 
although Chesterton implicitly distinguishes between law and 
crime in the passage on the philosopher-criminal in the 
beginning of the novel, asserting law as an external standard, at 
the end of the novel he nevertheless very explicitly confirms the 
identity of crime and law.301 To understand Žižek’s modification 
of his critique we will have to see how Chesterton enacts this 
identification of law and crime at the conclusion of The Man 
Who Was Thursday. However, to do this properly, we first need 
just a little more information about the plot of Chesterton’s 
novel.  
After his encounter with the police officer from the special 
taskforce of philosopher-fighting policemen described above, the 
main character of the novel, Syme, is recruited by the mysterious 
Chief of this taskforce (reduced to a ‘heavy voice’ in a ‘pitch-
dark room’), who sends him on a secret mission to penetrate the 
seven-member ‘Central Anarchist Council’ in charge of a 
powerful organization minded to annihilate the existence of 
civilization (Chesterton 1986, 48-49). During the course of this 
mission, Syme ends up being elected as ‘Thursday’; that is to 
say, as one of members of the Central Anarchist Council (to 
preserve secrecy, the members are only known to each other by 
the name of a weekday), whose president is ‘Sunday’, a big man 
of tremendous genius with an awe-inspiring aura (Chesterton, 
1986, 29-40). 
Now, let us return to Žižek’s modification of his critique of 
Chesterton. What Žižek refers to when he stresses that “At the 
novel’s end, the message is precisely the identity of crime and 
law […]”, is the highly surprising twist in wait for the reader in 
the final showdown of the novel, where Thursday and the other 
six members of the Central Anarchist Council, who have all 
turned out to be undercover policemen just like Syme, confront 
the president of the Central Anarchist Council, Sunday. Žižek 
puts it like this: 
 
Here the novel passes from mystery to a metaphysical comedy: we 
discover two surprising things. First, that Sunday, president of the 
Anarchist Council, is the same person as the mysterious never-seen 
 
301 Ibid., 41. 
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chief who hired Syme (and other elite detectives) to fight the 
anarchists; second, that he is none other than God Himself.     
     
In other words, what Chesterton does here in the final chapter of 
The Man Who Was Thursday is to assert the identity between 
crime and law, which he indirectly rejects at the beginning of the 
novel, in the narrative form of the identity between the arch-
villain Sunday and the chief of the special police-force; hereby 
renouncing his earlier ‘insistence on the need for a firm external 
standard’ (in the form of the law). The other no-less-decisive 
move that Chesterton makes is, as Žižek notes, to completely 
change the angle of the book from a detective story to a 
metaphysical comedy, or perhaps rather a ‘theological thriller’. 
This shift in perspective underlines Žižek’s real interest in 
Chesterton’s novel, namely its conception of God.  
So, what kind of God is it that Chesterton promotes in the 
double figure of Sunday/the Police Chief? Žižek answers this 
question with a short recourse to one of his favourite passages in 
‘Chesterton’s theological masterpiece’, Orthodoxy. This is a 
passage that definitely deserves a lengthy reproduction: 
 
When the world shook and the sun was wiped out of heaven, it was 
not at the crucifixion, but at the cry from the cross: the cry which 
confessed that God was forsaken of God. And now let the 
revolutionists choose a creed from all the creeds and a god from all 
the gods of the world, carefully weighing all the gods of inevitable 
recurrence and of unalterable power. They will not find another god 
who has himself been in revolt. Nay (the matter grows too difficult 
for human speech), but let the atheists themselves choose a god. 
They will find only one divinity who ever uttered their isolation; 
only one religion in which God seemed for an instant to be an atheist 
(Chesterton 2007, 130).302 
 
In other words, the God that Chesterton depicts in narrative 
terms in The Man Who Was Thursday as the split figure of 
Sunday/the Police Chief, who, as Žižek notes, ‘fights himself’, 
and who, as Chesterton puts in the above quote, ‘seemed for an 
instant to be an atheist’, is a God basically characterized by an 
inner discord, an inner antagonism. Now, in Žižek’s account this 
raises two serious questions. The first question concerns the 
locus of this antagonism. That is: is the antagonism that 
characterizes God due to our limited perception of God; or is this 
 
302 Ibid., 43-44. 
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antagonism inscribed into the very heart of God himself? As 
Žižek puts it: “[…] when God appears simultaneously as the top 
policeman fighting the crime and the top criminal, does this 
division appear to our finite perspective (and God is ‘in himself’ 
the absolute One without divisions)? Or is it, on the contrary that 
[…] God in Himself is the absolute self-division?”303  The 
second question concerns the more precise character of this 
division. That is to say: Is Chesterton’s double-figure, his 
divided God, in the end a kind of ‘unity of opposites’, a 
harmonious reconciliation of his two sides, a unity balancing his 
self-division, or is God really in discord with himself?  
As Žižek presents it, Chesterton manages to answer these two 
questions by virtue of the same modification of his conception of 
God. This modification is enacted by Chesterton (1986, 183), 
when, at the very end of the novel, Sunday/the Police Chief 
(God) as a reply to Syme’s question if he has ever suffered the 
same way as the members of the council have suffered while 
fighting him, answers: “[…] ‘can ye drink of the cup that I drink 
of?’” Thus, the attentive reader of The Man Who Was Thursday 
will, as Žižek remarks, have noted how we have here not merely 
a duality of the evil Sunday and the good Police Chief, but rather 
a trinity of the features of God. In Žižek’s words: “[…] the 
whole point of the novel’s final pages is that, to the opposition 
between the benevolent God of peace and cosmic harmony and 
the evil God of murderous rage, one should add a third figure, 
that of the suffering God.”304 The fact that God in Chesterton’s 
reading is a ‘suffering God’ means first of all that God is 
involved with his creation, indeed involved in the suffering and 
discord of his creation, like Sunday/the Police Chief is involved 
in the suffering of the members of his council/taskforce. And 
thus to answer the first of the above questions: God is not 
beyond, untouched by, the antagonism personified in the double 
figure of Sunday and the Police Chief, God does not merely 
‘appear’ as divided in our finite perspective. On the contrary, in 
the figure of a suffering God (Christ) this antagonism, this 
division, is incarnated in God himself, most unmistakably of 
 
303 Ibid., 45. 
304 Ibid., 47. Žižek (PD 125-126) presents a similar portrayal of God already 
in The Puppet and the Dwarf where he states that: “God is neither just nor 
unjust, simply impotent.” Yet, in this text Žižek does not relate the 
conception of God as impotent/suffering to Chesterton, but to the Book of 
Job. However, in “From Job to Christ” Žižek does, as we shall see, in return 
make a link between Job and Chesterton precisely on this point. 
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course in Christ’s cry of dereliction on the cross, ‘Father, why 
have you forsaken me?’. So, to answer the second question: 
Insofar that God is this self-division voiced on the cross, there 
cannot be a harmonious divine reconciliation of the antagonism, 
a suffering God cannot be a balanced ‘unity of opposites’. This is 
a crucial point, because as Žižek stresses:  
 
The insight into the speculative identity of Good and Evil, the notion 
of God’s two sides, peaceful harmony and destructive rage, the claim 
that, in fighting Evil, the good God is fighting himself (an internal 
struggle), is still the (highest) pagan insight. It is only the third 
feature, the suffering God, whose sudden emergence resolves this 
tension of God’s two faces, that brings us to Christianity: what 
paganism cannot imagine is such a suffering God. 305 
 
I will elaborate on this decisive issue of Žižek’s conception of 
the Christian God as a suffering God in a moment, but first let us 
pursue Žižek’s reading of Chesterton in “From Job to Christ” a 
little further to see how the latter finally overcomes the 
(masculine) logic of the constitutive exception with regard to his 
notion of God, laying open the road ‘towards a materialist 
theology’.   
 
Towards a Materialist Theology 
Near the end of his discussion of The Man Who Was Thursday, 
Žižek notes how the issue of suffering, introduced by Chesterton 
in the final chapter of the novel, cannot but bring to mind the 
Book of Job, and therefore also Chesterton’s short, brilliant 
“Introduction to the Book of Job.” What primarily interests 
Žižek in Chesterton’s commentary on this biblical text, is how 
Chesterton stresses that the Book of Job does not provide any 
satisfactory answer to why Job suffers, to why God tests Job, or 
in Chesterton’s wording, to why God refuses to ‘explain his 
design’. And more importantly, commenting on this reaction by 
God, Chesterton (1916, xxii) remarks that: “The refusal of God 
to explain His design is itself a burning hint of His design. The 
riddles of God are more satisfying than the solutions of man.” In 
other words, in Chesterton’s view, what God does when he is 
confronted with the ‘riddle’ of Job’s suffering is he relocates this 
riddle. As Žižek explains: “[…] he [God] resolves the riddle by 
supplanting it with an even more radical riddle, by redoubling 
the riddle, by transposing the riddle from Job’s mind into the 
 
305 Žižek, “From Job to Christ: A Pauline Reading of Chesterton,” 47-48. 
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thing itself––he comes to share Job’s astonishment at the chaotic 
madness of the created universe […].”306 Thus, what Chesterton 
performs here in his reading of the Book of Job is of course the 
properly dialectical move from ‘in-itself’ to ‘for-itself’ that Žižek 
(TTS 55) describes in The Ticklish Subject as “[…] the crucial 
Hegelian gesture of transposing epistemological limitation into 
ontological fault.” 
Moreover, it is against this backdrop we should understand 
Žižek’s claim, a few sentences further into the text, that through 
this reading Chesterton succeeds in exceeding the logic of the 
constitutive exception. Or as he puts it specifically in regard to 
Chesterton’s conception of God:  
 
God is here no longer the miraculous exception that guarantees the 
normality of the universe, the unexplainable X who enables us to 
explain everything else; he is, on the contrary, himself overwhelmed 
by the overflowing miracle of his Creation. Upon a closer look, there 
is nothing normal in our universe — everything, every small thing 
that is, is a miraculous exception; viewed from a proper perspective, 
every normal thing is a monstrosity. For example, we should not take 
horses as normal and the unicorn as a miraculous exception even a 
horse, the most ordinary thing in the world, is a shattering miracle. 
This blasphemous God is the God of modern science, since modern 
science is sustained precisely by such an attitude of wondering at the 
most obvious.307 
 
To further illuminate this assertion and unfold the consequences 
of the displacement in Chesterton’s notion of God toward a 
‘blasphemous God of modern science’ that it implies, Žižek 
introduces the two logics characterizing Lacan’s (1998, 78-81) 
‘formulas of sexuation’ that I described in chapter three. 
However, let me just give a brief recapitulation of these 
formulas, roughly following Žižek’s (FTKN 121-123) 
presentation in For They Know Not What They Do. The 
masculine formula states that: ‘All X are submitted to the phallic 
function’ [but] ‘there exists an X who is not submitted to the 
phallic function’. The feminine formula states that: ‘There does 
not exist any X who is exempt from the phallic function’ [but] 
‘Not-all X are submitted to the phallic function’. Now, with this 
as his implicit basis, Žižek explains that: 
 
 
306 Žižek, “From Job to Christ: A Pauline Reading of Chesterton,” 48.  
307 Ibid., 50. 
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Chesterton obviously relies on the ‘masculine’ side of universality 
and its constitutive exception: everything obeys natural causality—
with the exception of God, the central Mystery. The logic of modern 
science is, on the contrary, ‘feminine’: first, it is materialist, 
accepting the axiom that nothing escapes natural causality which can 
be accounted for by rational explanation; however, the other side of 
this materialist axiom is that ‘not all is rational, obeying natural 
laws’—not in the sense that ‘there is something irrational, something 
that escapes rational causality, but in the sense that it is the ‘totality’ 
of rational causal order itself which is inconsistent, ‘irrational,’ non- 
All.308 
     
As I have argued in chapter three, and as Žižek hints in the above 
quote, this move from the (masculine) logic of the constitutive 
exception to the (feminine) logic of non-All also constitutes a 
passage from idealism to materialism, that is, from a 
prioritization of transcendence (the exception) over immanence 
(the universality it is constitutive of) to an inversion of this 
prioritization in the sense that in genuine materialism “[…] 
immanence generates the spectre of transcendence because it is 
already inconsistent in itself” (OWB 61).309 To sum up, the 
notion of God that Chesterton, according to Žižek, outlines in his 
“Introduction to he Book of Job”, and in glimpses such as in the 
end of The Man Who Was Thursday and in the portrayal in 
Orthodoxy of God as being himself an atheist, is above all an 
incomplete God. That is to say, a God who is as confused and 
harassed by his own creation as man is, a God who, just like the 
human beings who believe in him, wavers in this faith, indeed, a 
God who even suffers the way that man does. And it is precisely 
due to this claim to God’s incompleteness and even impotence, 
paradigmatically expressed in Christ’s cry of dereliction, that 
Žižek holds that the Christian notion of God is compatible with 
materialism: “[…] within the field of religion, the singular point 
of the emergence of materialism is signalled by Christ’s words 
on the cross ‘Father, why have you forsaken me?’ — in this 
moment of total abandonment, the subject experiences and fully 
assumes the inexistence of the big Other.”310  
It is obviously such a reading of Christianity Žižek has in 
mind when he in the opening of The Puppet and the Dwarf 
asserts that only through a ‘materialist approach’ can we reach 
 
308 Ibid., 50. 
309 For a further elaboration of this point see Johnston (2008b, 142-144). 
310 Žižek, “Afterword: Lenin’s choice”, 180   
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the subversive core of Christianity. But, how should we 
understand the other part of Žižek’s assertion, that is, why do we 
have to go through this Christian experience of total 
abandonment or alienation to become a true materialist? And 
how should we understand Žižek’s claim that this is a 
specifically Christian experience? In extension to a remark in 
The Monstrosity of Christ on Jean-Luc Nancy’s reflections on 
Christianity and atheism, Žižek proposes the following 
statement, which can be read as a rudimentary answer to these 
questions:  
 
[…] a true materialism not only asserts that only material reality 
‘really exists,’ but has to assume all the consequences of what Lacan 
called the nonexistence of the big Other, and it is only Christianity 
that opens up the space for thinking this nonexistence, insofar as it is 
the religion of a God who dies. 
 
That true materialism assumes the full consequences of the 
nonexistence of the big Other means, as argued in chapter three, 
that it assumes the inconsistency, the contingency, of reality 
itself (PV 79). And this is precisely what the above reading of 
Christianity stresses: With its conception of the death of Christ 
as the death of God himself, Christianity does not merely reveal 
that there is nothing but material reality; rather, it reveals that 
this material reality is itself inconsistent, incomplete. The 
specifically Christian aspect of this claim is, as Žižek (PD 15) 
stresses in The Puppet and the Dwarf, exactly that in contrast to 
“[…] the standard form of atheism [where] God dies for men 
who stop believing in him; in Christianity, God dies for himself.” 
This is not only a proper ‘dialectical’ materialist reading of 
Christianity, it is also a non-perverse reading insofar that its 
emphasis on the death of God undermines any attempt to assume 
the role of being the instrument of the big Other. Moreover, what 
also guarantees such a non-perverse reading is that the above 
understanding of the death of God precludes a sacrificial reading 
of this death: God does not die for us, he dies for himself. This 
non-perverse God who dies for himself is a God who refuses to 
guarantee the meaning of our reality, a God who is no longer 
above or beyond, but engaged in this reality, as in his answer to 
Job and in Christ’s cry on the cross. 
Another key issue in regard to the question of how to avoid a 
perverse reading of the death of God (i.e. a reading in which God 
himself remains unaffected by his death and lives on as the 
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guarantor of our lives) is the issue of resurrection. In short, how 
can we maintain the idea of resurrection without it meaning that 
we also restore God as absolute? Not surprisingly, Žižek’s (MC 
291; cf. MC 267) solution to this problem is Hegelian: “[…] 
Crucifixion and Resurrection […] should be perceived not as 
two consecutive events, but as a purely formal parallax shift on 
one and the same event: Crucifixion is Resurrection—to see this, 
one has only to include oneself in the picture.” Or, perhaps we 
should rather say that Žižek’s Hegelian solution is ‘Pauline’, 
because as Žižek (FTKN 78) notes himself, in Paul’s gesture of 
re-reading the death of Christ as ‘the greatest triumph’: 
 
[…] we encounter again the fundamental Hegelian motif: 
‘reconciliation’ does not convey any kind of miraculous healing of 
the wound of scission, it consists solely in a reversal of the 
perspective by means of which we perceive how the scission is 
already in itself reconciliation – how, for example, Christ’s defeat 
and infamous death are already in themselves reconciliation. 
 
This ‘materialist reading’, to use Žižek’s (MC 287) words, in 
which ‘death and resurrection are strictly contemporaneous’ also 
sheds some light on the subtitle of Žižek’s essay “From Job to 
Christ – A Pauline reading of Chesterton.” Indeed, Žižek’s point 
with this subtitle seems be that if read the way he suggests, what 
Chesterton performs in the final Chapter of The Man Who Was 
Thursday, in his “Introduction to the Book of Job” and with his 
reference in Orthodoxy to the atheism of the Christian God, is 
precisely such a Pauline/Hegelian (materialist) move of a 
‘parallax shift’, through which an external difference is 
transposed into the thing itself. Now let’s return to the issue of 
Žižek’s conception of the Christian God as a suffering God. 
 
‘Only a Suffering God’… 
Actually Žižek touches upon the issue of a suffering God already 
in his brief discussion of Job in the last chapter of The Puppet 
and Dwarf. Here Žižek introduces Job as the key figure in his 
attempt to develop a quite original account of the origin and 
specificity of Judaism.311 As part of this account, Žižek (PD 124-
127; cf. FTKN lii-liii; CWZ 161-162; V 152-153) presents the 
following interesting reading of the story of Job. In Žižek’s (PD 
125) view Job is not, as it is often claimed, patiently enduring his 
 
311 I will not elaborate further on this account here, but instead refer to 
Adam Kotsko’s (2008b, 88-93) lucid outline of it. 
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suffering with a firm faith in God, quite the opposite, Job 
complains endlessly, refusing to bear his fate. Moreover, when 
Job is confronted by his three ‘theologian friends’ with their 
attempt to justify his suffering (God is just, so he must have done 
something wrong to deserve this) he refuses to accepts this 
‘standard ideological sophistry’ as Žižek (PD 125) terms it. What 
is at stake here according to Žižek, and this is crucial, is not 
merely the question of guilt, but the issue of the 
meaning(lessness) of Job’s suffering, because, as Žižek (PD 125) 
stresses, what is distinctive in the story of Job is precisely Job’s 
insistence on the meaninglessness of his suffering – a 
meaninglessness, which according to Žižek (PD 125), is 
confirmed by God himself when the latter takes Job’s side at the 
end of the story, claiming that it was Job, and not his ‘theological 
friends’, who spoke the truth. Žižek’s (PD 125; cf. FTKN lii; 
CWZ 161) startling conclusion is that by this refusal to ascribe 
meaning to Job’s suffering, The Book of Job probably constitutes 
the first example of a critique of ideology in human history. And 
in a long comment on Job in one of his conversations with Glyn 
Daly, Žižek (CWZ 161) gives the following elaboration of what 
he has in mind by this claim: “[…] the moment you accept 
suffering as something that doesn’t have a deeper meaning, it 
means that we can change it; fight against it. This is the zero 
level of critique of ideology – when you don’t read meaning into 
it.” One could of course make the objection against Žižek on this 
point that rejecting the meaning of one’s suffering could just as 
well be made with reference to God: there is no meaning to my 
suffering, because the ways of God are inscrutable. However, 
Žižek (MC 54-55; cf. V 153) explicitly rejects such an idea that 
‘the ways of God as inscrutable’ in The Monstrosity of Christ: 
 
The legacy of Job precludes such a gesture of taking a refuge in the 
standard transcendent figure of God as a secret Master who knows 
the meaning of what appears to us to be a meaningless catastrophe, 
the God who sees the entire picture in which what we perceive as a 
stain contributes to global harmony. […] Christ’s death on the Cross 
thus means that we should immediately ditch the notion of God as a 
transcendent caretaker who guarantees the happy outcome of our 
acts, the guarantee of historical teleology—Christ’s death on the 
Cross is the death of this God, it repeats Job’s stance, it refuses any 
‘deeper meaning’ that obfuscates the brutal reality of historical 
catastrophes. 
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In The Puppet and the Dwarf Žižek presents another more 
indirect argument against this notion of God as a secret Master 
who sees the complete meaningful picture of what man merely 
perceives as a meaningless stains. While stressing the same 
parallel between Job and Christ in terms of meaningless 
suffering as indicated in the above quote, Žižek (PD 125-126) 
also notes a decisive difference between them insofar as “[…] in 
the case of Christ, the gap that separates the suffering, desperate 
man (Job) from God is transposed into God Himself, as His own 
radical splitting or, rather, self- abandonment.” What this 
difference does is precisely to underscore the rejection in the 
Christian tradition of God as a transcendent omnipotent and 
omniscient Master: In Christianity the ways of God are not 
inscrutable, quite the contrary, as Žižek (PD 127) notes, 
Christianity is the religion of revelation and what is reveals is 
precisely that there is nothing hidden: God is this suffering, 
impotent, doubting man hanging on a cross. 
In regard to the specific context of this dissertation, one 
particular noteworthy consequence of this recognition of a 
critical insistence on meaninglessness in Judeo-Christian 
tradition is that it leads Žižek to question the range of Badiou’s 
definition of religion as the equation of truth and meaning. While 
he does not explicitly state anything like that in The Puppet and 
the Dwarf, Žižek does indicate such a critique of Badiou in The 
Parallax View. Commenting on Badiou’s suggestion in an 
interview from 2004 that the simplest definition of religion is the 
idea that truth and meaning are identical, Žižek (PV 181) stresses 
his agreement with Badiou that this gap between meaning and 
truth should be emphasized as the minimal difference separating 
religious idealism from materialism. Adding that Badiou is also 
right in advancing two opposing attitudes towards this gap 
between meaning and truth: a postmodern renouncement of truth 
all together in preference to the multiplicity of meaning, versus a 
stance that engages in discerning a dimension of truth outside 
meaning, that is, in short, as Žižek (PV 181) puts it in Lacanian 
parlance, “[…] the dimension of truth as real.” However, in the 
subsequent section of the book entitled ‘When God Comes 
Around’, Žižek (PV 182) modifies and elaborates on the first of 
these claims in a very relevant way, suggesting that Badiou’s 
above definition of religion does perhaps not capture all 
religions:   
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The key question about religion today is: can all religious 
experiences and practices in fact be contained within this dimension 
of the conjunction of truth and meaning? Does not Judaism, with its 
imposition of a traumatic Law, adumbrate a dimension of truth 
outside meaning (which is why Judaism is the mortal enemy of any 
Gnostic obscurantism)? And, at a different level, does not the same 
go for Saint Paul himself?  
 
In Žižek’s (PV 182) view, the best way to clarify this question 
would be by examining a situation in which religion itself faces 
“[…] a shock which dissolves the link between truth and 
meaning, a truth so traumatic that it resists integration into the 
universe of Meaning.” The paradigmatic example of such a 
situation is of course when theology faces the problem of evil, 
the question of how to reconcile the existence of God with the 
fact of the phenomena of excessive evil such as the Holocaust. 
Now, according to Žižek (PV 183), the traditional theological 
responses based upon an insistence on the omnipotence of God 
are basically the following: that evil is God’s punishment, that 
evil is God’s way of testing our belief, or that evil is simply an 
indication of how God works in mysterious ways. However, 
there is, Žižek (PV 184) says, also another theological answer to 
this problem, which refers to “[…] a God who—like the 
suffering Christ on the Cross—is agonized, assumes the burden 
of suffering, in solidarity with human misery”. And he (PV 184) 
elaborates on this notion of a suffering God in the following 
helpful way:  
 
[…] God’s suffering implies that he is involved in history, affected 
by it, not just a transcendent Master pulling the strings from above: 
God’s suffering means that human history is not just a theatre of 
shadows but the place of real struggle, the struggle in which the 
Absolute itself is involved, and its fate is decided.  
 
With this characterization of God as ‘suffering’, Žižek joins the 
company of some of the most important protestant theologians of 
the 20th century for whom the issue of God’s passibility has been 
absolutely fundamental.312 Although Žižek himself is perhaps 
not entirely aware of this context, he nevertheless immediately 
 
312 See Richard Bauchham’s article “’Only the suffering God can help’: 
divine passibility in modern theology” for a helpful survey. This focus on 
God’s passibility among (especially) contemporary protestant theologians is 
probably closely linked with the Luther renaissance and in particular his 
‘theologia crucis’ that has taken place in the 20th century.  
From a Perverse to a Suffering God 
 
237 
 
                                                
after the passage quoted above explicitly refers to Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer’s ‘profound insight’ that ‘only a suffering God can 
help us’. Another prominent example could be Jürgen Moltmann 
(1974, 10), who in his short essay, “The Crucified God and 
Apathetic Man”, makes the following statement setting him fully 
on par with Žižek: “A theology after Auschwitz would be 
impossible […] were not God himself in Auschwitz, suffering 
with the martyred and the murdered. Every other answer would 
be blasphemy. An absolute God would make us indifferent.” 
This suffering God is precisely a God who does not reduce the 
dimension of truth encountered in the real of suffering to a 
dimension of meaning.313 
Let me end this section and thus my outline of Žižek’s 
thought on the notion of a suffering God in the only proper 
Žižekian manner, that is, of course, with a joke. In the Puppet 
and the Dwarf, Žižek (PD 137-138) suggests that the best way to 
illustrate what he is aiming at with his reference to a suffering 
God is by means of the following joke. Three guys who have all 
been condemned for political crimes share the same cell in 
Lubyanka KGB prison in the late 1930s. While they are getting 
to know each other the first guy says: “I was condemned to five 
years for opposing Popov” – a top nomenclature representative 
at the time. The second guy says: “Ah, but then the Party line 
changed, and I was condemned ten years for supporting Popov.” 
Finally the third guy says: “I was condemned for life, and I am 
Popov.” I probably hardly have to point out that the structure of 
this joke constitutes the materialist-theological logic par 
excellence, the logic of incarnation: God/Popov abolishes the 
distance between himself and man, and he does so by displacing 
this external distance into himself, by getting involved in, taking 
part in, the sufferings and alienation of man, by becoming man.   
 
Concluding Remarks 
I would like to conclude this chapter with a brief reflection on a 
more general level of the theological implications of Žižek’s 
engagement with theological tradition with regard both to the 
 
313 As Žižek (PV 184) also notes, Bonhoeffer’s suffering God, and more 
generally the suffering God of modern protestant theology, has a forerunner 
in German Idealism: “It was Schelling who wrote: ‘God is a life, not merely 
a being. But all life has a fate and is subject to suffering and becoming. . . 
Without the concept of a humanly suffering God . . . all of history remains 
incomprehensible’.” 
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field of theology and Žižek’s own work. Let us begin with the 
latter. If we take seriously, as I have tried to do throughout this 
chapter, on the basis of his reading of Chesterton, Žižek’s claim 
in the opening of The Puppet and the Dwarf that genuine 
materialism and Christian theology mutually presuppose each 
other, then the role of theology in his work cannot be reduced to 
the status of an illustration or exemplification on par with his use 
of obscene jokes and pop-cultural references;314 but more 
importantly, it cannot just be dismissed as a purely negative 
concern. I will try to illustrate and justify the last part of this 
assertion a little further through a short discussion of the critique 
of Žižek’s engagement in theology made by John D. Caputo in a 
review in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews of Žižek’s 
probably most explicitly theological work to date, The 
Monstrosity of Christ.  
Near the end of his thorough and well-written review of this 
book, Caputo directs a rather harsh critique against Žižek. Not 
only does he question the sincerity in Žižek’s engagement with 
Christianity by suggesting that the latter’s interest in theology is 
the result of a pure coincidence and in the end not even directed 
against Christianity as such, Caputo also accuses Žižek of merely 
playing patronizing psychoanalytical games, whose final aim is 
nothing but the undermining of the ‘Christian patient’s’ belief in 
God. In Caputo’s own words: 
 
[…] we all know that Žižek can very well make his main case with 
no mention of Christ at all, that he can use the seminars of Lacan, the 
films of Alfred Hitchcock or the novels of Stephen King just as well. 
His whole point, as he says elsewhere, is subversive: to build a 
Trojan-horse theology, to slip the nose of a more radical materialism 
under the Pauline tent of theology in order to announce the death of 
God. […] He discusses Christian doctrines like the Trinity, the 
Incarnation and the Crucifixion the way an analyst talks with a 
patient who thinks there is a snake under his bed, trying patiently to 
heal the patient by going along with the patient’s illusions until the 
patient is led to see the illusion.315   
 
 
314 Of course, another question is if Žižek’s use of obscene jokes and pop-
cultural references can be reduced in this way to mere illustrations and 
exemplification. It is beyond the scope of the present discussion to go into 
this issue, see instead Todd McGowan’s (2007) article “Serious theory” for 
a discussion of this matter. 
315 Caputo, ”The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic? – Reviewed 
by John D. Caputo”  
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Well, the only proper answer to this critique is of course the 
‘vulgar-psychological’ claim, which persists at the very heart of 
the theological tradition itself, that Caputo’s ill-concealed 
indignation is indeed the best indicator of the truth of Žižek’s 
reading of the gospel, that it proves that Žižek’s reading 
succeeds in actualizing the scandal of the Gospel. Furthermore, 
Caputo’s suggestion that Žižek acts like an analyst, whose 
message is that God is dead, is neither precise nor radical 
enough; Žižek’s message is rather that God himself is the analyst 
telling us that he is dead. What Caputo cannot accept is not, as 
he pretends, Žižek’s (presumed) insincere engagement with 
theology, but precisely the scandalous (atheist) essence of the 
Christian message itself: a God who suffers and dies. Caputo 
will hear nothing of such subversive and speculative talk. Instead 
of lofty speculations about the monstrous Christ, Caputo clearly 
prefers the earthbound benevolent figure of Jesus. As he states in 
the ending lines of his review: “Truth to tell, I think Jesus (who 
does not even make the index in this book) would have been 
utterly dumbfounded by this polemic about the metaphysics of 
Christ.”316 Thus, in this way Žižek’s theological engagement 
highlights the tension at the heart of Christian theology between 
the ‘two beginnings’ of Christianity, between Jesus and Paul.  
To Žižek, there is no doubt that the emphasis should be put 
on Paul as the real founder of Christianity, because “[…] it was 
Paul who shifted the centre from Christ’s acts and teachings to 
the redemptive quality of his death.”317  Or in other words, the 
only genuine reading of Christianity is Pauline reading. 
 
 
316 Ibid. 
317 Žižek, “From Job to Christ: A Pauline Reading of Chesterton,” 39. 
  
  
                                                
Conclusion 
 
 
We must endure our thoughts all night, until 
The bright obvious stands motionless in cold. 
Wallance Stevens 
 
The point of departure of this dissertation was the decision to 
examine the theological relevance of Badiou’s and Žižek’s 
philosophies. However, as I put it in the introduction to the 
dissertation, we cannot know from the outset precisely what a 
decision will allow us to do and where it can take us. We will 
have to explore. So, where did my decision to explore the 
theological relevance of Badiou’s and Žižek’s philosophies take 
me? And what problems (if any) did it allow me to pose? Let me 
try to answer these questions by summarizing what I consider to 
be the most important insights that this dissertation has bought to 
light. 
In general terms I would say that the previous five chapters 
have shown there is no reason for theology to avoid or evade 
Badiou and Žižek; on the contrary, their philosophies call for a 
further theological engagement on several issues. Yet, it should 
also be clear from the above that this engagement has to be a 
qualified engagement, that is, an engagement that takes its 
starting point from a thorough understanding of the philosophical 
works of Badiou and Žižek in whole. In line with that, the 
dissertation has argued that even though Badiou clearly engages 
with ‘theological material’ as in his book on Paul, in the context 
of his philosophy as a whole, it makes no sense to read Badiou as 
part of the so-called ‘turn to religion’ in contemporary 
continental philosophy. Rather, as the dissertation has illustrated 
in the two first chapters, Badiou is extremely critical of, if not 
outright hostile towards, what he calls ‘religion’; it might even 
be argued that Badiou’s philosophy is in its very core anti-
religious.318 And when it comes specifically to Paul, I have 
argued that Badiou’s own interest is of a primarily philosophical 
character, indeed as Badiou (SP 1) puts it himself: “Basically, I 
have never really connected Paul with religion.” Hence, 
theologians engaging with Badiou’s philosophy would do well to 
 
318 As argued by Clemens and Roffe (2008) in their article “Philosophy as 
Anti-Religion in the Work of Alain Badiou.” 
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keep in mind the sound advice of Étinne Gilson (2002, xiii) that: 
“The fact that some scholars eliminate god from texts where god
is, does not authorize us to put god in texts where god is not.” 
However, as this dissertation has hopefully shown, this does not 
imply that Badiou has no relevance to theologians. Rather, it 
implies that we must be cautious in our engagement with his 
philosophy, that we must pay great attention to its inherent 
definitions and detailed distinctions, as for instance the 
distinction between religion and anti-philosophy. Thus, while 
Badiou’s attitude towards religion is clearly dismissive, his 
attitude towards ‘antiphilosophers’ like Paul, Pascal, 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, is, as we have seen, far more 
ambiguous. Furthermore, this notion of antiphilosophy is a much 
more well-developed and fine-tuned notion than Badiou’s very 
board and quite rudimentary notion of religion as ‘the equation 
of truth and meaning’. In other words, Badiou’s scepticism 
towards religion does not prevent him from engaging, as we 
have seen, at length with the writings of significant members of 
the theological pantheon. What has become clear throughout the 
present study of Badiou’s reading of key theologians or 
antiphilosophers such as Paul and Kierkegaard, is that, although 
this reading is subjected to Badiou’s own philosophical ends, it 
functions as a powerful reminder of how the Christian tradition 
contains vital resources to think through a number of essential 
problems that are still absolutely relevant today in a new way. 
That is, problems concerning fundamental human issues like: 
What does it mean to be a subject? Is freedom possible? What is 
truth? Which brings us to Žižek, because despite their various 
differences with regard to their engagement with theology, this 
ability to highlight (whether deliberately or not) significant 
theological thought resources is certainly a feature that Badiou 
shares with Žižek. 
However, before I turn to Žižek, let me elaborate a little 
further on the theological relevance of Badiou’s aforementioned 
critical attitude towards religion, or what I in the second chapter 
of the dissertation have referred to as Badiou’s ‘critique of 
religion’. My argument is that this critique is important for 
theology primarily in terms of its criticism of the contemporary 
‘pathos of finitude’, insofar that the lures of this pathos do not 
merely concern philosophy, but also theology. Thus, Badiou’s 
critique of the motif of finitude clarifies some of the challenges 
with which theology is currently confronted, particularly in 
  
regard to the following two issues. First of all, it holds a serious 
warning for theology of the temptations of so-called ‘post-
metaphysical’ thought. ‘Deconstruction’, ‘weak thought’ and 
other forms of contemporary ‘post-metaphysical’ philosophy 
might keep an always undefined space open for religion, but 
only at the risk of abandoning the very possibility of thinking 
God, and thus in the end of compromising theology as such. 
Žižek (MC 94, 254-68), to bring him back into the picture, also 
touches upon this issue, and in fact he relates to it in a far more 
direct theological manner, insofar that he explicitly opposes any 
kind of post-secular or deconstructive theology to what he claims 
to be the only mode in which the subversive core of Christianity 
can be preserved, namely as a theology that has its centre in the 
genuinely Christian idea of the death of God. The other notable 
reason why Badiou’s critique of the metaphysics of finitude is 
relevant in a theological perspective is that it implies the 
insistence on an important distinction between what we are and 
what we can do, between mortality and immortality. Although, 
Badiou emphasizes the crucial, perhaps absolute, difference 
between how he perceives of this distinction and the way in 
which it is (in his view) perceived in Christian theology, it 
should nevertheless inspire theology to think through what the 
contemporary potential of this distinction might be. And here, 
not only Badiou, but also Žižek offers some valuable guidelines. 
Especially Žižek’s attempt to conceptualize the excessive 
dimension in man to which he relates immortality in terms of the 
Freudo-Lacanian notion of death drive seems to me to contain a 
considerable theological potential, specifically with regard to a 
Christian anthropology. Which is also something that Žižek 
himself indicates. 
Another issue common to Badiou and Žižek that is of utmost 
relevance to contemporary theology is the issue of materialism. 
As I have argued, particularly in the third and the fifth chapter of 
this dissertation, I think that the philosophies of Badiou and 
Žižek enable the possibility of a very important dialogue 
between theology and materialism. In fact, this is perhaps their 
most decisive relevance. But, admittedly, such a dialogue would 
have to be developed further than this dissertation has been 
capable of. Hence, I would say, with reference to my 
introduction, that this is one of the problems that this dissertation 
poses. While the encounter between theology and materialism in 
Badiou’s case, more specifically in his reading in Theory of the 
  
Subject of Hegel’s dialectics, takes the form of a ‘missed 
encounter’, Žižek openly asserts the compatibility, indeed even a 
mutual presupposition, of (a particular brand of) materialism and 
theology. More precisely, a theology that accepts the full 
ontological consequence of the death of God, or in Lacanian 
terms, the inexistence of the big Other; that is, the acceptance of 
what Žižek refers to as the incomplete or ‘non-All’ character of 
reality. Indeed, this is the acceptance of a materialism that, 
precisely because it is grounded in nothing but a gap in being, 
nevertheless involves an element of grace. The crucial key to this 
dialogue between theology and materialism is, as illustrated in 
chapter three, above all a specific reading of Hegel’s dialectics. 
That is, a reading which has a sharp eye for how the Hegelian 
dialectics are inextricably bound up with the Christian doctrines 
of Trinity and Incarnation. Thus, a fundamental insight here that 
Žižek shares with important contemporary protestant theologians 
such as Eberhard Jüngel and Jürgen Moltmann, is that theology 
would do well to revisit Hegel’s philosophy. And indeed, 
Žižek’s greatest relevance is no doubt that he through his 
Hegelian lens manages to keep theology focused on ‘the death of 
God’ as the subversive core of Christianity.     
I would like to end this conclusion with a short rudimentary 
outline of a future avenue of theological research which would 
take as its starting point Žižek’s scattered invitations to think of 
theology in terms of the Freudian notion of ‘metapsychology’; 
an avenue upon which the present dissertation could be viewed 
as a preliminary faltering step. In his excellent study, Žižek’s 
Ontology, Adrian Johnston develops an implicit classification of 
Žižek’s thought which can serve as a helpful framework for such 
an outline. In short, Johnston suggests that we distinguish 
between three different levels and three corresponding 
conceptions of the crucial notion of the ‘void’ (‘gap’, ‘minimal 
difference’, ‘abstract negativity’, ‘lack’, etc.) in Žižek’s 
philosophical system. Firstly, at the level of substance, the void 
is conceptualized in terms of a ‘not-All’ reality emphasizing the 
fundamental inconsistency of being itself. Secondly, at the level 
of the subject the void is conceptualized in terms of the ‘death 
drive’ as (the exceptional) human ‘nature’ enabled by a ‘not-All’ 
reality, an incomplete substance. And thirdly, at the level of 
subjectivity the void is conceptualized in terms of ‘self-relating 
negativity’ (or a vicious circle between ‘subject’ and 
‘subjectivation’) which is created by the failed act of 
  
                                                
‘subjectivation’, i.e. by the very attempt to fill out the void of the 
‘subject’ (the void in human nature in terms of the ‘death drive’). 
Against this setting, my wager is that the philosophical 
system elaborated by Žižek through his parallel reading of 
German Idealism and psychoanalysis can provide the theoretical 
framework for what – to borrow Eric L. Santner’s expression – 
might be termed a future ‘psycho-theology’.319 The labour of 
creating such a psycho-theology would draw not merely on 
Žižek’s theoretical work, but more generally employ the 
resource of Freudo-Lacanian psychoanalytical theory and 
German Idealism as the primary lens or optic for a re-reading of 
the theological tradition. If we thus ‘translate’ the above 
classification of Zizek’s philosophical system suggested by 
Johnston into theological terms, we could indicate the following 
possible starting point and basic guidelines for such a future 
psycho-theology project. Firstly, at the level of ontology, the 
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo might be re-read as an account of 
reality as not-All. Secondly, at the level of anthropology, the 
doctrine of original sin might be re-read as an account of the 
specificity of human ‘nature’ as death drive. And thirdly, at the 
level of subjectivity, the doctrine of trinity might be re-read in a 
Hegelian manner (Malabou, 2005, 79-130) as an account of not 
merely divine, but human subjectivity as a vicious circle (God 
opens a void in himself between God/father and God/son by his 
very (failed) attempt to fill the void between God and Man). I 
will end these admittedly very basic suggestions here by risking 
the claim that the realization of such a project constitutes another 
problem or challenge posed by the present dissertation.  
In a comment on the final lines of Wallance Stevens’ 
beautiful Poem Man Carrying Thing, Badiou notes that it is the 
destiny of philosophers (and theologians I should say) to ‘endure 
our thought all night’. And it would indeed, Badiou adds, be the 
final step of philosophy (or theology for that matter) to see in the 
morning ‘the bright obvious stand motionless in cold’. “But”, as 
Badiou willingly admits, “that will never happen. On the 
contrary, when something happens in the day of living truths, we 
have to repeat the philosophical act, and to create a new 
variation.”320 
 
319 This wager has of course already been commenced, not only by Santner 
(2000), but also by people like Clayton Crockett (2007), Marcus Pound 
(2007) and Kenneth Reinhard (2003).  
320 Badiou, ”Philosophy as Creative Repetition”  
  
 
  
Summary (English Summary) 
 
 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to examine the theological 
relevance of the philosophical works of Alain Badiou and Slavoj 
Žižek. The dissertation attempts to do so through five individual, 
but nevertheless intertwined, studies. 
In the first chapter, the dissertation examines Badiou’s 
reading of Paul as he presents it in Saint Paul – The Foundation 
of Universalism. Although this book is thus naturally at the 
centre of the examination, the chapter is not a regular ‘study’ of 
this book as such; rather, the intention is to read Saint Paul 
against the wider background of Badiou’s work as a whole. This 
reading serves a double aim. Firstly, the aim of the first chapter 
is to clarify the immediate context of the book, and more 
precisely, to clarify to what extent Badiou, on account of the 
book, should be read, as has been suggested, in the context of 
and as part of the so-called ‘turn to religion’ in contemporary 
philosophy. This clarification will involve a discussion of 
Badiou’s stance in regard to the question of the relationship 
between philosophy and theology, and the relationship between 
religion and politics. Secondly, the aim of the first chapter is to 
clarify Badiou’s broader philosophical intention with his reading 
of Paul. This will bring the question of Paul’s conception of truth 
to the centre stage. 
In the second chapter of the dissertation, the focus is on the 
question of the role of religion in Badiou’s work. Here the 
dissertation argues that Badiou’s engagement with religion is 
primarily of a polemical and critical character. More specifically, 
three different, but nevertheless closely interrelated, cases in 
which Badiou engages polemically with religion are identified 
and elucidated. Firstly, it is argued that Badiou’s persistent 
polemics against what he repeatedly refers to as the ‘motif of 
finitude’ in contemporary culture can be read in terms of a 
critique of religion, insofar as Badiou (NN 86) explicitly claims 
that “The obsession with ‘finitude’ is a remnant of the tyranny of 
the sacred.” Secondly, it is argued that this ‘critique of religion’, 
at least to a certain extent, should be linked to Badiou’s attempt 
re-establish the autonomy of philosophy. Thirdly, with 
Heidegger as the main example, it is argued that Badiou 
persistently applies terms such as ‘religious’, ‘theological’, 
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‘pious’ and ‘sacral’, as a way to distance himself from or 
marginalize his philosophical rivals. Moreover, the discussion of 
Badiou’s notion of truth, commenced in the first chapter, is
continued in this chapter in terms of a careful exposition of the 
specific definition of religion that Badiou founds on an absolute 
opposition between truth and meaning. 
The third chapter focuses on Badiou’s and Žižek’s reading of 
the doctrines of incarnation and trinity, and with Hegel as the 
key theoretical reference, it argues that these readings are fully 
compatible with the conception of materialism that we find in 
their philosophies. However, as illustrated in a short return to 
Saint Paul, Badiou himself is reluctant to embrace such a 
reading, while Žižek explicitly indicates the compatibility of his 
conception of materialism and his reading of Christianity. 
Against this backdrop it is moreover argued, along with Žižek, 
that due to his resistance to what he considers to be a too 
Hegelian, or indeed an all too theological, conception of 
dialectics, Badiou paradoxically risks nurturing a certain 
‘idealist’ or even ‘religious’ tendency in his own philosophy. 
The fourth chapter investigates how we should understand the 
numerous references to immortality made by both Badiou and 
Žižek, against the backdrop of their theories of the subject and 
with special focus on the issue of freedom. It is argued that both 
Badiou and Žižek associate immortality with something inhuman 
in man, something in which he exceeds his own nature, and that 
this inhuman, excessive dimension, which paradoxically is 
precisely what makes man human, is for both of them closely 
connected to the issue of freedom. Furthermore it is argued that 
both Badiou and Žižek see freedom as also involving, indeed 
even relying on, an element of contingency, or in theological 
terms, a moment of grace. Where both Badiou and Žižek relate 
the capability of immortality to the notion of the subject, the 
latter moreover associates it closely to the Freudian notion of 
‘death drive’. This notion is at the centre of an important discord 
between Badiou and Žižek and indicates a theologically relevant 
difference between them on the issue of immortality. Both 
Badiou and Žižek associate the death drive with religion, but 
Žižek does so in an appreciatory way, while Badiou associates 
the death drive with religion pejoratively by relating it to the 
theme of finitude. 
The fifth chapter elaborates on the issue of materialism, 
arguing that Žižek perceives the relationship between 
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materialism and theology as a dialectical relationship, so that 
genuine materialism and Christian theology mutually presuppose 
each other. This argument is unfolded through a close reading of 
Žižek’s extensive engagement with the theological writing of G. 
K. Chesterton who constitutes one of Žižek’s most important 
theological inspirations. It is argued that Žižek’s reading of 
Chesterton constitutes a particularly good illustration of the 
dialectical relationship that he claims exists between theology 
and materialism because this reading follows a trajectory in 
Chesterton’s theological thought from an idealist to a proper 
materialist dialectic. 
 
  
 
  
Resumé (Danish Summary) 
 
 
 
Formålet med denne afhandling er at undersøge og belyse den 
teologiske relevans af Alain Badious og Slavoj Žižeks filosofiske 
forfatterskaber. Undersøgelsen udfoldes i en række individuelle, 
men ikke desto mindre sammenhængende, studier i form af 
afhandlingens fem kapitler. 
I afhandlingens første kapitel undersøges Badious læsning af 
Paulus, som han præsenterer i bogen Saint Paul – La fondation 
de l’universalisme.  Selv om denne bog således er i fokus i det 
første kapitel, udgør kapitlet ikke en egentlig værkanalyse af 
Badious bog. Sigtet med kapitlet er snarere at læse bogen på 
baggrund af og i sammenhæng med Badious forfatterskab i dets 
helhed. En sådan læsning tjener et dobbelt sigte. For det første er 
formålet at afklare den umiddelbare kontekst, som bogen indgår 
i, og, mere præcist, at afklare om Badious position på baggrund 
af denne bog bør ses, som det er blevet foreslået i dele af 
receptionslitteraturen, i forlængelse af og som en del af den 
såkaldte ’religionens genkomst’ i samtidens filosofi. Denne 
afklaring vil blandt andet indebære en diskussion af Badious 
ståsted i forhold til både spørgsmålet om relationen mellem 
filosofi og teologi og til spørgsmålet om relationen mellem 
religion og politik. For det andet er formålet med det første 
kapitel at indkredse Badious bredere filosofiske anliggende med 
Paulus. Afsøgningen af dette anliggende bringer spørgsmålet om 
Paulus’ begreb om sandhed i centrum. 
I kapitel to indkredser afhandlingen Badious definition og 
brug af religionsbegrebet. Afhandlingen argumenterer her for, at 
Badious engagement med religion primært er af en polemisk og 
kritisk karakter. Mere specifikt identificerer og belyser 
afhandlingen tre forskellige, men ikke desto mindre tæt 
forbundne, tilfælde, hvor Badiou på forskellig vis anvender 
religionsbegrebet i et polemisk anliggende. For det første 
demonstrerer afhandlingen, hvordan Badious polemik imod det, 
han henviser til som endelighedens dyrkelse i moderne kultur, 
kan læses som en form for religionskritik i den udstrækning, at 
Badiou (NN 86) udtrykkeligt hævder, at: “The obsession with 
‘finitude’ is a remnant of the tyranny of the sacred.” For det 
andet argumenterer afhandlingen for, at denne ’religionskritik’, i 
hvert fald i et vist omfang, skal ses i sammenhæng med Badious 
  
forsøg på at genetablere filosofien som en særegen og autonom 
disciplin. For det tredje viser afhandlingen med Heidegger som
det vigtigste eksempel, at Badiou flittigt benytter begreber som 
’religiøs’, ’teologisk’, ’from’ og ’hellig’ som etiketter til sine 
filosofiske rivaler for herved at kunne distancere sig fra, eller 
marginalisere, disse. Desuden fortsætter afhandlingen kapitel to 
den diskussion af Badious sandhedsbegreb, som blev påbegyndt 
i det første kapitel i form af en grundig gennemgang af den 
specifikke definition af religion, som Badiou fremsætter på 
baggrund af en absolut modsætning imellem sandhed og mening. 
Kapitel tre har forholdet mellem materialisme og teologi som 
sit omdrejningspunkt. Her præsenterer afhandlingen en læsning, 
der argumenterer for, at Badious og Žižeks mere eller mindre 
fragmentariske udlægninger af inkarnationen og 
treenighedslæren er kompatible med den udformning af 
(dialektisk) materialisme, som man finder i deres filosofier. Men 
det illustreres også via en kort omvej tilbage til Badious bog om 
Paulus, hvordan Badiou selv er tilbageholdende med at omfavne 
en sådan læsning hvorimod Žižek åbenlyst indikerer at hans 
begreb om materialisme og hans læsning af kristendommen er 
fuldt ud forenelige. På denne baggrund argumenterer 
afhandlingen i overensstemmelse med Žižek desuden for, at 
Badiou i kraft af sin udtalte modvilje imod, hvad han anser for at 
være en alt for Hegeliansk, eller endog en alt for teologisk, 
opfattelse af dialektik, paradoksalt nok uforvarende risikerer at 
fremme en idealistisk eller ligefrem religiøs tendens implicit i sin 
egen filosofi. 
Det fjerde kapitel forsøger på baggrund af en undersøgelse af 
Badious og Žižeks subjektsteorier og med særlig fokus på 
frihedstematikken at afklare, hvordan vi skal forstå utallige 
henvisninger til ’udødelighed’, som både Badiou og Žižek 
fremsætter i den senere del af deres forfatterskaber. 
Afhandlingen argumenterer for, at Badiou og Žižek begge to 
forbinder udødelighed med noget umenneskeligt i mennesket, 
noget igennem hvilket mennesket overskrider sin egen natur, og 
at denne umenneskelige, excessive dimension, som paradoksalt 
nok netop er det, der gør mennesket menneskeligt, for både 
Badiou og Žižek er tæt knyttet til spørgsmålet om frihedens 
mulighed. Endvidere argumenteres der for, at de begge to tænker 
frihed som noget, der også involverer, sågar afhænger af, et 
element af kontingens; eller i teologiske termer, et moment af 
nåde. Afhandlingen demonstrerer, at mens Badiou og Žižek er 
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enige om at relatere udødelighedstematikken med 
subjektsbegrebet, forfægter Žižek samtidig en tæt forbindelse 
mellem udødelighed og Freuds begreb om dødsdriften. Endelig 
viser afhandlingen, hvordan dette begreb om dødsdrift er i 
centrum for en væsentlig uenighed mellem Badiou og Žižek, 
som illustrerer en teologisk relevant forskel mellem dem, når det 
drejer som om, hvordan vi skal forstå udødelighed. Både Badiou 
og Žižek associerer dødsdriften med religion, men Žižek gør det 
på en påskønnende måde, hvorimod Badiou valoriserer 
dødsdriften negativt, fordi han forbinder religion med en 
viktimiserende dyrkelse af menneskets endelighed. 
Det femte kapitel genoptager materialismetematikken fra 
kapitel tre i et mere snævert fokus og udelukkende med henblik 
på Žižek. Afhandlingen argumenterer for, at Žižek opfatter 
forholdet mellem materialisme og teologi dialektisk, således at 
en sand materialisme og kristen teologi gensidigt forudsætter 
hinanden. Dette argument udfoldes gennem en nærlæsning af 
Žižeks omfattende engagement med den engelske 
litteraturkritiker, digter, krimiforfatter og ’amatørteolog’ G.K. 
Chestertons teologiske forfatterskab, der udgør en af Žižeks 
vigtigste teologiske inspirationskilder. Afhandlingen demonstrer, 
at Žižeks læsning af Chesterton udgør en særlig god illustration 
af det dialektiske forhold, som han hævder eksisterer mellem 
teologi og materialisme, fordi denne læsning eftersporer en 
forskydning i Chestertons teologiske tanke fra en idealistisk til 
en genuin materialistisk dialektik. 
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